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THE JOURNAL
OF
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOLUME XIII.

EDITED BY WM. T. HARRIS.

ST. LOUIS:
G. I. JONES AND COMPANY.
1879.

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THE JOURNAL
OF
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VOL. XIII.]

JANUARY, 1879.

[No. 1.

SCHOPENHAUER IN RELATION TO KANT.¹

BY J. HUTCHISON STIRLING.

The discussion of this relation will, it is hoped, be productive of not a little that may prove at once determinative of the one and illustrative of the other. The following is a translation of the entire section (23), which opens in page 85 of the third edition of Schopenhauer's work, "*Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde.*"

REFUTATION OF THE PROOF GIVEN BY KANT FOR THE A PRIORI NATURE
OF THE NOTION OF CAUSALITY.

The exposition of the universal validity of the law of Causality for all experience, its *a priori* nature and consequent limitation to the possibility of experience, is a main object of the Kritik of Pure Reason. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the proof given there of the *a priori* nature of the proposition. It is, in essentials, as follows: "The synthesis of the many of particulars through imagination that is required for every empirical perception — this synthesis gives succession, but not yet any determinate one: that is to say, it leaves undetermined which of two perceived states is the prior, not only in my imagination, but in the object. Determinate order of this succession, however — and through such order alone the contents of perception become experience, or, what is the same thing, such order alone gives authority to judgments objectively valid — this

¹ As preceding and conditioning this paper (which, however, is quite independent), attention is invited to the article, "The Philosophy of Causality: Hume and Kant," in the *Princeton Review*, for January, 1879.

order, then, results alone from the notion of pure understanding named cause and effect. The axiom of the causal relation, therefore, is condition of the possibility of experience, and, as such, given us *a priori*." (See *Krit. d. rein. Vern.*, 1. Aufl., S. 201; 5. Aufl., S. 246.)

According to this, then, the order of the succession of the changes of real objects shall be perceived to be an objective one only first of all by virtue of the causality of these. Kant repeats and illustrates this proposition in the "Kritik of Pure Reason," particularly in his "Second Analogy of Experience" (1. Aufl., S. 189; vollständiger in der 5. Aufl., S. 232); and, again, in the conclusion of his "Third Analogy," [?] which passages I beg every one to read over again, who would understand what follows. He maintains everywhere here that the *objectivity of the succession of the impressions*, which objectivity he explains as its agreement (the succession's agreement) with the succession of real objects; that this objectivity is perceived only through the rule according to which they follow one another—that is to say, through the law of causality; that, consequently, the objective relation of consecutive appearances to sense remains fully undetermined through my mere perception, inasmuch as I only perceive then the sequence of my impressions, and the sequence in my apprehension authorizes no judgment as regards the sequence in the object, unless my judgment support itself on the law of causality; seeing that, moreover, I might, in my apprehension, cause the succession of the perceptions to proceed as well in quite a reverse order, as there is nothing which determines it as objective. In illustration of these propositions, he adduces the example of a house, the parts of which he is able to consider in any required succession—as, from above downwards, or from below upwards; where, therefore, the determination of the succession would be merely subjective, and not realized in any object, because dependent on his will and pleasure. And, as a contrast, he brings forward the perception of a ship driving down stream. Here he perceives the ship ever lower and lower, and he cannot alter this his perception of the succession of its various positions. Hence, in this case, he deduces the subjective suite of his apprehension from the objective suite in the sensible phenomenon; and this latter suite he names, accordingly, a *Begebenheit*—an occurrence, an event, a something that has taken place or happened. Now, against this, I maintain that both cases are *noways different*; that both are occurrences; that the perception of both is objective—that is to say, it is a perception of changes of real objects, perceived as such by the subject. *Both are changes of the position of two bodies in each other's regard.* In the first case, one of these bodies is the corporeal frame proper of the observer himself, or, rather, only a part of it, namely, the eye; and the other is the house, in respect of the parts of which the position of the eye is successively altered. In the second case it is the ship alters its position in respect of the stream, and the alteration, therefore, is between two bodies. Both are occurrences; the only difference is that, in the first case, the alteration proceeds from the body of the

observer himself, whose sensations are, indeed, the starting-point of all the perceptions of it—it itself, nevertheless, being an object among objects, and, consequently, subjected to the laws of this objective corporeal world. The movement of his body by his own will is for him, so far as he is purely perceptive, merely an empirically perceived fact. The order of succession in the change might be as well inverted in the second case as in the first, had but the observer as well the power to draw the ship up stream as to move his eye in an opposite direction to the first one. For it is from the succession of the perceptions of the parts of the house depending on his own will that Kant concludes it not to be objective and not an occurrence. But the movement of his eye in the direction from roof to cellar is one occurrence, and the opposed movement from cellar to roof a second one, quite as much as the movement of the ship. There is no difference here whatever; just as—in regard to its being an occurrence or not—there is no difference whether I pass by a file of soldiers or they pass by me; both are occurrences. If, from the bank, I fix my eyes on a ship passing near it, it will presently appear to me that it is the bank moves, taking me with it, while it is the ship stands still. I am, of course, wrong here in regard to the cause of the relative change of place, seeing that I ascribe the movement to the wrong object; but I perceive objectively, and correctly enough nevertheless, the real succession of the relative positions of my body to the ship. Neither would Kant, in the case adduced by him, have believed himself to find a difference, had he reflected that his body is an object among objects, and that the succession of his empirical perceptions depends on the succession of the impressions of other objects on his body, and is, consequently, an objective one—that is, takes place with respect to objects *immediately* (though not mediately), independent of the will of the subject, and can, consequently, very well be perceived without the successive objects that impress his body standing together in a causal connection.

Kant says: Time cannot be perceived; therefore, no succession of impressions can be empirically perceived as objective—that is to say, as alterations of the sensible phenomena, in distinction from alterations of mere subjective impressions. The objectivity of an alteration can be cognized only through the law of causality, which is a rule in accordance with which states follow each other. And the result of his allegation would be that we perceive as objective no sequence in time whatever, except that of cause and effect, and that every other sequence of sensible phenomena perceived by us is determined thus, and not otherwise, only by our own will. I must allege against all this that sensible phenomena may very well *follow on* one another without *following from* one another. And this noways prejudices the law of causality. For it remains certain that every change is the effect of another, so much standing, *a priori*, fixed; still it does not follow on that one only which is its cause, but on all others which are simultaneous with this latter, and with which it (the effect) stands not in any causal connection. It is perceived by me, not only in the series of causes and effects, but in a quite other one,

which, however, is not, on that account, any the less objective, and very easily distinguished from any subjective one dependent on my own will — as, for example, that of my phantasmata. The succession in time of occurrences which stand not in causal connection is what we call *chance* (*Zufall*), a word derived from the *Zusammenfallen* — the falling together, the encountering, the contingency of what are in no connection — just like τὸ συμπεσθῆναι from συμβαίνειν. (Comp. Arist. Anal., post. I. 4.) I step out of doors, and a tile, falling from the roof, hits me; there is no causal connection between my stepping out and this falling of the tile; nevertheless, the succession — namely, that my movement preceded that of the tile — is objectively determined in my apprehension, and not subjectively by my own will; which otherwise, indeed, would rather have reversed the succession. In the same way the succession of the notes in a piece of music is objectively determined, and not subjectively by me who listen to them; but who will say that such musical notes follow each other according to the law of cause and effect. Nay, even the succession of day and night is, beyond doubt, objectively perceived by us, but these are certainly not apprehended as cause and effect, the one of the other; and, in regard to their common cause, the world, until Copernicus, was in error, without the correct perception of their succession in any way suffering therefrom. And by this, too, let it be said in passing, is the hypothesis of Hume refuted; inasmuch as the oldest and wholly exceptionless succession of day and night has, for all that, never misled any one to conclude, through custom, that the one is the cause of the other.

Kant says, in the same place, that an impression manifests objective reality (that, of course, means is distinguished from mere phantasmata) only by this: that we perceive its necessary connection with other impressions, as in subjection to a rule (the law of causality), and its place in a determinate order of our impressions as in relation of time. But of how few impressions do we know the place given to them in the causal series by the causal law! And yet we can always distinguish the objective ones from the subjective ones — real objects from phantasmata. In sleep, the brain being then isolated from the peripheral nervous system, and thereby from external impressions, this distinction is impossible to us; and, therefore, in our dreams we take phantasmata to be real objects, and only when we awake, only when the sensible nerves and the external universe with them return into consciousness, only then do we perceive our error; at the same time that, even in dream, so long as it is continuous, the causal law maintains its right — only that an impossible material is often imposed upon it. Almost we might believe that Kant, in the passage concerned, had stood under the influence of Leibnitz, however much in his whole philosophy he is opposed to the latter, when we consider, that is, the quite similar expressions of Leibnitz in his *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement* (Liv. IV, ch. 2, § 14), as, for example, “*la vérité des choses sensibles ne consiste que dans la liaison des phénomènes, qui doit avoir sa raison, et c'est ce qui les distingue des songes. Le vrai critérium, en matière des objets des sens, est la*

liaison des phénomènes, qui garantit les vérités de fait, à l'égard des choses sensibles hors de nous."

In regard to this whole proof of the *a-priori* and necessary nature of the law of causality from the circumstance that only through means of it do we perceive the objective succession of changes, and that it so far is a condition of experience, Kant has manifestly fallen into an extremely surprising error, and one so palpable that it is only to be explained as resulting from his pre-occupation with the *a priori* part of our knowledge, which has caused him to lose sight of what everybody else must have seen. The only correct proof of the *a priori* nature of the law of causality is given by me in section 21. This *a priori* nature is verified every instant by the immovable certainty with which every one, in all cases, expects from experience that it will take place in accordance with this law — that is, through the apodeictic validity that we attribute to this law — a validity which distinguishes itself from every other such founded on induction — as, for instance, the (empirically known) laws of nature — by this: that it is impossible for us even to think of this law's undergoing an exception anywhere in the world of experience. We may *think*, for example, of the law of gravitation some day ceasing to operate, but not of this taking place without a cause.

Kant, in his proof, has fallen into the opposite error from Hume. This latter, namely, called mere *following*, all *following from*; whereas Kant, again, will have it that there is only *following from*, and no *following* but that. Pure understanding, undoubtedly, can alone comprehend *following from*, but mere *following* as little as the difference between right hand and left, which difference, like mere following, is only to be apprehended by pure sense. The sequence of events in time can certainly, though denied by Kant as cited, be empirically cognized, just as well as the side-by-side of things in space. *How*, however, something *follows on* another in time generally, as little admits of explanation as how something *follows from* another; that cognition is given and conditioned by pure sense, as this by pure understanding. But Kant, in holding the objective succession of sensible phenomena to be known only by the clue of causality, falls into the same error with which (Kr. d. r. V., 1. Aufl., S. 275) he reproaches Leibnitz, that, namely, "he intellectualizes the forms of sense." As regards succession, my view is this: From the form belonging to pure sense — *time* — we derive our knowledge of the mere possibility of *succession*. The succession of real objects, the form of which is this same time, we cognize empirically, and, consequently, as *actual*. The *necessity*, however, of a succession of two states — that is, of a change — we cognize only by the understanding, through causality; and that we have the idea of the necessity of a succession is even already a proof that the law of causality is not empirically cognized, but *a priori* given to us. The proposition in general of the sufficient reason expresses, as lying in the innermost of our cognitive faculty, the basal form of a necessary connection among all our objects, which are but subjective states of our own; it is the common form of all such states or objects, and the sole source of the notion of *necessity* — a notion

which, as such, has absolutely no other true meaning or authentication than that of the appearance of the consequent when its antecedent is given. That in the class of objects now under consideration, where this proposition appears as the law of causality, their time-sequence is determined by it, depends upon this: that time is the form of these objects, and, hence, the necessary connection here takes on the shape of a rule of succession. In other shapes of the proposition of sufficient reason, the necessary connection which it everywhere prescribes comes to us in quite other forms than time, and, consequently, not as succession; preserving always, however, the character of a necessary connection, whereby there is manifested the identity of the proposition of sufficient reason in all its shapes — or, rather, the unity of the root of all the laws the expression of which is said proposition.

Were the controverted allegation of Kant correct, we should recognize the *actuality* of the succession merely from its *necessity*; this, however, would presuppose an understanding that embraced all the series of causes and effects at once — that is, an omniscient understanding. Kant has committed the impossible to the understanding, only to stand in less need of sense.

Kant's allegation that objectivity of succession is alone known from the necessity of the sequence of effect on cause, how can it be reconciled with that other (Kr. d. r. V., 1. Aufl., S. 203), which holds the empirical criterion of which of two states is cause, and which effect, to be merely the succession? Who but sees here the most evident circle?

Were objectivity of succession only known from the causality, it would only be thinkable as such, and just nothing but this; for, were it anything else, it would have other distinctive characters by which it might be known, which is just what Kant denies. Consequently, then, Kant being right, we could not say, "This state is effect of that one, and, therefore, follows it;" but the being sequent and the being effect would be one and the same thing, and the *dictum* tautological. And from this abolished difference between *following* and *following from*, Hume would be again vindicated as right when he held all *following from* to be mere *following on*, or denied the difference to exist.

Kant's proof must be limited in this way, then, that empirically we merely cognize *actuality* of succession: but as in certain series of occurrences we cognize, in addition, *necessity* of succession as well, and even know, before all experience, that every possible occurrence must have a determinate place in some one of these series; so there follows at once from this the reality and *a priori* validity of the law of causality, for which validity the proof assigned in section 21 is the only right one.

With Kant's doctrine of objective succession being only possible and cognizable from causal connection, there runs parallel the other of simultaneousness, namely, being only possible and cognizable from reciprocity, as expounded in the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," under the title, "Third Analogy of Experience." Kant goes so far

here as to say "that the simultaneousness of sensible phenomena, not reciprocally influencing each other, but separated, as it were, by a void space, would be no object of a possible perception" (that were a proof *a priori* of there being no void space between the fixed stars): and "that the light which *plays between* our eyes and the bodies in space [an expression which foists in the idea as if not only the light of the stars affected our eye, but our eye it] brings about a community between us and them, and in this way proves the simultaneousness of the latter." This last statement is even empirically false; as the sight of a fixed star noways proves that it is now in the same time with the spectator, but at most that, years ago, frequently only thousands of years ago, it was in existence. For the rest, this doctrine of Kant's stands or falls with the former one; only it is much easier to see through it; besides, the nullity of the whole notion of reciprocity has been already discussed in section 20.

With this examination of the Kantian argument in question, may be compared, should it so please the reader, two earlier attacks on it, namely, that of *Feder*, in his book "Concerning Space and Causality" (S. 29), and that of G. E. Schulze, in his "Critique of Theoretical Philosophy" (vol. 2, p. 422, *seq.*).

Not without much misgiving have I (1813) ventured to bring forward objections to a leading doctrine — received as proved, and still repeated in the latest authorities (*e. g.*, Fries, *Krit. der Vernunft*, Bd. 2, S. 85) — of the man whose depth of intellect I admire and venerate, and to whom I owe so much, and so much that is great, that his spirit might say to me, in the words of Homer:

Ἀλλὸν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλκον, ἧ πρὶν ἐπῆεν.

On these extracts from Schopenhauer I venture to comment as follows: In the first sentence I object to the expression "its *a priori* nature, and *consequent* limitation to the possibility of experience." Restriction to the possibility of experience does not follow from apriority as apriority; and neither does Kant advance the claim for apriority as apriority, but only for his own peculiar apriority. Schopenhauer is not fortunate in the passage he selects from Kant in exposition of the relative theory. As I have had occasion to imply more than once elsewhere, the *second analogy of experience* in the "Kritik of Pure Reason" is the most confused and unsatisfactory piece of writing in the whole of Kant's works; and if this be so with the section in general, it is equally so with the selected passage in particular.

He who consults the "Prolegomena" will find that Kant

fairly settled at last into two judgments for the process involved in a causal inference. We first say to ourselves, *When (or if) the sun shines, the stone warms.* There are as yet but two unconnected subjective impressions of this heat and that light. Each is but a separate feeling in our sensory. When we add the second judgment, however, we have connected the two feelings in a single inference, which inference is now objective. But it was the category of cause and effect enabled us to effect this. We possess this category, and, such facts coming to us as the conjunction of light and heat, we feel or see that this conjunction, as an example in point, falls under the rule of cause and effect; and we say, objectively and necessarily, *The sun warms the stone.* I object to this that the explanation is not competent, but a failure; for unless we knew, saw, or felt that the light preceded the heat — unless we knew, saw, or felt that the light *must* precede the heat — we could not have subsumed the facts as a case under the rule. Kant, of course, was quite aware that the synthesis in imagination of the elements of a perceptive act is really *syntheses*, each distinct in its own character, each *a* perceptive act; but he thought each also contingent, and, indeed, not yet a *perceptive* act proper, till a category acted. He overlooked the fact that this could not be so with at least the synthesis (A B) in causality. *That* category *could* act *only* when there was a *recognized first* and a *recognized second.* Kant, then, only invents a necessity to explain a necessity which he must still assume. Nevertheless, in the two judgments referred to, Kant brings what he holds on causality to an articulate shape at last, and we now readily grasp it, and see what he means. It is now explicit; it was only implicit before. One wonders, then, that Schopenhauer, with so much that was better before him, should have confined himself to what was worst.

The section in question, for example, takes up not less than two dozen pages; and if Kant had but had his materials well in hand — causality being alone concerned — he might easily have made one or two pages suffice. As he says himself, his materials for his peculiar work at any time are, first, time and

space, as the two pure or *a priori* phantasms of sense; and, second, the elementary notions of the understanding, as already functions of unity to the various perceptive multiples supplied by these two pure sense-forms. Now, in the case of causality, had time really possessed a multiple typifying the intellectual multiple of antecedent and consequent, an adequate *schema* or frame-work for receiving the correspondent successions of the actual things of sense might have been put together without difficulty, and so the whole transcendental rationale been easily accomplished. But in point of fact, at least as I believe, Kant found himself much perplexed precisely about a multiple in time that would fit such a succession as antecedent and consequent (cause and effect). He was certainly disposed, in the first instance, to find the mere succession of time sufficiently to answer. The *progressus* of time was a necessary one, he said; its course was necessarily from one moment to another; and each moment referred itself necessarily to a preceding one. It presently struck him, I doubt not, however, that there were in things themselves more time-successions than one. There were simple successions—as, the very letters in the word “succession”—and there were also causal successions—as, sun and heat, cloud and shadow, wind and wave, frost and ice, etc. Now, the sound *u*, or the letter *u*, though it follows the sound *s*, or the letter *s*, is not the effect of the sound *s*, or the letter *s*. Volume I is not the cause of volume II, or II of III. Evidently, then, if Kant’s scheme were applied to all successions in time, we should soon have some very pretty examples of the fallacy, *non-causa pro causa*. We assume Kant to have been long puzzled here, and to have been at last convinced of the fact that even *things*, if his *a priori* frame-work were to fit them, or they it, *must have a rule themselves already beforehand*, or they *must in themselves* be such as to correspond to the *schema* applied. But to admit as much was to admit a rule, a necessity, already to exist in that for which, precisely in consequence of its subjectivity and contingency, rule and necessity were the wants! When this occurred to Kant, in what a dreadful quandary (*qu’en dirai-je*) he must have found him-

self—his whole immense system on the topple because of a single miserable particular! Yet such evidently was the state of the facts. If any successive sensations were to be constructed into the *schema* and category of Causality, the one of them must be already known to be such that it is always A, as the other, similarly, that it is always B; and that, in the succession A B, B can never stand before A, nor A after B. (W W. II, 164.) In all such cases, my apprehension itself is bound down to a certain order in the very sensations it takes up. What preoccupied Kant, no doubt, was (his *one* problem) the consideration that elements of sense *cannot* have necessity. Still, it must have occurred to him, and did occur to him, that the categorical rule requires its sensuous antitype, which, in the case of causality, must be already a rule (a fixed order); and it is only at last in the “Prolegomena” that he comes to the *distinct* proposal of his two judgments, the one with a rule subjective and the other with a rule objective: 1, when (or if) the sun shines, the stone warms; 2, the sun warms the stone.

With such source of perplexity as this before him, it is no wonder that, in the section in question, he only seems to stumble from one confusion to another. He confounds mere *Wechsel* with *Veränderung* for example, and, though *apprehension* evidently means with him, for the most part, only the subjective synthesis in imagination, he also uses it for the objective synthesis after action of the *schema* and category. What disturbs the reader most, however, is Kant’s endless windings in statement and restatement of the necessity that binds the effect to the cause not being in things themselves, or in any qualities of them, but necessarily in us, consequently, and in qualities (categories) of us. Whatever change there may be in the words, this one proposition seems to recur ever again, in unchanged identity: that necessity *cannot* be in things of sense, but *must* be in categories of the intellect. The jaded reader, confused and desperate, can only mutter to himself, “And so *must be* because *must be*.” But, even without denying the necessity of the category, are we not to ask, when the category of causality makes choice

of certain sensations for its action — are we not to ask after the *grounds of its choice*, and if we find these grounds to lie in a *sensuous* rule prescriptive of which sensation shall be irreversibly first, and which irreversibly second, shall we not say, Here in this rule is already all the necessity that is wanted; your laborious *a priori* contrivances are all useless, and if anything is to be explained, explain to us, first of all, if you please, this first rule itself? Of course, Kant replies, Do you not see that what you call the *sensuous*, and I the *subjective*, rule can *not* contain necessity, but must be followed by an *objective* rule which *does*? We know — we may suppose him to continue — not things in themselves, but only the affections they occasion in us; and if you are ever to reduce such mere ghost-world to law, order, and objectivity, you must receive it into a necessary time and space of your own, presided over by necessary notions of your own. But the rejoinder is prompt: We know an actual outer space, an actual outer time, and actual outer objects, all of which are not as you say, but are things themselves, and very fairly perceived by us in their own qualities; it is, in fact, *their* necessity we see, and not any necessity in us — call it subjective, objective, or how you please.

But if this be the nature of the section as a whole, the particular paragraph quoted by Schopenhauer has, as said, an unsatisfactoriness of its own. It states (what *virtually*, of course, amounts to the “two judgments”) that, in the first instance, the order in a sensational multiple is indifferent, but that, in the second instance, when received into the *a priori* machinery, it is necessary.² Otherwise, says Kant, there would be a mere sport of my own subjective fancies, and any assumption of objectivity would be no better than a dream. Consequently, he adds, there *must* be an *a priori* which prescribes conditions and rules to the *a posteriori* (of sensation); and causality belongs to it. This is what we

² That, of course, is the one flaw: it is not the case, and, even for the action of the category, cannot be the case, that *in causality* the order of the “sensational multiple” is “indifferent.”

have seen already: the two main assumptions of Kant (as derived from Hume), and his own inference from them. As thus: 1. We only perceive our own subjective affections. 2. Subjective affections are only contingent. 3. The necessity, consequently, that appears in them, and is required for them, has an *a priori* source. The reasoning, as we have seen before, is that, as this is so and that is so, such and such must be, simply because it must be; it utterly breaks up and vanishes, of course, the moment it is shown that neither this nor that *is* so. This, however, is not what Schopenhauer sees here. On the contrary, he takes up the whole passage in a wrong sense—a sense which he would never have dreamed of imputing to Kant, had he not completely missed Kant's general conception. That general conception is simply this: Sensations only exhibit subjectivity; accordingly, as required, the categories—all the categories—shall bestow on them objectivity. Schopenhauer has actually read that passage of Kant as if it declared all objectivity to be bestowed *by the single category of causality alone*—a blunder that, surely, would be astounding in even a first-year's student of Kant! In the particular paragraph, Kant, of course, has no thought but of causality and causal multiples; he has not the most distant conception of enunciating it as a general rule for all sense-multiples that they can get objectivity only from causality. He firmly believes at this moment, we may say, that his reader knows perfectly now—knows nothing more perfectly now—than that *all* the categories are there for no other purpose than to infuse necessity into the contingency of sense; and he would have been completely astounded and confounded by his reader lifting his face to say: So, all objectivity is given by causality alone. *Lieber Gott!* he would have thought to himself, what *is* quantity there for, or quality there for, or substance there for, or modality there for? Is not every one of them wholly and solely there for no other purpose than to produce objectivity? It is really marvellous that Schopenhauer should have fallen into a blunder so egregious as this. But not content, even yet, he adds another—which, as being ludicrous, is worse. He actually supposes

Kant to hold that, in all syntheses except the causal one, *we* can *make* the members follow in what order *we* please. This is what he understands Kant to mean by the subjectivity of a series, none such being objective but the causal one. Any quantitative series — a row of bricks, a file of soldiers, herrings on a spit, strung beads or strung counters in the school-machine, set chess-men on the chess-board, or draughts on the draught-board — can be counted in different directions *without* displacement of the individuals. It was exactly in this way Kant regarded the various series in the faces of a house; he never dreamed that it would be supposed he called these series subjective, and merely under control of his own good-will and pleasure. Even had they been subjective, no such control would necessarily have belonged to him; but they were not subjective. A stable house was as objective to Kant as a drifting ship — only, for a beginning in surveying the house, he was not bound, as he was bound in surveying (causally, not quantitatively) the successive positions of the ship. The quantitative series of the house he could count along or across, up or down; the causal chain of the ship's movements he could only count down — without, of course, in either case, any power to displace a unit. Schopenhauer has no authority from Kant to apply the word “*Willkühr*” in regard to our supposed control over what is subjective; nay, in the passage referred to by Schopenhauer (as regards the house), I do not even find the word “*beliebig*.” (See paragraphs 3 and 4 of the *second analogy*.) Still this latter word *might* have been used without error. I *can* count series in the faces of a house in any *discretionary* order. I cannot displace these series, however; they are not there *at will* of mine. Schopenhauer has altogether wrong notions of subjectivity and objectivity. What is *sensible, empirical, actual*, seems to be wholly his idea of what is objective; while phantasmata at will in imagination loom to him as all that is subjective. Such a blunder in Kant's regard is simply boyish. What is only *sensible* is subjective to Kant; and so far as we can say empirical or actual of anything that has not yet undergone action of a category, such empirical and such actual are also subjective. Nothing

is objective to Kant that is without necessity. What is subjective, again, though necessarily only affection, is not by any means necessarily at will. Schopenhauer, again and again, commits the implied misreadings of Kant.

The reader must understand that what is given above as the gist of the relative passage from Kant has been executed from the text itself, without reference to the rendering of Schopenhauer, and that he may depend upon it as accurate. The imperfections of the passage have been allowed; but what it says is this: That *a posteriori* elements being all subjective and contingent, they can and must procure objectivity and necessity only from our own *a priori* categories, of which causality is one. Schopenhauer's rendering, on the other hand—and it constitutes his “objection” to causality in Kant—is that Kant holds the category of causality *alone* to be the minister of objectivity!

Schopenhauer's first words in interpretation of the text which, summarized from Kant, underlies the challenge before us, are perfectly correct. “The order of the succession of the changes of real objects shall be perceived to be an objective one only first of all by virtue of the causality of these.” That is the true and genuine Kant. About the end of the middle third of the “refutation,” too, we have similar correct words: “Only through means of causality do we perceive the objective succession of changes.” But what gives the correctness is, that “succession,” in these two sentences, is limited to one of “changes.” Elsewhere the statement, when it occurs to be made, is generally made without any such (accidental) guard; and implies, consequently, that those successions of sensible impressions which have undergone causality are alone objective, and that all other successions of sensible impressions—as, those of a house—are subjective. That is the main understanding of Schopenhauer in reference to Kant's process of objectivity; and that is what Schopenhauer, in the same reference, believes he has mainly to fight. All the categories being ministers of objectivity, and nothing but such ministers, it is an extraordinary mistake, especially in a passed Kantian expert, to attribute objectivity to causality alone. But all Schopen-

hauer's subsequent words express such mistake, quite openly, directly, and unmisgivingly.

The allegation that follows is this: "*Kant explains objectivity to be agreement of the succession of impressions with the succession of real objects.*" So far as it is intended to mean that agreement with sensible objects conditions the objectivity of our impressions, this is peculiarly objectionable. It represents a leading mistake of Schopenhauer's: that objectivity, namely, means only empirical perception. For objectivity, it seems enough to Schopenhauer to point to real objects, actual objects, sensible objects, empirical objects — as if the *fact* of such sufficed, without question of their constitution or genesis. But it is this question is Kant's whole business; and objectivity means, with him, *necessity*. Of course, wherever this necessity appears, it is in consequence of a category *curdling*, so to speak, subjective impressions into objectivity (in the usual sense), in time and space. Schopenhauer does not well follow all this; thinks Kant attributes objectivity to causality alone; and, in considerable disconcertion, ventures to talk loudly of other "actual" objects. Of course, the sentence will be quite correct if by "real objects" there be understood (with Kant) objects that have already undergone a category; but that is no understanding of Schopenhauer's. Neither does the completion of the sentence, "that this objectivity [this agreement, that is] is *perceived* only through the law of causality," at all help matters. The next sentence, too, only makes peculiarly glaring the false ascription to Kant in regard to causality. Schopenhauer has only misread a confused sentence of Kant's (the fourth of the original paragraph cited), and taken it to be general, whereas it was only special. Leaving what concerns subjective impressions a moment, we pass now to the *house* and the *ship*.

All that Kant means by these is this: In the object *house* (not my subject), I can take its constitutive multiple, its parts, in any direction, in any order, — begin and end in whatever direction or order I please. As regards the multiple of the phenomena connected with the *ship*, again, the facts are otherwise. There the order (as to where the beginning is to

be put) is not indifferent, but necessary and fixed. The conclusion is that, while it is the category quantity has made (out of the impressions), the object house, it is that of causality has functioned in the case of the ship. Kant, perhaps, does not mention quantity, but no intelligent reader requires that it should be mentioned. Very certainly, however, Kant, although he dwells on the indifferent order in the multiple of the house, never calls it "*subjective.*" The house, as a house, has already undergone the action of quantity, and the multiple, in its case, is no longer subjective. All that Kant wants to illustrate is, in multiples, the different order under different categories, and he has no idea of calling the one subjective and the other objective. It would precisely stultify him, he knows, to do so. There is no question here of the *subjective judgment* and the *objective judgment*, which *two* judgments precede or fall under every *one* category. That is a distinction, as I have said, that becomes prominent in the "Prolegomena;" and no one need, to his own confusion, refer to it in connection with Schopenhauer, for Schopenhauer, as I believe, never consciously or unconsciously had this distinction of judgments in his mind. No; Schopenhauer has no idea of the processes here but this simple one: that Kant affirms the induction or introduction of objectivity into subjectivity to be due to one category alone — the category of causality. It is this alone he combats. The very mode of his combat shows the grossness of his mistake. To Kant, the multiple connected with the house is quite as objective as the multiple connected with the ship; but that he attributes to the category of quantity, and not, laboriously and supervacaneously, like Schopenhauer, to the various causal relations of the eye in movement. That is a particularly acute device of Schopenhauer — Kant never could have denied that! He never *would* have denied it. It is quite certain that the eye and the house may be so mutually regarded; but any such consideration is quite beside the distinction Kant would demonstrate between the order in multiples under quantity, and the order in multiples under causality. But Schopenhauer is quite innocent; he is sure that the house, as also every-

thing else *actual*, is objective, and an object; and, turning the tables on Kant, he will demonstrate as much by application of Kant's own scale! "Both cases" are "occurrences"—that he will "maintain." That any man should attempt to criticise Kant in such profound ignorance of all that was cardinal and characteristic in Kant! Surely it is beyond even a *tyro* in the study to believe nothing "objective" to Kant that was not an "occurrence." Schopenhauer means no more (by his whole section) than that the house series is as objective as the ship series—that it is not subjective; how it would have surprised him to have been answered by an instant, if somewhat astonished, "Of course!" Both series are subjective affections, struck into objectivity, in time and space, by categories. But the category that functions in the one case is not the category that functions in the other. The one is quantity, and the other is causality. And that means that, in the one series, you can take its terms indifferently first and second; but, in the other, you can take them only necessarily first and second. Or here the terms follow *from* one another; while there they follow *on* one another. But though all this was so to Kant, he would certainly have acknowledged the movement of the eye to be an occurrence! On the whole, Schopenhauer's misapprehension and perversion of the very elements, rudiments, and A B C of Kant's doctrine, here and elsewhere, is scarcely credible.

Schopenhauer's first sentence in report of Kant is: "The synthesis of the many of particulars through imagination, that is required for every empirical perception—this synthesis gives succession, but not yet any determinate one; that is to say, it leaves undetermined which of two perceived states is the prior, not only in my imagination, but in the object." Kant's own words are these: "To all empirical perception there belongs the synthesis of the many of particulars through imagination, which is always successive; that is, the impressions in it always follow one another. The sequence, however, is, in imagination, as regards order (what *must* precede and what *must* follow), not at all determined, and the series of the units of the sequent impressions may be taken just as well

backwards as forwards." Kant then goes on to say that if such *order* is to be *determined* as that of an antecedent that precedes, and a consequent that follows from it ("an order," says Kant, "according to which something must necessarily precede, and when this is given, the other must necessarily follow"), this can only take place on action of the category of cause and effect. Kant has no thought here of the objective series of units that follow *on* one another; he addresses himself only to the series of units that follow *from* one another. His expressions are confused and imperfect, but that is really the import he means them to carry. He never dreams of declaring all sequence in imagination subjective till the one category of causality has acted; though his doctrine certainly is that all such sequence — however "sensibly," "empirically," or "actually" introduced — *is* subjective till *a* category, any one of the twelve, has acted. Schopenhauer represents Kant as saying "it leaves undetermined which of two perceived states *is* the prior;" but the actual expression is, "*must*" be the prior. Kant had no difficulty with the *is*; he knew impressions could come to him only in their own "actual" series, and these series he could *not* put otherwise; but that did not make them objective. It was the category made them objective, the category that was brought into play as in agreement with the special series of actual impressions — that is, these series were themselves different, and demanded different categories to suit. Some series, for example, might be regarded in any order; others, only in one.

But besides the capital mistake of Schopenhauer, another emerges here which (already referred to) is scarcely less glaring. It is that the synthesis "leaves undetermined which of two perceived states is the prior," even "in my imagination." Impressions in my imagination, so long as they are subjective, shall be at command of my own will — to be set here or set there, like pebbles on the beach, just as I please! But there is no such absurd doctrine as that in Kant, who knows, as everybody knows, that our imagination, be its power of action what it may, is passive to the order of its *impressions*, and cannot but be passive. Kant is, really, as

much subdued to "actuality" as Schopenhauer, or anybody else. One would like to absolve Schopenhauer here, but we fear the facts will not allow us. For example, "the succession of the perceptions of the parts of the house" are spoken of as "depending on one's own will;" one "might cause them to proceed in quite a reverse order." But Kant, when he said he could count or survey the various series of units in the surfaces of a house in what order he pleased, never meant it to be supposed that he had these series or surfaces under his own control—that he could actually dispose these series or surfaces in his imagination under whatever modifications it occurred to him to make. "The result of Kant's allegation would be that we perceive as objective no sequence in time whatever, except that of cause and effect, and that every other sequence of sensible phenomena perceived by us *is determined thus, and not otherwise, only by our own will.*" There we have the two errors—both unmistakable. "Subjective—dependent on my own will;" "subjectively—by my own will." There are other such expressions, but a single illustration of Schopenhauer's will, perhaps, be definitive here. It is the illustration of the tile. "I step out of doors," he says, "and a tile, falling from the roof, hits me; there is no causal connection between my stepping out and this falling of the tile; nevertheless, the succession, namely that my movement preceded that of the tile, is objectively determined in my apprehension, and not subjectively by my own will, which otherwise, indeed, *would, rather, have reversed the succession.*" Here we see again both mistakes. But as regards the latter of them, had he possessed the power, he says, which Kant attributes to him, he would have escaped the blow of the tile, for, naturally, *he would have made it fall first!* This needs nothing to confirm it, but it throws light on what may be further illustrative. In his endeavor to equalize house series and ship series, Schopenhauer says the latter would have been quite as the former, had we "only possessed the power to draw the ship up stream." That is an odd thing to say, but could he ever have thought of it, if the supposed pliancy of impressions in the imagination had not been vividly before his mind?

It is quite in consequence of similar conceptions that Schopenhauer feels doubt as to how Kant places himself in the empirical world. "Neither would Kant, in the case adduced by him, have believed himself to find a difficulty, had he reflected that his body is an object among objects, and that the succession of his empirical perceptions depends on the succession of the impressions of other objects on his body, and is, consequently, an objective one — can very well be perceived without the successive objects that impress his body standing together in a causal connection." That sentence is absolutely frightful. Kant never reflected that his body was an object among objects; had he done so, he would have been in a moment aware of an infinity of objects beside him, but not in any causal connection! Was Kant, to Schopenhauer, merely a fool, then? And in what a silly sense it is that objects are objects to Schopenhauer! "Don't you see that the contents of the empirical world are objects?" he says. "Ah, yes; so they are," replies Kant, with a smile, "*once they are formed.*" Nay, is the reader prepared to hear that this Schopenhauer, who so takes up Kant for his supposed exclusive causality, has himself no instrument of objectivity whatever but this same causality? His whole theory of perception is that we know only our own subjective states, but that these are thrown as objects into time and space solely by the action of causality. Absolutely, that is all. That is, very fairly, the whole philosophy of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer has causality for his single weapon — he limits himself so; and because of this same limitation (but only imputed by himself) he would pillory Kant, who has actually eleven others! By and by Schopenhauer objects the brain to Kant, as if this latter, ignorant of his own body, was equally ignorant of physiology and the nervous system! When Kant mentions *connection in subjection to rule as the principle of objective reality*, Schopenhauer exclaims, "But of how few impressions do we know the place given to them in the causal series by the causal law; and yet we can always distinguish the objective ones from the subjective ones, real objects from phantasmata." Again, he says: "Were the controverted allegation of Kant correct, we should recognize

the actuality of the succession merely from its *necessity*; this, however, would presuppose an understanding that embraced all the series of causes and effects at once—that is, an omniscient understanding.” These two passages are really based on similar considerations with those that refer to the body and the brain. It is an objecting of empirical fact in what we may call its secondary laws. Actuality signifying objectivity, it is quite true that Kant recognizes actuality only from necessity—meaning not only causal necessity, however, but categorical necessity in general. All our colors and other feelings become objects in time and space through the categories, says Kant. All our colors and other feelings become objects in time and space through the category of causality, asseverates Schopenhauer.³ One wonders how, in any sense or in any application, the latter should think the advantage to lie with him. Kant holds that he can know the *a posteriori* necessity only by possessing, first of all, an *a priori* necessity; and he cannot imagine any prejudice to result to the independence of the former secondarily, in consequence of being preceded by the latter. The laws of physics are not necessarily non-existent because of the laws of metaphysics. He cannot see that, though the latter prescribe *form*, it is any contradiction that the former should prescribe *matter*. Though the causal law is *a priori*, he says, knowledge of the causal process is not *a priori*. No; “to that there is required the cognition of *actual forces*, which can only *empirically* be given.” We may

³ That proposition, Schopenhauer’s own, his whole philosophy, falsely ascribed to Kant, is Schopenhauer’s object of special reprobation in Kant! For, of course, colors and other feelings are successions; and what Schopenhauer specially condemns is the proposition (falsely called Kantian) that successions become objective through causality *alone*. Really, that is the single proposition of Schopenhauer himself—impressions become objects in time and space only through causality! It is but fair to point out that, in Schopenhauer, the causality is only the reference by us of the subjective impression to its own self as causal object; whereas, in Kant, the necessity considered is that among the impressions themselves in their own series. That is Kant’s one (relative) problem, which one almost doubts Schopenhauer ever to have seen. And yet, when he gives his views of succession, he says: “The necessity of a succession of *two states* [in the object, namely—not in my subject]—that is, of a *change*—we cognize only by understanding, through causality.”

think, says Schopenhauer, "of the law of gravitation some day ceasing to operate, but not of this taking place without a cause." In what way shall we say that Schopenhauer differs from Kant in such references? Passing over that Schopenhauer is, in regard to an exclusive causality, alone the sinner he would make Kant, surely they both talk of the empirical world as conditioned by the *a priori* world, though perfectly cognizant, both, of the independence of the former on its own side. Surely, too, they both—Kant always, Schopenhauer when thetic—view the *a posteriori* as not only subjective, but contingent, and the *a priori* as the source of objectivity and necessity. Yet Schopenhauer objects to Kant that, to know the necessity of the *a priori*, he would require to be, a *posteriori*, omniscient! How of his own knowledge in the case of causality, and in the case of gravitation? But, returning, it would have made no difference to Kant, as regards the house and the ship, had he reflected that his body was an object among objects. It is precisely in that state of mind, indeed, and precisely from that position, that he makes the illustrations. Still, though his body was an object among objects, he was quite unable to perceive that "the succession of his empirical perceptions," depending "on the succession of the impressions of other objects on his body," was, "*therefore*," an objective one. It was precisely because that *therefore* did not, and could not, in that manner, exist, that he was led to inquire at all; and the result of his inquiry was to establish it on quite another basis. Kant is quite at home—no plowman more so—in that empirical world, *once it is formed*. But *how* it is formed, that is his single trouble; how contingent subjective sensations can become necessary objective perceptions. Schopenhauer seems positively to overlook the very problem in point, and to tell Kant the impressions themselves are all the objectivity he need seek. And, for that matter, indeed, Kant is much more under the authority of the actual than Schopenhauer himself, who objects the want to him. It was precisely because, from *its* nature, he could *not* draw the ship up stream, and precisely because, from *its* nature, he *could* see the house in any way, that he applied one category

there and another here ; he (Kant) would never have thought of “*only*” the power to “draw the ship up stream !”

The remark of Kant that is taken next, in regard to time itself not being perceived, is also mistaken by Schopenhauer. Kant’s words occur in the second paragraph of the *second analogy*. Like most others in this place, they are not exact. Still, they mean that, if we saw a thing in itself, that thing would impose on us all that we saw, and consequently that, if time were such thing, and no mere show of sense, we should be compelled to accept all facts in it at its own simple dictation. All is otherwise, however, on the other alternative, and all empirical multiples in time are only contingent and subjective till acted on by a category. From these facts Schopenhauer’s inference is : “Therefore, no succession of impressions can be empirically perceived as objective — that is to say, as alterations of the sensible phenomena in distinction from alterations of mere subjective impressions. The objectivity of an alteration can be cognized only through the law of causality, which is a rule in accordance with which states follow each other. And the result of his allegation would be that we perceive as objective no sequence in time whatever, except that of cause and effect, and that every other sequence of sensible phenomena perceived by us is determined thus, and not otherwise, only by our own will.” The main and accessory errors here have been already signalized ; and these errors *are* here, notwithstanding the *verbal* correctness of the phrase “the objectivity of an *alteration*,” etc. — an accidental guard which has been previously noticed. I would only point out that it is very absurd to suppose Kant not to admit “alterations of sensible phenomena” while as yet subjective, and, so to speak, crude. The phenomena of both house and ship, even while as yet without category, alter to Kant “sensibly,” according to their own conditions, and independent of him. All manner of lights, shades, colors, may “sensibly” alter on the retina, long before we have made objective perceptions of them. So of the other senses. The enormity of Schopenhauer’s error is made peculiarly glaring by the subsequent words : “The sequence of events in time can certainly, *though denied by*

Kant, as cited! be empirically cognized, just as well as the side-by-side of things in space." Of course, it is from the position of Kant that we talk of anything "sensible" being still "subjective." Schopenhauer, who knows only his own subjective states, ought, in consistency, to be as Kant. On the contrary, as we see here, for anything to be objective, it is enough for him if it is only sensible: "Objective — that is to say, alterations of sensible phenomena in distinction from alterations of mere subjective impressions!"

But Schopenhauer, for his part, "must allege against all that" the fact "that sensible phenomena may very well follow *on* one another without following *from* one another!" Why, does not Kant *say* the sensible phenomena of the house follow *on* one another without following *from* one another? More than that — this blunder of Schopenhauer's is so very gross! — is not Kant always aware that what his twelve categories subsume may be very well named just *so many* different successions, *all* of which, when subsumed, are *objective*? Schopenhauer makes considerable play with the distinction of following *on* and following *from*. Hume, he says, made all following only a following *on*; Kant, *ex contrario*, made all following only a following *from*; and both were wrong! This, however, is true neither of the one nor the other; and only Schopenhauer is wrong. The truth has just been said as regards Kant; and of Hume, it is easy to know that he acknowledged following *from* to be the cardinal principle of reason itself, though unable to refer its *origin* to anything but instinct *naturally*, or anything but custom *philosophically*.

The illustration from the musical notes, which we have next, is good in itself, but, as it is now superfluous to say, inapplicable to Kant. As for that of day and night, it is wholly inept. So little is it inept to Schopenhauer himself, nevertheless, that he even seems exultingly to say it does to death both Kant and Hume. I observe Mr. Caird, also, seems to accept the illustration from Schopenhauer, and to regard it as, at least, of some value. It belongs to Reid, though, and is no property of Schopenhauer's. Reid says (*Works*, p. 627): "It follows, from this definition of a cause, that night

is the cause of day, and day the cause of night. For no two things have more constantly followed each other since the beginning of the world." But, despite Reid, it is, as said, only inept. How terrible soever it may be thought, I have no hesitation in affirming that it would hardly have drawn a glance from either Kant or Hume. To object a mere alternation of an indifferent first and an indifferent second, that had each its sufficient reason in a common third something — to object such mere alternation to either Kant or Hume — is wholly to misunderstand both. Kant's first words under the *third analogy (reciprocity)* are these: "Things are at the same time, or together, if, in the empirical perception, the apprehension of the one can reciprocally follow on the apprehension of the other (which, in the case of causality, is impossible). Thus, I may carry my observation first to the moon and afterwards to the earth; or, reversewise, also, I may carry it first to the earth and then to the moon; and, just because of this — just because the perceptions of these objects may reciprocally follow each other, I say they exist at the same time, or together." In the alternation of day and night, these do not, indeed, exist *together*, as the moon and the earth do (yet, absolutely, they are always only side by side), still it is impossible to make of their succession an irreversible A B, for, even to Reid, B A is equally tenable; and, without such irreversible succession, it is impossible that the category of causality should act — a consideration which (however fatal to Kant's scheme for procuring a necessity which the scheme itself already presupposes) effectually defends him from the objection in review. How much Schopenhauer is submitted to the one strange error comes well forward here, also. "Nay, even the succession of day and night is, beyond doubt, objectively perceived by us, but they are certainly not apprehended as cause and effect, the one of the other." From these words it is again made plain to us that, to Schopenhauer's belief, Kant held there could be no *objective perception* except under the relation of cause and effect. What extraordinary delusion! Kant had never the faintest idea of the relation of cause and effect in connection with the succession of day and night, and yet, very certainly,

that succession was to him, also, "objectively perceived." Causality apart, had not Kant actually eleven other agents of objectivity?

The immediately following words but bespeak the same blunder: We distinguish objective perceptions from mere subjective phantasmata, in many cases, he says, where causality is not in place. Kant, of course, though with more consistent ideas as to the relative distinction, would have only cried to that, "I should think so." He would also have quite agreed with the quotations from Leibnitz; thinking, at the same time, of a good many other sources of *liaison* (or "rule") besides causality, and wondering, perhaps, at the slowness to the ordinary distinction between reality and dream.

Kant, as we have seen, reasons always in this way: Sense is, and can be, only contingent; there must be categories. But again, there is necessity in sense; consequently, categories *are*. Schopenhauer, for his part, as we know, too, has only one category—causality; and his reasoning in its regard simply is that we attribute apodeictic validity to the law of causality because we find we must. There is certainly analogy between the reasonings, so far as the fulcrum in each seems *must be* because *must be*. Still, we wonder what grounds Schopenhauer can find in this for proceeding to fling at Kant the reproach of an "extremely surprising and palpable error." Kant's proof (from necessity) is at least much more feasible and full than his own.

Schopenhauer, very properly, ascribes following *from* to the understanding, and following *on* to sense; but the distinction is Kant's own. It is the product of the very *Transcendental Reflection* by which Kant would, in correcting Leibnitz, refer him to the *Transcendental Topik*, where sense and intellect are assigned each its place. Leibnitz conceived time and space as *intellectual* results of the conditions and actions of things themselves. If things acted so and so on one another, he thought, then, the conceptions of space and time, or of things in space and time, were but logical consequences. Plainly, then, Kant's reproach was true—that Leibnitz "intellectualized" what were only "forms of sense;"

for time and space are perceptions, and not mere conceptions. Kant's action, on the other hand, is different. With him, intellect certainly enters into perception; but it does so only in its own quality. It simply gives focus, as it were, to the nebula of mere sense. Rather, then, Kant's act might be called, not an intellectualizing of sense, but a sensualizing of intellect. Even that, as a reproach, however, would be quite unjust. Plato already, in the "Theætetus," showed how intellect was necessary to sensation in order to make perception of it; and all modern theories about the acquired perceptions of sense concern nothing else. In point of fact, there is no man more open to complicated reproaches of this kind than Schopenhauer himself; who, with what theory he advocates, can only, and does only, convert sensation into perception by an intellectualizing (rather, as explained, sensualizing) use of the single category of causality. And this, certainly, is strange; Schopenhauer is the single person in this world who "intellectualizes the forms of sense" (rather, "as explained," etc.) by "the clue of causality," and he makes it a reproach to Kant! Of course, this reproach, though but another sample of the main blunder, would have had a certain relevance, had Schopenhauer said "clue," not of causality, but of *all* the categories. It is not the fact, either, as we have already seen, that Kant "denies" the "sequence of events in time" to be "empirically cognized." Kant's action is simply to supply necessity to the empirically cognized sequence of events in time. He tells us, again and again, that the sequence of the shining of the sun and the warming of the stone is empirically cognized (but, of course, only subjectively), even before action of the category.

When Schopenhauer says, further, "*how* something follows *on* another in time generally, as little admits of explanation as how something follows *from* another; that cognition is given and conditioned by pure sense, as this by pure understanding," we recognize again only Kant's own *Topik*, and are surprised it should be introduced as a principle from elsewhere for—the correction of Kant. It is beyond doubt, also, that Schopenhauer, in the sentence quoted, does not more certainly

characterize sense and understanding as, so to speak, *quarries*, each absolutely *sui generis*, and each simply inexplicable, than Kant himself does. Kant accepts understanding at the hands of ordinary school-logic without a question, and he similarly accepts from sense, not only its inexplicable, general *a priori* forms, but its equally inexplicable, endless *a posteriori* matter. In neither respect is there any attempt at deduction on the part of Kant. Certain materials being given us, he only attempts to show in what manner they are wrought up. He knows nothing of their *whence*, nor asks. Ignorance in that respect is a *discrimen* proper and peculiar of the very position of Kant. Schopenhauer, as we have seen above, though opposing Kant, only makes the same avowal. But what was consistent in Kant is, again, inconsistent in Schopenhauer; for the latter, unlike the former, is understood to *deduce* the universe. We conceive of Schopenhauer, even from the outside, that, being allowed the bare fact of will, he is able, methodically and step by step, to derive from it all the other infinite contents of the whole huge universe, the *a-priori* unities of the understanding, and the *a-posteriori* multiplicities of special sense as well. It at once chills and disappoints us, then, to hear Schopenhauer so soon speaking of sense and understanding, which together *are* the world, as both inexplicable, and we wonder *what* it can be he demonstrates out of will.

Schopenhauer proceeds now to a formal statement of his views on succession. They are as follows: 1. From the form belonging to pure sense — time — we derive our knowledge of the mere possibility of succession. 2. The succession of real objects we cognize empirically, and, consequently, as actual. 3. The *necessity* in a change we cognize only by the understanding through causality. 4. That we do cognize this necessity is the proof that causality is *a priori*, and not empirical. 5. All our objects are subjective states of our own. 6. Connection among these is bestowed wholly by the principle of sufficient reason. 7. This principle is basal form of necessary connection, lying in the innermost of our cognitive faculty. 8. This principle is the common form of all our objects. 9. It

is the sole source of the notion of necessity. 10. That, the antecedent being given, the consequent appears—this is the very meaning and authentication of this notion of necessity. 11. Time is the form of the objects in which the principle of sufficient reason becomes the law of causality. 12. The time-sequence of these objects is determined by this principle or law. 13. Hence, connection here takes on the shape of a rule of succession.

One wonders when one reads these propositions. Inconsistency seems the burden of every one of them—inconsistency as regards Schopenhauer with Kant; inconsistency as regards Schopenhauer with his own self. The first two propositions—the correction in regard to “actual” being borne in mind—are literally Kant’s own. Then, (3) that we recognize necessary connection in the relation of cause and effect only through a law of causality, that lies in the understanding—if that proposition is not Kant’s, what proposition is? It is, in brief, Kant’s answer to Hume. Only Kant does not think it enough to state it, he must reason it as well. Accordingly, he is at pains to demonstrate—in connection with the subjectivity of impression and the *apriority* of time and space—the fact of the understanding being constituted by an organic system of functions (categories), each of which (causality included) is, through imagination, combined with time into an *a priori schema* or frame-work for reception (with regulation and consolidation) of the contributions of special sense. That is a full, general statement of Kant’s one object; and, though I hold it to be, on the whole, unreal, and a superfetation merely, surely, in its amplitude both of purpose and plan it contrasts very strangely with the simple assertion of Schopenhauer; which, nevertheless, is meant by him utterly to subvert it! It is enough to Schopenhauer that the causality of his own understanding refers his own subjective impressions to their own selves as their own causes. That is to him an act of perception. Functions of the understanding, *schemata* of the imagination—all of them he will explode. He retains only one function of the understanding—causality; but, simply appending to it the word “intui-

tive," he feels himself thereby authorized to lecture Kant — severely — on the absurdity of introducing elements of reflection into the sensuous act of perception. Nor does it at all appear inconsistent to him, immediately thereafter, and in the same connection, to bring in himself all those *reflections* with respect to position, relative distinctness, organic movements in the eye, etc., which, constituting what are called the acquired perceptions of sense, are so current and common nowadays with the psychologists of every country!⁴ So little, indeed, has he made himself at home with what is central in Kant — the theory of perception, namely — that in the section preceding this "refutation" (p. 80) he has these words, which, as quite inapplicable, are utterly unintelligible: "Perception, with Kant, is something quite immediate, and takes place without any assistance from the causal nexus, and, consequently, from the understanding; he directly identifies it with sensation!" Forgetting how much he himself, but a moment ago, demonstrated the power of reflection in perception, he would hold causality, with Kant, as being but an affair of notions and reflection (not even called "intuitive"), to have no application to sense. He says, also, in the same place (p. 81), that Kant puts causality only in connection with the thing in itself, and so "Kant, then, must leave quite unexplained the origin of empirical perception; with him, as given by a miracle, it is a mere affair of sense — coincides, therefore, with sensation!" One can only hold one's hands up. Is this the Schopenhauer who, as a Kantian expert, was deferred to even by a Rosenkranz? 4. The necessity of causality is the proof of its being *a priori*. Here again, what is mere assertion with Schopenhauer has, with Kant, at least the light of rational references. Schopenhauer, too, who, when with only his own materials before him, attributes the conversion of subjectivity into objectivity to causality alone, urges everywhere, with all his might, as

⁴ His whole position, indeed, as regards perception, is, in effect, that of the realist; and it is impossible to reconcile it with that of the subjective idealist, for whom, to say nothing of the unreality of time and space, there do not exist even the things in themselves which existed for Kant.

against the materials of Kant, that to conceive objectivity dependent on causality alone, is manifest absurdity! 5. The subjectivity of all our sense-objects is also, of course, a proposition signally Kantian. Schopenhauer himself calls the distinction involved, Kant's "greatest merit." By all true philosophy, however, it ought, very specially, to be denied. 6. Sufficient reason is alone the principle of connection. Causality being with Schopenhauer one of four, is with Kant one of twelve. Guarded so, the proposition may be passed as Kantian. With the same guard where necessary, propositions 7, 8, and 9 may be similarly passed. 10. Necessity, with Kant, means twelve categories, and not one only; consequently the appearance of the consequent on the given antecedent is not Kant's *sole* authentication of necessity. Nevertheless, causality being alone in view, the proposition may be esteemed Kant's. But it is necessary to remark that, so far as it is only succession that is in reference, all Schopenhauer's objections in such reference come back on himself. We have also to point out to both Kant and Schopenhauer that, if necessity here means only, and is alone authenticated by, the appearance of B on the appearance of A, then the whole question depends on *the peculiar nature* of A B — or, what is the same thing, on A B being, not a mere succession, but a change. This is the vital point of view, but it is not entertained by either. Kant, indeed, has his subjective judgment to represent it; but here in Schopenhauer, the *names* apart (antecedent and consequent), there seems to be consideration only of one appearance after another in time. That, as said, ought to bring Schopenhauer down on his own self. It reminds us of what we shall presently see, that Schopenhauer, erroneously conceiving Kant to make the mere order in time a criterion of the causal action, is particularly loud in disapprobation. Here, however, he seems to say the mere fact of A being followed by B is the sufficient proof and guarantee of the necessity of the relation. "The notion of necessity has absolutely no other true meaning or authentication than that of the appearance of the one when the other is given." Elsewhere, too, he seems to attribute to the time-order itself

some portion of the causal efficacy. One moment, he says, is parent of the other. Propositions 11, 12, and 13 may be passed pretty well without comment. We shall not even object that—some of the last averments being contrasted—time would seem now to determine causality, and again, causality time; but, in a concluding reference to these deliverances on succession, we must decidedly accentuate this that, as the entire scheme of Schopenhauer but repeats, so far, the scheme of Kant, one is minded to look back with more than surprise on the so-called “refutation.”

But, to pass further, the sentence that follows is this: “Were the controverted allegation of Kant correct, we should recognize the *actuality* of the succession merely from its *necessity*.” It is difficult to see how Kant’s machinery can be open to that charge. The succession in Kant, so far as it is *actual*, is supposed to be recognized only as matter of special sense, disposed in the *a priori* sense-forms. It is so, also, that, as we have just seen, it is regarded in the scheme of Schopenhauer. Then, according to both, it is the understanding that, through its law of causality, adds *necessity*. Kant, no more than his critic, needs an “understanding omniscient of the whole series of causes and effects at once.” It is enough for Kant that he has, in the *a priori* forms (space and time), an *a priori* matter such that the law of causality subsumes it. There is no reason for objecting to Kant, when occupied in forming the world, the series of empirical causes in the world, once it is formed. These depend on the contributions of special sense, for which we have to wait. One wonders why Schopenhauer should object to Kant here, any more than to himself. One gets to think, indeed, that Schopenhauer is more bent on objecting for the sake of objecting, than on looking to the truth of the case, even in relation to himself. Consider his almost sneering severity to Kant for introducing into the act of perception forms of reflection! Such forms constitute for all philosophers the special instruments for the conversion of sensation into perception. As we have seen, Schopenhauer is quite as others here—only he forgets his adoption of the rationale of the acquired perceptions, and he arbitrarily *names*

causality, as used by himself, "intuitive." As for Kant, he is perfectly consistent; he says (Prol., p. 45): "All our perception takes place only by means of the senses; the understanding perceives not, it reflects only." Of course, Kant's whole categorical scheme is *for* perception, is there to give sensation *focus*; but it is still understanding, not sense. It is precisely Schopenhauer himself makes the understanding perceptive ("intuitive"). A moment ago, too, the same Schopenhauer blamed Kant for identifying perception with sense!

What Kant is employed on in the next reference is that, despite the apparent contemporaneousness of certain effects and causes — as, heat in the room and in the fire, the dint in the cushion, and the bullet on it — the cause is always "dynamically" first. "Accordingly," says Kant, but with only this in his mind, "the time-sequence is certainly the only *empirical* criterion of the effect in relation to the cause" — that is, taking any actual case of causality, you distinguish the effect from the cause, empirically, by its relative place in time. But "mere *succession*" (following *on*) is "the empirical criterion of which of two states is cause and which effect." This is what Schopenhauer makes of it, and he cannot reconcile it with the other "allegation, that objectivity of succession is alone known from the necessity of the sequence of effect on cause!" "Who but sees here," he adds, "the most evident circle?" Accordingly, the statement of his next paragraph is one of astonishment, that, with Kant, following *on* should now be equal to following *from*, and Hume, by his very antagonist, vindicated!

Kant's proof is next to be "limited," etc., and Schopenhauer's own proof substituted for it. The whole of Schopenhauer's claim in the averment, however, is simply Kantian; "empirically we only cognize *actuality* of succession, but in certain cases we cognize "necessity" as well, etc., "so there follow at once from this the reality and *a priori* validity of the law of causality." Schopenhauer, having utterly reprobated the case of Kant, only holds it up to him again as the very thing he should have done!

Schopenhauer now remarks on Kant's doctrine of reciprocity; but what is said refers, for point, to another section, where we find, as hitherto, only failures to understand. For instance, when Kant talks of things being separated by a wholly empty space, he means an absolute vacuum of existence, a cleft absolute, and not the participating empty spaces of the astronomical heavens. This, then, we pass.

For wind-up, now, we have, on the part of Schopenhauer, only expressions of veneration for Kant, and deprecating apologies. He appends a line from Homer, intimating that, like the goddess in the case of Diomedes, Kant had purged for him his eye-sight. Diomedes was, in consequence of the operation, to be able clearly to distinguish god and man; but Kant's influence on Schopenhauer has been to make appear before the eyes of this latter, not Kant's own plain self, but the most extraordinary and contradictory hermaphrodite of god and man that it were possible even to dream.⁵

Samples, then, enough of the *ἀχλὺς* which Schopenhauer thanks Kant for removing, we have seen to remain; but these samples are very far from exhausting the supply. There is nobody whom Schopenhauer boasts himself to know better than he knows Kant, and it is certainly hardly possible that one man should know another worse. There are eleven other categories besides that of causality, and in regard to each of these Schopenhauer is as ignorant as in regard to the latter. Without very well knowing what they are for, and how they are to act, he rejects them all, with the single exception of causality, which, nevertheless, as we have seen, he will accept only on his own terms — terms involving capital mistakes only as to the terms of Kant. That is, Schopenhauer rejects all that (“theoretically”) is really good in Kant — sug-

⁵ In the foregoing, as well as in what follows, other portions (besides the one translated) of the book in question, and, also, Schopenhauer's chief work, “*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*,” are occasionally in allusion. It is particularly in the latter work that Schopenhauer reprobates Kant's introduction into perception of forms of reflection. Notwithstanding this reprobation, it is the same Schopenhauer quotes approvingly, the *σοῦς ὀργῶν* of Epicharmus, and similarly refers to the authority of Plutarch for the necessity of mind to sense. See the former work, about page 80.

gestion, namely, in regard to collection and tabulation of the categories as the concrete contents of pure thought. But, *en revanche*, he loudly and fervently accepts from Kant all of his that (with "theoretical" reference) is either questionable or of no account. As any one may understand without much reflection, it is only an abuse of the commonest common-sense to tell us we do not perceive actual outer independent things in an actual outer independent space and time; but it is just this telling that Schopenhauer receives from Kant with the most extravagant gratitude. That is to him the foundation of the imperishable glory of Kant — that time and space are only subjective *spectra* of our own, and objects, or what are called things, only apparent projection into these *spectra* of our own subjective affections. These, nevertheless, are but samples of Kantian contributions that are, really, of no account. Equivocal contributions, again, are what concerns theology ("scholasticism") in Kant, the various refutations of the arguments, ontological, cosmological, and teleological, for the being of a God. Naturally, in his "enlightenment," namely, Schopenhauer is specially thankful for these. In practical reference, he accepts from Kant the absoluteness of will, but rejects — scornfully — the categorical imperative, and, with it, free will, though praising the (worthless) distinction by which Kant would save it! In fact, he accepts from Kant — his own whole philosophy indeed! — only the "*Maja*," only what Reid scourged as the "ideal system;" all the rest he rejects; and yet he declares "his whole exposition is merely the *completion* of the Kantian transcendental idealism!" (Op. cit. pref.)

But said ἀγλῶς in Schopenhauer is not limited to Kant. In other references as well, there seem partial scales over his eyes which isolate his vision into compartments of that *empty-space* separation which — naturally! — he so signally misunderstands in Kant. His different views, that is, seem each in an independent, unparticipating world of its own, absolutely without relation to anything else. Take his scheme of perception, for example, a scheme on the credit of which he is perpetually glorifying himself, claiming here for himself, in-

deed, almost as much glory as for his refutation of Kant's categories — a large portion of it consists of these inferences to which are due what we call here the "acquired perceptions of sense" — organic sensations of the eye itself, misty or clear appearance of the object in itself or relatively, etc. But it is only on the ordinary understanding of an external world that such theory of acquired perceptions is really practicable or consistent, and it denotes inextricable confusion in the mind of Schopenhauer that he should still attempt to adopt such theory while no objects exist to him but his own subjective sensations. Besides these acquired perceptions, there is, in Schopenhauer's general theory, only one other leading point, and it is the one on which he lays the greatest stress. We possess *a priori* the category of causality, he says, and by virtue of its possession we refer our subjective states to their causes; and thus it is that an objective world is at once realized around us. It is hardly possible to suppose anything weaker — unless, that is, there be an outer reality. I have the subjective affection of sweetness or of greenness, and my category of causality compels me to refer these to a cause. To what cause? There is nothing but themselves. Is it to the sweetness as cause I am to refer the sweetness as effect, or am I to refer the greenness as effect to the greenness as cause? To what as causes are the subjective affections to be referred? If we have only subjective affections, as Schopenhauer avers, then the category has nothing else to refer them to but their own selves. That any man should start with the material of subjective affection only, and should so lightly, easily, and confusedly see it grow into the formed world around us, through the category of causality, and the acquired perceptions of sense alone! Such philosophizing is the very *Capuchinery* of thought.

Nor is Schopenhauer ever seen at any greater advantage wherever else he *philosophizes*. Schopenhauer is not a philosopher, but a *littérateur*; and, as a *littérateur*, he is, on the whole, quite legitimately a subject for admiration. He is thoroughly educated, and, as it is called, well-read — an actual expert in several languages and literatures, ancient and

modern. He has, in the same direction also, gifts of his own. He is really, as it is said, brilliant — expressing himself well always, and possessed of no little ingenuity and wit. Still, even here, I know not that he can offer contributions of any objective value. A sally in a sentence will not repay the reading of a volume. Altogether, it is difficult to see for what it was that the neglected Schopenhauer looked forward to compensation at the hands of our grandchildren. Our grandchildren will certainly gain no good from his weak, bungling attempts at philosophizing; and there is really not enough of possible literary profit to tempt expenditure of time upon him. That the Pessimists should regard him as their father and founder, may be natural enough; but still, surely, they are men on their own account, and need not be, or are not, at all indebted to any standing-ground borrowed from him.

Schopenhauer's deliverances in regard to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel may be referred to as in no small degree determinative of his relative level. Had he known Kant, he would have known them. That he did not know them is the convincing proof that he did not know Kant. And he did not know them. He contrasts his own "completion of the Kantian transcendental idealism," of which we can now judge, with "Fichte's humbug." An opinion of Schelling's is a "*Curiosum*," a "*leichtfertiges In-den-Tag-hinein-Schwätzen*, which deserves no place among the opinions of earnest and honest inquirers." And, as for Hegel, it seems impossible for him to find words opprobrious enough; he absolutely foams at the mouth on thought of the bare name. When "one's mind, with Hegel's insane word-collocations in regard, in vain martyrs and exhausts itself in the attempt to think something," the result is "disorganization of brain;" for "what is *Hegelei* else," he asks, "than empty, hollow, disgusting *Wortkram*?" And so, "out of a common head, nay, out of a common charlatan, there is made," he sneers, "a great philosopher!" — a great philosopher who, in truth, he repeats, is but "an arrant quack!"

Now, Fichte and Schelling may not have succeeded; but, surely, it was at least a great and suggestive problem they

took in hand. Nor less certain is it that as much—with whatever righteous additional emphasis—can be said for Hegel. Like Plato's "Republic," the system of Hegel is to me, in a certain sense, only a poem, only an ideal; but that ideal is the ideal (and idea) at last of *a completed philosophy*. Aristotle has, in a certain way, "gropings" after a like object; but, as disjunct, whatever they be in themselves, they may, on the whole, be named "blind;" and no man but Hegel in this universe has produced for this universe what may prove the key—terms of *explanation* that at length come up to need. And Schopenhauer, whether he accepted it or not, ought, at all events, to have seen as much.

But, Schopenhauer apart, how many see this, even now? Who sees that a touch converts Kant into Hegel, and yet that the latter, after all, is to the former very much as reality to dream? Who sees that? and it has been already shown in many ways. In one other way, and at its shortest, perhaps, let it be shown once again now.

Kant's one peculiar act subjectively is Hegel's one peculiar act objectively. That one peculiar act in both (Kant's one peculiar act, consequently) is the Notion of Hegel. Consider Kant's theory of perception! So considering, is it not manifest to you that Kant's one act is, through categories, *Begriff* (the *Universal*), to reduce the manifold or multiple of sense (the *Particular*) into the Unity of Apperception, Self-consciousness (the *Singular*)—and what is that but *the Notion of Hegel*?

How that notion is *explanation* at length, *how* it is the key of the universe, this is not the place to demonstrate. We may say, however, that had but Schopenhauer caught a glimpse of this, had he but caught a glimpse of the transformation now witnessed—and, necessarily then—of the considerations involved, we should have been spared much. Nay, had he but caught a glimpse of Kant's one act, the theory of perception, as namable thus—*Begriff*, with Kant, is that mental act which, combining the particulars of sense into unity, isolates and individualizes them into separate, single, and distinct, but correlated, objects, or entities, in time and

space — is it conceivable that he would have so belabored the full Kant, and exalted in disparagement his own poor, meagre, warped, and piecemeal self?

So far, however, as blindness to either Kant or Hegel is concerned, it is only fair to Schopenhauer to regard him as but, of many sinners, one; at the same time that, at least in the latter case, excuses are not wanting. Hegel, in dialect and dialectic is, for every ordinary reader, utterly unintelligible. So it is that we see how very unsatisfactory — after so many years — the general study still remains. Readers who can quite as easily satisfy themselves in regard to the meaning of a Hume or a Berkeley, as in regard to the meaning of a Scott or a Dickens, naturally lose all patience with a Hegel, in whom not one sentence seems to have sense, and eagerly meet the spite of baffled countrymen of his own, who would be glad to think the *unused* already used up and done with. But the truth is far otherwise. If the key has been found for the casket of Hegel, and its contents described, it is quite certain that the public has never yet seriously set itself to apply this key, or examine these contents. Something to stimulate or assist seems still to be wanting. Much, of course, lies in the very temper of the time. It is out of the materials of that casket, however, that we are to build the bridge which, leaving the episode behind, leads to the long epic of the race. Hegel's act is, probably, as the opening of the final seal into the consciousness of man. It is very interesting to hear him tell Goethe (on whom such ideas never dawned) that "where he [Goethe] places the Inscrutable and Incomprehensible, precisely there Philosophy dwells — precisely thence draws vindication, explanation, and deduction." Hegel's work shall be now dead, and yet how many are there in existence who can form any conjecture here of what Hegel means? America, at present, is perhaps the very loudest in despair (see *Princeton Review* for March and May); and yet, in all probability, it is precisely America that is the place of hope. What we may call *academic accomplishment* has seized the Germans. They desire only learnedly to *state*; but *what* they state is, but too often, *external* merely. How many statements have there not

been of Schopenhauer, to go no further, and which of them shows even a glimpse into the truth of his relation to Kant? Nay, which of them has ever tested and compared with their own selves the various pieces in the machinery of this very Kant? Certainly not, in either case, any of them that I know. As it is in Germany, so it is in England. We, too, are contented, if we shall but appear learnedly to state. We master not the proposition, but only what is said of it by all that host of imposing foreign names, who, empty nut-shells for the most part, are themselves but mocked by similar shadows. The "literature of the subject," bless you! what is the "subject" itself to that? Exhibiting not one tittle of evidence in proof, we *assume* to know the last and supreme formula, and to be justified, accordingly, in treating all others as *de haut en bas*. We, too, are academically decorous; writing words so soft, unincisive, unimpressive — putty-like — that they leave the reader vacuous. But all this is otherwise in America, where the true fuel finds itself at least fairly alight. In America, and not in England, it is that there are Kant clubs, and Aristotle clubs, and scores of young men meeting weekly to initiate themselves, with boundless appreciation, even into the adamant Hegel.

But, be all that as it may, the ignorance of Schopenhauer in regard to his own great contemporaries shall be the concluding trait in the portrait we would draw of him; and we may now explain what it was that gave this operation itself occasion. It lay in the essay on the "Philosophy of Causality," engaged to write which, it was recollected that Schopenhauer was very specially referred to by Mr. Caird, as well in connection with Kant as with the particular subject named; and, accordingly, the necessity of consultation was obviously suggested. One or two earlier allusions to Schopenhauer may, indeed, be found on my part; but it was now only that, by direct examination, I enabled myself to speak at first hand — with what result may be now judged.

But the reference itself, even in relation to Mr. Caird, demands a word. It concerns "Schopenhauer's Objection to the Deduction of Causality," and occurs at page 456 of "A

Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant." In regard to this objection itself, we have already, presumably, light enough; and may, allowably, therefore, venture to judge of the manner in which Mr. Caird views it.

Mr. Caird's relative eleventh chapter, headed, "The Principles of Pure Understanding," opens with Kant's simple distinction between his mathematical and his dynamical categories (a distinction which, as the essay on the "Philosophy of Causality" shows, is pretty well Hume's). The former (quantity and quality) evidently enter into, and form part of, objects themselves; while the latter (relation and modality) concern — *that* (relation) the modes in which objects exist in reference to each other, and *this* (modality) the modes in which they exist in reference to our minds. And what is meant is obvious. There is no difficulty in seeing that extension and intension are *in* houses, paints, syrups, etc.; while, substantiality, causality, and reciprocity concern the existence of things in each other's regard, and possibility, actuality, and necessity the same existence as respectively differing in validity for the mind (what is possible is less valid than what is actual, etc.). That the two classes should be also contrasted as "intuitive and discursive," and, again, as "constitutive and regulative," is plain at a glance, at the same time that these terms make the general interest unmistakable.

What Mr. Caird observes here is "that this distinction is now transferred to the Principles of Pure Understanding, and it therefore becomes important to determine its exact meaning." The transference spoken of is, simply, that the categories, as further discussed, are discussed in the classes the distinction gives. That the distinction itself, once made, should be found to continue, seems as little calculated to give pause, as its meaning (inherence *versus* relativity) to puzzle. All that requires now to be understood is that the categories give rise to certain "*Grundsätze.*" This German word may, certainly, be translated "*principles;*" but it is important that these principles should be seen to be in the form of *propositions*, main or fundamental propositions, which are successively named "axioms," "anticipations," "analogies," and

“postulates.” In short, there is nothing to call specially for remark, whether as regards the transference (which, as said, is only a continuation to be expected and taken without note), or as regards the “distinction,” which Kant himself (and surely with reason) thinks it enough merely to mention. Mr. Caird, however, considers it necessary to enlarge here into a copiousness of remark and illustration, in the midst of which one finds one’s self uneasily on the quest for relevancy.

For example, we find it said: “The distinction, as drawn by Kant, may be stated as follows: it is possible to represent or imagine objects without determining them as existent,” etc. This, of course, is only an edge, so to speak, of the key-note which pervades a paragraph. It will suggest, however, that the distinction in question is regarded as turning essentially on the determination of existence as such. Now, can it be taken ill of any one who pretends to any Kantian acquirement, should he ask, with a sort of wonder, What, pray, has that got to do with the intrinsic properties of objects as against their extrinsic relations? Kant is quite as willing “to determine objects as existent” in the case of his mathematical categories, as in that of the dynamical ones. The ridge between the two slopes is not at all the consideration of existence. Kant has no idea that his illustrations in reference to a house, degrees of resistance, degrees of heat, etc., will be supposed to concern imagination only, while drifting ships, indenting bullets, warming stones, etc., shall be exclusively determined as “existent.” Both classes of objects are constructed in the imagination, and in precisely the same manner; they differ only in the categories to which they owe objectivity. But, more than that, both classes of objects are *equally* determined as existent.

Another distinction, or rather, another wording of the same distinction, which immediately follows is to a like effect. In the *Kritik of Pure Reason* (WW. II, 760), Kant has a foot-note to his table of “*Grundsätze*,” which runs thus: “All *conjunction* is either *composition* or *connection*. The former is a synthesis in which the individuals do *not* necessarily belong the one to the other. For example, the two

triangles into which the diagonal divides a square do not, considered *per se*, belong to each other. Of this nature is the *homogeneous* synthesis in everything that can be *mathematically* regarded. Such synthesis, also, is either one of *aggregation* or one of *coalition*, the former referring to *extensive*, and the other to *intensive*, magnitudes. The second conjunction, *connection*, on the other hand is a synthesis in which the individuals necessarily *do* belong the one to the other — as, accident to substance, effect to cause. This synthesis (as seen from the examples) is *heterogeneous*, and yet conceived as *a priori*. This conjunction, now, I name *dynamical*, as not being discretionary, but depending existentially on the individuals in it. This *dynamical* conjunction, lastly, is also capable of a twofold division — into, first, the *physical* one of objects mutually; and, second, the *metaphysical* one of objects in their relation to the mental faculty.”

There is nothing shadowed out in this note but synthesis as under each of the four categories — quantity, quality, relation, and modality. It serves no purpose but to allow Kant the indulgence of his passion for words and phrases that shall be felicitously distinctive; and, certainly, there is enough here in that kind to please any one. Hume opposes *conjunction* to *connection*, but Kant opposes *composition* to *connection*, and subordinates both as *species* under *conjunction* as *genus*. Then each *species* falls into two *sub-species*. *Composition* (*mathematical* synthesis or conjunction) is either the *aggregation* of *extensive* magnitudes, or the *coalition* of *intensive* magnitudes; while *connection* (*dynamical* synthesis or conjunction) is either *physical* (relation — substance and accident, cause and effect, action and reaction) or *metaphysical* (modality — possibility, actuality, necessity, etc.). Then the terms in the different syntheses, naturally, are also necessarily different. Under composition, for example, they are like in kind (*homogeneous*), but they do *not* necessarily belong to each other (in the sense of the one being existentially due to the other — as, the effect to the cause). Whereas, under connection, again, they are different in kind (*heterogeneous*), and yet *do* necessarily belong the one to the other (in the sense of being existen-

tially due, etc.). There is not an atom of difficulty or ambiguity in the entire passage; and that individuals here are existentially due, and there are *not* existentially due, the one to the other, has not the slightest reference to distinction between objects as existent or non-existent.

Mr. Caird, apparently, however, does not so readily find himself at home in the passage. The paragraph (pages 440-442) constitutes his relative commentary, and it is to the effect as follows: "Homogeneous elements which do not necessarily belong to each other," he conceives to refer to that peculiarity in quantity according to which "it can be increased or diminished without limit; all that is determined by these principles, therefore, is, *not* that you must combine any element with any other, but that if you do so, you must do it in a particular way!" Now, all that Kant means, so far, is only, as we have seen, a synthesis of like to like, which "*likes*" are still indifferent to one another, and do not cause one another. The particles of any stone are such. Surely, then, Mr. Caird either sees something quite dissimilar to this, or only conveys this with such left-handedness as sets hopelessly at fault. And what follows is worse. When Kant only wants it to be understood that the connection of substance and accident, cause and effect, may be described as a "synthesis of heterogeneous elements which belong to each other," Mr. Caird seems suddenly lost in a labyrinth, in which, coherency there is none. There is still, to be sure, external cheerfulness of speech; but the internal uneasiness is revealed by this little foot-note: "Cf. Spinoza, l. c. In the above account of Kant's doctrine I have been obliged to introduce more of my own interpretation than usual; I could not otherwise get a distinct meaning out of Kant's words." And, no doubt, this is accurately the nature of the case here and elsewhere. Mr. Caird, unable "otherwise to get a distinct meaning out of Kant's words," only all too often sees into them *tropes*. A simpler passage than what we have translated it is surely impossible to find anywhere, whether in Kant or another; and it is not easy to express one's surprise that it should have been so perverted or sublimed, so disfigured or

transformed. Nor are the neighboring passages different. "Relation of imagination to knowledge," "Freedom of the imagination due to abstraction," "Limitation of knowledge by imagination," etc. — these, too, can but seem to us, as it were, bones of the hippogriff, instead of the simple articulations of Kant; and we are reminded of the "crabs, goats, scorpions, the balance and the water-pot," which, according to Mr. Emerson, "lose all their meanness [here, meaning] when hung as signs in the Zodiac."

The truth is that Kant has a peculiar plan of his own to propose, and it is only misseen when the beams of his workshop are extended into the firmament. These vessels and utensils are all, very specially, his; and it has neither consistency nor meaning to lift any one of them out of its own limited perspective. No doubt, points do crop up here and there in Kant that may profitably receive a general application, and where names may be in place (hardly ever Spinoza's); but, for the most part, that is not so, and we only lose ourselves when we leave the very homely bounds of the critical manufactory. Consider the mischief that results, too — chimeras of the brain offered as problems to the schools, and an idle babble endlessly protracted! "Notice: No admittance except on business." By this placard we know what is *sui generis*, and on its own account; and by just such placard is the Kantian gateway overhung and guarded. It is idle to approach such eminently private workshop as though it were a cosmical treasure-house, and each plain implement were to be taken up with the child-like awe that only sees marvels of the universe. But our object here is special, and we may, accordingly, limit ourselves.

"This is Kant's general argument. There are, however, a few inconsistent or ambiguous statements introduced into it, and especially into that part which refers to the principle of causality, which must be examined before we can fully justify the above interpretation of it. Thus, at the beginning of his discussion of the second *analogy of experience*, Kant distinguishes two cases: the case of such an object as a house, where the sequence of our perceptions is reversible; and the case of a boat sailing [no, no, not "sailing," *drifting*; it is

the current, and not the wind, that is to be regarded as the cause acting] down a river, where it is irreversible. We can begin with either the top or the bottom of the house, but we cannot see the movements of the boat except in one order. [We might have seen it moving up, down, along, across, or in any direction, if "sailing," and not mere drifting at control of the current, had been taken into account.] In the latter case, therefore, as Kant argues, we give to our perception of succession an objective value; but in the former case we regard it as merely subjective; or, what is the same thing, in the latter case we bring the sequence of our perceptions under the category of causality, and in the former case we do not." Mr. Caird, in writing this, supposes himself to be approaching "Schopenhauer's objection," and no doubt correctly, as we now superabundantly know. Still, Mr. Caird writes this from himself; he is not reporting from another. This is not the *oratio obliqua*; these are Mr. Caird's own opinions. His reference to "inconsistent or ambiguous statements," "especially" in what concerns "the principle of causality," is direct; and equally direct is his intimation that this inconsistency or ambiguity concerns Kant's statements in regard to succession in the case of a house as contrasted with succession in the case of a drifting ship. Further, this also is direct: that Kant characterizes the one succession as subjective, and the other as objective. Than this, there is no other possible understanding here. But Mr. Caird conveys the same ideas even more strongly (not more directly) elsewhere. At page 454 he says: "Kant argues that the judgment of sequence cannot be made except on the presupposition of the judgment of *causality*;" and at page 451 he had already said: "Hume had maintained that the principle of causality is simply the general expression of a subjective habit of mind, which is due to the repeated experience of sequence; the *post hoc* is the reality which, by an illusion of the imagination, is turned into the *propter hoc*; Kant answers that the experience of the *post hoc* is itself impossible except to a mind that connects phenomena as cause and effect." "The judgment of sequence cannot be made except on the presupposition of the judgment of causality!" "The experience of

the *post hoc* is itself impossible except to a mind that connects phenomena as cause and effect!!” “No mind is capable of the cognition *post hoc* that is not already capable of the cognition *propter hoc*!!!”

“Were such things here as we do speak about,
Or have we eaten of the insane root
That takes the reason prisoner?”

It was a fearful blunder on the part of Schopenhauer to suppose Kant considered the succession of the house subjective, and no succession objective but that of causality alone. As we see, Mr. Caird fully indorses that blunder — the radical blunder that is the theme of this essay; but then, further, he out-Herods Herod. Schopenhauer, even making the prodigious blunder he did, was never so far left to himself as to conceive the cognition of succession as succession only possible to Kant on presupposition of causality. Following *on* was to him as much *sui generis* as following *from*. One vainly turns the eye round and round in search of how and where Mr. Caird could get even the dream of such things. Kant shall have held it impossible to cognize the rows on his bookshelves, the steps on his stairs, the laths in his Venetians, etc., endlessly, unless on presupposition of the category of causality! Why, there are successions even *necessarily* in the form A B C D, etc., which are not causal, and utterly independent of causality in any reference. Everybody has heard the chimes — at midnight, or whenever else. Ding-ding-dong-ding, ding-ding-dong-ding; it is quite certain that each chime has its fixed place in the series — has at least the *position* of a necessary consequent in the one direction, as of a necessary antecedent in the other; and yet causality has nothing whatever to do with either the sequence or the necessity. Ten minutes to nine must absolutely precede five minutes to nine; one o'clock, two o'clock; Sunday, Monday; May, June — in short, every one moment of time another, just as every atom of space is beside another, on this side and on that, and on all sides. These are successions — necessary, too — and they are absolutely independent of causality, whether as existent or as cognized. Nor is it possible for any man to find Kant, at last, otherwise than fully awake to all that these things imply.

Even Mr. Caird, in fact, only saves himself to himself here, by resolutely looking away from all these homely considerations (which are really all that Kant entertains), and having recourse to that expedient of cosmical transelementation to which there has been already allusion. It is in reference to the unity of the universe, and the correlation of all its parts, he thinks, that there is justification for Kant's (never made) assertion that objectivity results from the category of causality alone! It is quite true that Kant will have the world a correlated unity; but it is not true that he will have the causal category as this unity's sole source. Every single *category* — and there are twelve of them — is *constitutive*, as every single *idea* — and there are three of them — is *regulative*, of this unity. Kant, consequently, cannot even dream of making cognition of succession, as such, conditional on presupposition of succession causal. If Mr. Caird will consider Kant's own illustrations of causality, he will find what a homely empirical role that category is supposed to fulfill, and that, too, only beside others which equally with it bestow unity, which equally with it bestow objectivity, and so bestow objectivity that even the succession in a house is not subjective; and never was either thought subjective or called subjective by Kant himself. "Kant," Mr. Caird says (p. 457), "either forgets or abstracts for the moment from the fact that whether we say the sequence is due (as in the case of the house) to the movement of our organs of sense, or whether we say that it is due to the movements of the objects perceived (as in the case of the boat) — in both cases we make a judgment of objective sequence." Of course, it would be absurd seriously to attempt to show that this sentence were quite as relevant to the precession of the equinoxes as to Kant; but is not the influence of Schopenhauer, to which it is wholly and solely due, eminently regrettable? But there is no pleasure to me in this duty that, parenthetically so to speak, has fallen upon me; and with these half-dozen hints — honest, as they must be — I gladly leave it.⁶

⁶ Only through ability to discern *propter hoc*, first of all, is it possible to discern *post hoc*! Were not the *post* of the *house* and the *propter* of the *ship* but a moment ago independently and specifically side by side? To Kant himself, even in

There is such a thing as a literal understanding of Kant, in which the alphabet A B C D, etc., is the alphabet A B C D, etc.; and there is also such a thing as an *oneiromantic* understanding of Kant, in which W is a windmill, K a kite, and O an owl. Or, there is an internal understanding of Kant, and there is an external understanding of Kant. The internal understanding smelts, melts, fuses all manner of earthy provisional matter into a single diamond-point that mirrors and comprehends all; and he who possesses it sees all at a glance, and can tell all in one word or a thousand. The external understanding, again, is academical, exegetical, formal; and all Kant's distinctions — analysis, synthesis, axioms, anticipations, analogies, postulates, paralogsms, antinomies, etc. — verbally appear in it, one after the other, as a series of *frames* that contain nothing, or that contain nightmares; while he that possesses it is accordingly conditioned. Such things are exemplified, for the most part, by almost scores of "*Introductions*" sent in from all sides. And yet it is remarkable that, always excepting Schopenhauer of course, all the Germans known to me who write on Kant — Erdmann, Ueberweg, Schweigler, Rosenkranz, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Edmund Montgomery, *al.* — are, in the sense indicated, *literalists*. One would have expected such teaching to have been generally adopted; but, no; on the contrary, with the exception of Americans, most members of other nationalities who affect the theme seem largely to disdain the letter, and even to prefer, as we may surmise, the cabala of dream. In England the very mention of German philosophy would seem to repugn. It is only the neighboring island that shows any interest in the subject. If any one will cast his eyes over these periodical *Kottubos's* and *Hermathena's*, or the more permanent classical and philosophical works that issue from the press of

causality, does not the subjective *post hoc* precede and condition the objective *propter hoc*? Is it not similarly situated with the categories as a whole? Is not Kant's one problem to explain *how* the evident and unquestioned *post hoc* can contain the mysterious and doubted *propter hoc*? Or just consider this — if the *propter hoc* precedes and conditions the *post hoc*, how did it ever occur to call the house-series subjective?

Dublin, he will recognize that the *life* of learning and philosophy—no longer to be found at Oxford or at Cambridge, at Edinburgh or Aberdeen—is still vigorous in Ireland's Trinity. While there are Thompsons and Jowetts, and such eminent younger strengths as Bywater, England indeed cannot be said to be without Greek, and philosophical Greek. (As for Scotland, though the veteran Dr. William Veitch, of Edinburgh, is probably the greatest philological Grecian out of Germany, the Scotch, on the whole, have no Greek.) Still, as intimated, it is in Dublin that Greek, and philosophical Greek, may at this moment be regarded as, through strength of mutual association, *living*. There quite a fire of genius would seem to burn now. Maguire, Mahaffy, Monck, Graham, and a whole host of others emulously wrestle with each other, and communicate to their countrymen quite a heat of learning and philosophy. In the midst of such an intellectual life, Kant, as may be supposed, has not been neglected. And yet (will it be possible to forgive me?) I have experienced a certain dissatisfaction with most of the Irish works that I have seen on Kant. They are too academical, too exegetical, too formal. With those eternal Mill-references, and other such, they have, somehow, an old-fashioned look. I would have men of such real accomplishments, real endowments—more than formalists. It almost pains one to the core to think that such a gracious, vigorous, and thoroughly equipped intellect as Mahaffy's should *allow* itself to remain, at least as regards the *best* of German philosophy, so glaringly on the outside. An article in the *Princeton Review* for July—which, by the by, is the immediate occasion, and “only begetter,” of the directly preceding remarks—offers, in this connection, much material for comment; but I must simply allow it to take its place on the kind earth, amid so much else that is to be used as seed, according to Carlyle, or simply disintegrated as so much chaff. And with this I conclude, trusting always that something of a lesson has been read, not wholly inapplicable, whether to Schopenhauer, or to Kant, or whoever else.

RAPHAEL AND MICHAEL ANGELO.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF HERMANN GRIMM BY IDA M. ELIOT.

Skilled labor presupposes a nation ; art, a nation and a man. Skill, even when it rises to its highest excellence, can be acquired ; art, even in its lowest forms, is inborn, and cannot be gained through any amount of diligence by one who has not possessed it at first. Skill is dependent upon the material which it uses, and its highest triumph is to employ and display this material in endless variety. Art is a child of the spirit, and her triumph is so to control the material that it shall express intelligibly to others the slightest fancy of that spirit which wishes to communicate itself. Art speaks from soul to soul ; the material is only the medium through which the communication is made.

But some material is necessary to both skill and art, and for this reason they are confounded by those who are not able to recognize the spirit through the material. These same people, however, have heard of art, and think that through study they can acquire that discerning power which nature has denied them. Nature alone can give this power, and so it happens that they suppose that art lies in the highly-wrought, and that what is simple is mere skill. These people form the majority in our day, and since their desire of seeing continually something new has created the supply, it has come to pass that a number of workers have been called artists because, through work and study, they have succeeded in imitating those symbols of true art which can be seen in the work of well-known artists. Also, they have used materials even more skillfully than the artists themselves, while the real artists, whose simple thoughts required merely a simple expression, are entirely overlooked for the present. But at last the voice of those who understand and admire them will break forth, and the vexation which the world experiences at finding itself deceived by false imitation will prepare for these a so much the more brilliant reception.

This is the natural course of events. For this reason a Bernini could excite admiration after Michael Angelo; for this reason were so many real artists unknown, while false ones shone forth in the glory of passing days; but for the same reason justice is not forever silent, and it finally sets the real in the place of honor, while it does not need to thrust out the false, whose own weakness has let it fall into obscurity.

For creative spirit lives forever, the material is transient; the spirit is strengthened and grows, while the thoughts of mankind depend upon that first creative thought of the artist as bees upon their queen; the material, however, is consumed like everything external — like clothing, which falls to pieces; gold, which wears away; and the body, which decays. Take two golden statues, both melted down and destroyed, the one of which was a work of art, the other a mere piece of workmanship; the latter has vanished without leaving any trace, while the other can still be seen by the eyes through which the soul of the artist spoke to the stranger soul, making it more beautiful and noble than before, and other souls with whom it shared the wealth it had received were richer for that reason. The world is full of such unknown inheritances.

Praise, honor, and reward allure and satisfy the artisan, but to the artist these are merely the symbols of the love of a people to whom he feels himself drawn nearer by these. Should he feel that these would put him farther off, he would despise them. Both are striving for fame, but the artist desires it only as a consolation which whispers to him lovingly that his efforts have not been vain, which says to him that from his works the spirit which he breathes into them shall shine forth victorious.

To the artisan, fame is merely the giving him an opportunity to sell his works at higher prices, and to increase their sale; an illusion, a deception, which comes to his aid when he convinces himself that, outwardly, his productions resemble the works of an artist — that creature hated and envied by him. But the letter is dead, the word is everlasting.

Though the work of the artisan is despicable when it pretends to be art, it is honorable when it stays within its own

domain. It takes root in a nation, and has a fertile soil. We need it ; it bounds our existence ; as physical beings we should be nothing without it, just as we could not exist, spiritually, without art ; and as body and spirit cannot be separated, so with art and the work of the artisan — they go hand in hand, they need each other, but they are not the same.

There is no art which has not by its side a similarly named trade, as there is nothing which cannot be seen on two sides — one its earthly origin, the other its spiritual place among creations, considered with regard to its beauty.

Beauty has no aim — it exists ; it is its own limit, as is the work of the artist. The useful has an aim beyond itself, and deserves its name only when it has attained its object. One can imagine an artist who might work alone in a desert, and finish a statue of perfect beauty without ever asking whether any one will ever see it except himself and the daylight ; an artisan who should work on alone is an anomaly ; a potter who should make, at random, vessels for which there is no use. These very utensils, however, which are used and then thrown away, are worthy of a double consideration. Worthless in the spiritual meaning during this usefulness, they become, after a thousand years, monuments of vanished culture, and the spirit of the nation speaks from them. It is so with the painting of the Egyptians, and even the ornaments of the old Germanic funeral urns. For the work of the artisan has a spirit in common with the unconscious spirit of the nation, while the artist stands above his people and his time, and what he produces is a symbol of his own thoughts, which he throws to his people as a gift.

Wherever art is considered, the mechanical part must also be considered ; but one must distinguish between them, or else each will be injured by confusion with the other. In order to do this, one must be perfectly free. He only who, without prejudice, listens to the sound of that voice which speaks but in the silence of the inmost heart, will recognize at once whether a work was created in devotion to beauty. He only can tell if it was made by profane hands, useful to the artisan, who possessed only keen appreciation of the weakness of the public, and skill in successfully flattering it. In this connection I need only allude to the theater.

The artist represents his ideal. This word, like all of those which signify deep veneration when spoken by connoisseurs, has become idle praise when uttered by those who care for art only because they hope in that way to fill the emptiness of their souls; and, therefore, one has a horror of using it. Let us give to it its true content.

As long as we live and accumulate experiences we are convinced that nothing upon earth is perfect. While, on the one hand, we recognize in everything that has happened or is created a manifestation of laws eternally true to themselves, on the other hand we see that these laws are subject everywhere to disturbances which we call chance before we recognize it, and we discover that, on account of endless counteracting influences, nothing appears in that completeness of which its conception renders it capable and towards which it strives. The soul of man yields at last to the truth of this experience, but is, however, not satisfied with the idea that it must be so; a feeling, firmly rooted, insists that it was not so once, and may be different in the future. Even with this consolation the soul is not satisfied, but unconsciously, with creative activity, from the pattern of what it sees and experiences, fashions a spiritual form of creation free from those disturbances, and this serves as a double symbol of a higher existence that lies buried in the past, and will rise again in the future. This invisible self-created world we call the ideal.

No man, even the humblest, is without this possession. There is no loss which would carry this with it. The ideal remains man's peculiar property as an inalienable good, and even when it seems to be dimmed and lost, it starts anew. It is the land to whose soil we all cling, whose serfs we all are. It is a slavery we cannot escape, whether we proudly recognize through the bondage, the real blessing, or whether with obstinate denial we seek to tear ourselves away. In every mortal is inborn the longing after his ideal. This may grow weary, it may be almost destroyed, but even should it come to pass that it no longer is apparent in the individual, still will a nation, as a whole, possess it and never give it up. Either it dreams of a future grandeur or it laments a past one.

What corresponds to the ideal of a nation is called by men

the beautiful, the good; those who feel this more sensitively than others, stand high in public esteem; those who combine in themselves and express the feeling of the whole nation are the men whom one loves and honors. But those in whom the reflection of the universal consciousness is so strong that it is clearly mirrored in them, and that they give utterance to it in music, language, or in some other way, till it, gaining for itself its own existence, stands there as an embodiment of what the nation considers good and beautiful—these men are the artists, men who raise to the highest point the veneration of the people. They show one's own soul in the truest sense, one's longings in the most alluring way, and one's future and past in the purest light. They repeat with convincing words one's most secret thoughts; they teach one to speak their own language. They show one's character in completeness. Wherever they enter, every one greets them; wherever they go, all thoughts eagerly follow them; and any work of theirs that can be obtained is valued and kept as the greatest treasure. With such feelings do we honor Goethe, Beethoven, Schiller, and Mozart.

The artist stands in necessarily close relation with his people. Should a nation stand as high toward other nations as its artists stand toward it, then its rule is extended to a wonderful degree. The Greeks take such a high rank. Phidias, Homer, Sophocles, worked for all nations and all times; Corneille and Racine sang for the French only; Shakespeare for all Germanic nations. Those were Greeks and this one an Englishman, and the national characteristics form a part of their personalities. We cannot imagine them without the soil on which they stand. But for the blooming earth on which it shines, the sun would be a dead mass of tormenting clearness; but for its rays, the world would be a dark wilderness, a formless, horrible obscurity; one needs the other; only their contact causes life to arise. In the same way a nation needs its artists. The recognition and esteem of men gives to them their name and worth, but their word and work give to the people the opportunity of loving and honoring them. The artist stands between the finite and the infinite;

where the two meet, he seizes the lightning, holds it fast, and gives it everlasting duration. Everlasting, as long as men live who understand him; should the people who loved him die out, his fame would vanish with his works.

That, however, is hardly to be imagined or feared. A nation does not arise and die out like a species of animal that appears and perishes. When a nation is powerful and great, it has had a father and mother who produced it. We cannot always trace out the combination, but often it lies clear before our eyes. Nations always separate, and from the various branches, which meet on different sides, spring new nations. More wonderful still than the physical commingling of the races is the spiritual unison of their styles of culture. From Roman models was developed the comedy of the Italians; through France it passed to England; there it enriched the ground upon which Shakespeare's flowers grew. From the union of Spanish, English, Italian, and classic elements arose the strict national form in the tragedies of Corneille and Racine; from the Egyptian, the Greek sculpture arose; from Byzantine lifeless attempts sprang the old Italian painting; later, with a fresh start, the old Italian art united with the Greek in Raphael and Michael Angelo. From how many sources sprang Goethe's and Schiller's works? Everywhere there is contact; everywhere great men stand upon foreign shoulders. The most distant elements come together and are united in them. They never gush forth as a spring from the rock, but from a thousand channels their life streams, the waters flowing together; muddy at first, but in the course of time getting clearer, and winning a name. At last they stand in their own individual power, and each of their works bears upon its face the name of the artist. Men all know that there lives but one person who could create that.

But one thing is true: if artists produce works whose divine beauty satisfies our longing, they themselves are, like all of us, subject to those distractions which are the inevitable dowry of human nature. They create the ideal—they cannot newly create themselves; they are only the priests—what they give is greater than they themselves are. But they are the only

ones who try to present it, and so, although they have an individual independent life, their works mingle with the poetry of their lives, and the desire of mankind to see both as an undivided whole is so great that — when all facts are wanting — one tries from these works to trace back the personal experiences of the artist. Raphael's Madonna in Dresden must be a picture of the Fornarina; Shakespeare's sonnets are a new delight to the interpreter; Goethe's, Lessing's, Schiller's writings are examined with conscientious eagerness, and the whole nation takes part in bringing to light the smallest personal allusions. It loves the man, it honors him; he must be no empty name; it perceives with new delight, from a thousand earthly trifles, that this man lived as all others do, ate and drank, and while it draws him down to the every-day life of the times, it rises to him, with whom it feels itself now firmly united. Still, we can never learn the things about the real lives of great men that are known only by those who saw them daily, and who were in a position to feel their influence. What we picture to ourselves is always an imaginary scene, in which we ourselves unconsciously play the most important part. We see their lives as we would like to see them. With this feeling we involuntarily arrange all our information, make prominent what pleases us, and pass over what we prefer kept in silence; and it is our longing for an ideal which teaches us to do this.

The book which has started all these reflections into new activity is "Guhl's Artist Letters." In two volumes the author has given a long list of letters which have been written by painters, sculptors, and, in part, by their friends and patrons. The work begins with the old Italian masters, and extends into the last century. Everywhere the most significant passages are quoted, each is accompanied by a commentary, and, besides this, in a short introduction, the different artists are characterized as a whole.

There are many there who have no claim to immortality — whose activity was merely that of the artisan, without going very deep. There are many who are true artists — Titian, Correggio, Murillo, Rubens — of whom I shall speak here no

further. But only two deserve the higher name of great men — Raphael and Michael Angelo. This distinction is deeper than one might at first think. Euripides, Calderon, and Racine were great poets; Sophocles, Æschylus, Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe were great men; Alexander, Scipio, Hannibal, Cæsar, Frederick, and Napoleon, were that also; while Turenne, Eugene, Blucher, and Wellington were merely great generals. A great man is recognized as a universal force. His soul is so great that it makes little difference through what medium he expresses himself, while those who are great in one special direction require comparison with their kind, and imply a lower order from which they have risen. They were more capable, wiser, more fortunate than their comrades, who always serve as a measure for their greatness. But the great need no such foil; they are separated from the crowd of mortals, and lead a peculiar existence. They appear like broken fragments of another planet, fallen here and there from Heaven, according to the will of Fate. Wherever they are seen, the light all falls on them; the rest stand in shadow. Related to one another like the members of an invisible aristocratic family, they stand close together before our eyes, as if in a brilliant cloud, neither century nor nationality separating them. Raphael and Phidias clasp hands; Frederick the Great stands no nearer than Cæsar; Plato and Homer no farther off than Goethe and Shakespeare. An earthly immortality makes them seem living, and involuntarily we lay everything of importance at their feet and ask their judgment. They are strangers on the earth, and yet the only ones entitled to live here; happier than the happiest, and yet more unhappy than the most wretched among us; for we do not foreshadow [the perfect as they do, and therefore do not feel, as they, the yawning gulf that separates us from it, over which neither bridge leads nor wings can carry. There are a few who were taken by an early death before the years when the torture of isolated work is felt, but the greater number learned, through a long life, to know the pain which they alone could feel and bear. I name, specially, Raphael, and Michael Angelo.

They stand toward one another as Achilles toward Hercules;

as the resistless beauty which beams on all, toward the gloomy force which conquers all; as a short sunny spring toward a long year that begins in storm and ends in tempest. Raphael's works are like golden apples which ripened in an everlasting sunshine; one sees no painstaking in them, he seems to have thrown them off without labor; and even when he represents ruin, or any frightful subject, his pictures have a clear beauty in them, and never oppress the mind of the beholder, who is lost in admiration.

But Michael Angelo's figures know nothing of those bright realms; they seem to move under a heavily clouded sky, to dwell in caves, and each rolls his fate onward as if it were a burden of rock, which strained all the muscles to the utmost. Earnest, sad thoughts are pictured in their brows, as if they, in their lofty eminence, scorned the smiling existence into which Raphael sends out his creations. With each step they seem to remember that the earth under their feet is an iron globe to which they are chained, and they drag after them the invisible chain with which the Divinity has fettered them to a gloomy destiny.

The life of no artist will at all compare with Raphael's in good fortune. No struggles with poverty or hostility oppressed his youth. When a child, as we should call him, he caused the greatest hopes; by degrees he fulfilled and surpassed them, soon going over a distance which no one had anticipated. Who would have believed that it was possible for Art to attain such height? When Francesco Francia saw one of his pictures for the first time, he laid aside his brush and died of grief, that now there was nothing more to strive after. Quickly the youth outgrew his masters; from painting to painting we can trace the more complete development of his genius. At first one can hardly distinguish his pictures from Perugino's, soon it is only Michael Angelo, whose superiority delights him. They knew and honored one another, but did not love each other. That was impossible; but each had the other frequently in mind. Although there was no outspoken rivalry, perhaps there would have been one. Raphael died in the bloom of his life. No diminution of power, no stand-still,

no mannerism is to be seen in him, as in Michael Angelo, who viewed and represented the world in a grandiose way. The human form was safe in his hands; he knew how to make significant the slightest turns, to put beauty into every sinew, whether tense or passively resting. Raphael's forms exhausted the possibility of human motion, as the statues of the Greeks that of human repose, as the poems of Shakespeare exhaust the subject of human passion, or Goethe's poems all aspects of loving. His works are wholly perfect. Any seeming faultiness is only individuality, as the eccentricities of nature do not offend against her laws. When we look at these works, our longing ceases and we desire no more. We wish merely to look; our thoughts vanish; the demands of fancy are silent and are satisfied. There is no suggestion in them that he was painting for others — that he had in mind gold and fame; he seems to have sought for his own happiness while he was working. The goddess of beauty offered him her lips, and he kissed them; her form, and he embraced it. What mattered it to him whether it were seen or not; he did not stand upon a stage opposite his beloved one, and go into raptures of delight in order that others should be inspired to applaud. He enjoyed life, and painted. His pictures show a study that to-day is unheard of, but it seems to have been to him only a delight. It pleased him to repeat a beautiful form three or four times before he painted it; to represent a body in many different postures before he used it definitely in his pictures. All flowed easily from his fingers; it was no work — as the flowers are not any trouble to the rose-bush. Whatever he touched turned into beauty. His life broke off just at the height. He did not fade slowly away; of a sudden he was no longer there; he perished like a beautiful city that sinks into the sea with all its wealth.

A magic charm surrounded him, and possessed all whom he met. All who were with him felt this. Wherever he worked, envy and jealousy ceased among the artists; all were united and arranged themselves under him; all loved him. When he went to the Vatican, more than fifty of them surrounded him, and, accompanied by them, he went up the steps of the palace.

He, perhaps younger than most of them, was more beautiful, more distinguished than all. And still we have no trustworthy likeness of him. But who does not know him? To whom could he be a stranger? When I stand before his pictures, I believe I know him better than his best friends who were with him; and so have thought millions of people since his death, when they have been in the presence of his works. It is the most inspiring charm of fame to be known by all and loved by all. Fame is something very different from praise and recognized position. Those people are not famous who are known only through the words and writings of others, but those who are known personally through their own works, and about whom people feel silently that they are great, and their works indispensable.

Raphael enjoyed this fame as perhaps no mortal has done before or since. He may be compared to Alexander, who was as young as he, and dashed through as brilliant a course, and also died in his bloom. Byron's fame shines with dull light in comparison with his. He also was, in his youth, the greatest poet of his people, and others rendered homage to his superiority. But, taken captive by the circle whose incense he despised, yet still drank in, he grew weak from the first, and at last fell a sacrifice to a double life, from which he had not the power to escape. Alexander was a royal youth. He was not limited to the sphere in which he was, but Raphael was an artist, and never anything else. He might have tried for a cardinal's hat. We are not now to speak of what he might have done, or how he might perhaps have changed in the course of his life, but only of what he really did while he lived. From the beginning to the end, by his conduct, he fulfilled the ideal of an artist's life, and even his jealousy of Michael Angelo does not impair his fame, but rather raises it. For whoever stands so high must desire to be first of all, and can endure no one above him.

What we know concerning the mutual relation of these artists is not very clear, and is of doubtful worth. Verdicts which great men pass upon their peers, even when they sound harsh, have not the significance of the evil words with which

mediocre natures dispute about rank. If Michael Angelo once angrily exclaimed that whatever Raphael knew of architecture he learned from him, he did not wish by that to make Raphael smaller and himself greater. Goethe might perhaps have said, in the same way, of Schiller, "What he has become has been through me;" as Æschylus might have said of Sophocles, or Corneille of Racine. Considered in general, the words are false, yet under certain circumstances they would be justified at the time, and would be rightly interpreted by those for whom they were spoken; for these, filled with the spirit of the voice then present, would feel the truth of the thought which was thus expressed.

There is no praise more sublime and touching than the way that Vasari, Michael Angelo's friend and pupil, ascribes Raphael's supremacy over all artists, not mainly to his superiority and the wisdom of his amiable conduct, but to the essence of his beautiful nature. All painters, not merely the lowest, but the greatest, who were anxious about their own fame worked under him in perfect harmony. Discord and evil thoughts disappeared before him. If he had need of the assistance of any artist, the latter would leave his own work instantly and hasten to him. He lived like a prince. All followed him to honor him, and the pope, who received him like a friend, knew no bounds to his generosity toward him. But that did not hurt his modesty. No one reproached him for having collected treasures. With what a natural grace he yields to Fra Giocondo, an old learned monk, whom the pope had given him as an assistant when he was made the chief director of the building of St. Peter's. The letter to his uncle, Simon Ciarla, to whom he writes on the subject, sounds like words from a very modest youth. He writes that he hopes to learn from him, and to grow ever more perfect in his art. So he wrote in 1514, when he was in his thirty-first year.

In 1483 Raphael was born, in Urbino. His father was Giovanni Sanzio, "*pittore non molto eccellente*;" his first teacher, Pietro of Perugia, "*che era cortese molto ed amator de' vegl' ingegni*." The account of the large cartoons by Leonardo da Vinci and Michael Angelo allured him to Florence, where he

stayed till his father's death. His mother then needed him, and he returned to Urbino, and there kept in order the domestic arrangements. At all times he painted — in Urbino, again in Perugia, and, before his visit to Florence, in Civitella and Sienna. Vasari gives a list of quite a number of isolated productions. Once more he went to Florence and, from there, at last, to Rome. This was when he was twenty-five years old. He died at Rome.

What a small range of places! Urbino, Sienna, Florence, Rome, and, according to Passavant, we may add Bologna. All lie so close together that one might say that Raphael had never gone from home. Michael Angelo's travels would have been just as limited if flight had not driven him twice to Venice. But at that time the center of the world was Italy, and that of Italy was Rome. This was the time when the Romance nations still fashioned the destiny of the world.

Next to Vasari's life of Raphael, I would rather read what Rumohr writes of him in "Italian Researches." Rumohr's style is perhaps the purest imitation of Goethe's manner of telling things, as he was accustomed to do in his old age. If we call Goethe's style easy, then we may call Rumohr's comfortable. He writes as if he were speaking, and he speaks with the measured freedom of a man who is asserting what is exactly true. Since he lived in circles in which it was considered poor taste to utter anything commonplace, his way of thinking and expressing himself bears the mark of excellence in its best sense. In the German language very little has been written, concerning art, which can take the same rank as his writing. Passavant often contradicts both him and others who have made the life of Raphael an object of special study. In general, the disputed points are about trifles, the decision of which throws no peculiar light on the life of the artist.

The editor of the artist letters has in the introduction and notes given everything that is of importance for the sympathizing reader. There are not too many letters given. Style and content always have something specially pleasing, which one can discover in them even if one did not know who had written them. Still, I must not omit here one criticism which applies to the whole book.

All these letters contain nothing that is absolutely necessary to our idea of the real artist ; they are very important sources of information concerning the men — nothing more. For this reason, although much information and many observations are recorded, so that we can accompany the artist in his life, still these scraps of writing form no points which, in themselves, are such land-marks of development as paintings or events of a spiritual or political nature, under whose influence the life has changed its direction. The intention of the book was merely to give the letters and comment upon them, and this is done in a superior manner. But those who, in this book, see before them for the first time the whole activity and the life of the artist might suppose that these letters are important affairs, which they are not. To-day, indeed, the letters exchanged between Goethe and Lotta may be better known than those of Werther, and the correspondence between Schiller and Goethe may be more read than their works. This is a false tendency. Whoever studies one of Raphael's paintings, with its surrounding relations, learns more of him than he can learn from all of his letters. In these remarks I point out a peculiarity of our time, for this age prefers to seek out the most important of the secondary items, and in considering these the spirit of the whole often falls into the position of the unessential.

[*To be continued.*]

THE SPATIAL QUALE.

BY WILLIAM JAMES.

Mr. Cabot, in his acute and suggestive article on the notion of space in the July number of this journal, argues that, as it forms a system of relations, it cannot be given in any one sensation, and concludes that it is a symbol of the general relatedness of objects constructed by thought from data which lie below consciousness. However Mr. Cabot may differ in de-

tail from the authors whom he criticises, he and they are generically one; for the starting-point of their whole industry, in endeavoring to *deduce* space, lies in their regarding as the fundamental characteristic thereof the fact that any one spatial *position* can only be defined by its relation to other positions, and in their assumption that position, until thus defined, is not felt at all.

Mr. Cabot begins his article with the Hegelian thesis that extension has only negative predicates; that it signifies only the indefinite “*otherness*” of all objects of perception to each other. I am at a loss to see how such an inaccurate identification of a species with its entire genus can ever have been in favor. Otherness is not space; otherness is just — otherness, and nothing else; a logical relation between ideas of which *spatial* otherness supplies us with a very peculiar and distinct sort of instance. The ground of its distinctness from other kinds of otherness I hold to be the special form of sensibility which objects spatially comparable *inter se* awaken in us; and I shall endeavor in the following pages to prove that this form of sensibility — this quality of extension or spatial *quale*, as I have called it — exist at the outset in a simple and unitary form. The *positions* which ultimately come to be determined within it, in mutual relation to each other, are later developments of experience, guided by attention. These *relations* of position differ in no respect from the logical relations between items thought of in non-spatial regards. If I say A is farther to the left than B, my relating thought is the same as when I say a nasturtium is nearer to vermilion than a rose. When I say “An ox is larger than a sheep,” my relating thought is the same as when I say “Napoleon was more ambitious than Washington.” The difference in the two cases lies wholly in the sensible *data* on which the thought works. In the one case these are spatial, in the other chromatic, in the third moral; and would be what the Germans call *intensiv* in a fourth case, if I were to say, “Camphor smells milder than ammonia.”

It seems to me that the differences of opinion to which the question has given rise, have arisen in the failure to discrimi-

nate between the mere sensible quality of extensiveness, as such — the spatial *quale*, as we may call it — and the subdivision and measurement of this extension. By holding fast to this discrimination, I believe that empiricism and nativism can be reconciled, and all the facts on which they severally lay most stress receive equal justice. Almost all those who have written on the subject hitherto have seemed to regard it as axiomatic that our consciousness of the whole of space is formed by adding together our perceptions of particular spaces; that there can be no perception of any extent at all without a perception of particular positions within that extent, and of their distances and directions from each other. Extension becomes thus what the English psychologists have called it, an “aggregate of co-existing positions,” and we find intelligent writers like Mr. Sully¹ speaking of “the *fallacious assumption* that there can be an idea of distance in general, apart from particular distances;” whilst Wundt similarly says:² “An indefinite localization, which waits for experience to give it its reference to real space, stands in contradiction with the very idea of localization, which means the reference to a determinate point of space.”

If all this be true, Mr. Cabot is perfectly right in saying that we cannot be aware of space at all without being aware of it as a distinctly apprehended system of *relations* between a multitude of parts — without, in a word, performing a mental synthesis. But that we are originally aware of it without all this, can, I think, be easily shown; and this vague original consciousness of a space in which separate positions and directions have not, as yet, been mentally discriminated, deserves, if it exists at all, the name of sensation quite as much as does the color, “blue,” or the feeling, “warm;” especially since, like “blue” or “warm,” it seems a simple form of retinal or cutaneous sensibility, involving no muscular element whatever.

I will try first to show that into our cognition of space there necessarily enters what must be called a specific quality of

¹ Mind, vol. iii, p. 177.

² Psychologie, p. 480.

sensibility, *sui generis*, the spatial *quale*. This cannot possibly be analyzed into the mere notion of order or relation. Mill, Bain, and Spencer, who so strangely keep repeating that space is nothing but "the order of co-existences," forget the fact that we have co-existences which are arranged in no spatial order. The sound of the brook near which I write, the odor of the cedars, the feeling of satisfaction with which my breakfast has filled me, and my interest in writing this article, all simultaneously co-exist in my consciousness without falling into any sort of spatial order. If, with my eyes shut, these elements of consciousness give me any spatial feeling at all, it is that of a teeming muchness or abundance, formed of their mutual interpenetration, but within which they occupy no positions. For the "order of co-existences" to become the order of space, the co-existences must, in the first place, be evenly gradated, or ordered, in themselves; and, in the second place, their gradations must be enveloped in the unity of the peculiar spatial feeling.

The mind can arrange its ingredients in many orders. The order of positions in space is evenly gradated in three dimensions, but neither the even gradation, nor the three dimensions, nor both together, suffice by themselves to constitute its spatiality. We may have an evenly gradated order of luminosities from white to black; of tints from yellow, through green, to blue; of loudnesses, of all intensities, of good and evil, and so on; but the position of any item in these orders, although it may be metaphorically expressed on a spatial scale, is not directly intuited by the mind as objectively existing in such a scale. The order is really a logical one, *constructed* out of the mutual relations of the various items by the mind, which compares them. It lacks the sensible matrix, so to speak, of a unifying intuition, in which they lie imbedded as the equally logical order of related positions lies in space. Just so we may arrange items of experience in three dimensions; tones may be arranged on scales of intensity, pitch and *timbre*; colors in the orders of hue, intensity, and purity; and the entire system of all possible color and tone, thus constructed, have been symbolized to the imagination by cubes, pyramids,

spheres, and the like. But no one dreams that they exist as such, for every one is conscious that the construction is a logical one, involving a conscious comparison of remembered items and their relations. These exist separately, and to the *system* which they unitedly form there corresponds no sensible, unifying quality which the mind can immediately intuit as a unifying background, like that yielded by space to the bi-dimensional order of objective positions.

Space, then, as we know it, is something additional to mere co-existence and mere continuous order. The space in which items are arranged when they are intuited by us as objectively existing in spatial order, and not simply so symbolically figured, is an entirely peculiar kind of feeling, indescribable except in terms of itself. Why should we hesitate to call it an ingredient of the *sensation* yielded to us by the retina or skin, which intuits the items? Every one will admit the degree of *intensity* of a sensation to be a part of its sensible quality. The brightness of the blue sky, as I now look at it, betrays its intensity by pricking, as it were, my retina. The *extent* of the blue which I at this moment see, seems to be an attribute given quite as immediately. A broad blueness differs from a narrow blueness as immediately as a bright blueness from a sombre blueness. I may, it is true, in the exercise of conscious comparison, identify this particular brightness and blueness with a certain remembered number in a conventional scale of colors, and then think of the neighboring tints as they evenly shade away from this one. So I may, by taking thought, estimate in square feet the breadth of the blue surface, and locate by my imagination its position in that total system of real spaces which I have learnt to know as the geographic world, but which no single retinal sensation can ever give me all at once, because no single retinal image is large enough. For the *intuition* of a given objective space, with its peculiar *quale*, must not be confounded with the *notion* of the total space, in which that and all other particular spaces lie in determinate order. The latter is a real construction out of separate, but related, elements. The former is a sensation — given all at once, if at all. Any space which I can take in at one glance comes to

me as an undivided *plenum*. Were it built up, as the empiricists say, out of a vast number of perceptions of position fused together, I do not see how its quality could escape retaining something of the jerky, granulated character of its composite source. The spaces we *do* construct by adding together related positions — those, namely, which are too vast to be taken in at one glance — are, in fact, presented to consciousness in this jerky manner. The thought of the space between me and the opposite wall is perfectly smooth. The thought of the space between me and San Francisco has to be imagined as a successive number of hours and days of riding or railroading, filled with innumerable stoppings and startings, none of which can be omitted without falsifying the imagination. But if, as the empiricists say, all our space consciousness were compounded of innumerable ideas of motion and position, even the shortest space we perceive ought to be as coarse-grained, if one may so express it, as the distance from here to San Francisco.

We are thus forced to conclude that it is a simple, specific quality of retinal or cutaneous sensation. The quality of muchness or vastness, which envelops the separate positions and particular extensions which we learn to discriminate, clings to them always, colors their order, and makes it the special kind of order we call spatial. *Quâ* order, the spatial order is truly the product of relating thought; but *quâ* spatial it is a *datum* of simple sensibility. In the individual's psychic history the sensation, space, as a simple vague consciousness of vastness, comes first. The field of vision — or better, the sensation of light — can no more exist without it than without its *quantum* of intensity. But just as the degree of intensity, to be cognized as such or such a degree, requires a long education, involving memory, comparison, and recognition; so the quantity of extension, to be perceived — as a given number of feet, rods, or miles — presupposes a like education. The standard of intensity is the intensity of some remembered sensation which we choose for our absolute unit. The standard of extension is the remembered spatial sensation of vastness, or *absolute size*, which we get when certain amounts of our cutaneous surface are excited, or when on our retina we feel the image of our

hand, foot, and so forth, at a certain average or habitual distance selected as the norm.

The spatial *quale* is, then, primitively a very vague *quantum*, but it is a *spatial quantum*. The word vague means that of which the external limits are uncertain, or that which is without internal subdivisions, or both; in the technical language of logic, that which is neither "clear" nor "distinct." The vaguely spatial field of vision is made clear and distinct by being subdivided. To subdivide it means to have the attention called now to one point, now to another within its limits and upon its borders. This is a process which, amongst other things, undoubtedly involves different local sensations at different points, and feelings resulting from muscular motion. Its result is the *measurement* of the field of vision. We may admit the coincidences which Helmholtz, Wundt, and others have shown between visual space thus *measured* and the laws of muscular movement of the eye-ball; we may even allow that the measurement is almost exclusively due to an intellectual elaboration of sensations of motion or innervation. But for all that, we need not in the least suppose that the *spatiality* of the thing measured does not preëxist as a simple sensible quality.

It seems to me that all our sensations, without exception, have this spatial *quale*. I am surprised that Riehl, whose article is in other respects so just, should regard it as an exclusive endowment of the retina. What I mean by the spatial quality is what Professor Bain so often refers to as the "massiveness" of a feeling. The squeaking of a slate-pencil is less spatial than the voluminous reverberations of a thunder-storm; the prick of a pin less so than the feeling of a warm bath; a little neuralgic pain, fine as a cobweb, in the face, far less so than the heavy soreness of a boil or the vast discomfort of a colic or lumbago.³

³ Should any one object that such terms as "voluminous" and "massive," applied to sound and pain, are but metaphorical, and involve no literal spatial import, we may ask him why this peculiarly spatial metaphor is used rather than any other. Evidently because of some quality in the sound or pain which distinctly *reminds us of space*. If we furthermore hold, as I do, that the only possible

The vastness of the retinal sensation seems in no essential respect, but only perhaps in amount, to differ from these. It need not surprise us to find an objectively small surface yielding, when excited, a more massive sensation than a much larger, but less sensitive, surface. How disproportionately great does the crater of a newly-extracted tooth feel! A midge buzzing against our tympanum often feels as big as a butterfly. Degree of nerve-disturbance, and extent thereof, seem to a certain extent to stand mutually in vicarious relation. The retina, then, by the mere fact of being excited, gives us the feeling of extent, and it differs from other sensitive surfaces only in the fact that we are able to fix our attention successively on its different points, to discriminate their directions, and so to measure it.

If one should admit that the first two dimensions of space may thus be called part of the simple retinal sensation, but that the intuition of depth cannot be so given, I would not only reply, with Stumpf, that we cannot feel plane space *as a plane* without in some way cognizing the cubic spaces which the plane separates, but I also would propose the following simple experiment: Let the objector sit with closed eyes, and let a friend approximate some solid object, like a large book, noiselessly to his face. He will immediately become aware of the object's presence and position — likewise of its departure. The perception here seems due to the excessive tactile sensibility of the tympanic membrane, which feels the pressure of the air differently according as an object is near it or not. To certain blind persons this sensation is a surprisingly accurate revealer of surrounding facts, and a friend of

foundation of an analogy is a partial identity in the analogous things, we must suppose the voluminousness and massiveness in question to be, at least partially, the same with spatial bulk. Now, the category of *muchness* is the only *partial* ingredient common to all the several terms. But *muchness* is generic, and embraces temporal, numerical and intensive, as well as extensive muchness. But that peculiarity in the pain and sound which makes us call them voluminous is quite different from that which would make us call them protracted, numerous, or intense. They must, then, have some other characteristic which determines their muchness as spatial; and this, being otherwise indescribable, is what I call the simple spatial *quale*

the author, making the experiment for the first time, discriminated unhesitatingly between the three degrees of solidity of a board, a lattice-frame, and a sieve, held close to his ear. Now as this sensation is never used by ordinary persons as a means of perception, we may fairly assume that its felt quality in those whose attention is called to it for the first time, belongs to it *quâ* sensation, and owes nothing to educational suggestions. Now this felt quality is most distinctly and unmistakably one of vague spatial vastness in three dimensions—quite as much so as is the felt quality of the retinal sensation when we lie on our back and fill the entire field of vision with the empty blue sky. When an object is brought near the ear we immediately feel shut in, contracted; when the object is removed, we suddenly feel as if a transparency, clearness, openness, had been made outside of us.⁴ And the feeling will, by any one who will take the pains to observe it, be acknowledged to involve the third dimension in a vague, unmeasured state.

On the peripheral parts of the retina discrimination is very imperfect, although practice may make it much less so. If the reader will fix his eye steadily on a distant point, and bring his hand gradually into the field of view, he will first see the hand, and see it as extended and possessing parts, but will be wholly unable to count the fingers. He will see objects on the same portions of the retina without recognizing what they are. In like manner if he turn his head up side down, or get into some unnatural position, the spatial *relations* of what he sees—distances, directions, and so forth—will be very uncertain, positions and measurements vague; but who will pretend that the picture, in losing its *order*, has become any the less spatial?

Just as the current psychologies assume that there can be no space before separate positions have been accurately dis-

⁴ I may remark parenthetically, upon the thoroughly objective reference of this uneducated sensation. The observer is not aware of his feeling as such, but of the immediate presence or removal in space of an object. The blind persons whom I have examined with reference to their use of this sensation were entirely ignorant that it resided in the tympanum at all. They did not know how they came to feel the objects, but only that they were there.

tinguished, so they assume the perception of motion to be impossible until the positions of terminus *ad quo* and terminus *ad quem* are severally cognized, and their successive occupancies by the moving body are perceived to be separated by a distinct interval of time. As a matter of fact, however, we cognize only the very slowest motions in this way. Seeing the hand of a clock at XII, and afterwards at VI, I judge that it has moved through the interval. Seeing the sun now in the east and again in the west, I infer it to have passed over my head. But we can only *infer* that which we already generically know in some more direct fashion, and it is experimentally certain that we have the feeling of motion given us as a direct and simple *sensation*. Czermak long ago pointed out the difference between seeing the motion of the second-hand of a watch, when we look directly at it, and noticing the fact of its having altered its position when we fix our gaze upon some other point of the dial-plate. In the first case we have a specific quality of sensation which is absent in the second. If the reader will find a portion of his skin — the arm, for example — where a pair of compass-points an inch apart are felt as one impression, and if he will then trace lines a tenth of an inch long on that spot with a pencil-point, he will be distinctly aware of the point's motion and vaguely aware of the direction of the motion. The perception of the motion here is certainly not derived from a preëxisting knowledge that its starting and ending points are separate positions in space, because positions in space ten times wider apart fail to be discriminated as such when excited by the dividers. It is the same with the retina. One's fingers when cast upon its peripheral portions, cannot be counted — that is to say, the five retinal tracts which they occupy are not distinctly apprehended by the mind as five separate positions in space — and yet the slightest movement of the fingers is most vividly perceived as movement, and nothing else. It is thus certain that our sense of movement, being so much more delicate than our sense of position, cannot possibly be derived from it. A curious observation by Exner⁵ completes the proof that movement is a

⁵ Wiener Sitzungs Berichte, LXXII., Bd. III., Abth., § 156. 1875 .

primitive form of sensibility, by showing it to be much more delicate than our sense of succession in time. This very able young physiologist caused two electric sparks to appear in rapid succession, one beside the other. The observer had to state whether the right hand one or the left hand one appeared first. When the interval was reduced to as short a time as 0.044 the discrimination of temporal order in the sparks became impossible. But Exner found that if the sparks were brought so close together in space that their irradiation circles overlapped, the eye then felt their flashing as if it were the motion of a single spark from the point occupied by the first to the point occupied by the second, and the time interval might then be made as small as 0.015 before the mind began to be in doubt as to whether the apparent motion started from the right or left. On the skin similar experiments gave similar results.

We are accordingly compelled to admit a sensation of motion as such, prior to our discriminations of position in either time or space. But motion, even in this primitive state, occurs in spatial form. It thus follows that we have a feeling of space, distinct enough at any rate for motion to be apprehended as such, before we have anything like the perception of a system of related positions, distances, or directions. This feeling of space, involving as it does no consciousness of relations (though it may later evolve such consciousness), can only be called a kind of sensation.

Whether the feelings of muscular contraction and innervation, or whether the vertiginous sensation yielded by the semi-circular canals of the ear involve also a cognition of motion of this "distinct," though not "clear," kind may be left an open question. It seems, at least, not improbable that they do.⁶ We should thus have a certain spatial quantifica-

⁶ I have not seen Cyon's late work on the semi-circular canals, but I cannot believe him to have succeeded in proving these to be the principal space-giving organ. That they give, when excited, a vague sense of motion through a vague room is undeniable, and they make us acutely sensible of different directions and velocities in this motion. I imagine they subserve the finished structure of objective space more by their delicate discrimination of direction than in any other way. Right and left, up and down, are elementary sensations. If we take a cube and label one side *top*, another *bottom*, a third *front*, and a fourth *back*, there remains no form of words by which we can *describe* to another person which of the re-

tion given as a universal datum of sensibility. These primitive movement spaces may be at first wholly ambiguous.

Vierordt has, in fact, tried in a striking essay⁷ to show that we are originally not aware whether a given movement sensation is performed by us or by something else upon us. Objectivity and subjectivity, direction, extent, and all other relative determinations are subsequent intellectual acts, presupposing memory and comparison. But these latter functions could never work their data into the spatial form unless that form already clove to the latter as sensations.

To sum up briefly my thesis: I say that the feeling arising from the excitement of any extended part of the body is felt as extended — why, we cannot say. The primary retinal sensation is a simple vastness, a teeming muchness. The perception of positions within it results from sub-dividing it. The measurement of distances and directions comes later still.

The vastness is subdivided by the attention singling out particular points within it. How this discrimination occurs we shall see later; but when it has occurred, every subdivision thus separately noticed appears as occupying a separate position within the total bigness. Several subdivisions of a sensitive surface, excited together, fuse into a broader position or bigger space than that of any one of them excited or noticed alone,⁸ but smaller than the total bigness which they help

maintaining sides is *right* and which *left*. We can only point and say here is right and there is left, just as we should say this is red and that blue, without being able to give an idea of them in words. Now when we move our heads to the left or right new objects dart into those respective sides of the field of vision, and thus the sides of this field have their intrinsic contrast augmented by the still intenser contrast of the two feelings of direction in movement severally associated with them. Up and down, and intermediate directions, have their differentiation in consciousness improved in the same way. It may be also that our visual feeling of depth, the third dimension, is re-enforced by an associated semi-circular canal feeling of floating forward. Where the third dimension is abysmal — as in looking up to, or down from, a height — the association of a swimming, floating, or falling element is very manifest.

⁷ Zeitschrift für Biologie, 1876.

⁸ The single sensation yielded by two compass points, although it seems simple, is yet felt to be much bigger and blunter than that yielded by one. The touch of a single point may always be recognized by its quality of sharpness. This page looks much smaller to the reader if he closes one eye than if both eyes are open. So does the moon, which latter fact shows that the phenomenon has nothing to do with parallax.

constitute. A and B, two points simultaneously discriminated by attention, are *ipso facto* felt as outside or alongside of each other; but the amount of separating interval and the direction are at first quite vague. It is only when a third point, C, has been noticed, or rather a large number of additional points, all outside of each other, that the comparison of their distances and directions fixes and determines the distance and direction of A from B. We then feel A and B to be closer together than B and C. We feel C to be in the same direction from B as B is from A, and the like. And this gradual education determines for the first time a system of fixed positions within the total space. In a word, accurate perception of any two positions as such, presupposes separate acquaintance with other positions. The mapping out of retinal space involves much experience; the mere perception of it as spatial, none. All these are ultimate facts not deducible from anything simpler. He who believes them is certainly to be called a "Nativist," or a "Sensationalist."

It follows, from these propositions, that if a sensitive surface is affected *in its totality* by each of many different outward causes, each cause will appear with the vastness given by the surface, but the several causes will not appear alongside of each other, not even if they all excite the surface at once. The olfactory and gustatory surfaces seem to be in this predicament. Whatever excites them at all excites the whole extent of them at once; though, even in the tongue there seems to be a determination of bitter flavors to the back, and of acids to the front, edge of the organ. Spices likewise affect its sides and front, and a taste like that of alum localizes itself, by its styptic effect on the portion of mucous membrane which it immediately touches, more sharply than roast pork, for example, which stimulates all parts alike. The pork, therefore, tastes more spacious than the alum or the pepper. In the nose, too, certain smells, of which vinegar may be taken as the type, seem less spatially extended than heavy, suffocating odors, like musk. The reason of this appears to be that the former inhibit inspiration by their sharpness, whilst the latter are drawn into the lungs, and thus excite

an objectively larger surface. I will, however, not venture to dogmatize on this point.

In like manner, a sensitive surface, excited everywhere homogeneously, might only feel its total vastness without discerning positions therein. A fœtus bathed in *liquor amnii* discerns no one part of its skin more than another. But if we wet a portion of the skin, the wet part is strongly contrasted with the rest, and, with the general contrast of excitement, the contrast of local feeling simultaneously awakes. Adventitious sensations, occurring on special points of a sensitive surface, certainly call attention to the diversities of local feeling resident in the points, and make us notice their separateness in a way impossible when the surface was unexcited. In the spatial muchness of a colic — or, to call it by a more spacious-sounding vernacular, belly-ache — I can with difficulty distinguish the north-east from the south-west corner, but can do so much more easily if, by pressing my finger against the former, I am able to make the pain there more intense. I cannot feel two local differences on my skin by a pure mental act of attention, unless the local feelings are very strongly contrasted indeed, and belong to quite distinct parts of the body. But I can get the contrast of local feelings in spots much closer together by exciting them, even though each be excited in an identical way, as by compass-points. In cases of this sort, where points receiving an identical kind of excitement are, nevertheless, felt to be locally distinct, and the objective irritants are also judged multiple, — *e. g.*, compass-points on skin, or stars on retina, — the ordinary explanation of psychologists is no doubt just: We judge the outward causes to be multiple because we have discerned the local feelings of their sensations to be different. Granted none but homogeneous irritants, that organ would then distinguish the greatest multiplicity of irritants — would count most stars or compass-points, or best compare the size of two wet surfaces — whose local sensibility was the least even. A skin whose sensibility shaded rapidly off from a focus, like the apex of a boil, would be better than a homogeneous integument for spatial perception. The retina, with its exquisitely sensitive *fovea*,

has this peculiarity, and undoubtedly owes to it a great part of the minuteness with which we are able to subdivide the total bigness of the sensation it yields. On its periphery the local differences do not shade off very rapidly, and we can count there fewer subdivisions.

But I believe that the psychologists, in making the judgment of discrete cause, *always* depend on perception of discrete position, have only stated half the truth.⁹ I fancy that the breaking up of the sensitive surfaces into positions depends quite as much on our recognition of the heterogeneity and multiplicity of simultaneously impinging sensations as the latter recognition depends on our noticing the positions.

Positions which would not be distinguished if excited by homogeneous stimuli have their local feelings awakened when the stimuli show a strong contrast of quality. Whatever emphasizes the quality of the adventitious feeling turns the attention more exclusively to it, and makes us, in the same act, aware of its place. Qualitative contrasts are counted *where* they belong. On the retinal margin color contrast is very imperfect. A motley object gives us nothing but a blurred perception of "something there." The *there* is as blurred as the *something*, but the moment the object breaks into two colors the *there* breaks into two spots.

It follows, from all this, that the psychologic problem which the study of space-perception suggests is not what has generally been assumed. How, after noticing certain simultaneous differences, do we come to make a spatial construction of them? That problem is unanswerable; extent cleaves immediately to every simultaneity, and position to every difference we notice within it—all by an ultimate law. Our real prob-

⁹ I do not refer to the explanations of double image by misjudged doubleness of position, where two organs are used—the double pea felt with crossed fingers (see Robertson, in *Mind*, vol. i) and double optic images (see Wundt, *Psychologie*). These delusions are no doubt due to the fact that the simultaneous excitements in question most habitually come from two objects differently located. The objective judgment, however, may be readily corrected by experience without the duplicity of the local sensation, as such, being in the least altered. I deal in the text only with the local discriminations made within the continuous bigness yielded by a single organ, retina, or finger.

lem is: How come we to notice the simultaneous differences at all? How can we ever evolve parts from a confused unity, if the latter did not yield them at first? How, in a word, does a vague muchness ever become a sum of discrete constituents? This is the problem of Discrimination, and he who will have thoroughly answered it will have laid the keel of psychology.

I can only suggest here that the history of discrimination is to a great extent a history of interaction between sensations. It is due to the play of association and dissociation. In the case that now concerns us, local contrasts which would never be noticed, *per se*, are emphasized in consciousness in many ways by the addition of other feelings to them. In addition to what we have noticed already, I may make the following remarks.

In the first place, it is a law that sensations experienced in immutable association are apt not to be discriminated. We do not discriminate the feeling of contraction of the diaphragm from that of expansion of the lungs. Experienced always together, they form the simple feeling called "drawing breath." Now, the purely local peculiarities of feeling in different parts of a sensitive surface are locked into an invariable order in our experience. We should therefore naturally expect to have great difficulty in picking out any one point on the retinal surface; for example, if that surface never became the seat of other contrasts than these immutable, local differences. The difficulty would be still further increased by the fact that, considered *in abstracto*, local differences are utterly insipid, and carry with them no difference of emotional interest. But emotional interests are the great guides to selective attention. One retinal position, therefore, could hardly be singled out from any other before an interesting object had come to occupy it. It might then share the interest of the object, and be noticed. Again, the local differences, *per se*, may be very slight quantitatively, and require an adventitious sensation, superinduced upon them, to awaken the attention. But after the attention has once been awakened in this way, it may continue to be conscious of the unaided difference; just as a sail on the horizon may be too faint for us to notice until some

one's finger placed against the spot has pointed it out to us, but may then remain visible after the finger has been withdrawn.

On the skin the purely local contrasts of feeling seem slight, whilst the adventitious sensations, that may simultaneously come and perch in different near spots, are few in kind. But who can doubt that if, instead of receiving the same kind of sensation from the outer world at each point, a square inch of the skin might be checkered all over with spots of heat and cold, of itching, throbbing, stinging, pressure, and suction, our local analysis of it would be far more delicate. But this imaginary condition of the skin is the actual condition of the retina, with its power to be simultaneously impressed by the most widely contrasted and most sharply diversified adventitious feelings. The retina can at once feel white and black, but the ear cannot so feel sound and silence. The addition of mobility to these two peculiarities of the retina multiplies enormously their separate effects as aids to discrimination. A luminous point, moving from *a* to *b* on the retina, will awaken the perception of movement in space which we saw above to be primordial; which, in fact, excites the attention more than any other retinal sensation, so that the marginal parts of the retina may be said to be mere sentinels, saying, "Who goes there?" and calling the *fovea* to the spot. The tract moved over is thus most vividly accentuated and marked off from the environment. Moreover, a sensation but dimly segregated whilst on the margin of the field of view has its quality distinctly contrasted with all the rest the moment we turn the *fovea* upon it, and may then remain distinguished when it resumes its marginal position. The number of forms and colors we learn to separate from each other is thus increased, whilst the incessant wandering of the forms and colors from point to point must inevitably, by that "law of dissociation by varying concomitants" of which I have spoken in a previous article,¹⁰ drag the purely local feelings, not only apart from each other in consciousness, but also apart

¹⁰ On Brute and Human Intellect. This Journal, vol. xii, p. 236.

from any constant association with particular forms and colors, and end by letting them roll out isolatedly upon the table of the mind, where they then are felt as so many positions, pure and simple.

In yet another way the local feelings, if very slight, may be discriminated by the aid of motion. It seems to be one of the laws of discrimination that two feelings, whose contrast is so slight as to pass unnoticed, may end by becoming distinguished, in case they severally form associations with other bodies of feeling whose contrast is more massive. The massive contrast takes, as it were, the smaller one in its tow. The slightly differing feelings are dragged asunder, and afterwards, by a process we cannot explain, remain segregated and discernibly *in se*. Thus, Madeira and sherry may be indistinguishable at first to my taste; but, if I get to associate the taste of one with Brown's table and the taste of the other with Smith's, I will presently, on tasting Madeira, be reminded of Brown's dining-room by *something* in the wine, and will then use the name Madeira, which is also associated with the same experiences. Later still, the "something" itself is cognized as a characteristic flavor. To apply this to the eye, each peripheral retinal point becomes habitually associated with the one peculiar feeling of movement necessary to bring the object which occupies it to the *fovea*. If two feelings of movement are more massively contrasted, *inter se*, than two retinal local feelings, they may drag these out from their first confounded state, just as Brown's table and Smith's drag sherry apart from Madeira.

It is no wonder then that the retina, whose peculiarities of structure so enormously facilitate the intricacy of association and dissociation, should be the organ in which all discrimination, local as well as qualitative, is at its maximum.

I have said nothing yet about the quantitative measurement of retinal distances. It seems quite certainly performed by the aid of movement, which, superimposing the same line or figure on different tracts of the retinal surface, marks them off as tracts equal to each other. Feelings of innervation and contraction, quantitatively compared with each other in con-

sciousness, may also be used to estimate the equivalence of retinal tracts on which the same image cannot be successively superposed. I assuredly have nothing to add to the admirable labors of the German physiologist on the *Ausmessung des Seefeldes*, and do not venture to decide between Classen's views and those of Wundt and Helmholtz. I merely call attention to the fact that these quantitative equivalencies are woven by the muscles into a previously existing spatial surface, in which the general bearing of the several included positions is already defined. The equivalencies have no more to do with constituting the spatiality, as such, than the numbers on a block of houses have to do with constituting their habitability. Most authors assume that without muscular feelings the spatial form of consciousness could not exist at all. They either constitute it or help create it. M. Delbœuf more clearly than any one, says, in his *Psychologie comme science naturelle*, that they constitute it; and in his brilliant and original article on Vision¹¹ he maintains that a punctiform sense organ, which could only be excited by a line of force vertical to its surface, would, if made to move from the point A (which sends one such line down upon it) to the point B (which sends another), affect us with the consciousness that A and B were situated beside each other in space, at a distance measured by the intervening movement. If, for instance, we have a punctiform ear at the bottom of a tube which admits only such air waves as coincide with its axis, we should, according to M. Delbœuf, by rotating this tube, first upon the trombone, then upon the drum, and then upon other instruments of the orchestra, acquire a perfectly topographic field of sound, as spatial as that of the retina, the position of each sonorous ingredient being defined by the movement which calls it into existence. The reason why the actual ear gives us no such distinct field is, according to M. Delbœuf, because our ear is so constructed that, no matter which way we move it, we are always conscious of the same sounds, the utmost alteration

¹¹ Revue Philosophique, T. iv., pp. 173, 183. "*La faculté de se mouvoir en sachant qu'on se meut.*"

being a slight change in relative intensity. Now I believe this is entirely incorrect, and that we have not the shadow of a reason to suppose that, were the trombone to become silent the moment we moved our ear from it towards the drum, and the latter not to sound until, so to speak, we had accurately sighted it, we should form any notion that they coexisted, separated by an interval of space. Sounds and motions would form pure succession in time, like the succession of notes separated by muscular feelings in the larynx when we sing a scale.¹²

The only organ which can give a feeling of space is an extended, not a punctiform organ. When the retina fixates, first A and then B, B comes into the field without A vanishing. For a time they are actually felt to coexist as simultaneous retinal sensations, distinguished from each other by the analytic attention. This form of presence, and no mere linking by motion, makes their arrangement spatial. All that motion can do is to help us distinguish A from B as they lie side by side. In the retina it does this by rapidly altering their sensible quality. When the *fovea* is on A, A is bright; when it moves to B, B is bright. In this way it breaks A and B apart, and we perceive their separate positions. A motion which should occur without in any way altering the relative intensity or quality of the coexistent feelings would in no way aid us to distinguish them. It would help our space perception quite as little as the motion of M. Delbœuf's punctiform organ, which, by altogether annihilating A the moment B was attended to, might be considered as occupying the opposite extreme. The retina forms the golden mean.

So far, it seems to me, we have met with no great difficulties. What has made students of the subject disinclined to admit that the retinal sensations, purely as such, have a primitive, spatial collaterality in consciousness, has been the fact

¹² The ascription of height and depth to certain notes seems due, not to any localization of the sounds, but to the fact that a feeling of vibration in the chest and tension in the gullet accompanies the singing of a bass note, whilst when we sing high the palatine mucous membrane is drawn upon by the muscles which move the larynx, and awakens a feeling in the roof of the mouth.

that the same amount of excited retina can suggest the most various, absolute, and relative direction and size in the object whose image occupies it, according to the circumstances. If the native determinations of space by the retina be so overpowered by the suggestions of experience, there can, these authors think, be nothing intuitive about them.

But this difficulty is easily cleared away by reflecting that the determinations of size, shape, and so forth, in question, pertain to the objective world of things, as we deem them absolutely to exist. These objective spaces may very well not be intuitive, but constructed by Association and Selection, out of various subjective spatial experiences, partly tactile, partly locomotor, partly retinal experiences taken from other points of view than the present. And the present retinal sensation, with its spatial characteristics, may quite as well be used as a sign of these other spatial characteristics as the sound *bang* may be the sign of the widely different sound made by the explosion of a cannon. Underneath all this complex and varying objective import of the retinal sensation, the subjective sensation itself persists, with all its parts, alongside each other, in the full spatial collaterality which nativists claim for them. It is true, that most men overlook it, because the import is of more practical moment to them than the sign. But artists and physiologists train their attention to observe the sensation *in se*, and I am not aware that any one of them has ever professed to find it devoid of the spatial *quale*.

Such abundant room thus appears to be left for the achievements of empiricists in the study of this objective construction that they need not grudge to the nativists the little gift of primordial bigness and collateral subdivision which the latter are contented to "beg" at the outset of their task. The only point which, in my mind, casts the least doubt on their assumption is drawn from the ear. Though we are able by that organ to discriminate coexistent voices, or pitches, we do not necessarily arrange them alongside of each other. At most, the high tone is felt as a thin, bright streak on a broader, darker background. It may be, however, that the terminal organs of the acoustic nerve are excited all at once by sounds

of any pitch, as the whole retina would be by every luminous point if there were no dioptric apparatus affixed. Notwithstanding the brilliant conjectures of the last few years which assign different acoustic end-organs to different rates of air-wave, we are still greatly in the dark about the subject; and I, for my part, would much more confidently reject a theory of hearing which violated the principles advanced in this article than give up those principles for the sake of any hypothesis hitherto published about either organs of corti or basilar membrane.

There are but three possible kinds of theory concerning space. Either (1) there is no spatial *quale* at all, and space is a mere symbol of succession; or (2) there is a *quale* given immediately in sensation; or, finally (3), there is a *quale produced* out of the inward resources of the mind, to envelop sensations which, as given originally, are not spatial, but which, on being cast into the spatial form, become united and orderly. This last is the Kantian view. Stumpf admirably designates it as the "psychic stimulus" theory, the crude sensations being considered as goads to the mind to put forth its slumbering power. Wundt, who calls space a synthesis containing properties which its elements lack, explicitly adopts the third view, and so does Lotze. Helmholtz is so sententious (and vacillating?) that it is a little hard to class him distinctly, but there is no doubt that visual space, at any rate, is constructed for him out of non-spatial sensations of sight. The word "empiricist" in his optics means just the opposite of its ordinary signification. Mill, Bain, and Spencer seem all to have gone astray, like lost sheep. Mill, with his mental chemistry, would sometimes seem to hold the third view, but sometimes again the first. Bain sticks most to the first, but sometimes implies the third. These authors are bent on making a triumphant use of their all-sufficing principle of association. They wish, therefore, if possible, to *account* for space by it. But, between the impossibility of getting from mere association anything not contained in the sensations associated, and the dislike to allow any spontaneous mental productivity, they flounder in a dismal dilemma. Spencer joins them there.

He most explicitly denies the spatial quality to any of the elementary sensations. In his *Psychology*, volume 2, page 168, he says: "No idea of extension can arise from a *simultaneous* excitation" of a multitude of nerve terminations like those on the skin or the retina, since this would imply a "knowledge of their relative positions,"—that is "a preëxistent idea of a special extension, which is absurd." On page 172 he says, "No relation between *successive* states of consciousness gives in itself any idea of succession;" and, on page 218, "the *muscular* sensations accompanying motion are quite distinct from the notions of space and time associated with them."

He nevertheless vociferously inveighs against the Kantian position, that space is a spontaneous mental product. And yet he does not anywhere explicitly deny space to have a specific *quale* different from that of time.

Such subject incoherency is really pitiful. The fact is, that all these English authors are really psychical stimulators, or Kantists, at bottom. The space they speak of is a new mental product not given in the sensations. I repudiate this position because it appears to me thoroughly mythological. I have no direct experience of any such mental act of creation or production. My spatial intuitions do not occur in two times, but in one. My mind is woven of one tissue, and not chopped into joints. There is not a moment of passive non-spatial sensation, succeeded by one of active spatial perception, but the form I look at is as immediately felt as the color which fills it. If one can be called a sensation, so can the other. That higher parts of the mind are also involved in spatial perception, who can deny? They fill it with intellectual relations, as Mr. Cabot has well pointed out. But these relations, when they obtain between elements of the spatial order, do in no whit differ from the same intellectual relations when they join elements in the orders of number, in tensivity, quality, and the like. The spatiality comes *to* the intellect, not from it.

One word more about Kant. Helmholtz says:¹³ "By Kant the proof that space is an *a priori* form is based essentially on

¹³ *Mind*, vol. iii, p. 213.

the position that the axioms are synthetic propositions, *a priori*; but even if this position be dropped, the space representation might still be the necessary *a priori* form in which every coextended manifold is perceived. This [*i. e.*, dropping the axioms] is not surrendering any essential feature of the Kantian position.”

I make bold to differ from this. The mere innateness of the spatial form of sensibility is surely not the essence of the Kantian position. Every sensationalist empiricist must admit a wealth of native forms of sensibility. The important question is: Do they, or do they not, yield us *a priori propositions*, synthetic judgments? If our “sensation” space does this, we are still Kantians in a deeper sense by far than if we merely call the spatial *quale* a form of *Anschauung*, rather than an *Empfindung*. But if the new geometry of Helmholtz and others has upset the necessity of our axioms (and this appears to be the case; see, especially, the article just quoted), then the Kantian doctrine seems literally left without a leg to stand upon.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS.

(A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THOMAS DAVIDSON, AND TRANSLATED BY HIM FOR THIS JOURNAL FROM THE ITALIAN.)

[The author of the following letter, which I believe I am at liberty to print, I do not know. Last spring, when I was looking over, in Rome, the mediæval commentaries on Aristotle, and trying to discover their value for a true interpretation of his text, it was suggested to me that I should do well to consult some of the more famous Catholic doctors who made a special study of Thomas Aquinas and his commentaries on Aristotle. An opportunity having presented itself to me to do this, I seized it eagerly, and soon became satisfied that the much-maligned scholastics had understood Aristotle at least as well as any one who came after them, and, as a consequence, had a philosophy which, for thoroughness and profundity, left most succeeding systems far behind it. I became especially interested in the doctrines of the greatest of mediæval thinkers, Thomas Aquinas, and most gladly accepted the offer of Father Domenico Marinangeli, of the cathedral at Aquila, in the Abruzzi, to obtain for me a summary of that philosophy from a friend of his who knew it thoroughly, and who was at work on an exposition of it, hereafter to be given to the public. The following is this summary, which I have translated from the Italian, in the hope that it may help to interest Americans in the works of the great Catholic thinker. Our Protestant prejudices, caused by the abuses of

Catholicism, have perhaps long enough blinded us to the great truths that lie embedded in the doctrines of that system, and, with the aid of a shallow Baconianism, cut us off from the historical development of thought in the world. When our thinking returns to the basis of Aristotle, as it inevitably must do, we shall have much to learn from the schoolmen.

The italics in the letter are the author's; the Greek quotations have been added by me. — T. D.]

DEAR SIR :

§ 1. Before presenting you with an epitome of the Thomistic philosophy, allow me to recall to your attention a few truths professed by all.

1. That the human mind *adds nothing* to, and *takes nothing away* from, the nature of things when it unites with and cognizes them.

2. That our mind, in the *act* of cognition, sets out from the *real, concrete essence* (ὀνσία), and not from the abstract or possible (τὸ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ἢ τὸ δυνάμει).

3. That the proper object of philosophy is the supreme reasons of things (αἱ πρῶται αἰτίαι or τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτία).

4. That Catholic Ontologism consists in asserting and maintaining the supremacy of God in rational science.

5. That this supremacy consists in the placing of God as the highest principle of philosophy and the *objective law* of our *speculative judgments*, in such a manner that, even according to the schools of the adversaries of Ontologism, His ineffable and divine will is the supreme law and norm of our moral actions.

Now, I say: 1. That according to Saint Thomas, the powers of the mind are in part *active* and in part *passive*, and that in the *process* of cognition the latter precede the former (1 Sum., q. 77, art. 3).

2. That Being stands to the *passive powers*, ut principium et causa movens; to the *active*, ut terminus et finis (ib. id., art. 4). The object of this article is to show that the powers of the mind are *ordered*.

3. That Being, *principium et causa movens* (ὄθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως) *est ens actu*, or *real*, according to the Thomistic axiom: *Nihil reducitur de potentia in actum nisi per aliquod ens actu*. (Αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν ὅπῃ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος.

Aristotle, *Metaph.* IX, 8.) I cite no passage, because Saint Thomas repeats this everywhere.

4. That the intellect ($\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$) is the primal power of the mind, and the *first of the passive* powers (1 S., q. 82, art. 3); and the will, the first of the active powers, being the moving cause of all the forces of the mind. Hence this power is able to make the intellect pass from the *condition of potentiality* to the second acts, but cannot make anything pass to the *first act*, which *act* is caused directly and immediately by God in our intellect. (1. S., q. 82, art. 4, ad 3). This article, *Utrum voluntas moveat intellectum?*—translated by the famous Cardinal de Vio into this other, *Utrum voluntas deducat intellectum de potentia in actum*—replies to the question in the negative as regards the *first act* ($\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\eta \xi\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\alpha$), and then proceeds to solve the following problem: *Num primus motus intellectus reducatur in Deum et quomodo?* If you should see fit to read the profound demonstration of Cardinal de Vio, who, in his commentary on Saint Thomas, certainly was not prejudiced by party spirit in favor of this or of that other system, there being no such controversy in his day, you will see most plainly that God is the efficient cause of our *first intelligence*, or *first act*, as the Thomistic phrase is.

These theories bring him to the question, Does the human mind always think or not? ($\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \nu\omicron\sigma\acute{\iota} \acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon \delta' \omicron\delta \nu\omicron\sigma\acute{\iota}$. *De An.* III. 5. 2.) Let the following proposition serve as a reply to the question: *Utrum potentiæ rationales sint semper in actu respectu objectorum in quibus attenditur imago.* (Lib. 1, sent. dist. 3, q. 4, art. 3.)

In this thesis Saint Thomas distinguishes, with regard to our intellect, the simple *intelligere* ($\nu\omicron\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu$) from *discernere* ($\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$) and *cogitare* ($\delta\iota\omega\nu\omicron\sigma\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$). Now, simple *intelligere*, “nihil aliud dicit quam simplicem intuitum intellectus in id quod sibi est praesens intelligibile.” And *intuition*, “nihil aliud est quam praesentia intelligibilis ad intellectum quocumque modo;” that is, as he explains, not implying any *intentio cognoscentis*, Being presenting itself not as *objectum cognitum*, clearly and distinctly, but as simple *principium cognitionis et objectum agens ad potentiam*, and therefore known confusedly.

In this sense, the mind *semper intelligit* — what? *Se et Deum* — itself and God. This *confused intelligence* is *initial* and *imperfect*, as Saint Thomas himself admits in reply to the second difficulty. *His words are: Ad secundum ergo dicendum, quod philosophus loquitur de *intelligere*, secundum quod est *operatio intellectus completa distinguentis vel cogitantis* et non secundum quod HIC SUMITUR INTELLIGERE. (Ib. id. ad 2.) Now, why has it not *consciousness*, *i. e.*, cognition, clear, distinct, perfect, complete?

Consciousness is reflected cognition; therefore, it cannot take place where there is not first cognition. But in the *first act* there is no cognition. Inasmuch as in it there is only the simple intuition (per simplicem intuitum), and since that is merely the presence of the intelligible to the intellect (presentia intelligibilis ad intellectum), and not a determinate, but an indeterminate, presence (quoenumque modo et indeterminate), the intuition results in the simple intelligence which the mind has permanently of itself and God (*intelligit semper se et Deum*), and not in cognition, inasmuch as that belongs not to simple *intelligence*, but to *discernere* and *cogitare*. Hence it is in vain that we strive to become conscious of the first act in which God is present to the mind, *non tanquam objectum cognitum sed tanquam principium cognitionis*. Just so we do not feel that we perceive the light, which is not a distinct object presenting itself to our eyes, but is the objective principle of vision which informs our eyes, makes them act, and enables them to see. And here it is necessary to observe that man, being of a nature composed of spirit and body, and nature being the *principium operationis*, the action of man, even in regard to spiritual objects, can never be entirely spiritual; but every operation of the intellect is accompanied by the operation of the body in the brain, and hence it is that every idea is accompanied by an image, every intellectual concept by a concept of the imagination. For this reason the consciousness, which is the cognition by the mind of its *own* acts, cannot take place with regard to that act which is entirely spiritual, not caused by the human compound, but entirely divorced from connection with the body, as is the first act of the intel-

lect — that primordial act by which the intellect is formed or stamped with the divine light, which is the Word-Cause-Reason of things, animated or invested with the power to reflect the action of that word in things — enabled to act. These facts enable us to understand that the expression “first act” has not the same meaning that any act of a man has with reference to the other acts that follow it. The first act, if it is first in regard to time, is still more so in regard to order. Out of it spring the second acts, which *begin* and *end*, *i. e.*, *pass*, while it presents, with respect to the second acts, neither beginning nor end, but precedes them all, and includes them all; in short, does not pass, but endures. Now, there is no consciousness of that which neither begins nor ends — of that which is forever uniform and permanent. So we do not *feel* the act by which the soul informs the body and makes it live, although the psychologists admit and insist upon that act. Our great Rosmini admitted a *fundamental feeling* as the substratum of all sensations. The psychologists have bitterly combated the doctrine of that philosopher, and so they pretend to have a consciousness of the first act whereby the Word-Cause-Reason of things originally informs the spirit.

Consciousness is reflected cognition, which has for its *term* that which was the *efficient principle* in direct cognition. (1 S., q. 85, art. 2.) In consciousness we do not perceive again the object already perceived in direct cognition, but we perceive ourselves, our own act, our own direct cognition; hence, *immediately* we perceive the knowing *subject*, and *mediately* in the subject, already united by direct cognition to the *object*, we again perceive the *object* itself. When, however, we perceive it the second time, we perceive it just as we have already perceived it in direct cognition. Now, how can any one of us assume to have a consciousness of our *first act*, if it is not our act, or an act having its origin in us, although produced by God in us, while we remain passive. We are not the efficient principle of the first act, but God; the formation of our intellect is the term of that act. Adversaries might reply that we have consciousness not only of our *act*, but also of our passive *state*, even when it is not we who act, but an-

other that acts on us, and we do nothing more than *receive* his action. This is most true, but with one condition, viz. : that we *react* upon that which acts upon us, and receive its action in this way. Without such reaction on our part, we receive nothing; he who receives, acts in receiving; he acts against another act — that is, reacts. How many objects in the course of a walk impress themselves upon our senses, without our having any recollection of them? And we have no recollection of them because we have had no consciousness of them, and we have had no consciousness of them because we did not react when they impressed themselves, in order to receive and feel them. Now, there can be no reaction to receive the first operation of our intellect, because there can be no reaction by the intellect which is not formed, but is being formed in that act.

The truth is, the passivity of the first act is the creation of activity; the intellect is formed and set in action — put to its first act — which is causal of all other acts. And such a first act of the intellect is that intuition of which Saint Thomas speaks, and that *intelligere* pure and simple, which is not yet *discernere* or *cogitare*. For this reason, if the intellect is essentially self-compenetrative and endowed with consciousness, even its first *intelligere* must be accompanied with its proper consciousness. Nevertheless, consciousness of the first *intelligere* must, in every respect, correspond to that act, and hence must be (1) inborn in the intellect, and not produced by the intellect after the manner of its other conscious acts; (2) not distinct, or gathered up and laid aside in the memory, like all the other acts of consciousness, but diffused without beginning and without end, equally and permanently underlying as a principle, and dominating as a criterion all the other acts of the intellect; (3) confused and vague in itself, as well as in respect to the object apprehended (intuited, *angeschaut*) in the first act, according to the theory above expressed; (4) consciousness, not of any apprehension of an object, but of derivation from the formal object of our spiritual faculties and of distinction in it. Now, that there is such a consciousness in man is proved by his original and fundamental feeling of

the true, the good, and the beautiful. This feeling is called *common sense* in respect to the true, *moral sense* with respect to the good, simply and absolutely, and *æsthetic sense* with respect to the beautiful. What, after all, is this feeling but the consciousness of that first act, whereby we are stamped by God with His word and image and drawn to Him?

Yes, drawn to Him; and the accomplishment of this drawing is all our destiny. This is the final reply; this is the highest outcome of the system. Do you strive after a consciousness of intuition? Well, the whole development, the whole round of second acts is simply the consciousness of intuition. The feeling of the true, the good, and the beautiful is the first moment in this consciousness. The celebrated Gioberti, prince of modern Italian philosophers, in explaining his ontologism, his distinguished two states of the intellect, that of intuition and that of reflection, which is simply the consciousness of intuition. Reflection reconstructs what is given in intuition, and reconstructs it *distinct*, making use of created terms, and so *appropriates* it, and finally apprehends as the term of its own cognition (the objectum cognitum of Saint Thomas) what in intuition was merely its *principium et causa movens*. If consciousness is the reflex act which repeats in inverse order all the process of the direct act, which sets out from God, it must retrace the whole line which separates the intellect from God, and retrace it in the same manner in which the intellect has descended from Him. But what is this mode save that in which the ray sets out and proceeds from the sun—in other words, the mode of the emanation of light? Now, the spiritual light is the reason. Hence the true and perfect consciousness of intuition is attained only by *reasoning*. Reason is the word of God, is the divine form (ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram), stamped with which the intellect becomes, subsists, and acts a true ray of God upon the universe. Yes, the reasoning which deals with the existence and attributes of God is the consciousness of intuition; and, indeed, without this basis and the lever of intuition, how could the finite intellect rise to the infinite—to God? There is a *quid divinum* (θεϊόν τι) in the intellect which draws it upward, lifts it to the

metaphysical order, to the transcendental order of causes and principles, and gives a *real value* to its speculations. The intellect must, through reflection, reascend the whole line by which it has descended in intuition. It must do this setting out from the opposite extremity — that is, from the creature — and this is the proof of God for the creature, according to the teaching of the Book of Wisdom, of Saint Paul, of Saint Thomas, and of all the doctors of the Church. The path from the creature to God, by which consciousness must reascend, is the *metaphysical* order of causes and principles by which it rises from the *physical* order of created things to the *absolute* order of the *First Cause* and the *Final Reason*, which is God.

§ 2. The existence of this first, continuous, and perpetual intelligence with which our minds are furnished from the first moment of their creation is always presupposed by the Angelic Doctor in the development of the active powers, quæ e converso se habent — that is, which ascend from the created to the creator — whereas the passive powers descend from the creator to the created, and are the *guides* of the *former*. In fact, I open the first *Summa* and read: “Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile?” In this article he establishes the following proposition: “Deum esse, quamvis non a priori, a posteriori tamen demonstrari potest, ex aliquo ejus notiori nobis effectu.” Having accomplished this demonstration, he concludes: “Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est *per se notum quoad nos*, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos” (1 S., q. 2, art. 2). What, then, is the nature of that knowledge of God whereby He is known to us in Himself, and which is not derivable from created things? To me, it is the simple intelligere per simplicem *Intuitum quocumque modo* et indeterminate vel sub quadam confusione, as he teaches elsewhere. This is the *real presence* of God which the mind always enjoys in respect to Him, who is principium et causa movens, and who can be such only in His essence (*sussistenza*), and not in his *image* or *similitude* or *reflection* (vestigio), as the psychological school holds. Hence it is clear that when Saint Thomas teaches that God is not the *first object* known quoad nos (τὸ πρῶτον ἴμῶν), he speaks with reference to *cogitare* and *discernere*, and not of intel-

ligere — that is, with reference to the *active powers*, to which belongs *determinate* and *distinct* cognition, and not to the *passive powers*, which have only initial and indeterminate cognition. Here there is no middle alternative. Either the knowledge of God per simplicem Intuitum precedes the *determinate* and *distinct* knowledge which belongs to *cogitare* and *discernere*, and which is derivable from created things, and then *causa dicta est*, or it does not; and then there is no meaning (1) in the words *secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos*; (2) in the words *notiori nobis effectu*, and hence in the whole thesis of the Angelic Doctor, written in comparative language, which, according even to the grammarians, supposes and absolutely implies the positive. But there is more than this. Since Saint Thomas teaches that this *intelligere per simplicem intuitum* is attended with a certain indeterminate love toward God, * * * *consequitur quidam amor indeterminatus* (Loc. cit. lib. Sent.); this love ought, according to the Thomistic exposition of the psychological school, to relate itself, not to God, but to that which is in some manner the *image*, the *similitude*, or the reflection of Him, which appears in His works. According to such an hypothesis, who does not see that the primacy of divine love would be canceled from the human heart and mind. Hence it is clearly manifest that the school which excludes the efficacy of the supreme cause in respect to the first act of our intelligence is the very source of *modern incredulity*. In fact, if we assume that God is not the objective and ontological law of our intellect, it is impossible to demonstrate without self-contradiction that He is the immediate, immutable, and invariable rule of our wills.

The same perpetual intelligence is presupposed by the Angelic Doctor in his *Summa contra Gentiles*, epp. 12, 13, and 14, in which he demonstrates that God “non est maxime intelligibilis quoad nos.” Now, who does not know that between the superlative and nothing there is a middle way? This is the confused and indistinct cognition in relation to which our mind “*quodammodo est in actu, et quodammodo in potentia*”

(1 S., q. 83, art. 3). He arrives at the same truth in the proposition demonstrating that the soul is a substance subsisting *per se*. His words are: “Anima humana, cum sit omnium corporum cognoscitiva, est incorporea et subsistens.” He proves this thesis by two different arguments, the former of which he derives from the nature of the bodily organ, which, being determined *ad unum*, cannot know more than one thing in the manner in which our mind knows. The latter, derived from the nature of the action of the mind itself, he expresses thus: “Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens, vel intellectus, *habet operationem per se cui non communicat corpus.*” What, then, is the intellective operation which the mind possesses independently of the body? I find nothing but intelligere, having no sensible sign representing it in the knowable. But what is the object peculiar to this intellectual faculty which transcends the sensible? The Angelic Doctor answers even this question in the third article of the same question; for brevity’s sake I transcribe merely the proposition: Cum de ratione animæ prout in communi consideratur, sit esse formam corporis prout vero in speciali, in quantum scilicet est intellectiva, *esse cognoscitivam formarum absolutarum sive universalium: dici debet animam non esse compositam ex materia et forma* (1 S., q. 75, art. 5). So the mind can act by itself, without the concurrence of the body.

Again I open Saint Thomas, and find the following thesis: “Cum principium intellectivum sit quo *primo* intelligit homo, sive vocetur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, necesse est ipsum uniri corpori humano ut formam” (1 S., q. 76, art. 1). Let any one who has eyes read the demonstration of this article, and then tell me whether our soul can *cognize nothing* in its *present* state without that body to which, according to Saint Thomas, the soul gives life. “Manifestum est autem quod *primum quo corpus vivit est anima*, * * * *similiter principium quo primo intelligimus.*” He teaches and maintains the same truth when he denominates our mind *higher reason*, because through itself it intendit “*æternis conspiciendis aut*

consulendis ; conspiciendis quidem secundum quod ea in se ipsis speculatur, consulendis vero, secundum quod ex iis accipit regulas agendorum ” (1 S., q. 79, art. 9).

In short, the object of the higher reason is the supreme reasons of things ; the object of the lower reason, the things themselves. The former are absolute and universal, the latter contingent and particular. Now, which of the two reasons ought to be the *guide* of the other—the higher of the lower, or *vice versa*? Let Saint Thomas decide : “ Ad primum dicendum quod ratio inferior dicitur a superiori deduci, vel ab ea regulari, in quantum *principia* quibus utitur *inferior ratio* deducuntur et diriguntur a principiis superioris rationis ” (Id. id. id., ad. 1). Who does not see that, according to the psychological theory, the principles of the lower reason, which has for its exclusive object the contingent, ought to direct and guide the principles of the higher reason, whose proper object is the eternal reasons of things, considered as efficient causes of the things themselves? But, according to Saint Thomas, how are *such forms* in themselves? To the angel of the schools they are :

1. *Absolute* and *universal*, according to the proposition above alluded to.

2. *Immutable* and always *identical, semper unum*, with themselves, in spite of the plurality of the *cognizing* intellects. He says : “ Ad quartum dicendum quod, sive intellectus sit *unus* sive plures, id quod intelligitur est *unum*. Id enim quod intelligitur non est in intellectu secundum *se* sed secundum *suam similitudinem*; lapis enim non est in anima sed species lapidis, (ὁ δὲ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος. *De An.* III., 8, 2) et tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra se ipsum, alio quin scientiæ non essent de rebus sed de speciebus intelligibilibus ” (1 S., q. 76, art. 2, ad 4).

3. *Objective*, whether because they can *speculari in seipsis* by the human mind as *higher reason*, or because they are in God, as first cause. Let us hear what he says of him : “ Ad primum ergo dicendum quod species intelligibiles quas PARTICIPAT noster intellectus reducuntur, sicut in *primam causam*, in

aliquod principium per suam essentiam intelligibile, scilicet in DEUM. Sed ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium a quibus scientiam collegimus, ut Dionysius dicit." Cap. 7, De divin. nom. lect. 2. (1 S., q. 84, art. 4, ad. 1). And here I must inform you that this testimony is the *essence* of *Catholic Ontologism*, inasmuch as alone it contains and expresses the integral elements of science, such as God and the world, creator and creature. And what else is the formula, "Being creates the existent," but the literal translation of this text? And yet, who would believe it? The opponents of our doctrine use this thesis as their chief weapon in their attacks upon Ontologism! They shout to the four winds of heaven: "Read the reply to the third difficulty; open your eyes once and forever to the truth; learn the true Thomistic system contained in it." This reply reads: "Quod intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia in actum per aliquod ens actu, id est per *intellectum agentem*, qui est virtus quædam animæ nostræ, ut dictum est (q. 79, art. 3); non autem per intellectum separatum sicut per causam *propriam proximam*, sed forte sicut per causam *remotam* (ib. id., ad 3). It is plain, they conclude, that the cause of the *first act* of our intellect is that *virtue* of our soul called by Saint Thomas the active intellect (*νοῦς ποιητικός*), and that the separate (*χωριστός*), active intellect enters in, perhaps, *ut causa remota*, but never *ut proxima*, as the Ontologists aver.

I reply that this observation is meaningless, because it is made by our opponents to apply to the order of *passive powers*, whereas in this thesis Saint Thomas speaks *EXCLUSIVELY* of the *active powers*, whose proper object is the contingent. He speaks in the sense of the first reply, in which he had said: "Sed ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium a quibus scientiam colligimus." Hence, I say that if the *active, separate, i. e., ontological* intellect, which, as we shall see, is God, were the *proximate* and *proper* cause of the secondary acts of our possible intellect, and not the active *human* intellect, man would no longer be an *active* and *free* being, but a reed shaken by every wind in the hands of God — a horrible doctrine, which Saint Thomas

avoids by saying that the active, *separate* intellect aids the mind in its reflective period as a *causa remota*. This doctrine will be made clearer in what follows.

4. *Evident* in themselves, and therefore *principium cognitionis*. Saint Thomas says: "In rationibus æternis anima non cognoscit omnia objective in presenti statu, sed causaliter (1 S., q. 84, art. 5). This proposition is the basis, the foundation, the pivot of all the Thomistic philosophy. This consists of two parts. In the first, he overthrows the doctrine of Plato, and shows the absolute impotence of the human mind to acquire a knowledge of things *directly* and *intuitively* in their eternal reasons *alone*. In the second, he shows that the eternal reasons, considered as *efficient causes* of the things themselves, are the first and highest principle of Christian philosophy. Have the goodness to read the demonstration, and you will be convinced of the correctness of my exposition. In fact one needs but to cite the foundation of the thesis to be entirely convinced of it. This foundation is the following passage from Saint Augustine: "Si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico; ubi quæso id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me, sed ambo in ipsa quæ supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate." "Veritas autem incommutabilis," notes the Angelic Doctor, "in æternis rebus continetur. Ergo anima intellectiva *omnia vera* cognoscit in rationibus æternis." Now, who would say that the immutable truth which identifies the different thoughts of two men is the *active* intellect, "qui est aliquid animæ nostræ," as the defenders of psychologism add? Who does not see that it is in opposition to the basis of this system, viz.: "invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt conspiciuntur," that Saint Thomas establishes the above proposition? Who does not see that the above proposition is true only of the PRESENT LIFE, as is stated in the words "in *presenti statu*," and not of the *future life*, as is continually asserted and vociferated by the *Civiltà Cattolica* and its satellites, who say that the vision of the eternal reasons of things is shared only by the *blessed*, and by *pure* and *holy souls*, according to the conclusion, and is not the universal ontological light of the human race!

That, in the view of Saint Thomas, God the creator is the *rational element* in science, its immutable principles, the supreme harmony of human thought, and the ontological light of the human mind, is further manifest from the following proposition: "Species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut id quo intelligit intellectus: non autem ut id quod intelligitur, nisi secundario; res enim cujus species intelligibilis est similitudo est id quod primo intelligitur" (1 S., q. 85, art. 2).

From this proposition it is clear that our minds require a similitude (*εἰδότης*) distinct from the intellect and from the thing known, in order to cognize anything!

But you will say, If the said intelligible species is not id quod intelligitur, but merely id quo intelligitur, how is it that the mind does not warn us of this in the first act of cognition? And what? Must things be admitted which the spirit does not know? I reply, with the Doctor Saint, and say that, although to the direct and confused cognition, called by ontologists cognition of the intuitive order, nothing else is given us but the object, nevertheless, in the reflective cognition, the *idea*, or similitude, *id quo intelligitur*, is given *secundario*. Indeed, the *real* and *concrete* thing is always that which the mind perceives and receives in preference, *primo*. Here are his words: "Intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva SECUNDARIO est id quod intelligitur; sed id quod intelligitur PRIMO est RES cujus species intelligibilis est similitudo" (1 S., q. 83, art. 2). This doctrine is elsewhere established by the Doctor Saint (*De An.*, Bk. III, § 8). The above truth is still further confirmed by this other proposition: "Magis universalia et communia sunt priora in nostra *intellectuali et sensitiva cognitione*." Now, I ask what are the universals, but the eternal, reasons which, according to Saint Thomas, must inform our *intellectual* and *sensitive* cognition? In this same thesis is included a golden doctrine, which explains in a marvelous way the nature of the PASSIVE and ACTIVE powers. It says: "Secundo oportet considerare quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit. Omne autem quod procedit de potentia in actum,

prius pervenit at *actum incompletum qui est medius inter potentium et actum*, quam ad actum perfectum. Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit intellectus est scientia completa, per quam *distincte et determinate res cognoscuntur*, ACTUS autem incompletus est scientia incompleta, per quam sciuntur res *indistincte sub quadam confusione*. Quod enim sic cognoscitur, secundum QUID *cognoscitur in actu* et QUODAM MODO in POTENTIA; unde Philosophus dicit quod, *sunt primo nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis, posterius autem cognoscimus distinguendo principia et elementa*'' (ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν πρῶτον διτλά καὶ σαφεῖ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γινεται γνῶριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διακρίσσει τὰύτα). Phys. I, 1. Cf. *De An.* II, 2, 1. (1 S., q. 85, art. 3.)

This, then, is the manner in which Saint Thomas in several places explains, *ex professo*, the nature of the *intelligible species*, *similitudes*, *absolute forms*, and *eternal reasons* of things which constitute the *rational, constant, and immutable* element in science — the element which is *semper unum et secundum omne tempus*. Now, can such forms be called *abstract, subjective, and logical*, as Saint Thomas calls the cognitions of sensible things? Are they *identical, i. e., unum et idem*, with those *universal, immaterial, and necessary* cognitions of which he speaks in the following proposition: "Anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora, *immateriali, universali, et necessaria* cognitione? (1 S., q. 84, art. 1.) I answer, No. In fact, the first are *absolute, universal, immaterial, objective, and evident per se*; the second, on the contrary, are *abstract, subjective, and logical, i. e., existing solely in the cognitive mind*. As such, they cannot be called *semper unum*, since they vary according to the plurality and different capacities of the cognizing intellects; or *objective*, since they cannot be contemplated (*speculari, θεωρεῖσθαι*) in *se ipsis*, like the first: or *self-evident*, since man, according to Saint Thomas, cannot understand, or *cognize, or know THESE SECOND, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata*. *Id ibid.* (δὲ δ' οὐκ ὁρᾶται νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων ἢ ψυχῆ. Aristotle, *De An.* III, 7, 3.) But you will say, Why did not Saint Thomas distinguish these two sorts of forms? I reply that he did distinguish them, in the passage where he speaks, *ex*

professo, of the latter, viz., in prop. 84, art. 1. In that article, in fact, to those who, with Saint Augustine, object, *quod corpora intellectu intelligi non possunt; nec aliquid corporum nisi sensibus videri potest,*" he replies: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quantum ad ea quæ intellectus cognoscit (the abstract, universal cognitions of which he had spoken), cognoscit enim corpora intellegendo, *sed non per corpora neque per similitudines materiales et corporeas, sed per species immateriales et intelligibiles, quæ per suam essentiam in anima esse possunt.*" Evidently the Sainted Doctor here distinguishes the intelligible species, *quibus intellectus cognoscit*, from the *subjective* and *abstract* species, *i. e.*, the *universal cognitions*, * * * *quæ cognoscit*. In fact, if the *universal*, *necessary*, and *subjective* cognitions (subjective, because existing only in the human intellect) were identical with the objective *intelligible* species, *quibus intellectus cognoscit*, the reply of Saint Thomas would be meaningless, inasmuch as it would concede to the adversary that, in truth, *corpora intellectu comprehendendi non possunt*. Hence the universal, abstract, and necessary cognitions of which Saint Thomas speaks in question 84, article 1, could never be *such* unless they were recognized as *faithful copies* of the eternal species (forms) and reasons of things, *quibus intellectus cognoscit*. To Saint Thomas, therefore, these *absolute*, *universal forms*, *similitudes*, *intelligible species*, *eternal reasons*, and *efficient causes of things* are the only fount of the eternal and necessary element in science, and, as such, are objective and exist outside of the human spirit. This theory is rendered evident by this other proposition of Saint Thomas, viz.: "Quod intellectus divinus est mensura rerum; intellectus humanus est quodammodo mensuratus a rebus (q. 1, de veritat., art. 2).

Now I ask, by what things is the human intellect measured? Is it by the materiality of things? No, because the less is not the measure of the greater. Who does not know that the human intellect is the noblest and greatest essence of created things — that it is their lord and master? It cannot, therefore, be measured by them. Shall it be meas-

ured by the *universal, necessary, abstract, and logical* species, which are the cognitions derived by the mind from sensible things (according to Saint Thomas)? This, likewise, is impossible; for these stand related to the intellect as the *contained to that which contains*, as the *effect to the cause*, as the *measured to that which measures*, and hence it cannot be comprehended by them. What then are the things which measure it? They are none other than the supreme reasons, considered as efficient causes, which, according to the opposite school, are found in things *obscure and involved*, and which must be *made clear and unfolded* by being placed in full light by ontological reflection. Hence it is clear that our intellect in some *sense* and in a certain *respect* is measured by things, *quodammodo*, but not *totally*. But wherein consists this particular *sense* and *respect* in which our intellect is measured? Let us listen to the Angelic Doctor himself: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod anima non secundum quameunque veritatem judicat de rebus omnibus, sed secundum veritatem primam, in quantum resultat in ea, sicut in speculo, secundum prima *intelligibilia*. Unde sequitur quod veritas prima sit major *animâ*; et tamen etiam *veritas* creata, quæ est in intellectu nostro, *est major anima*, non *simpliciter* sed *secundum quid*, in quantum (this is the particular respect) est *perfectio* EJUS sicut etiam scientia posset dici major anima. SED VERUM EST quod nihil *SUBSISTENS* est majus mente rationali nisi Deus” (1 S., q. 16, art. 6, ad 1). God, then, is the Being greater than the human mind, and He alone is the measure of it, and of whatever truth exists in it. “Cum ergo Deus sit primus intellectus et primum intelligibile, oportet quod veritas intellectus cujuslibet ejus veritate mensuretur (*Contra Gentes*, Lib. I, ep. 62). This doctrine is opposed by its adversaries with a distinction, not derived from Saint Thomas, but from their own brains. They say that the knowledge of things may be *absolute* or *relative*, and that the latter requires the absolute idea in order to be apprehended, whereas the other, since it may exist very well by itself, does not.

I reply: True cognition of a thing is that which perfectly

expresses its *nature*, *i. e.*, without *adding anything* to it or *taking anything away* from it. Now, which of the two kinds of cognition is *conformable* to the nature of created things — the relative or the absolute? Surely that which expresses, and is conformable to, the nature of created and contingent things. But relative cognition is the only one that is conformable to created and relative things, and hence this is the only scientific cognition of them. For this reason the pretended absolute cognition of them is not scientific, and cannot be invoked as such by the opposite school in defense of their interpretation of Thomism. Indeed, how can there be any absolute knowledge of the relative? The *relative* is only the *relative*, the finite the finite, etc., etc. Hence, from created things there can be derived no absolute knowledge; for, since cognition must be an effect of the truth, and truth an effect of being, as Saint Thomas teaches, “*Sic ergo entitas rei precedit rationem veritatis; sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus*” (*De Veritat.*, q. 1, art. 1), if an *absolute* cognition could be derived from relative things, there would be an effect greater than its cause. But that is self-contradictory; hence, also, it is self-contradictory to say that *relative* things can give *absolute cognition*. Therefore, the above distinction made by the psychological school in regard to created things is either altogether meaningless or expresses an absurdity. And so, I beg that school not to confound the *power* which we have of considering *abstractly* any property of a thing already known (*i. e.*, by abstracting or prescind-ing from all the other properties) with the *scientific* cognition of the thing itself, which can never be *true*, *certain*, and *universal* until it is completely equal to the thing itself. Indeed, it is true, as Saint Thomas says, that our minds can examine, abstractly, the color of an apple, without thinking of the apple in which it inheres; but just as, according to the axiom, there is no accident without substance, ontological existence of the color is impossible without the apple, so, likewise, it is impossible to acquire the *perfect knowledge* of it without its reality, or without the *common* idea of *being*, as Saint Thomas expresses himself. This doctrine, therefore, proves that, just as the existence of things created is

impossible without the creator, so it is impossible to know them as *absolute* or independent of Him. In proof of which I say that the knowledge of the *thinking subject*, of *liberty*, of *immortality*, called by the said school absolute knowledge, is not so, but merely relative, inasmuch as it includes the idea of cause. Indeed, the thinking subject is a potentiality which must pass into act, either *first* or *second*; but nihil reducitur de potentia in actum nisi per aliquod ens actu, according to Saint Thomas; hence the thinking subject, considered in itself, as it occurs in children, or in *potentiality*, necessarily includes the idea of cause. This *necessary relation* appears more manifestly whenever the thinking subject is confronted with the object thought. In truth, the human intellect, according to Saint Thomas, is *passive* and *receptive* in the act of cognition, and Being acts upon it (1 S., q. 79, art. 2).

Now, are not the efficacy and action of Being in relation to our intellect an effect? And is not Being, which produces this action, a cause? And is not immortality known in an act of intelligence? If so, does this school believe that the creature ceases to be a second cause, and that it no longer receives the influence of the first cause? Or does it believe that the latter will not be *causa et motor universalis* even in the other life? And are not reward and punishment an effect with reference to the soul? And is not God, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the wicked, a cause? Hence the knowledge of the *thinking subject*, of freedom, and of immortality, however regarded, whether in itself or in relation to the temporal or eternal object, includes the idea of cause and hence is relative, not absolute, as is given out by the disciples of the psychological school, with an air of contempt and haughty triumph. From the above considerations it is clear that the Angel of the Schools established the following proposition: “*Intellectiva cognitio fit a sensibili non sicut a perfecta et totali causa, sed potius sicut a materia causæ*” (1 S., q. 84, art. 6).

If, in the view of Saint Thomas, the sensible is not the *perfect* and *total* cause of science, it is evident that the other portion must come from the above treated *eternal reasons*, or

else from our own *intellectual power* itself, called by Saint Thomas the *active intellect*. But the active intellect, “non se habet ut objectum agens ad potentiam,” *i. e.*, to the possible intellect (1 S., q. 79, art. 4, ad. 3); hence the active human intellect cannot be the complementary *efficient cause* of science. In order to be so, it would have to possess *in itself* the reasons of things; but these, as Saint Thomas teaches, it does not possess. “Ad nonum dicendum quod intellectus agens non sufficit per se ad reducendum intellectum possibilem perfecte in actum, CUM NON SINT IN EO DETERMINATÆ NOTIONES OMNIUM RERUM, UT DICTUM EST. Et ideo requiritur ad ultimam perfectionem intellectus *possibilis* quod uniatur *aliqua* illi *agenti* in quo sunt rationes omnium rerum, scilicet Deo” (1 S., q. *de anima*, art. 3, ad 9); hence the active intellect, “qui est aliquid animæ nostræ,” cannot furnish that part of science which does not come from sensible things. But, if this is the case, why has Saint Thomas not left us a formal proof of the fact that it was to the eternal reasons that he attributed the *perfect, complete, and scientific* knowledge of everything? I reply that Saint Thomas has given us a most luminous proof of what the scientific knowledge of this same mind of ours is. He says: “Sed verum est quod iudicium et efficacia hujus cognitionis, per quam *naturam animæ* cognoscimus competit nobis secundum *derivationem luminis intellectus nostri a veritate divina* in qua rationes omnium rerum continentur, sicut supra dictum est (quæst. 84, art. 5). Unde Augustinus dicit (*De Veritat.* in g. cp. 6, paulo ab init.): ‘*Intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte quantum possumus definimus, non qualis sit uniuscujusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat.*’ Est autem differentia inter has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam sufficit ipsa *mentis presentia*, quæ est principium actus ex quo mens percipit seipsum; et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per *sua presentiam*. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam non *sufficit* ejus *presentia*, sed requiritur *diligens et subtilis inquisitio*” (1 S., q. 77, art. 1).

From this authority it is as clear as the sun that the Angelic

Doctor derives the scientific knowledge of the human soul — *i. e., in universali* — from the eternal reasons, as the efficient causes of things, as he had taught in quæst. 84, art. 3.

I offer you this brief *resumé* of the Thomistic philosophy, in the hope that it may serve you as a guide in the study of Saint Thomas.

ALGORITHMIC DIVISION IN LOGIC.

BY GEORGE BRUCE HALSTED.

From its very start, logic has been suffering from the mistaken idea that it was actually an account of all the fundamental principles of legitimate inference, of all valid use of the reasoning faculty.

From the shackles of this self-imposed, but never fulfilled requirement it has not yet quite freed itself, and the confusing effects are visible alike in Ueberweg and Jevons. But once recognized that logic is not a branch of psychology, is conversant with classes of *things*, and that point is passed where it could be believed that mathematics was only a developed branch of ordinary logic, or supposed that the more powerful mathematics was trying to show that logic was only a branch of algebra.

In actual reasoning, the mind, far from being confined to the scholastic logic, jumps, climbs, and runs along in accordance with all sorts of principles, various, though valid.

These results, however, may be stated in terms of ordinary logic — that is, in terms of genus and species — of the relations of classes; and from the generality, simplicity, and certainty of this formal logic, it is, even from the new point of view, as worthy as it was ever thought to be of all study; more especially since those who, recognizing the fundamental character of other relations beside that of the simple copula, have worked on the “Logic of Relatives,” have not been able as yet, in spite of the fine contributions made by De Morgan, to bring any cosmos out of that chaos.

But the latter's two statements, "first, logic is the only science which has made no progress since the revival of letters; secondly, logic is the only science which has produced no growth of symbols," were neither true after Boole had put to the science his master hand.

A notation analogous to that used in the coördinate, but more highly developed, science of quantity was found to give to the old and new ideas astonishing vigor. Boole summarizes his result by saying: "Let us conceive, then, of an algebra in which the symbols x, y, z , etc., admit indifferently of the values 0 and 1, and of these values alone. The laws, the axioms, and the processes of such an algebra will be identical in their whole extent with the laws, the axioms, and the processes of an algebra of logic." But this statement must be interpreted very narrowly to be at all exact.

That the slightest extension of the analogy to cause or reason must lead us all wrong is evident from the fact that this algebra admits of only two phases, 0 and 1, while logic admits of three phases, namely, not only *none* and *all*, corresponding to 0 and 1, but also *some*, "which, though it may include in its meaning *all*, does not include *none*" (Boole, p. 124), and hence has no analogue in such an algebra. Again, this algebra may, perhaps, be called unduly arithmetical.

From the idea of the convertibility and transitiveness of the relation expressed by the ordinary copula, or from the equal balance of subject and predicate throughout the formal logic of absolute terms, one would look for an exact correspondence of theorems, subject and predicate being transposed.

Now, of the Boolean product we know, besides the peculiar law $xx=x^2=x$, that also xy is either identical with, or less than, either of the factors. This we may write $xy = or < x$, and $xy = or < y$; and if $z = or < x$ and $z = or < y$, then $z = or < xy$.

From the principle of correspondence there would thus be another function, $F(xy)$, such that $x = or < F(xy)$, and $y = or < F(xy)$, and if $x = or < z$, and $y = or < z$, then $F(xy) = or < z$.

This function is logical addition, which we may distinguish

from Boole's by a subscript comma (+,). It must be by a slip that Prof. Jevons, in the preface to the second edition of his *Principles of Science*, calls it Boole's.

He says (p. xvii) of Leibnitz: "He first gives as an axiom the now well known law of Boole, as follows:

"'Axioma I. Si idem secum ipso sumatur, nihil constituitur novum, seu $A+, A=A$.'" Now, no one knows better than Prof. Jevons that the way in which Boole entirely avoids this sort of addition, with its accompanying "Law of Unity," is one of the marked peculiarities of his system.

However much this kind of addition seems called for by logical simplicity, by the principle of correspondence, by the balance of multiplication and addition, yet, besides not agreeing with Boole's arithmetical analogy, it has the grave defect of not being an invertible operation.

Says Boole, page 33: "But the very idea of an operation effecting some positive change seems to suggest to us the idea of an opposite or negative operation, having the effect of undoing what the former one has done. Thus, we cannot conceive it possible to collect parts into a whole, and not conceive it also possible to separate a part from a whole." It is very true that in treating certain subjects — as, for example mathematics — great advantage arises from the fact that you are able to use invertible addition and multiplication, your subtraction and division being determinative.

But in this case, though if $b +, x = a$, then $x = a - b$, yet is x not completely determinate. It may vary from a to a with b taken away. The noting of this peculiar fact led Prof. Jevons, in 1864, in his "Pure Logic," to say, page 80: "But addition and subtraction do not exist, and do not give true results, in a system of pure logic, free from the condition of number. For instance, take the logical proposition $A +, B+, C = A +, D +, E$ meaning *what is either A or B or C is either A or D or E, and vice versa*. In these circumstances, the action of subtraction does not apply. It is not necessarily true that, if from same (equal) things we take same (equal) things the remainders are same (equal). It is not allowable for us to subtract the same thing (A) from both sides of the above

proposition, and thence infer $B +, C = D +, E$. This is not true if, for instance, each of B and C is the same as E, and D is the same as A, which has been taken away."

This last sentence is very true, but it does not prove his statement, much less does it warrant his saying, as he does, on the next page, "The axioms of *addition* and subtraction," etc., for you may always logically *add* as many terms as you choose to both sides with perfect safety. He has also failed to notice that by parity of reasoning he must sweep away logical division, which corresponds to Abstraction, but which he calls "Separation," devoting to it chapter V. For, denoting logical division by (\div), if $bx = a$, then $x = a \div b$. But it will be observed that x is not fully determined by this condition. It will vary from a to $a + \bar{b}$, and will be uninterpretable if a is not wholly contained under b . This only shows that logical multiplication is not invertible; and though Boole was able to make addition invertible and arithmetical by convening that the sign $+$ should only appear between terms mutually exclusive, yet even he failed in regard to logical division, and bolstering himself by what I have shown in a previous paper to be an erroneous analogy, he left his system straddling the fence, having one of the fundamental operations ($+$) invertible and the other (\times) not. He says, page 36: "Hence it cannot be inferred from the equation $zx = zy$ that the equation $x = y$ is also true. In other words, the axiom of the algebraists that both sides of an equation may be divided by the same quantity has no formal equivalent here." In the article on "Boole's Logical Method," I showed how this follows necessarily from the peculiar sliding sort of multiplication found in logic, where if one factor is wholly or in part identical with another, we have an analogy to the fact that superimposing mathematical planes does not increase the thickness, or the one may slide wholly or partly into the other and leave no trace.

I there gave an example, using purposely terms whereof one "rational" is part of the meaning of another "man."

Let us now add the consideration of an example where this is not the case.

Suppose x , y , and z to be none of them included in each other, and that $zx = zy$, which interpret, stratified rocks = rocks deposited from water.

We cannot divide out the common term leaving stratified things = things deposited from water, because the proposition, in the positive information which it gives about zx and zy , conveys nothing about the relation of $\bar{x}z$ to $\bar{y}z$.

If we could only legitimately conclude $\bar{x}z = \bar{y}z$, then we might safely divide and say $x = y$.

An eminent author wrote me as his opinion that the proposition gave no information "about $\bar{x}z$ or $\bar{y}z$ (unstratified rocks, or rocks not deposited from water)." This was probably only a momentary slip, but it leads me to call attention to the fact that the proposition does tell us $\bar{x}z = \bar{y}z$, *i. e.*, unstratified rocks = rocks not deposited from water; but this is of no help to us in rendering division possible.

We certainly can not in any off-hand way, or without the introduction of absurd terms similar to the imaginary in common algebra, make our logical multiplication throughout simply invertible.

But if we could exchange $+$, and \bar{x} for two invertible processes, and thus avoid the incongruity of Boole's system, would we not, after all, still be sacrificing logical simplicity in the real analysis and analogies of the subject to desired ease of a working calculus?

Inverse operations are defined from the direct. A logical quotient, then, is the solution of the equation $xb = a$. . . (1) in respect to x . This we have already denoted by $x = a$; b . . . (2), and noted that the solution is indefinite.

But it is very remarkable that in this expression, independently of the value of x , the classes a and b cannot be taken arbitrarily; for the equation $bx = a$ involves an independent relation between the classes a and b , namely, $a\bar{b} = 0$. . . (3) which we may obtain by eliminating x , without regard to its value. We see from this that division in logic is by no means an unrestrictedly practicable operation, and to fully replace (1), we must have not only (2), but also (3).

This equation (3) is the necessary *condition* assumed before

we can talk of the logical quotient of a by b . $a ; b$ has no sense unless this requirement is fulfilled. Whenever we speak of a quotient we assume this.

Now, for the value of $x = a ; b$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} a ; b &= (a +, \bar{b}) (v +, b), \text{ or} \\ &= a +, v\bar{b}, \text{ or} \\ &= ab +, v\bar{ab}. \end{aligned}$$

Where v is an arbitrary, an indefinite class. $o ; o = v$.

By the use of this v the above equations for $a : b$ contain all the particular solutions which arise when the real value of x is more definitely fixed or known.

Two cases are especially worthy of notice: the widest where $v = 1$ (the universe), and the narrowest where $v = o$.

In the latter case the quotient is seen to be coincident with the dividend, a . In the former, the maximum case, $a : b = a + \bar{b}$. If here we take $a = o$, we have $o : b = \bar{b} = 1 - b$. Here the condition $a\bar{b} = o$ becomes a mere identity, and may be neglected, showing that this operation may always be performed. In general, for any product xy , it is immediately allowable if $x +, y = 1$. So if $a = b \therefore a : b = 1$.

To continue on deriving division formulæ in this remarkable algebra is an exercise highly suggestive and interesting, but in reality in the above special case, $o : b = 1 - b$, we have all that is necessary for a solution of the logical problem.

It amounts simply to the old familiar operation of forming the negative of a term, and together with $+$, and \bar{x} gives in the simplest possible way all the deductive powers attained by Boole's complicated and ill-balanced, yet wonderful, calculus.

Moreover, in reference to these operations, the existence of a perfect *duality* enables the whole matter, like modern geometry, to be exhibited in pairs of corresponding theorems:

$$e. g., \quad \text{I. } aa = a. \quad \text{I'. } a +, a = a.$$

$$\text{II. } a (b +, c) = ab +, ac. \quad \text{II'. } a +, bc = (a +, b) (a +, c).$$

As a final recommendation, uninterpretable steps are thus entirely obviated, each step being susceptible of simple statement in the ordinary language of logic.

This rounded system, expanded so as to be easily understood by beginners, will be called Dual Logic.

THE JOURNAL
OF
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. XIII.]

APRIL, 1879.

[No. 2.

HEGEL ON ROMANTIC ART.

[TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND PART OF THE ÆSTHETICS.]

BY WM. M. BRYANT.

CHAPTER I. — THE RELIGIOUS CIRCLE OF ROMANTIC ART.

Since, in the representation of absolute subjectivity or personality as final and complete truth, Romantic Art has for its substantial content the union of the spirit with its essence, the satisfaction of the soul, the reconciliation of God with the world, — and, by this means, his reconciliation with Himself, — it is upon this stage that the Ideal appears for the first time to be completely at home. For it was happiness and independence, satisfaction, tranquillity, and freedom which we declared to be the fundamental characteristic of the ideal. Unquestionably, we cannot venture to exclude the ideal from the conception and the reality of Romantic Art; and yet, in relation to the Classic ideal, it acquires a wholly different form. Though we have already pointed out this relation in a general way, we must here, at the beginning, clearly define (*feststellen*) its more concrete significance, in order to make manifest the essential type of the Romantic mode of representing the Absolute. In the Classic ideal the divine is, on the one hand,

limited to individuality. On the other, the soul and happiness of the particular gods become manifest exclusively through their corporeal forms; and, again, since the principle of the individual in itself and in its externality is set forth in the inseparable unity of the individual, it is evident that the negativity of the inherent tendency to dissolution, of corporeal and of spiritual anguish, of sacrifice, of resignation, cannot appear as an essential moment. The divine of Classic Art, indeed, falls asunder into a circle of divinities. But it does not separate itself, within itself, as universal essentiality on the one hand, and as particular, subjective, empirical manifestation in human form and human spirit on the other. Just as little, too, does it, as non-phenomenal Absolute, possess a world of evil, of sin, and of error; with the task, on the contrary, of bringing this contradiction into reconciliation, and, as this reconciliation, to be for the first time the truly actual and divine. In the conception of absolute subjectivity, on the other hand, there lies the contradiction between substantial universality and personality; a contradiction whose completed mediation fills the subjective or personal with its substance, and elevates the substantial to the rank of an absolute subject, possessing self-knowledge and rational will. But to the actuality of personality (*Subjektivität*) as spirit there belongs, in the second place, the deeper contradiction of a finite world, through the cancellation of which as finite, and its reconciliation with the Absolute, the infinite itself creates its own essence, through its own absolute activity, for itself; and is thus, for the first time, absolute spirit. The manifestation of this actuality on the ground and under the form of the human spirit acquires, therefore, with respect to its *beauty*, a relation altogether different from that in Classic Art. Greek beauty exhibits the inner quality of spiritual individuality, conceived wholly in its corporeal form, its deeds and its adventures, completely expressed in the external, and dwelling happily therein. For Romantic Art, on the contrary, it is absolutely necessary that the soul, although it appears in the external, should at the same time show itself to be gone out of this corporeal state back into itself, and to live within itself. At this stage,

therefore, the corporeal can express the internality of the spirit only in so far as it brings into manifestation the fact that the soul has its congruent actuality, not in this real existence, but in itself. Upon this ground beauty is now no longer considered as the idealizing of the objective form, but as the inner form of the soul in itself. It is a beauty of internality which is to be looked upon rather as form and manner (*als Art und Weise*), in accordance with which each content is fashioned and developed in the inner being of the person. It is, therefore, a beauty which refuses to hold fast the external, even while the external is thus pervaded by spirit. Since, therefore, the interest is now lost, so far as concerns the purifying of real outer existence to the point of this classical unity, and is concentrated upon the opposite aim of inbreathing the inner form of the spiritual itself with a new beauty, art gives itself little concern respecting the external. Just as it finds it immediately at hand, so it accepts it immediately; while even on this side it leaves it to be, as it were, fashioned at discretion. In Romantic Art, reconciliation with the Absolute is an act of the inner nature which, indeed, appears in the external, but which does not have the external itself in its real form as an essential content and aim. Along with this indifference respecting the idealizing union of soul and body there appears, for the special individuality of the external side essentially, *portraiture*, which does not obliterate particular features and forms, as they come and go, the requirements of the natural, the imperfections of the mortal state, in order to replace them with more appropriate characteristics. True, in this relation a correspondence must, in general, still be required; but the precise form it is to take becomes indifferent, and does not purify itself from the accidentality of finite empirical existence.

The necessity for this thorough-going characterization of Romantic Art may likewise be justified from still another side. The Classic ideal, when it stands upon its own true height, is secluded within itself, independent, reserved, non-receptive, a complete or rounded individual, which excludes others from itself. Its form is its own. It lives wholly and exclusively within this form, and dares not expose any portion of itself

to participation in the merely empirical and accidental. Hence whoever, as spectator, approaches this ideal, cannot appropriate to himself its existence as something external that is related to his own phenomenal being (*Erscheinung*). Though the forms of the eternal gods are human, they do not, for all that, pertain to the mortal state; for these gods have not themselves suffered the infirmity of finite existence, but are raised above this without mediation. Participation in the empirical and relative is broken off. On the contrary, infinite subjectivity, the Absolute of Romantic Art, is not merged (*versenkt*) in its manifestation. It exists within itself, and by this very fact does not possess its externality as something belonging essentially to itself, but as something other than itself, — something quite freely set aside, and belonging to the indifferent or neglected beyond. Besides, this external *must* enter into the form of the common-place, of the empirically human, since here God himself descends into finite temporal existence, in order to mediate and to reconcile the absolute contradiction which lies in the conception of the Absolute. Thus empirical man also acquires a side from which there is opened to him a relationship, — a connecting link, — so that he himself may with confidence draw near in his immediate naturalness; since the external form does not, through classic austerity (*Strenge*) toward the particular and accidental, repel him, but presents to his view that which he himself has, or which he knows and loves in some object in his immediate surroundings. It is through this air of being at home (*Heimathlichkeit*) in ordinary affairs, that Romantic Art confidently exerts its attractiveness in all directions. But, since now the renounced externality has, through this very renunciation, the task of pointing to the beauty of the soul, to the loftiness of internality, to the holiness of spiritual existence, it tends at the same time to merge itself in the internal character of the spirit and in its absolute content, and to appropriate to itself this inner nature.

In this surrender (*Hingabe*), finally, there lies, in general, the universal idea that in Romantic Art infinite subjectivity is not solitary and alone within itself, like a Greek god, which lived

within itself, wholly complete in the happiness of its seclusion. Rather it comes forth from itself and enters into relation with another. But this "other" still belongs to subjectivity, which finds itself again therein and remains in unity with itself. This unit-being (*Einseyn*) of subjectivity in its "other" is the unique, beautiful content of Romantic Art, the ideal of the same, which has essentially for its form and manifestation, internality and subjectivity, soul, sensibility. The Romantic Ideal, therefore, expresses a relation to other spiritual being, which is so bound up with internality that it is only precisely in this other that the soul in internality lives with itself. This life virtually in another is, as sensibility, the sincerity and fervor of love.

We can, therefore, declare *Love* to be the universal content of the Romantic in its religious circle. Still, love first acquires its true ideal form when it expresses the *affirmative*, immediate reconciliation of the spirit. But now, before we can, upon this stage, consider the most beautiful ideal satisfaction, we have previously, on the one side, to traverse the process of *negativity*, into which the absolute subject, or person, enters, as subjugation of the finitude and immediacy of its human manifestation,—a process which unfolds itself in the life, suffering, and death of God for the world and humanity, and its possible reconciliation with God. On the other side, it is humanity which now, on the contrary, has on its part to complete the same process, in order that in itself there may be made actual what is as yet only potential in the reconciliation referred to. In the midst of this stage, in which the *negative* side of the sensuous and spiritual entrance into death and the grave constitutes the central point, lies the expression of the *affirmative* bliss of the contentment, which in this circle belongs to the most beautiful objects of art.

DIVISION. — For the more precise division of our first chapter, therefore, we have three different spheres to pass through.

1. The history of the redemption of Christ. The moments or elements of the absolute spirit represented in God himself, in so far as he becomes man, has an actual outer existence in

the world of finitude and its concrete relations, and in this most uniquely particular outer-existence brings the absolute itself into manifestation.

2. Love in its positive form, as reconciled feeling of the human and the divine; the holy family, the maternal love of Mary, the love of Christ, and the love of the disciples.

3. The Church; the spirit of God as present in humanity through the conversion of the soul, and the destruction of mere naturalness and finitude, generally through the return of man to God, — a return in which, first of all, repentance and martyrdom constitute the mediation between man and God.

I. History of Redemption through Christ.

1. Art apparently superfluous. — 2. Its necessary intervention. — 3. Accidental particulars of the external representation.

The reconciliation of the spirit with itself, absolute history, the process of the truth, is brought to view and certitude through the manifestation of God in the world. The simple content of this reconciliation is the combination or blending (*Ineinssetzung*) of absolute essentiality with particular human subjectivity; an individual man is God, and God is an individual man. Herein lies the fact that virtually — that is, according to conception and essence — humanity is truly spirit; and each particular subject or person, therefore, as man, possesses infinite destiny and importance, namely, to exist as a purpose of God, and to be in unity with God. But in just the same measure man becomes subject to the demand to give actuality to this conception, which is at first only a mere possibility (*nur ein blosses Ansich*); that is, to fix upon his own union with God as the goal of his existence, and to reach that goal. In so far as he has fulfilled this destiny he is a free, infinite spirit. This he may do only in so far as the unity to which we have referred is the primordial element, the eternal foundation of the human and the divine nature. The goal is at the same time the beginning, existing in and for itself. It is the point of departure for Romantic religious consciousness, namely, that God himself is man, —

is flesh, — in order that he may become this individual subject or person, in whom, therefore, the reconciliation does not remain a mere possibility, in which case it would be known only in the abstract conception thereof; but rather he presents himself as existing *objectively*, even for the perceiving (*anschauende*) consciousness, as this individual, actually-existing man. This moment or element of *individuality* is of importance, because therein each individual possesses the view of his own reconciliation with God, which in and for itself is no mere potentiality, but is actual, and for this reason has been brought into full manifestation as real in this one subject or person. But since now the unity, as spiritual reconciliation of opposite moments, is no merely immediate individual-being (*Einseyn*), there must, in the second place, be brought into existence in this *one* subject or person also the process of the spirit as history of the same, through which process the person for the first time truly becomes spirit. This history of the spirit undergoing completion in the individual contains nothing else than what we have already referred to, namely, that the individual man shall put aside (*abthue*) his individuality in both the corporeal and the spiritual sense, — that is, that he shall suffer and die; but on the contrary shall, after the pain of death, reappear from the dead; shall arise as the glorified God, as the actual spirit which now, indeed, has entered into existence as an individual, as this subject or person; and yet, even so, is essentially only in truth God, as spirit in his Church.

1. This history furnishes the essential object for religious Romantic Art, but for which art, taken purely as art, doubtless becomes somewhat superfluous; for the principal fact lies here in the inner certitude, in the sentiment and perception of this eternal truth, in *faith*, which bears testimony to the truth in and for itself, and thus becomes identified (*hineinverlegt*) with the inner nature of the imagination. Developed faith, namely, consists in the immediate certitude of having the truth itself present to the consciousness along with the conception of the moments, or elements, of this history. But if it is in the consciousness of the *truth* that the real interest centres, then

the *beauty* of manifestation, as well as representation itself, is altogether an indifferent affair, since the truth is present to consciousness independent of art.

2. On the other hand, however, the religious content acquires at the same time, in itself, the moment or element through which it not only becomes accessible to, but in a certain sense demands, art. In the religious conception of Romantic Art, as we have already often affirmed (*angeführt*), the content itself bears within itself the tendency to carry anthropomorphism to the last degree of development; since this content has for its central point the being of the Absolute and the Divine, in combination with human subjectivity as actually visible (*erschauten*), and, therefore, also as external, corporeal, phenomenal, and must represent the Divine in this, its individuality, which is closely connected with the necessities of nature and with finite modes of manifestation. In this respect art furnishes to the perceiving consciousness, for the manifestation of God in the immediate present, an actual individual form, even a concrete image of the external characteristics of those events in which are unfolded the birth of Christ, His life and suffering, death, resurrection, and ascension to the right hand of God. It is, therefore, in art alone that there is retained an ever-renewed presence (*Dauer*) of the already vanished, actual manifestation of God.

3. In so far, however, as in this manifestation emphasis is laid upon the fact that God is essentially an individual person, exclusive of any other, and is not merely the unity of divine and human subjectivity in general, but represents that unity in the form and person of *this particular* man (namely, Christ), in so far there appears in art, by reason of the content itself, all phases of the accidentality and particularity of finite existence, from which beauty at the height of the Classic ideal had purified itself. What the free comprehension of the beautiful had removed as incompatible with it, — that is, the non-ideal, — is here necessarily taken up and brought to view as a moment or element having its origin in the content itself.

a. If, therefore, the person of Christ, as such, has been

frequently chosen as the object of representation, those artists have succeeded in the least degree who have attempted to make of Christ an ideal in the sense and in the mode of the Classic ideal. Such heads and forms of Christ may, indeed, show seriousness, calmness, and dignity; but, on the other hand, Christ must possess internality and absolutely *universal* spirituality; while, on the other hand, He must possess subjective personality and *individuality*, and both these are irreconcilably opposed to felicity (*Seligkeit*) in the sensuous nature of the human form. To combine these two terms, — *i. e.*, expression and form, — is a task of the utmost difficulty; so that painters have always fallen into embarrassment whenever they have departed from the traditional type. Seriousness and depth of consciousness, indeed, must be expressed in such heads; but, on the one hand, the features and forms of the face and figure should just as little be of a merely ideal beauty as, on the other, they should be reduced to the merely common and ugly; or, again, should be elevated to the merely sublime, as such. With respect to the external form, it is best to adopt the medium between the particular natural phase and ideal beauty. To attain precisely to this appropriate medium is difficult, and hence it is especially in the choice which he here makes, that the ability, the fine sense, and spirit of the artist is displayed. For the most part, independent of the content which belongs to faith, we are, in the representations of this entire circle, drawn (*gewiesen*) to the side of subjective activity more than was the case in the Classic Ideal. In Classic Art, the artist desires to represent the spiritual and divine immediately in the form of the corporeal itself, in the organism of the human figure; and the corporeal forms, in their modifications, which do away with the common and finite, furnish, therefore, the chief phase of interest. In our present circle the image remains common, familiar (*bekannt*); its forms are, to a certain extent, indifferent, — something particular, which may exist on this wise or on that, — and in this respect may be handled with greater freedom. The predominant interest lies, therefore, on the one hand, in the form and method (*Art und Weise*) with which the artist

causes (*lässt*) the spiritual and innermost nature, as this spiritual being itself, to shine forth through this common and familiar form. On the other hand, it lies in the subjective execution, the technical means and skill through which he inspires his forms with spiritual life, and gives them the clearness and comprehensibility of the spiritual.

b. As to what concerns the further content: That lies, as we have already seen, in the absolute history which has its origin in the conception of spirit itself, which renders objective the conversion of the corporeal and spiritual individuality in its essentiality and universality. For the reconciliation of the individual subjectivity with God does not appear *immediately* as harmony, but as harmony which proceeds originally from infinite pain, from resignation, from sacrifice, from destruction of the finite, both sensuous and subjective. The finite and the infinite are here combined in one; and the reconciliation, in its true depth, internality, and power of mediation, shows itself only through the magnitude and harshness of the contradiction, which must find its solution. Hence, also, the unutterable poignancy (*Schärfe*) and dissonance of suffering, torment, anguish, to which this contradiction leads, belongs to the very nature of the spirit, whose absolute satisfaction here constitutes the content.

This process of the spirit, taken in and for itself, is the essence, the central idea (*Begriff*) of spirit in general, and, therefore, acquires (*enthält*) the characteristic of being, for consciousness, the *universal history* which must repeat itself in each and every individual consciousness. For consciousness, as many individuals, is precisely the reality and existence of universal spirit. In the next place, however, since spirit has, as its essential moment or element, actuality in the individual, this universal history presents itself only in the form of *one* individual to whom it is attributed, as belonging especially to Him, as the history of His birth, His life, death, and return from the grave; and yet in this individuality there is retained, at the same time, the significance of being the history of the universal, absolute Spirit itself.

The special turning-point in this life of God is the abandon-

ment of his individual existence as *this* man. It is the history of the passion, the sorrow on the cross, the Golgotha of the spirit, the pain of death. In so far, now, as there lies in the content itself the necessity that the external corporeal manifestation, — the immediate existence as individual, — shall appear in the pain of its negativity as the negative, in order that the spirit may reach its heaven through sacrificing sensuous and subjective individuality to its (the spirit's) truth, in so far this sphere of representation is separated almost wholly from the classical plastic ideal. On the one hand, for example, the earthly body and the infirmity of human nature generally is elevated and honored, since it is God himself who appears therein; but, on the other hand, there is, first of all, this human and corporeal, which is posited as negative, and arrives at manifestation in its pain, while in the Classic ideal it did not lose the undisturbed harmony with the spiritual and substantial. Christ scourged, crowned with thorns, bearing his cross to the place of execution, raised upon the cross, expiring in the torture of his agonizing, protracted death, — all this is excluded from representation in accordance with the forms of Greek beauty; but in these situations there exists the higher quality of holiness in itself, the depth of the inner nature, the infinitude of suffering, as an eternal moment or element of the spirit, as endurance and divine tranquility.

Respecting this form a further circle is constituted, — partly by friends, partly by enemies. The friends themselves, indeed, are by no means ideal personages; but, in accordance with the conception, they are particular individuals, ordinary men drawn to Christ by the attraction of the spirit. The enemies, on the contrary, since they place themselves in opposition to God, condemn Him, mock, torture, and crucify Him, are represented as internally base; and the representation of the inner malignity and hatred against God produces in the outward expression ferocity, rudeness, barbarity, rage, distortion of form. In all these respects deformity appears here as a necessary moment in contrast with Classic beauty.

c. But in the divine nature the process of death is to be considered only as a point of transition, through which the

reconciliation of the spirit with itself is brought to completeness, and the two sides of the divine and the human, of the absolutely universal on the one hand and of phenomenal subjectivity on the other (and whose mediation is the thing of chief importance), combine into one affirmative totality. This affirmation, which is in general the foundation and original element, must, therefore, give proof of itself in this positive way. Among the events in the life of Christ, those affording the most suitable subjects for the expression of this idea are the resurrection and ascension, apart from the moments in which he appears as teacher. Here, however, there arises the gravest difficulty, especially for the arts of visible representation. For, in part, it is the spiritual, as such, which must attain to representation in its internality; in part, the Absolute Spirit, which, in its infinitude and universality, affirmatively established in unity with subjectivity and elevated above immediate existence, must, nevertheless, still bring the whole expression of its infinitude and internality into view and sensuous realization (*zur Anschauung und Auffindung*) in the corporeal and external.

II. *Religious Love.*

1. Idea of the Absolute in Love.—2. Of Sentiment.—3. Love as Ideal of Romantic Art.

Spirit in and for itself is not, as spirit, immediately an object of art. Its highest actual reconciliation in itself can only be a reconciliation and satisfaction in the spiritual, as such, which, in its pure ideal element, withdraws itself from artistic expression. For absolute truth stands on a higher level than that of the appearance (*Schein*) of the beautiful, which cannot release itself from the ground of the sensuous and phenomenal. If, however, spirit in its affirmative reconciliation acquires through art a *spiritual* existence, in which it is not only known as pure thought, as ideal, but can be *felt* and *contemplated*, then there remains to us only the internality of the spirit,—*i. e.*, soul, sentiment,—as the one only form which fulfils the double requirement of spirituality on the one side,

and of the possibility of being comprehended and represented by art, on the other. This internality, which alone corresponds to the conception of the free spirit satisfied within itself, is *Love*.

1. In love,—that is, on the side of the *content*,—there are present those moments, or elements, which we have shown to constitute the fundamental conception of absolute spirit, which conception is that of the reconciled return of the spirit out of its other to itself. This other, again, as other, in which the spirit abides with itself, can only be spiritual, a spiritual personality. The true essence of love consists in this: that consciousness surrenders itself, forgets itself in another self, and, nevertheless, through this very surrender and forgetfulness of self, attains for the first time to the full possession of self. This mediation of the spirit with itself, and the development thereof to a complete totality, is the Absolute. And yet, doubtless, this is not to be taken in the sense (*Weise*) that the Absolute, as merely singular, and, therefore, finite subjectivity, may recognize (*zusammenschlüsse*) itself in another finite subject. Rather the content of subjectivity, securing in another its own mediation with itself, is here the Absolute itself; it is the spirit which, in another spirit, comes for the first time to be knowledge and will pertaining to itself as to the Absolute, and which has the satisfaction of this knowledge.

2. Now, more closely considered, this content, as love, has the *form* of sentiment concentrated within itself; which sentiment, instead of rendering its content explicit,—instead of bringing it into consciousness, in accordance with its definiteness and universality,—far rather collects the breadth and immeasurable extent of the same within the simple depth of the soul, without unfolding to the imagination the wealth and variety of treasures which it contains within itself. Thus such content, which in its pure, spiritually characterized (*ausgeprägten*) universality, would be denied artistic representation, comes again, in this subjective existence as sentiment, to be within the range of art; for, on the one side, with the still undeveloped depth which constitutes the characteristic of the

soul, there is no necessity compelling the development of this content to perfect clearness; while, on the other side, it secures at the same time from this form an element which is appropriate to art. For soul, heart, sentiment, however spiritual and internal they may remain, nevertheless always have relation to the sensuous and corporeal, so that they are able to give indications of the innermost life and being of the spirit through the corporeal itself, through the look, through the features of the countenance, or, more spiritually still, through tone and word. But the external can appear here only so far as it is called upon to express the innermost nature itself in that phase of its internality which belongs to the soul, or sentiment.

3. If, now, we agree upon the reconciliation of the internal with its reality as the conception of the ideal, we can at the same time designate love as the *ideal* of Romantic art in its religious circle. It is *spiritual* beauty, as such. The Classic ideal also pointed out the mediation and reconciliation of the spirit with its other. But here the "other" of the spirit was the external form pervaded by the spirit itself, and constituting its corporeal organism. In love, on the contrary, the other of the spiritual is not the natural, but is itself a spiritual consciousness, an other person (*Subjekt*),—an "other" which spirit thus realizes for itself in its own realm, in its own most appropriate element. Thus love, in its affirmative satisfaction and virtually (*in sich*) tranquilized, happy reality, is ideal, but at the same time absolutely *spiritual* beauty, which, by reason of its internality, can express itself only in the internality, and as the internality of the soul. For the spirit, which in *spirit* is present and immediately certain of itself, and thus has the spiritual as material and ground of its existence, is in itself internal, and, more precisely, is the internality of Love.

a. God is love, and therefore, also, His deepest essence in this form appropriate to art is to be seized and represented in the person of Christ. But Christ is *divine* love. On the one hand, as the object of this love, he is God himself, considered as non-phenomenal essence; on the other, he manifests him-

self to redeemed humanity, and thus the unfolding (*Aufgehen*) of one subject, or person, in a definite other subject, or person, can by so much the less come to light in Him; but rather there is made manifest the *idea* of love in its universality, — the Absolute, the spirit of truth, in the element and in the form of sentiment. The expression of love, also, is generalized in proportion to the universality of its object, and in this expression, therefore, the subjective concentration of the heart and soul does not become the essential thing; just as, though in a wholly different relation, the general idea, and not the subjective side of the individual form and sentiment, was given an important significance among the Greeks in the ancient Titanic Eros and in Venus Urania. Only when, in the representations of Romantic Art, Christ is comprehended rather as at the same time an individual person, absorbed in himself, does the expression of love appear in the form of subjective internality, though, indeed, always elevated and supported by the universality of its content.

b. But the subject most accessible and most favorable to religious Romantic phantasy is the love of the Virgin Mary, — *Maternal love*. Eminently real, human, it is also wholly spiritual. It is disinterested, purified from all desire, is non-sensuous and yet present; it is internality absolutely satisfied and happy. It is a love without longing; and yet it is not friendship, for friendship, however deeply tender it may be, still demands a return, — an essential object as ground of the friendly union. Maternal love, on the contrary, apart from any reference to ulterior aims or interests, possesses an immediate basis in the natural bond of connection between mother and child. Here, however, the love of the mother is limited just as little on the side of nature. In the child, whom she has borne beneath her heart, to whom in sorrow she has given birth, Mary possesses the complete knowledge and sentiment of herself. And this same child, the blood of her blood, stands, again, high above her; and yet this higher Being belongs to her, and is the object in which she forgets herself and likewise attains to her own complete being. The natural internality of maternal love is thoroughly

spiritualized; it has the divine for its peculiar content, but this divine quality remains latent (*leise*) and unknown, wondrously interwoven with natural unity and human sensibility. It is blissful *maternal love*, and pertains only to this *one* mother, who is first and last in the possession of this happiness (in its full measure). This love is, indeed, not without grief, but the grief is only the sorrow of the loss, the mourning over the suffering, dying, dead son; and, as we shall see at a later stage, does not pertain to injustice and torture inflicted from without, or to the endless conflict with sin, to the pain and torment of repentance and expiation. Such internality is here spiritual beauty; it is the ideal, the human identification of man with God, with the spirit, with truth; it is a pure forgetfulness, a complete cancellation of self, and yet, in this forgetfulness, it is thoroughly (*von Hause aus*) one with that in which it is merged, and this united being now realizes a blissful contentment.

In such fine form does maternal love, — this image, as it were, of the spirit, — enter into Romantic Art in place of the spirit itself, for it is possible for art to seize spirit only in the form of sentiment, and the sentiment of the union of the individual with God is present in the most original, most real, and most lively manner only in the maternal love of the Madonna. It must, of necessity, enter into art if the ideal, the affirmative, satisfied reconciliation, is not to be wanting in the representations of this circle. There was, therefore, a time in which the maternal love of the Blessed Virgin pertained in general to the highest and holiest, and was venerated and represented as such. But when the spirit brings itself back into its own element, separated from all natural bases of sentiment, back to consciousness of itself, then spiritual mediation alone, free from such bases, must be considered as the open (*freie*) way to truth; and hence, in Protestantism, in contrast with this Madonna-worship of art and faith, the Holy Ghost and the inner mediation of the spirit has come to be the higher truth.

e. In the third place, finally, the affirmative reconciliation of the spirit appears as sentiment in the disciples of Christ,

in the women and friends who follow Him. These are for the most part characters who, in the hands of their divine Friend, have become penetrated by the rigor (*Härte*) of the idea of Christianity, and who, without having experienced the outer and inner torment of conversion, have become strengthened and enlightened through the friendship, the doctrine, and the exhortation of Christ. Thus they remain steadfast. From these, indeed, the immediate unity and internal quality of maternal love is, without doubt, quite separate; but the bond of unity is here also the presence of Christ, the custom of living in community, and the immediate attraction of spirit.

III. *The Spirit of the Church.*

1. Martyrdom. — 2. Repentance and Conversion. — 3. Miracles and Legends.

When we come to the transition into a final sphere of this circle, we find that this can be joined on to what has already been said concerning the history of Christ. The immediate existence of Christ, as this individual man who is God, comes to be posited or assumed as cancelled. That is, in the manifestation of God as man, it becomes evident that the true reality of God is not immediate being, but rather that it is spirit. The reality of the Absolute as infinite subjectivity is only the spirit itself; God is present only in knowledge, in the element of the internal. This absolute existence of God, as no less ideal than subjective *universality*, does not, therefore, limit itself to this individual, who, in His history, has brought to light (*zur Darstellung*) the reconciliation of human with divine subjectivity, but extends itself to the human consciousness reconciled with God; in general, to *humanity*, which exists as many individuals. For himself, however, taken as individual personality, man is doubtless not immediately divine. On the contrary, he is precisely the finite and human; and the human only arrives at reconciliation with God in so far as it actually posits itself as negative, — and, virtually, it is negative, — and thus cancels itself as the finite. It is through this deliverance from the imperfections of finitude that humanity for the first time comes to itself, or recognizes

itself (*ergiebt sich*), as the external and present existence of the Absolute Spirit; as the spirit of the Church, in which the union of the human with the divine spirit is completed within human actuality itself, as the real mediation of that which virtually — that is, according to the idea of spirit — is originally in unity.

The principal forms which are to be considered of importance, with respect to this new content of Romantic Art, may be presented in the following divisions :

The individual subject or person who, estranged from God, lives in sin and in the conflict of immediacy, and in the incompleteness (*Bedürftigkeit*) of the finite, has the infinite destination of coming into reconciliation with itself and with God. But since, now, in the history of redemption through Christ, the negativity of immediate unity has proved to be the essential moment or element of the spirit, it becomes evident that the individual subject or person can elevate himself to freedom and peace in God only through the transformation of the natural and of finite personality.

This elevation of finitude appears here under a threefold form.

1. *First*, as the external repetition of the history of the Passion, which presents itself under the form of actual bodily suffering, — as martyrdom.

2. *Secondly*, it is exhibited as a transformation produced in the inner nature of the soul, — as internal mediation through awakening, repentance, and conversion.

3. *Thirdly*, and finally, the manifestation of God in earthly actuality is comprehended in such a way that the ordinary course of nature, and the natural form of other events, are cancelled, and the power and presence of the Divine become manifest; whence the miracle acquires the form of an actual occurrence.

1. *Martyrs*. — The first manifestation in which the spirit of the Church proves itself to be actual in the human subject or person consists in this: That man reflects in himself the divine process, and reproduces the eternal history of God. Here, again, vanishes the expression of immediate affirmative

reconciliation, since now man must secure reconciliation through the cancellation of his finitude. Hence that which, at the first stage, constituted the central point, here appears in greatly enhanced proportions; for the destruction of the hypothesis of the inadequacy and unworthiness of humanity, now assumes importance as the highest and exclusive task.

a. The peculiar content of this sphere is, therefore, the endurance of sufferings imposed by cruelty, as well as individual resignation, sacrifice, privation, self-imposed for the sake of being in want; for the sake of arousing every species of suffering, agonies, and torments, that by this means the soul may become purified, and may feel itself to be at length whole, contented, and happy in its heaven. This negativity of pain becomes, in martyrdom, an end in itself, and the greatness of the glorification is measured by the dreadfulness of that which the man has suffered and the fearfulness of that which he has overcome. The first thing now which, in the uncompleted inner nature of the person, can be posited or assumed as negative in relation to his alienation from the world and to his sanctification, is his *natural* existence, his life, the satisfying of the primary necessities of existence. Bodily suffering, therefore, constitutes the principal object of this circle. In part, such suffering was imposed upon the faithful by enemies and persecutors of the faith through hate and desire for vengeance; in part, it was voluntarily assumed (*vorgenommen*), with a view to escape from individual inclination, through total abstraction. Here, in the fanaticism of endurance, man accepts both, not as injustice, but as blessing. For through suffering alone can the tyranny of the flesh—esteemed as altogether sinful—be broken, the obduracy of the heart and the soul be subdued, and reconciliation with God be attained.

In so far, however, as in such situations the conversion of the inner nature can be represented only in that which shocks us, and in the ill treatment (*Mishandlung*) of the external, in like degree is the sense of the beautiful likely to be perverted or destroyed. Hence the objects of this circle constitute a very dangerous material for art; for, on the one hand, the individuals must be represented as of a wholly other class than

was required in the history of the sufferings of Christ. They must be represented as actual, particular individuals, marked with the stamp of temporal existence, and in the infirmity of finitude and of the natural state. On the other hand, the torments and unheard-of atrocities, the destruction and dislocation of limbs, bodily torments, the modes of execution, — such as decapitation, roasting over a slow fire, burning at the stake, boiling in oil, breaking upon the wheel, etc., — all these are hideous, revolting, disgusting, external appearances whose separation from beauty is too great to admit of their being chosen by a sound art as the objects of its representations. The mode of treatment of the artist may, indeed, be excellent, so far as the execution is concerned; but the interest for this excellence is always related only to the subjective side, which, though it may seem to be in accordance with the rules of art, nevertheless struggles in vain to bring its material completely into harmony with itself.

b. Hence the representation of this negative process demands still another moment or element, which rises above this torment of body and soul and turns toward affirmative reconciliation. This is the reconciliation of the spirit in itself, which, as aim and result, has been attained through torments endured to the end. In this sense, martyrs are the conservers of the divine, in opposition to the rudeness of external tyranny and the barbarity of unbelief. For the sake of the kingdom of heaven they endure pain and death; and this courage, this strength, perseverance, and blessedness, must, in like degree, be manifest in them. Still, this internality of faith and of love, in its spiritual beauty, is by no means a spiritual health, which gives perfect soundness to the body; it is rather an internality which has been thoroughly wrought upon by suffering, or which comes to light in the midst of sorrow, and which still contains within it, as something peculiarly essential, the moment or element of pain. Painting, especially, has frequently chosen such piety as the object of its representations. The chief task of painting, then, consists in the expression of the blessedness of the martyr in contrast with the revolting laceration of his flesh; and this ex-

pression must appear simply in the features of the countenance, — in the look, etc., — as resignation, as triumph over pain, as satisfaction in the attainment and increasing-realization (*Lebendigwerden*) of the Divine Spirit in the inner being of the person. If, on the contrary, sculpture attempts to present such content to view, it is found to be less suited to represent concentrated internality in this spiritualized way, and must, therefore, reject the painful, the distorted (*Verzerrete*), in so far as this announces itself as developed in the corporeal organism.

c. But, in the third place, the side of self-denial and endurance concerns, at this stage, not only natural existence and immediate finitude, but directs the aim of the soul toward heaven, in a degree so extreme that the human and earthly, even when it is itself of a moral and rational type (*Art*), comes to be despised and rejected. Here, indeed, the idea of the conversion of the spirit is made vital and active by the spirit within itself; and the more uncultured the spirit is, only so much the more barbarously and abstractly does it turn itself with its concentrated force of piety against everything which, as finite, stands in opposition to this in-itself-simple infinitude of the religious sense; against every particular sentiment of humanity; against the many-sided inclinations, relations, circumstances, and duties of the heart. For moral life in the family, the ties of friendship, of blood, of love, of the state, of vocation, — all this pertains to the worldly; and the worldly, in so far as it is here still unpervaded by the absolute conceptions of faith, and is not developed to unity and reconciliation with the same, appears to the abstract internality of the believing soul to be excluded from the circle of its sentiments and duties, and to stand in opposition thereto as something in itself nugatory, and, therefore, as hostile and hateful to piety. The moral organism of the human world, therefore, is not as yet respected, since the phases (*Seiten*) and duties thereof are not as yet recognized as necessary, authorized links in the chain of an actuality in itself rational, in which nothing can with impunity be elevated in one-sided fashion to an isolated independence, nor yet can it be sacri-

ficed, but must be retained as a valid moment or element. In this respect, religious reconciliation itself remains here merely *abstract*, and shows itself in the simple heart as an intensity of faith without extension, — as the piety of the solitary soul which has not yet progressed to a universally developed confidence in, and to an intelligent, comprehensive certainty of itself. When, now, the force of such a soul places itself resolutely in opposition to worldliness, considered merely as negative, and forcibly separates itself from all human ties, though they be originally the strongest, it must be evident that this is a crudeness of spirit and a barbarous tyranny of abstraction which can only repel us. We would, therefore, in accordance with the standpoint of our present consciousness, honor and revere the religious spirit (*Religiösität*) in such representations; but when piety proceeds so far that we see it wrought up to the point of violence against what is in itself rational and moral, we are no longer able to sympathize with such fanaticism of sanctity; but, on the contrary, this species of renunciation, so far as it repels from itself, destroys and crushes what is in and for itself justified and hallowed, must appear to us as immoral, and as contradicting the true religious spirit. Of this class are many legends, tales, and poems. For example, the story of a man who, full of love for his wife and family, and loved in return by all belonging to him, left his house, wandered about as a pilgrim, and, returning at length in the disguise of a beggar, refrained from making himself known. Alms were given him, and, out of compassion, a small space was granted him under the stairway for his dwelling-place. Thus he lived for twenty years in his own house, beholding, the while, the sorrow of his family respecting himself, and only at last in his dying moments revealing himself to them. This monstrous caprice of fanaticism we are called upon to venerate as sanctity. Such persistence of renunciation may well remind us of the exquisiteness of the torture to which the Hindu likewise freely submits himself for religious ends. Still, the endurance of the Hindu has an altogether different character. With that people, indeed, man puts himself into a state of obtuseness and

unconsciousness, while in our world it is *pain*, and purposed consciousness and keen sense (*Empfindung*) of pain that constitutes the precise aim; for here it is by this means that greater purity is thought to be acquired; and the degree of the purity will, it is believed, be the greater the more closely the suffering is bound up with the consciousness of worth and of the love for renounced kindred, and with the constant view of the renunciation. The richer the heart is which imposes such proof upon itself, the more noble the possession which it bears within itself, and which it yet believes itself bound to condemn as nugatory, and to stamp as sinful, by so much the more cruel (*desto härter*) is the state of non-reconciliation, which may produce the most fearful convulsions and the wildest dissensions. According to our conception, such a soul, — which is at home in a visionary rather than in a real world, as such, and which, therefore, also feels itself lost in the substantially valid realms and aims of this definite actuality, and in spite of the fact that it is completely contained and involved therein, still looks upon these customary affairs as negative in relation to its own absolute character (*Bestimmung*), — such a soul, in its self-imposed suffering no less than in its resignation, must appear to us insane; so that we can no more feel sympathy for it than we can bring about its elevation out of this state. Such deeds have no aim possessing any further validity or content than what pertains exclusively to the individual himself, separate and apart from all others. His only aim is to secure the salvation of *his own* soul, to make sure of *his own* happiness. But whether this particular one should be happy or not is a matter of concern to very few.

2. *Repentance and Conversion.* — The opposite mode of representation in this sphere withdraws, on the one hand, from the external torment of the corporeal nature; and, on the other, from the negative tendency against what is in itself justified in worldly actuality, and thus wins, in respect both to its content and its form, a basis commensurate with ideal art. This basis is the conversion of the *internal nature*, which is now expressed only in its *spiritual* pain, in the conversion

of the soul. Thus, in the first place, the perpetual barbarity and frightfulness of the torment of the body falls into abeyance; and, secondly, the barbarous phase of the religious sense of the soul no longer holds itself steadfastly in opposition to the customs of humanity, in order that it may, in the abstraction of its pure intellectual satisfaction, violently tread beneath its feet every other class of enjoyment in the sorrow of an absolute renunciation, but puts itself in opposition to that alone which in human nature is, in fact, sinful, criminal, base. It is a high assurance that faith—that tendency of the spirit itself towards God—is able to undo the accomplished deed, even when it is sinful and criminal; to make of it something foreign to the individual, to wash it quite away. This withdrawal from the evil, from the absolutely negative, which becomes actual in the individual after the subjective will and spirit, once become base, has now despised and destroyed itself;—this return to the positive, which is now established as the only actual sphere in contradistinction to the earlier existence in sin,—is the true infinite power of religious love, the presence and actuality of the absolute spirit in the individual itself. The feeling of the strength and persistence of the individual spirit (which through God, to whom it turns, overcomes evil, and in so far as it mediates itself with Him, knows itself to be one with Him) gives, then, the satisfaction and happiness of perceiving (*anzuschauen*) God as indeed absolute other, in contradistinction to sin and temporality, and yet of knowing this infinity at the same time as identical with me as this person, of bearing within myself this self-consciousness of God as my *Ego*, my self-consciousness, so certainly as I am myself. Such transformation (*Umkehr*) takes place, it is true, wholly in the internal nature, and belongs, therefore, rather to religion than to art; while nevertheless it is the internality of the soul which, for the most part, seizes upon this act of conversion, and can also shine through the external, so that the art of visible representation—painting—acquires the right to make use in its representations of such process-of-conversion (*Bekehrungsgeschichte*). If, however, it represents completely all the particulars which

lie in such process-of-conversion, then many things which are ugly may enter along with them, for in this case the criminal and repulsive must also be set forth; as, for example, in the story of the Prodigal Son. Hence the most favorable conditions for painting, in such case, will be to concentrate the conversion alone upon a single figure (*Bilde*), without further details of criminality. Of this class is the Magdalene, which is to be numbered among the most beautiful objects in this circle, and which has, especially by Italian masters, been treated exquisitely and in strict accordance with art. She appears here both spiritually and physically as the *beautiful sinner*, in whom sin and repentance are equally attractive. Still, neither in respect of sin nor of holiness is it then taken so seriously. To her much was forgiven (*verziehen*), for she loved much. For her love and her beauty she is forgiven (*ist ihr verziehen*), and the pathetic phase of it consists in this: that she makes an accusing conscience of her love, and lets fall tears of anguish in the beauty of a soul full of tender sensibility. Her error is not that she has loved so much; but this is, if possible, her more beautiful and more touching error: that she should still believe herself to be a sinner; since now her highly sensitive beauty only presents the conception that she has become noble and pure in her love.

3. *Miracles and Legends*.—The last side, which is connected with the two preceding, and which may be esteemed of importance in both, has reference to the miracle, which, in general, plays an important rôle in this entire circle. In this connection, we can point to the miracle as the process of conversion of immediate natural existence. Actuality lies open to view as an ordinary accidental existence; this finite being is in contact with the divine, which, in so far as it immediately concerns things wholly external and particular, casts them asunder, transforms them, and makes of them something wholly different,—interrupts the natural course of things, as men are accustomed to say. Now, the soul, as amazed by such unnatural phenomena (in which it thinks to recognize the presence of the divine) and constrained to represent them in its finite imagination, constitutes one of the chief elements

of many legends. In fact, however, the divine can affect and govern nature only as reason, as the unchangeable laws of nature itself which God has implanted therein, and the divine cannot permit itself to manifest itself immediately in particular circumstances and events which interrupt natural laws; for the eternal laws and properties (*Bestimmungen*) of reason alone pervade nature and operate therein. With respect to this side, legends frequently proceed without constraint (*Noth*) into the abstruse, insipid, senseless, ridiculous, on the ground that spirit and soul must be moved to faith in the presence and actuality of God by what is in and for itself the irrational, false, and undivine. Emotion, piety, conversion can indeed, then, still be of interest, but it is only the *one* side—the internal; so soon as it comes into relation with other and external objects, and this other comes to effect the conversion of the heart, then the external cannot be in itself something absurd and irrational.

These may be considered the chief moments of the substantial content which, in this circle, is of importance as the nature of God, and as the process through which and in which it is spirit. It is the absolute object which art does not create and reveal from and by itself, but which it has received from religion; and, with the consciousness that this is the truth in and for itself, art now approaches it in order to express and represent it. It is the content of the believing, longing soul, which is itself potentially the infinite totality; so that now the external remains more or less external and indifferent, without coming into full harmony with the internal, and hence frequently develops into an adverse material not thoroughly within the grasp of art.

THE TRUE AND THE FALSE IN DARWINISM.

A CRITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE THEORY OF ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT. BY
EDUARD VON HARTMANN. BERLIN, 1875.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY H. I. D'ARCY.

III. *The Theory of Heterogeneous Generation, and the Theory of Transmutation.*

[Continued from JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY for April, 1878, and July and October, 1877.]

This is the case, for instance, with the fresh-water snail, *planorbis multiformis*, found near Steinheim (conf. Ph. d. Unb. Ster. Ausg. p. 594), the form-circle (*formenkreis*) of which, shifting between very distant limits, shows uniform systematic transitions in all directions; but yet, with the exception of just those forms, which, like *denudatus* or *trochiformis*, might manifest a tendency to the type of a new species or genus, and which, in accordance with the theory of heterogeneous generation, make their appearance suddenly; again, as regards the forms related to each other by transition, at least as great variations are to be found among those of the same period — that is, those deposited in the same horizontal stratum — as among the oldest and the most recent stratum, so that the geological features present, on the whole, the appearance of a species with complicated extensions forward, backward, and sideward, but still confined within a definite circle; they afford no evidence favorable to the gradual transmutation of one species into another.¹

Since, then, embryology and paleontology seem rather to oppose than to favor the theory of transmutation, the latter sees itself forced to seek its support in the materials drawn

¹ Compare Wigand's thorough criticism (No. 14 of the appendix) of Helgen-dorf's monograph. Wigand's results are completely confirmed by an examination of paleontological materials by Sandberger, of which he seems to have been ignorant (Verhandl. der Physik. med. Ges. zu Würzburg, N. F. B. d. V. S. 231). Sandberger refers in support of his own views to Hyatt of Boston, Leydig, and Weissman.

from the present fauna and flora. It would be a very appropriate task for a theory of natural science to strengthen its assumption of the descent of all organic bodies by means of gradual transmutation, since such assumption transcends experience, from the analogy of some processes, however few, of transition, experimentally established, of one species into another. Darwinism must, however, admit that it has not yet been able to fulfill this condition, and that it continually requires us to regard the transition shown by artificial grouping as a genetic transition. Even in artificial breeding it has not yet succeeded in procuring a pigeon which, with every external variation, does not retain the decisive specific characteristics of the pigeon. Now, the more efficient the means at the command of the breeder, compared to those of nature, the less favorable would the contrary result of artificial breeding be as evidence of natural processes in the origin of species; therefore, the above-mentioned negative result must present the transmutation theory in a rather suspicious light. But as we cannot have recourse to any direct observation of the origin of a new species, nothing remains but, in order to secure a ground for wider analogies, to select such varieties as at first view seem to lead, through a gradual intensifying of their variations, from the original form to a new species.

Varieties can be divided into three classes: First, those in which only the color, hair, texture, thickness of the cell walls, chemical composition, etc., are affected; these can be affected, partially at least, during the life of an individual, by a change of surroundings (local varieties), but are even in those instances, when they seem to appear spontaneously, not at all calculated to establish systematic differences. Second, monstrosities. Third, morphological varieties. (Wigand, p. 48 to 52.) In the case of monstrosities, we should distinguish those where there is a retrograde metamorphosis from those where such metamorphosis does not occur. The former, which are chiefly found among domesticated creatures, display, according to rule, a luxuriance of growth at the expense of sexual power, and at the same time a descent to a lower morphological and physiological level of organization, and should,

therefore, be excluded in our consideration of the ways and means through which the true ascending development of organic bodies is affected. We are, therefore, really led to the monstrosities where there is no retrograde metamorphosis, and to morphological varieties; and for our purpose each of these, in a certain sense, completes the other. The morphological variety presents a perfectly complete type, without any extraordinary characteristic, but just for this reason the degree of departure from the type of the original form is not so striking as to warrant the conclusion that the character of the species has been lost. With the monstrosity, on the other hand, this loss of specific character is obvious, but only in the direction of some one particular feature. This feature often deviates so far from the form-circle of the species that it seems morphologically like the type of a different genus, or even family; but it does not lead to a new and complete type, for such would require a whole series of successive correlative changes.

We can, therefore, for the present take any one of the following views as to the origin of species: That monstrosities remain, and the other characteristics are acquired by degrees in the same way; or that morphological varieties extend further in the same direction in which they have deviated from the parent form; or that the result of each process is simultaneously reached—that is, the typical completeness of the morphological variety and the sudden variation of the monstrosity. Whatever view we take, we still have to deal with abrupt changes. While all varieties which result, not from the influence of external circumstances on actual individuals, but from spontaneous change in generation, emerge at once before our eyes, the suddenness is peculiarly striking with which monstrosities, not only in artificial life, but even in nature,—and, therefore, independently of external influences, arise spontaneously,—come into existence complete, and, *p̄r saltum*, as something entirely new (Wigand, p. 50). Upon this phenomenon Hofmeister based his theory of the origin of a new species. (*Handbuch der physiologischen Botanik*, 1, 563, 564.) We may, indeed, define monstrosity as a partial heterogeneous generation in a different way, but the single steps of

the process always remain so long that they are quite inconsistent with the transmutation theory, which, in a strict sense, requires changes so slight as to be inappreciable. Even if a species might, during a very long period, complete its form-circle, though moving with inappreciably short steps, still, experience shows that the really decisive steps which introduce something morphologically new can be traced within the species; and we should have much less reason to doubt that, in the great majority of cases of transition from one species to another, such a step over a greater or a less interval is requisite.

If we bear in mind what has been already said, it is clear that we shall find ourselves forced, for many reasons, to assume that the interval between two types connected by descent is crossed *per saltum*, whether the interval is crossed by a single leap or the process is regarded as one made up of several steps. This division of the process may occur in very different ways, as the metamorphosis of animals, alternate generation, dimorphism, monstrosities, or morphological varieties; but always the least change from one variety of the same form-circle to another in the case of a morphological variety, which is characterized by an addition to its organs, or by the increase or diminution of the numerical relation of its parts, is only conceivable through a germ-metamorphosis, which introduces the change of type by a morphologically different arrangement of cells in the embryo.

As far, however, as the transmutation theory is concerned, the foregoing observations in no way affect its operation, in so far as this is limited in assisting in the development of specific types in their shifting form-circles, and in supplying a broader basis, and lessening the intervals to be crossed by heterogeneous generation, and so reducing each interval to a minimum. On the other hand, it would be very difficult to prove the assertion that any species has actually originated by simple transmutation from its direct ancestors. It cannot, under the circumstances, be denied that it is possible that nature may have in every case availed itself of heterogeneous generation. Indeed, if the older school of natural philoso-

phers was right in maintaining the constancy of species, it would be hazardous to assert that species could possibly originate by mere transmutation. I believe, however, that I must regard the establishment of the changeable nature of the limits of species hitherto assumed to be unchangeable, and the proof that the permanance of species, like that of human characteristics, has only a relative meaning within certain limits, as one of Darwin's chief services, and as the one whose value will be longest recognized. Those interested in Wigand's book must, therefore, regret that it has made an unsuccessful attack upon this very position, and thereby exposed a weakness to the followers of Darwin which they will scarcely fail to see and utilize. But as the principle of the transmutation theory extends beyond the form-circle of the species to the theory of descent itself, and as this principle stands and falls with the mutability of species, we must look for a moment at this latter question.

That the conception of species is no more a fiction than any other abstract conception, but is founded in the nature of individuals, is freely admitted; it, however, ascends from the conceptions of orders, families, etc., and descends from that of the variety. It is not denied that these collections of common characteristics are founded on the nature of actual individuals; it is only denied that these systematic classifications have steadfastly fixed limits. When we have classified a particular domain of the natural system, and arranged it in a succession of groups, of which each higher one includes a number of lower ones, it still is for each one of us to decide, unless opposed by a long-reaching and uniform custom, which of these groups will receive the name of a species; and the extraordinary difference of opinion among natural philosophers as to the classification of species in most of the domains of the natural system best shows how difficult it must be to ascertain objective *criteria* wherewith to connect and reconcile conventional definitions.² Whoever, then, will endeavor to

² Ernst Haeckel's monograph on "die Kalkschwämme" (Berlin Reinner, 1872), vol. 1. "Biologie der Kalkschwämme," pp. 474-478, affords a striking example of

attack this shifting meaning of the conception of species as really unfounded, will naturally, in the first place, labor to discover an absolute criterion for this conception. Wigand thinks this criterion is best supplied by the phenomena of crossing. He admits that there are different species which produce fruitful offspring, but he denies that this crossing can produce fruitful and lasting results; and he accordingly asserts that we have in this, at least, a negative mark of species. That is, if two forms do not cross so that their offspring will be perfect and fruitful, this is decisive that such forms belong not simply to different varieties, but to different species (p. 31), and Wigand, therefore, defines his test of perfectly fruitful crossing as "certain and easy impregnation, perfect fruitfulness, and such a constitution in the first and all succeeding generations as precludes the possibility of a retrogression to the ancestral form" (p. 29, note). Each of these three conditions is, however, incapable of fulfillment even within the limits of a single species; its non-fulfillment, then, can by no means prove that two forms do not belong to the same species. If impregnation within the limits of a species were certain, married women would be always pregnant; if all offspring were fruitful, none would be unfruitful except those produced by crossing; finally, if all retrogression were excluded, all the species among which atavism occurs must be declared to be themselves the products of crossing. The criterion, therefore, of perfectly fruitful crossing goes far beyond the mark when it undertakes to establish a relative

this. Hæckel comes to the following result: "The natural system may, for instance, underlie the six following combinations: A, 1 gen. with 1 species; B, 1 gen. with 3 species; C, 3 gen. with 21 species; D, 21 gen. with 111 species; E, 43 gen. with 181 species; F, 43 gen. with 289 species. On the other hand, the artificial system admits of the six following groupings: G, 1 gen. with 7 species; H, 2 gen. with 19 species; I, 7 gen. with 39 species; K, 19 gen. with 181 species; L, 39 gen. with 289 species; M, 113 gen. with 591 species. Each of these twelve systems could advance plausible claims for itself, as each system-maker renders them prominent in support of his own principle. None of them, however, could ever be shown to be the absolutely true system." P. 477. The note on page 478 gives a more accurate account of these systems and of the different principles adopted in each.

degree of fruitfulness within the species as an absolute test (Conf. Ph. d. Unb. 8ter. Ausg. pp. 591–592), and if this criterion is only a relative one, it is a mere question of degree — that is, it is a question of fixing conventional limits for a sphere which, from its very nature, cannot be strictly limited.

Another remark made by Wigand, though rather incidentally, by which he associates species with the highest point in the curve described by fruitfulness, seems of more importance. The sexual affinity is greater between two different blossoms of the same tree than between the pollen and organs of one and the same blossom (on this account measures have been adopted, in the case of several plants, to prevent their self-fecundation); greater between two different individuals of the same form than between two different blossoms of the same tree, and greater between two varieties of the same species than between two similar individuals. But, on the other hand, fruitfulness rapidly decreases after the limits of species have been passed. In opposition to this, we must observe, firstly, that the decrease of fruitfulness with the increase of intermixture, though true of certain species, is by no means an universal law; and, secondly, that the maximum of fruitfulness, the highest point in the curve, on which Wigand lays so much stress, is frequently not to be found in the species, but in the variety. In a large number of plants, impregnated by pollen carried by the wind, and as well as in some others, self-fecundation may be regarded as the rule. It must, therefore, suffice for the preservation of the species; or, according to Wigand's unfortunate terminology, be perfect. In the case of gregarious animals which have polygamic habits the intermixture is also perfect, and does not occasion the disadvantages which always follow in its train when artificial breeding is resorted to. When varieties diverge widely from each other, they often manifest a decided objection to crossing; they will at least give the preference to individuals of their own variety. It is even asserted by many observers that in some instances varieties are less fruitful when crossed than, in other instances, species are.

We may, therefore, conclude that, in many instances, the

highest point of the curve of fruitfulness does not coincide with species, but lies within this, upon the variety; or, perhaps, within still stricter limits.

We may, however, fairly assert that species is seldom far from the maximum of fruitfulness; and this may be a very important point of view, as a relative criterion for the empirical decisions as to what species is and what it is not. We may, perhaps, assume that in such cases, where a clearly defined maximum of the curve exists, this actually corresponds with the species, provided that the species has left its originating process behind, and no new process of specific development within itself has commenced. If the species has not yet come to a stand-still — if it is not yet completely established — there is still a certain tendency to cross with allied species, from which it is separated by more or less indeterminate boundaries; but if, on the other hand, a new process of specific development has begun, if its varieties are already so sharply defined that one might doubt whether he should regard them as species, then the maximum of fruitfulness has generally been transferred to the varieties.

The circumstance that, as well as the developed species, we also find undeveloped and over-developed species which still remind us of varieties; such as include within themselves varieties which resemble species, speaks most distinctly for the mutability of actual species, even for the proposition that the conception of species in the sense of the developed, and not yet over-developed, species coincides with the highest point of the curve of fruitfulness.

Whether, however, such a point exists, and how we, where direct observation of fruitfulness is impossible, should apply this criterion in the determination of species, remains now, as before, undetermined.

Against the evidence adduced in favor of the mutability of species, a reference to the constancy of species during the period over which our experience extends is, of course, of no avail — at least, if it depends exclusively upon perfectly developed species. The fact that this or that species has remained con-

stant since the building of the Egyptian pyramids cannot prove that now certain divergent varieties are not about to acquire the character of species, or that certain undeveloped and shifting species are not tending to develop and establish themselves. The time within which attention has been directed to these processes is really too short to expect conclusive results from them. We are inclined to conclude as to the course of the development process, from the few different phases of it which lie before us, just as we conclude from the gaseous, glowing cloud-streaks, the burning liquid suns, and the solid moons, as to the whole cosmic development of these bodies.

Wigand says (p. 30): "Therefore the absence of transition is by no means a decisive criterion of species, since there are varieties in which no transitions occur; if, however, a transition is shown from one of two given forms to the other, this is conclusive proof that these are not different species. The constancy of form during reproduction, and under all circumstances, is not an unerring sign of species, because varieties manifest, in a measure, a similar constancy; but a form which, under a certain change of circumstances, or in the course of time, changes into another form, or is demonstrably generated from another form, is not specifically different from this other form." These positive criteria as to what forms are not to be regarded as distinct species do not, after what has been before said, require further refutation. Varieties which already appear constant should be regarded as inchoate species, and if it were to happen in the course of time that we should observe the growth of new species in this way, it would be entirely erroneous, in reliance upon the prejudice in favor of the constancy of species, to deny these the character of species, instead of recognizing the thus established mutability of species in the development of organic types. For the moment, the only object is to establish transitional forms, although, of course, these cannot be found between those species which have originated from varieties between which, as varieties, transitional forms did not exist. But even if transitions should be discovered between two forms which hitherto had been regarded as species, it would be premature to cry out, "then there are

no species ;” such an instance, and their number is constantly increasing, would rather suggest a new reason to approach the correction of the old notions as to the constancy and absolute independence of species. Wigand himself shows the worthlessness of this test (p. 18), and even maintains that “the form-circle of one species may touch that of another,” by which the much dreaded transition is established.

The theory of the mutability of species, while being developed, is supported by the fact that we cannot find among the oldest fauna and flora representatives corresponding to the species which exist to-day, while we can find such representatives of the genera (*Gattungen*), families, and orders ; that, moreover, the paleontological representatives of the present forms are decidedly less different from each other than are the latter ; that, for instance, the representatives of families at an early geological period are only distinguished from each other as genera, and at a still earlier period as species. Even when we look at different divisions of the animal kingdom, — for instance, at the fishes and the amphibious animals, — we arrive, by going backwards, at a time when the average difference between them becomes continuously less. Wigand disputes this fact also ; and, although he cannot fairly deny the decrease of difference as we go backwards, yet asserts that the different systematic characteristics are distinguished from each other, not only in degree, but in kind ; so that, for example, two species could never come from two genera. But, unfortunately, Wigand is not in a position to state wherein lies the exact difference between the idea of species and that of genus ; and as he cannot do this, we must retain the assumption that these ideas are distinguished only by the degree of difference, which degree is clearly sufficient for a continuous development. According to Wigand’s own opinion, there is nowhere in the natural system so complete a difference as between the variety and the species ; if, then, we have recognized this as one of degree, the same must certainly hold good of all other differences. If the idea of species lies in close proximity to the highest point in the curve of fruitfulness, this shows nothing more than that a certain combination of agreement and differ-

ence is most favorable to reproduction ; if the point of difference advances, then the most favorable relation between agreement and difference must be sought at a point further back, — that is, the process of differentiation at this forward point, developed differences which require for their characterization a higher systematic mark than that of species.

It follows, therefore, that the proposed test of species — the maximum of fruitfulness — does not at all afford such a criterion for the difference between species and genus as would prevent the progress from one to the other in the advancing process of differentiation. Only thus much is true in Wigand's argument against the mutability of species that every species is not capable of change, but only such as in its morphological divergence from a genealogical ancestor, carries within it the tendency to further morphological development ; and the broader the types which further development of the species introduces, the more essential is the fulfilment of this condition. The more striking the new morphological element exhibited by such a species in its organic development, the higher the degree in which it is qualified to serve as the first parent of a new order or class, the more certainly necessary is an act of heterogeneous generation, and the more powerless must mere transmutation appear.

What we have thus gained for the transmutation theory by the recognition of the mutability of species is nothing more than that we have given to it what had been completely taken away by the doctrine of the constancy of species. — that is, the possibility of explaining the transition from one species to another, when these do not manifest such great morphological differences that a retrograde form-metamorphosis becomes necessary. We have by no means, however, received for the transmutation theory more than the mere possibility of such explanation, and this possibility can only become a probability in actual cases when the probability is established that the regular series of intermediate forms between undoubted species is a genealogical series ; the certainty of this could only be shown by observation of a process of transmutation occurring before our eyes. It will be seen that the transmutation

theory stands on very weak supports, whether the mutability of species be admitted or not ; while everything advanced above against its correctness, and in favor of the theory of heterogeneous generation, remains entirely unaffected by the question of the constancy or mutability of species. The result, then, of this chapter is, that even if future discoveries and observations should give a larger sphere to the operation of transmutation than it can claim in the present condition of our knowledge, yet the construction of the very foundation of the natural system will devolve upon heterogeneous generation, and the function of transmutation will be rather to clothe the skeleton with flesh and skin, to aid the evolution of variety in the domain of organic forms, and at the same time to prepare the way for further heterogeneous generation. Both are simply means by which the inherent law of development manifests its operation, and both mutually support and supplement each other. It is entirely erroneous to suppose that the one theory excludes the other ; the only question is as to the relative extent of their influence and the limits of their operation. If, however, it were necessary that one of them should be excluded, then the construction of the organic world, by means of heterogeneous generation without transmutation, would seem to be at least quite possible, and the construction of it by means of gradual transmutation without heterogeneous generation would appear to be utterly impossible. The disputed point is, however, that Darwinism maintains that this impossibility is the truth, while the advocates of heterogeneous generation, on the other hand, by no means assume so hostile a position as to the coöperation of transmutation, but rather concede to it a more or less extensive influence. We must, therefore, conclude that the non-Darwinian advocates of the theory of descent are at least much nearer the truth than is Darwinism, in its exclusiveness as regards heterogeneous generation.

THE WORLD AS FORCE.

[WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER.]

BY JOHN WATSON.

II. Indestructibility of Matter.

In a former article¹ an attempt was made to show the imperfection of that conception of existence, so alluring to minds whose energies have gone mainly in the line of scientific enquiry, which ranks Intelligence among the special forces of nature, and refuses to it any claim to an exceptional position. It was there contended that the reduction of Intelligence to Force rests upon an uncritical separation of the two correlatives, Nature and Reason, which is degrading to both alike; leading, on the one hand, to the destruction of reality, and on the other, to the dissolution of knowledge. In illustration and proof of this position, an examination of Mr. Spencer's remarks upon Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force was entered upon; the upshot of which was that, starting from that Dualism which may be said to be one aspect of common-sense knowledge, and assuming a ready-made and variously qualified world to begin with, Mr. Spencer plausibly evacuates Nature of rational elements, but only because those elements are covertly assumed, while openly they are unrecognized or denied. Intelligence, it was maintained, is not reducible to Force, any more than it is convertible with Matter: it is as little definable in terms of Motion as in terms of Time or of Space. To make Reason dependent upon that which it alone makes possible, upon that which apart from Reason is a blank, unthinkable abstraction, is to display a philosophical perversity, or a confusion of thought, that could not well be exceeded. The evil result of this inverted conception of reality was pointed out in the reversal of the true order of dependence in the special conceptions treated of—Force being put first,

¹ Jour. Spec. Phil., April, 1878, p. 113, ff.

instead of last — and in the self-contradictory assumption that individual sensations or feelings, which *ex hypothesi* are free of relation, are convertible with the relations admittedly essential to the constitution of the real world of nature. In contrast to this, it was held that Nature is not the antithesis of Intelligence, but simply Intelligence in its lower stages; and that Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force, as each in turn is a higher synthesis of universal and particular, thought and existence, mark a gradual ascent at once in Nature and in Intelligence, so that Force, as the last stage reached, is the apex of Nature, the most perfect unity in diversity of that which we distinguish logically as the material world.

In the criticism of Mr. Spencer's view of Nature, and the presentation of the speculative view, it was incidentally pointed out that the problem of philosophy is not, How does the individual man, by his particular sensations, gradually appropriate objects that lie beyond the range of consciousness? but, How does Intelligence manifest itself in Nature, and by successive stages mount up to a higher plane? The former question admits of no answer; because, in assuming that the particular alone may reveal that which is real, it virtually denies knowledge and overthrows reality. To the empirical psychologist this must seem a foolish, as well as a "hard" saying, only to be explained as one of the wild and incoherent utterances of an Idealism intoxicated with abstractions. It will naturally be replied that Intelligence, as we know it, is always a possession of individual men, and that any universal Intelligence, other than the sum of individual Intelligences, can only be a fiction of the over-speculative imagination. The only way in which a knowledge of reality can be obtained at all, it will be said, is through the senses of individual men, and any method which pretends to do more than manipulate the materials supplied by sense must produce sham, and not real, knowledge.

Adequately to discuss the problem here raised would require an extended enquiry into the mutual relations of Metaphysics and Psychology, and such an enquiry cannot be attempted here; but, to prevent misapprehension, as well as to indicate

the general direction in which the answer lies, a single remark may be made. The assertion that there is a purely individual intelligence, if by that be meant an intelligence existing in isolation from a real world, and from other intelligences, is a self-contradictory proposition. An intelligence so shut up within itself could never have any knowledge of nature, or of other intelligences, or even of itself. Consciousness involves an object to be known not less than a self to know it; but an intelligence of the kind imagined could have no object whatever before it, and therefore could have no knowledge. To be conscious of any real object of nature, it would have to go out beyond the limits of its self-isolation and give up its individuality. To be conscious of other intelligences, it must perform the astounding double feat of going out of itself and of dragging from their enclosure a number of other self-involved individuals. Nor could an individual intelligence be conscious even of its own sensations, for such a knowledge implies the distinction of one real sensation from another, and of both more or less explicitly from itself, *i. e.*, the partial construction of a real world. A purely individual intelligence — an intelligence exclusive of universality — is a fiction of the abstracting intellect. We do, indeed, for sufficient reasons, distinguish one individual man from another; but, just as it is absurd to say that one individual may exist alone, and constitute a universe by himself, so it is impossible for an individual intelligence to exist that is not universal. Consciousness, at least, certifies to the reality of its own objects as such, for otherwise it could not even establish itself; and, hence to speak of a merely individual consciousness, of an intelligence existing purely for itself, is but to proclaim, and so to deny, a universal skepticism. We may, therefore, safely conclude that, whatever psychology may have to tell us of the intelligence of individuals, it can never prove the individuality of intelligence; it cannot overthrow the essential conditions of all knowledge without at the same time overthrowing itself. From unrelated sensations, from feelings that are not universalized, no reality and no knowledge of reality can be evolved; the very beginning of intelligent experience involves the re-

flection of particular sensations upon each other and into a universal self, and hence that stage of knowledge we call sensation is really a mode of thought, differing only in degree from thought in its higher and more complex forms. By the differentiation of feelings that are thought — *i. e.*, of real relations from each other and from the thinking self — the known universe gradually grows up, broadening in complexity and cohering into closer unity. Analysis and synthesis, nature and thought, are but different aspects of a single process.

By Matter, in all of its significations — and it has many — is meant the totality of substances, or the unity underlying all substances. As a Substance is a combination of properties, so Matter is a combination of Substances. It is indispensable, in estimating the relation which the doctrine of the Indestructibility of Matter bears to the wider doctrine of the correlation of forces, that we should have a perfectly clear consciousness of what we really mean when we affirm Matter to be indestructible, and hence it seems advisable to clear the way by setting forth the various correlative meanings of the terms, Substance and Matter.

There are at least four distinct senses in which writers of the school of Spencer speak of Substance and of Matter. The first corresponds to the conception held by common sense, the second and third are characteristic of the special sciences, and the last is peculiar to Spencerian Metaphysics. When the “plain” man speaks of a Substance or Thing, he means by it something known to him by its sensible properties. Each thing is, he would say, directly perceived, and it can at any time be recognized by its characteristic marks. A substance thus includes the notion of persistence through successive times, or Identity, and this Identity is assumed to be independent of mere temporal succession. Moreover, a substance need not be unchangeable in all of its properties; so long as those which characterize or define it, those *essential* to it, remain, the identity of the substance is taken for granted. At the same time, as each Thing is known and recognized by properties directly, or apparently directly, presenting themselves, the maximum of change that a

substance may undergo without losing its identity is relatively small. Among the changes regarded as unessential, change in place is prominent; a Substance, provided it retain its color, weight, etc., is not supposed to lose its identity by transference to another place. A Substance is thus indifferent, not only to succession in Time, but to motion in Space. We may say, therefore, that, in ordinary knowledge and in popular language, a substance is that which is known and recognized as identical by its essential properties; or that which remains identical with itself, notwithstanding a change in unessential properties. The common conception of Matter corresponds to the common notion of Substance. Ordinarily, we are not accustomed to think or speak of Matter, but only of Substances. Still there are times when we vaguely think of all substances as together making up one world of nature. The bond uniting the infinity of individual Substances is Space and Time, which, before, we had rejected as unessential. The conception of Substance and the conception of Matter cohere, in so far as each Substance, notwithstanding its individuality, is regarded as a part of Matter; but common sense does not ask how matter can be a unity, while yet it is differentiated in an infinity of distinct Substances. It is enough for it that all Substances are in one Space and one Time.

The first of the scientific conceptions of Substance and of Matter is the product of an extension and partial rectification of the popular conception. By the chemist or physicist the name Substance is applied to "the solids, liquids, vapors and gases, the ponderable, visible, and resistant objects of sense."² This notion of Substance differs only in degree from that of common sense. The weakness of the latter is that things are distinguished from each other only by their most obvious properties, while their deeper

² G. H. Lewes, *Problems of Life and Mind*, vol. 2, p. 204, Am. ed. I cannot help saying here that, in this work, Mr. Lewes seems to me to come nearer to the speculative point of view than any other member of the empirical school I know of. His remarks on Matter, Force, and Cause (p. 203, ff.) are exceedingly fresh and suggestive.

relations are overlooked. Science fixes upon more permanent > attributes, and hence its comprehension of that which constitutes the identity of a Substance is more accurate and more profound. The difference, then, lies in the more exact differentiation of Substances from each other, and in the fewer number of properties conceived to form the essence of a substance. The properties by common sense regarded as essential are looked upon as unessential, only the more permanent properties hidden from common sense being regarded as essential. Besides the compatibility of change of place and succession of time with the essential identity of a substance, science adds that a change in the prominent sensible properties does not in any way affect that identity. A > substance, in short, is that which retains its identity, notwithstanding change in place and succession in time, because it remains unchanged in its chemical, electrical, or physical properties. Matter will, therefore, be the assemblage of such substances. Here, again, no attempt is made to explain how Matter can be a unity, and yet differentiate itself in an infinite variety of clearly defined substances. There is a tendency, however, to regard the common characteristics of all substances — extension, mobility, weight, etc. — as constituting the essence of Matter. This tendency leads to the second scientific conception of Substance and of Matter.

This third conception is of most importance for our immediate purpose. The identity of a substance is now held to lie > in the permanence of its mass as a whole, or of the units of mass by which it is constituted. Thus, by a stroke, a whole group of properties is struck out of the list of essential attributes. A substance, it is held, may change in its chemical, electrical, or physical properties, but it cannot alter in the particles which compose it. Its mass as a whole may change its place, or its molecules or atoms may alter their position relatively to each other, but the sum of the units of mass, measurable by the amount of resistance they offer, or by their gravity, is a constant quantity. Here we have a most important alteration in the notion of Substance. According to com- > mon sense, a Substance to be the same, must retain unchanged

those sensible properties designated by its name ; science in its first mind demands the permanence of chemical, electrical, or physical properties ; science in its second mind is contented with the mere unchangeability of the quantity of a substance. All three imply the union of identity and change, but by successive differentiation the essential attributes are finally reduced to quantity of mass, or solidity. One individual substance is distinguished from another simply by the greater or less number of its units, and by the relation of those units to each other in place, or of the units as a whole to another group of units. Hence Matter, as the totality of individual substances, is definable as an assemblage of units of mass. Since each unit is in space, and is capable of motion, matter, while it is regarded as differentiated in these units, is yet conceived as indifferent to position and to motion. And, as between all existing masses relatively to each other, and between the units composing any given substance, there is exactly the same relation of whole and part, while the elements are the same in both, we easily pass from substances to the one substance, which is matter. The essence of matter is therefore, from this point of view, equivalent to its quantity, or the number of its indivisible units of mass ; all properties except that of solidity are set aside as unessential. It is matter in this sense alone that is said to be "indestructible." Change, or position in space, succession in time, alteration in physical, chemical, or electrical properties, do not affect the essence of matter, because these changes still leave unaffected the number of units of mass which together make up matter as a whole.

The definitions of Substance and of Matter, so far, are based upon actual knowledge of the real relations of things, and imply a distinction between essential and unessential attributes. The fourth conception, on the other hand, expressly denies any knowledge of existence as it actually is, and the opposition of essential and unessential, the unity of identity and difference, vanishes in the affirmation of the Indistinguishable. Substance is the indeterminate, unknowable Substratum underlying the known properties of things. The identity of Substance is not due to the permanence of certain

definable attributes in the flux of other attributes, but in the absolute unchangeableness of Substance itself; that which has no attributes can suffer no change. Hence the definition of Substance coalesces with the definition of Matter in itself, since both alike are definable as that which has no knowable attributes; every Substance is a pure changeless identity, and therefore none is distinguishable from the rest. Here we reach the extreme limit of abstraction; the conception of Matter cannot be further attenuated, and perforce we must be contented with the purified residuum we have at last obtained.

The mere fact that Matter has such a variety of significations is of itself a sufficient reason for carefully marking off each from the rest. The tendency to pass unconsciously from the one to the other must lead, unless great care be taken, to a confusion of thought disastrous in its results. But there is a special reason, in the present instance, for exactly distinguishing the one from the other. As will be made good in the sequel, the whole reasoning by which Consciousness is plausibly explained by the conception of Force, and only allowed a rank coördinate with special Forces of nature, rests upon the tacit assumption that what is true of Matter, defined as an assemblage of units of mass, is true of Matter in its other definitions also. Because, in one signification of the term, it is correct to say that Matter is a collection of atoms, it is taken for granted that the conception of Force, which is a synthesis of Matter and of Motion, is adequate, not only to the definition of Matter as displaying chemical, electrical, and physical properties, but to Existence in all its modes, including Life and Consciousness. We have seen, by a bare enumeration of the different meanings assignable to the term, that Matter connotes only those properties for the time regarded as essential, and that the reality of those properties which, from a special point of view, are looked upon as unessential, is quietly ignored, if it is not positively denied. There is thus a real danger that the relative distinction of essential and unessential should be regarded as an absolute distinction, with the result that all properties rejected for the time being as unessential should be thrown away altogether as so much waste of

nature. That this prevision of danger is not imaginary becomes manifest when we find the conception of Force, employed as a rubric, applicable to all modes of existence.

An examination of Mr. Spencer's chapter on the Indestructibility of Matter³ at once shows that the term Matter is employed by him in all of the four senses distinguished above, and that the first three are made use of without any notice being taken of the transition from the one to the other. The doctrine of the indestructibility of Matter does not tell us anything whatever in regard to the permanence or fugitiveness, the ultimate reality or unreality, of physical, chemical, or vital relations; it tells us only that the total number of the units of mass that together constitute Matter is a constant quantity. That this is the real force of the doctrine no one, we think, is likely to dispute, but very many are sure to forget. This indestructibility of Matter, Mr. Spencer begins by saying, "so far from being admitted as a self-evident truth, would, in primitive times, have been rejected as a self-evident error. There was once universally current a notion that things could vanish into absolute nothing, or arise out of absolute nothing." This illusion has, however, been gradually dispelled by wider knowledge. "The comet that is all at once discovered in the heavens, and nightly waxes larger, is proved not to be a newly-created body, but a body that was until lately beyond the range of vision. * * * Conversely, the seeming annihilations of Matter turn out, on closer observation, to be only changes of state. It is found, *e. g.*, that the evaporated water, though it has become invisible, may be brought by condensation to its original shape."⁴

Here Mr. Spencer uses the term "Matter" in two distinct senses — that of common sense, and that of science in its first mind. To say that the primitive man denied the doctrine of the indestructibility of Matter is true or false, according to the meaning we give to the term. If by Matter we mean that which is definable as a totality of units of mass, the

³ First Principles, Part II., ch. 4.

⁴ First Principles, sec. 52, pp. 172, 173.

primitive man did not deny the indestructibility of matter, simply because he never thought of matter in that sense at all. If, on the other hand, we are to understand by Matter individual substances determined by the prominent properties which they manifest to the unreflective consciousness, then undoubtedly the indestructibility of Matter was denied. But, it must be added, that it was correctly denied. Neither Mr. Spencer nor any one else would maintain that the comet, as a visible object, begins to be for the observer before it is observed, and it was only of things as observed that the primitive man made any affirmation. The indestructibility of Matter, in short, does not mean the absolute permanence of sensible properties, but only the absolute permanence of Matter as a whole, of Matter as composed of indivisible units of mass. There is, therefore, no incompatibility in the denial of the permanence of sensible objects, and the affirmation of the permanence of the total quantity of Matter. That Mr. Spencer supposes the two propositions to be contradictory, surely argues the absence of a clear consciousness on his part of the distinction between two quite different conceptions of Matter. And, surely, there is further confusion in the first proof given of the indestructibility of Matter. That "the evaporated water, though it has become invisible, may be brought by condensation to its original shape," proves that change in the sensible properties of things does not necessarily imply change in the essential properties; but it does not prove what it ought to prove, viz., that the quantity of Matter always remains the same. Here, therefore, we have Matter employed, first, as that which has certain prominent, sensible properties; and, secondly, as that which has certain physical, chemical, or electrical properties; and neither of these is distinguished from the third conception of Matter, as that which is made up of a definite number of indivisible atoms.

Mr. Spencer's next step, however, shows that only in this last sense can we properly speak of the indestructibility of Matter. "Not till the rise of quantitative chemistry," he says, "could the conclusion suggested by such experiences be reduced to a certainty. When, having ascertained, not only

the combinations into which various substances enter, but also the proportions in which they combine, chemists were enabled to account for the matter that had made its appearance or become invisible, the proof was rendered complete. When, in place of the candle that had slowly burnt away, it was shown that certain calculable quantities of carbonic acid and water had resulted — when it was demonstrated that the joint weight of the carbonic acid and water thus produced, was equal to the weight of the candle, plus that of the oxygen uniting with its constituents during combustion — it was put beyond doubt that the carbon and hydrogen forming the candle were still in existence, and had simply changed their state.” Here we have exemplified the transition from the common conception of Matter, through the first scientific conception of it, to the final definition of it as a combination of units of mass. When Mr. Spencer speaks of the “candle that has slowly burnt away,” he is speaking of Matter simply as the totality of sensible substances — of Matter as understood by common sense. So long as a substance retains the properties by which it is known and identified, it may change, but its substantiality remains undisturbed; when the properties assumed to be essential to it, and fixed in a name, are no longer present, the identity of the substance is denied. Secondly, by the identity of Matter, Mr. Spencer means the permanence of the chemical and other properties that, together, define the essence of substances. The candle “burns slowly away,” — *i. e.*, the sensible properties disappear, but “certain calculable quantities of carbonic acid and water have resulted,” *i. e.*, the properties by the scientific chemist known to be essential have not disappeared, but are permanent. The constituent elements of the substance no longer occupy the same relative position as regards each other; but, while separated, they still exist, ready to recombine, the moment the old conditions are restored. Here, again, what we have is not the indestructibility of Matter as it must be conceived by the correlationist, but the permanence of the elementary constituents of substances as defined by their chemical attributes. And hence we find Mr. Spencer coming, at last, to the third conception of matter. The “joint weight

of the carbonic acid and water," produced by the burning away of the candle, is "equal to the weight of the candle, plus that of the oxygen uniting with its constituents during combustion." Even here we have not a perfectly clear presentation of the conception of Matter, in the sense in which alone we can speak of the indestructibility of matter, for weight properly comes under the notion of Force, not under that of Matter. The reason of this want of definiteness, of course, is, as we shall afterwards see at more length, that the extremity of abstraction, condensed in the term Matter, has to be corrected by the reintroduction of elements presupposed in that abstraction, and hence it has to be admitted, as is virtually done here, that the atomic conception of real existence is only a partial expression of the truth. Still it is evident, on consideration, that what alone is conceived as absolutely permanent is the quantity of the constituents, *i. e.*, the number of units of mass, as measured by their joint weight. Here, therefore, we come to that final definition of Matter which is alone really established by the doctrine of its indestructibility. No sensible property, no chemical or physical property, of substances is permanent: nature undergoes perpetual metamorphoses, but all through the infinite variety of its changes, the unitary masses of matter are unchanged and unchangeable. This is the basis of the atomic theory. Abstracting from all other differences of the real world, and fixing exclusively upon the attribute of solidity, we may affirm, provided we are allowed to endow the different sorts of atoms with different weights, that the mass of every body, and of every constituent element of a body, never either increases or diminishes. There may be change in the relative positions of masses, or of the molecules or atoms composing masses, but none in the quantity of the masses, because none in the individual atoms. From which it directly follows that the total number of units of mass must be eternally the same—in other words, that matter is unchangeable in its total quantity. It is evident, from this, that the doctrine of the indestructibility of matter is based upon a partial or abstract consideration of the real world, and that any theory which treats this

abstraction as if it were synonymous with concrete existence, must end in a distorted conception of the more complex elements of existence. It is this process of abstraction which, unaware of its own character, gives rise to the supposition that Intelligence is definable as a special Force among other cöordinate Forces. By tracing the successive stages of its growth we may, perhaps, help to dispel the illusion that the unity and permanence of the intelligible world is adequately formulated in the doctrine of the indestructibility of matter and the persistence of force.

The very beginning of the intelligent comprehension of reality cannot be regarded as analysis alone, nor synthesis alone, but as one indivisible act comprehending both within itself. The initiary limit of knowledge may be formulated either in the judgment, "This is real," or in the identical judgment, "I know this as real." But this judgment, it must be observed, is partly an abstraction that does not adequately express all that is implied in the very simplest knowledge of that which is real. For "This" is perfectly indeterminate, whereas every real conception is determinate. Correctly to formulate the beginning of real knowledge, we must throw our judgment into the shape, "This is not That," or, from the side of the subject, "I know This as distinguished from That." The first reality known, or the primary act of knowledge, is therefore concrete. The beginning of intelligent experience is only expressible in the form of a syllogism, not in the form of a conception, or even of a judgment. The analytical aspect of this real act is the affirmation of one property or relation as real; its synthetical aspect is the comprehension of both properties or relations as only real in their community with each other. On the side of intelligence, the analysis is the reference of one property, thought as the negative of another, and therefore itself as positive, to a universal self; the synthesis is the twofold reference of both to the same indivisible self. Hence the fallacy of the ordinary theory of abstraction; hence the elaborate trifling of common Logic, which runs out into a bewildering maze of subtleties, and perversely represents Thinking as the

very superfluous process of converting reality into fiction. Real objects, it is supposed, are first constituted of various properties, revealed by the immediate presentations of Sense; and then Thought, of its own arbitrary choice, selects one out of the number, and sets it apart for special contemplation. Now, such an imaginary process of Abstraction is supposed to be possible only because a complex act, having the double aspect of analysis and synthesis, has gone before and supplied a concrete reality to operate upon. We may easily see what gives countenance to this false explanation of the process of thought. There is a sense in which it may be said that knowledge is based upon abstraction or analysis. The comprehension of one property in pure isolation is a feat that can be performed by no conceivable intelligence, since every property is itself only in relation to another property; but in the advance of knowledge, by successive differentiation, it naturally comes about that a greater degree of interest attaches to one term of a relation than to another. Hence one property, or one set of properties, is looked upon as positive, in contrast to the other or others, which are regarded as negative. The distinction is itself a purely arbitrary one, for the term from one point of view called positive may from another point of view be termed negative. But this predominant interest in one term of a relation, while it does not convert the isolated term into an independent reality, yet prepares the way for the illusion that it does so. And hence, at a later stage of thought, the positive properties — the properties in which an excess of interest is felt — are classed together as the *essence*, or definition of a thing, while the negative properties are vaguely passed over as unessential. But essential and unessential, like positive and negative, are purely relative distinctions; what from interest is now conceived as essential, is again rejected as unessential. It must, therefore, never be forgotten that, when we speak of the essence of a thing, we do not thereby limit reality for all time to the special group of properties we have in view for the time being. When Matter is said to be defined by the property of solidity, its essence, it is a tremendous perversion of the truth to suppose

that by such a limitation we have, as by a magical incantation, caused all the other relations of the universe to disappear. Those properties classed as essential, fixed in a definition, and marked by a common name, are real; but they are not all that is real. The conception of Matter as a congeries of indivisible units of mass is not intrinsically truer or more valuable than the conception of Matter as defined in the totality of Chemical relations. Intrinsically, the one is as important as the other; relatively, the one or the other is more important, according to the special point of view; absolutely, *i. e.*, as a formulation of existence in its completeness, the more complex conception is the more important of the two. The term Matter, like all other common names, is simply a short-hand method of designating one aspect of real existence; it is no mystic spell to conjure all other relations into nonentity. The only sense, then, in which it can be said that knowledge is gained by an analytical process is that in which the mind's interest in a special set of properties overrides its interest in another set; so that the negative term of the relation is passed over as unessential, and only the positive term is attended to. In reality, as has been shown, analysis is not a single process, but only one aspect of a single process; just because one property is only an element in reality, and, therefore, in itself an abstraction, every real act of knowledge is synthetic not less than analytic.

The reality of a property depends upon its negative relation to another property. To this we must add that the relation of the two terms is real solely because of their relation to the Intelligence manifesting itself in them. The judgment, "This is not That," may be more fitly thrown into the formula, "This is known not to be That." It is a stubborn illusion, shared alike by the man of common sense and by the purely scientific man, that, besides the properties or relations by which things are constituted, there is a third "something," separable from the thinking self, and constituting the only real existence. Our analysis, however, of the initial act of knowledge makes it evident that this "something" is simply the abstraction of relation-to-intelligence. Remove the rela-

tion to intelligence, with its double aspect of positive and negative, essential and unessential, and nothing whatever remains. The relation is real, and the thinking self is real, but there is no "something" over and above this unity of universal and particular. And the real relation thus constituted by intelligence is not a merely particular judgment; in the reality of the relation is involved its absoluteness or universality; and this we may express in the judgment, "This particular relation is universal." A relation because it is real is universal, and it is universal because it is thought. No doubt it may be afterwards discovered that, from a higher point of view, the relation at first regarded as absolutely permanent is not in itself permanent, but has to be carried up into a wider universal; but this does not destroy its reality, and therefore does not affect its universality. The subsequent advances in knowledge, as repetitions of the primary act of knowledge, involve a process of combined analysis and synthesis, and thus existence increases in complexity, while intelligence never loses its unity. We may, therefore, say that knowledge proceeds from the less to the more concrete, the more to the less abstract, the less to the more known. Hence common knowledge is more abstract, or less concrete, than scientific knowledge. Here, again, it is important to notice that, from the mind's predominant interest in some terms over others, certain properties are classed as essential, others as unessential. Thus, existence gets separated into groups of positive attributes, while the other attributes are vaguely merged in the general conception of negation. From this point of view common knowledge may be said to be analytic, not because analysis is possible apart from synthesis, but because the mind's interest in the positive attributes gives them a fictitious excess of reality for the time. Thus, the way is made easy for that formulation of common sense which, overlooking the negative movement involved in the process of knowledge, conceives existence as made up of a number of individual things or substances having purely positive attributes. Hence, a double illusion: the illusion that the substance itself is real, apart from its relations to other substances, and that it is real

out of relation to intelligence. Just as the negative factor implied in every form of reality is passed over as if it were not, because of the almost exclusive interest taken for the time being in the affirmative factor, so the still less manifest relation of the properties to intelligence is overlooked or misinterpreted. Accordingly, we find the empiricist, who formulates the common-sense conception of reality, speaking in language which implies the threefold fiction of "something" apart from its properties, of positive attributes in isolation from negative, and of a concrete reality independent of intelligence. Recognizing the analytic or affirmative side of knowledge, and passing over the synthetic or negative side, he is led to separate real existence from that which is the necessary condition of its reality. The same imperfect comprehension of the elements of knowledge and of reality which leads him to raise the positive or relatively essential properties to the "bad eminence" of independent sovereignty also suggest to him to separate Matter, as defined by one set of properties, from Intelligence, as defined by another set, and to claim for each a reality of its own. He passes from the one to the other in turn, and cannot be got to see that, as the negative aspect of reality has also a positive side, a real world apart from a universalizing intelligence to make it real, is as much a fiction as a circumference without a center.

The development of common into scientific knowledge involves a great increase in that double process of differentiation and integration which is implied in the simplest conception of reality. The universe increases immensely in complexity, but at the same time it coalesces into a more perfect unity. Here, also, countenance is given to the false conception of real knowledge as a process of analysis or abstraction. The empiricist is not content merely to separate Thought and Matter as abstract opposites of each other. He applies the same process of abstraction to the various aspects in which Nature itself is contemplated by the scientific mind in its different moods. Common knowledge really grows up by means of a dialectical process, in which there is a perpetual equilibrium of the positive and the negative aspects of reality. But as the individual

mind interests itself temporarily only in the attributes it conceives as positive or essential, the negative or unessential attributes are passed over with a hasty glance and forgotten. Thus the equilibrium is destroyed. The same dialectical process, and the same predominance of interest in certain select relations of existence, is manifested in the procedure of the special sciences; with this difference—that each tendency is carried out to its extreme. The scientific man breaks up the first immediate unity of things, which is sufficient to satisfy the languid interest of common sense, and in this analysis he vastly extends the synthesis essential to all experience, increasing a thousandfold the complexity of the known universe. But as his interest centres, not in the easily accessible relations alone regarded by common sense, but in those hidden away from its superficial gaze, he naturally treats the sensible properties of things as unimportant and unessential. This affords the empiricist fresh scope for misconstruction. The relations of things which are accessible to all are not for that reason absolutely unessential, but they are apt to be thought so by one who places himself at the purely scientific point of view. And this is what the empiricist frequently does. Overlooking, in his haste, the negative element essential to all knowledge, he assumes that the relations labelled “essential” by science need alone to be considered, while those relations classed by it as “unessential” may be thrown out as so much useless lumber. But no aspect of reality, or of knowledge, is unessential to one who proposes to formulate the conditions of reality as a whole, and to give a true account of the nature of knowledge. Part of the problem of Philosophy is, in fact, to bring forward into the light those elements of existence and of knowledge that, by common sense and by the special sciences, are allowed to rest in shadow. Philosophy can plead no predominant interest in one aspect of the world rather than in another, for to it all are alike important and alike essential. The equilibrium of real existence disturbed by the preoccupation of common sense and of science must be restored. Philosophy may not pander to the one-sidedness of common and of scientific knowledge without violating its most sacred

duty ; it must formulate existence in its totality, dismissing no aspect of it with a contemptuous "unessential!" The empiricist does not know his duty, and hence he seizes upon the analytic side of knowledge, to the neglect of the "synthetic unity of experience." And not only does he throw aside as unessential those real relations emphasized by common sense, but he is prone to dismiss from his thoughts all elements of reality except the most abstract. Having once entered upon the path of abstraction, he is never at rest until he has followed it up to its issue. The rejection of the sensible properties of common knowledge is not enough, but he must go on to remove even such manifestly real properties as those conceived to be essential by the chemist, the physicist, and the astronomer ; nay, he will carry the process of pure analysis to its utmost limit, and pause only when his frenzy for abstractions has faded away into an ecstatic vision of Matter in itself. The nude form of a universe, differentiated only by a multiplicity of units of mass, is still too concrete, too definite for him ; he has not yet stripped existence to the bone, and he must complete the process, or be miserable. Such devotion to the abstract not only renders a true philosophy an impossibility, but it completely misconstrues the essential character of scientific procedure. The differentiation of physical from chemical relations, and of the latter from dynamic relations, is not only a justifiable procedure of science, but it is the condition of scientific progress ; the elimination of all motion, change, and life from the world is essential to the comprehension of the world as a collection of units of mass, and to exactness in dynamical and chemical conceptions. But because the special sciences, for sufficient reasons of their own, concentrate their attention upon certain aspects of existence, to the exclusion of others not less essential, that is no reason why the philosopher, who is not bound by the same rules as the scientist, should raise the special to the dignity of the universal. The dry bones of reality must again be clothed upon and touched with new life before any theory adequately representing the infinite fulness of the intelligible universe can be framed.

“It is important,” says Mr. Lewes, “to bear in mind that all our scientific conceptions are analytical, and, at the best, only approximative. They are analytical, because science is ‘seeing with other eyes,’ and looks away from the synthetic fact of experience to see what is not visible there. They are approximations, because they are generalities.”⁵ The contrast here drawn between common knowledge as synthetic and scientific knowledge as analytic is utterly fallacious. There are not two discrepant processes of knowledge, but all knowledge is developed in the same way, by a differentiation that is at the same time integration—an analysis that includes synthesis. The unity of the process of knowledge is just as perfect as the unity of existence and the unity of intelligent experience. Common knowledge is more remote from reality than science, and hence it is more “general,” or abstract. When Science, to use one of Mr. Lewes’s illustrations, resolves Light into undulations of ether acting upon the retina, it does not pass from fact to abstraction, from synthesis to analysis. The point of view is changed: but in the change there is an actual increase in differentiation and integration, an advance from the more to the less general, the less to the more concrete. By breaking up the phenomenon of Light into its factors, the undulations of an elastic medium and the sensibility of the retina, the phenomenon is more exactly defined; the analysis is, at the same time, a new synthesis. And this is but a single instance of the general procedure of Science. It is true that, if we attend solely to its analytic aspect, as Mr. Lewes does, and attempt to build an exhaustive theory of the process of knowledge upon that alone, we may contrast the fulness of reality, characteristic of common knowledge, with the extreme tenuity of scientific knowledge; but to do so is simply to misinterpret the one kind of knowledge as well as the other. Both alike proceed, and must proceed, by a dialectic process that is neither analytic nor synthetic, but both in one; and both alike distinguish the essential from the unessential, the positive

⁵ Problems of Life and Mind, vol. ii, p. 226.

from the negative. Common sense attends only to those relations that rouse its interest, and all others it dismisses as unimportant. And as the attributes so selected are simply the most superficial, the knowledge of common sense is necessarily more "general" than the knowledge of science. What by the plain man is regarded as essential, is passed over as unessential by the scientific man; the interest of the latter lies in the more recondite properties of things, and hence those commonly known are taken for granted and lightly passed over. Science, as such, however, does not deny the reality of the ordinary relations; that is left for the empirical philosopher, who plumes himself upon the exclusive accuracy with which he formulates scientific procedure. When you know that $7+5=12$, you cannot be forever repeating the slow process of adding unit to unit. So, when the common properties of things are once known, they are as a matter of course taken for granted, and henceforth treated as $= x$. Hence the seeming abstractness of scientific knowledge, as compared with ordinary knowledge. But the abstractness is only seeming; we cannot be always going back to the very beginning of knowledge, but must take something for granted, and start afresh. Thus, science, without denying established relations, widens the area of existence, and increases the complexity of knowledge. It is by a reciprocal analysis and synthesis that science comes to classify one set of relations as essential and another set as unessential. But, as no real properties are unessential in the last resort, the distinction is an artifice of science, not one determining the nature of real existence itself. Mr. Lewes's mistake is that of all empiricists; he takes the real world, in the plenitude of its known relations, and this he supposes to be known by a "synthesis of sensibles." That is to say, the presentations of Sense reveal existence as it truly is; and hence science, as contemplating only special aspects of existence, stands in unfavorable contrast to the knowledge of common sense. But, in the first place, Sense does not give real objects, for it gives of itself nothing at all; and, secondly, supposing it did, it would be "synthetic" only by including scientific knowl-

edge as a part of universal knowledge. On the first point, nothing more needs to be added. The second point brings out the fallacious procedure of empiricism into especial prominence. Mr. Lewes contemplates the real world after the completion of the long process by which it has been manifested to intelligence, or, more correctly, after intelligence has manifested itself in it; and hence, attending only to a part of that process at a time, he plausibly tells us that science deals only with "generalities." Most assuredly it does, if we contemplate the intelligible world as a whole; most assuredly it does not, if we are speaking of it as compared with ordinary knowledge. The part is always less than the whole, and therefore more abstract; to say that the world as it interests science is partial or abstract, compared with the world in the plenitude of its relations, while a true, is not a very instructive remark; and to maintain that it is more abstract than that common-sense knowledge with which it starts, and which it is its one object to extend, is an utter perversion of the truth. Empiricism is perpetually oscillating between truism and falsehood.

Mr. Spencer, as his readers are never allowed to forget, holds that, after giving an "inductive" proof of a proposition, it is necessary straightway to supplement it by a "deductive" proof. It is curious that it has never occurred to him that two things which cannot be permitted to stand alone must be but two aspects of the same thing. If either proof is complete in itself, why weaken it by the suggestion that it is in need of being complemented by its opposite? There is a true instinct in this double process of demonstration, but, like other instincts, it has a very imperfect comprehension of itself. The opposition of Induction and Deduction is but another aspect of the false separation of Synthesis and Analysis. There is a real justification, from the point of view of scientific knowledge, in separating the one aspect from the other, and there is no practical harm done in regarding each as a separate process. For science rests upon an unformulated abstraction from Intelligence, and rightly regards its task as complete when it has set forth those relations that in their totality

express the realm of Nature. It is otherwise with philosophy, which proposes to itself the more ambitious task of formulating existence as a whole, and therefore essays to show the ultimate relations of Nature and Intelligence. Science, as has been reiterated, perhaps to weariness, is interested only in certain aspects of reality, and hence it takes for granted the relations of things familiar to common sense. Things, as partially qualified, are its points of departure, and its own peculiar procedure consists in extending and widening common knowledge. Thus it may rightly enough be said to proceed "from the known to the unknown," or, as we should prefer to say, from the less to the more known. This is what science knows as Induction.

It is rightly held that no advance in knowledge is possible by what Syllogistic Logic calls Deduction, since by a mere restatement of that which is already assumed to be known no advance to the "unknown" can possibly be made. We cannot, therefore, wonder at the contempt of science for "mere conceptions." The contempt is a healthy one. The man of science knows that to gain any real knowledge he must begin where common sense leaves off; that to know more about existence he must go out beyond ordinary conceptions of existence. Empirical Logic, here following scientific thought, also asserts that knowledge is gained by a discovery of new relations of things; and, so far, it is correct. But, as it falsely asserts that our common knowledge of things is acquired by passive observation, it takes for granted that individual things, or particular "facts," are discerned without any constructive activity of intelligence. Hence, the discovery of new relations is supposed still to leave individual things in their isolation. The only change in things is in their greater complexity. The real world is now supposed to have, independently of intelligence, all the properties revealed by science, as well as those known in ordinary knowledge. Induction now assumes quite a different aspect. It consists in the separation, one by one, of properties already assumed to be known, and hence it is no longer a progress from "the known to the unknown," but a regress from the more to the less

known. By abstraction, it is supposed, a general law is discovered; and this law, once discovered, may be shown to apply to the particular facts from which it was abstracted. The process of reasoning down from the general law to the particular facts is Deduction. Now here we have a confusion between a universal as law of nature and a universal as an abstract conception. If nature is already known in the fulness of its relations, what possible sense is there in seeking for laws of nature, which are but special groups of relations considered apart? If everything is known already, there is no need either of Induction or of Deduction. By a bare intuition we may comprehend all things, and any process of knowledge is not only useless, but impossible. Thus, the measure of truth which Empirical Logic had attained to in the judgment that knowledge proceeds "from the known to the unknown" is again lost in a theory of Deduction, that, assuming a perfectly known world to begin with, can only explain the process of knowledge as a retreat from the better known to the less known. If we take the first, and relatively correct, notion of Induction as a progress from the less to the more known, we may easily give it a form that will correctly embody the true process of knowledge. Every advance in knowledge is the discovery of a new relation, and every new relation is, from its connection with intelligence, necessary and universal. Thus scientific knowledge does not first reveal a number of disconnected particulars, and then proceed to combine them into a general law. The law is discerned in the discernment of the particulars. A law is neither more nor less than a complex of relations, and all relations are *ipso facto* universal and necessary. The distinction between "fact" and "law" is a purely relative one. A fact is not by itself regarded as a law, but it contains the universal element which is characteristic of law. In speaking of facts, we are looking rather at the particular than the universal aspect of relations; in speaking of a law, we contemplate the universal rather than the particular aspect. But there is no real separation in reality or in knowledge. That which is real is necessarily universal, and there is no universality apart from reality. Induction emphasizes

the particular aspect of reality. Deduction emphasizes the universal. In the one, it is said, we go from the particular to the universal; in the other, from the universal to the particular. Correctly stated, there is no "going" from the one to the other at all, for each only exists in and through the other. If the particular did not imply the universal, no combination of particulars would be possible, and hence there could be no universal law; the universal separated from the particular is no law, but a barren abstraction. The true process of knowledge is, therefore, one combining these two aspects of knowledge in one indivisible act. There is not pure Induction or pure Deduction, but both; and the separation of the one aspect from the other, however convenient it may be to the individual enquirer, is but a logical artifice, that in no way affects the real indivisibility of the one dialectic process.

These considerations warn us beforehand what we are to expect from the "inductive" and "deductive" proofs offered by Mr. Spencer in support of the doctrine of the indestructibility of Matter. We may be certain that they are but different ways of stating the same thing, and that the one simply makes explicit that which in the other is implicit. The inductive proof is briefly this: Take any substance, and find out by weighing it the number of its constituent atoms; let it undergo a chemical or physical process of change, and it will be found that the number of constituent atoms is still exactly the same as before. Here we start from the ordinary empirical assumption that a thing, as variously qualified, is given by purely passive observation. The Induction itself is further supposed to be a process of passive observation. But, if that be the case, how can we legitimately pass from our particular observations of individual substances to the universal affirmation that Matter as a whole is indestructible? As Hume has shown, the mere observation of facts does not entitle us to make any universal judgment; we are confined to the judgment, "This substance, so long as I observe it, remains the same in quantity." The tacit assumption, therefore, which underlies this so-called inductive proof is that the proportion between weight and mass, or force and matter, because

it holds good in particular instances, also holds good universally; in other words, every real relation is universal. The "deductive" proof simply brings out into relief the assumption here obscurely made. We may conceive Matter to be compressed, it is said, to any finite extent, but we can never conceive it to be compressed into nothing. Now, there is no difficulty in conceiving — *i. e.*, imagining — any given unit of mass to be reduced in size, so long as we contemplate the mass *per se*, without introducing the conception of weight or force impressed. In like manner, it is perfectly easy to imagine the decrease of the given weight of any mass, so long as we abstract from the mass and look only at the weight. What, then, is inconceivable? Manifestly, the conception of a mass that is not proportional to weight, or of weight that is not proportional to mass. We cannot conceive Matter compressed into nothing, because we cannot conceive the compression of nothing. The deductive proof, therefore, asserts universally that mass and weight are correlative and proportional. How is this known? Evidently by an appeal to Induction. The universal law has no meaning except in and through its particulars; it is a mere name, until we assume certain real relations of mass and weight. The truth underlying these proofs, therefore, is that every particular relation is universal. This universality and particularity are alike due to intelligence. The comprehension of any relation as real is at the same time the affirmation that, wherever that relation exists, there the universal law holds good. The doctrine of the indestructibility of matter is but an imperfect statement of the immortality of intelligence.

The fourth, or metaphysical conception of Matter is, in one view, an utter perversion of the relations of existence and intelligence, and, in another view, an unconscious testimony to their unity. We have seen that, while knowledge is in all cases a double process of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, there is yet a natural illusion which gives countenance to the fallacy that the product of knowledge is due to analysis only. In the search for an ultimate unity, the motive power of all philosophical speculation, there is a predis-

position to fix upon the positive aspect of thought, to the exclusion of the negative aspect. Put into practice, this predisposition results in the false supposition that unity is to be sought by abstraction, and not by synthesis, in the elimination of differences, not in the combination of differences in a higher unity. Empiricism, in dealing with the known world, ends in the exclusion of all except quantitative relations as unessential or negative. But this still leaves a trace of differentiation, and the restless aspiration after a perfect unity only finds its object, or supposes it has found it, in the pure, undifferentiated unity of MATTER IN ITSELF. Now, when we ask what relation this pallid abstraction has to the process of knowledge, we find that it is just its ideal beginning, the mere "something is," the Aristotelian *ἔστι*. Thought has gone through a laborious experience, only to reach as its goal the point from which it set out. Strictly speaking, as has already been shown, this supposed realization of the high aspiration after unity is not even the initial limit of knowledge, for that involves the reflection of one term of a relation upon the other, and of both into the intelligence which is their source. "Something," or "Matter in itself," is the bare predicate of reality, detached from its proper connection and raised by abstraction to a fictitious independence; or, otherwise expressed, it is the "think" without the "I." To invest this vague prophecy of the unity of all existence — or, what is the same thing, of the unity of intelligence — with mysterious and awe-inspiring attributes, is but to destroy the abstract purity of Matter in itself, and to become the prey of an imagination freed from contact with the real world. The self-deception which finds in pure Being a fit object of worship is only worthy of tolerance because it may be regarded as an unconscious testimony to the real identity of Thought and Existence. It is a true philosophic impulse, which ever points onward to a perfect unity, reconciling all differences; but the impatience and confusion of thought which lead to the notion that a true unity is to be found by the facile process of ignoring all differences is a perversion of that impulse, and a destruction at once of knowledge and of reality.

The result of our investigation thus far is to show that Matter, as conceived by the correlationists, is synonymous with indivisible units of mass, and excludes from its essence or definition all other relations whatever. "Matter," says Mr. Lewes, "is the Felt, viewed in its statical aspect."⁶ If for "Felt" we substitute "Intelligible," and interpret the phrase "in its statical aspect" to mean "conceived as exclusive units of mass," this definition may be adopted. Intelligence, at the stage in question, conceives the universe as absolutely indifferent to all change, not excluding change of place or motion, and attends only to the permanence of its extended and solid particles. This is not absolutely the first stage in the rational evolution of the real world, as revealed by science, but it is one of the earlier stages. The simplest conception of all, as we saw, was that of Space, the synthesis of homogeneous units, definable only as each external to the rest. This mere outerness begins to give way in the notion of Time, the synthesis of homogeneous units that are, not only out of each other, but, so to speak, into each other. The synthesis of Space and Time is the conception of Position, the mutual relation of relatively concrete units of space, that persist through successive times. Positions, as indifferent to each other, and as filled, form the content of the conception of Matter, defined as an aggregate of mutually exclusive units of mass. But as all positions are relative to each other, and as all alike may be filled, there is implicit in the notion of Position the more concrete idea of Motion, and in the notion of filled positions, the idea of specific motion, *i. e.*, the motion of Matter. Matter, defined as a congeries of exclusive units of mass, thus finds its justification in the correlative notion of concrete Motion. Hence, the conception of existence, as arrested in isolated atomic units, has to be corrected by the conception of those units as changing their relative positions. The conception of Motion is thus the first remove from the purely abstract notion of the real world—the first negation of the atomic conception of existence. The complete justifica-

⁶ Problems of Life and Mind, vol. ii, p. 231.

tion of this negation is to be found in the notion of Force, which is a negation of negation, a second remove from the abstract conception of things. Motion and Force, in their relations to Matter, will, therefore, be our next topic.

JACOB BOEHME.

[TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, BY EDWIN D. MEAD.]

I.

From Lord Bacon, the English lord chancellor, and the chief leader of all external, sensuous philosophizing, we turn to the *Philosophus Teutonicus*, as he was called, to the shoemaker of Lusatia — a man of whom we Germans need not be ashamed. It was, indeed, through him that philosophy first appeared in Germany with a distinctive German character. He stands in the directly opposite extreme to Bacon, and was called *Theosophus Teutonicus*, even as formerly Mysticism was called *Philosophia Teutonica*.

This Jacob Boehme was long forgotten, and was decried as a pietistic visionary. The period of enlightenment, especially, limited the number of his students. Even Leibnitz esteemed him highly; but not until more recent times has he again been duly honored, and has the profundity of his thought again become acknowledged. It is certain that, on the one hand, he does not deserve that old contempt; but neither, on the other hand, is he entitled to that high honor to which the present has sought to elevate him. To call him a visionary signifies nothing. If one pleases, one can call every philosopher so, including Epicurus and Bacon; for even these have held that man has his true reality in something other than eating and drinking, or the every-day life of hewing wood, or making clothes, or buying and selling. As to the high honor to which Boehme has been elevated, he owes it especially to his form of contemplation and sentiment; for contemplation and inward feeling, praying and longing, the figurative style

of thinking, allegorizing, and the like, are held by some to be the genuine form of philosophy. But it is only in the idea, in thought, that philosophy has its truth — that the absolute can be expressed, or that indeed it *is*, as it is in itself. On this side Boehme is a perfect barbarian — a man nevertheless, who, along with his crude mode of representation, possesses a concrete, deep heart. Since he has no method, or order, it is difficult to give a presentation of his philosophy.

Jacob Boehme was born in 1575, in Old Seidenberg, near Goerlitz, in Upper Lusatia. His parents were poor peasants, and in his boyhood he herded cattle. He was brought up in Lutheranism, to which he always adhered. The biography which accompanies his work was written by a clergyman, who knew him personally. We find much in this biography concerning the various agitations through which he arrived at deeper perception. Even as a herdsman on the pastures, as he relates of himself, he had most wonderful visions. The first wonderful vision came to him in a thicket, in which he saw a cavern and a box of money. Startled by this splendor, he was inwardly awakened out of dull stupidity; but the vision did not reappear. He was afterwards apprenticed to a shoemaker. It was chiefly through the text (Luke xi., 13), “Your Father in Heaven shall give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him,” that he was roused to the thought that in order to know the truth he should, in simplicity of spirit, earnestly and continually pray, seek and knock, until he, then on his wanderings with his master, should, through the passing of the Father into the Son according to the Spirit, be carried over into the holy Sabbath and glorious day of rest of souls, and that thus his prayer should be answered. Thereupon (according to his own account,) he “was surrounded with divine light, and remained for seven days in the highest divine contemplation and fulness of joy.” His master dismissed him on this account, with the remark that he could not afford to keep a prophet with him. After this he lived in Goerlitz. In 1594 he became a master shoemaker, and married. Later, “in the year 1600, in the twenty-fifth year of his age,” the light appeared to him again in a second vision, of the same

sort as the first. According to his own account, he saw a brightly polished pewter vessel in the chamber, and "through the sudden sight of the lovely, jovial lustre" of the metal, he was conducted (in a fit of abstraction, and in the entrancement of his astral spirit) "to the central point of secret Nature," and into the light of the Divine Being. "He went out before the gate and into the fields, in order to drive this vision out of his head, and yet he experienced the feeling none the less, but rather longer, stronger, and clearer; so that, by means of the imparted signs or figures, outlines and colors, he could, as it were, see into the heart and innermost nature of all things (which position, so strongly forced upon him, he also maintains and glorifies in his book *De Signatura Rerum*), on account of which he overflowed with great joy, thanked God, and turned peacefully to his domestic affairs." Later he wrote many works. He remained in Goerlitz, working at his trade, and there, in 1624, he died.

His works have received special attention from the Dutch, and therefore most of the editions have been published in Amsterdam, though reprinted in Hamburg. His first work was the "*Aurora*;" or, "The Morning Red in its Rising," which was followed by many others; that entitled "On the Three Principles," and another, "On the Threefold Life of Man," are among those which are worthiest of attention. Boehme constantly read the Bible. What other works he read is not known. Very many points in his works prove, however, that he had read much, and especially mystic, theosophic, and alchemistic writings; partly, at any rate, the works of Theophrastus Paracelsus Bombastus, of Hohenheim—a philosopher of something the same sort as Boehme himself, but peculiarly diffuse in his writings, and without Boehme's deep feeling. Boehme was often persecuted by the clergy, but he caused less sensation in Germany than in Holland and England, where his works have been published in many forms. His writings make a strange impression upon the reader, and one must be familiar with his ideas in order to find the true meaning in the exceedingly confused form of their expression.

The content of Jacob Boehme's philosophizing is thoroughly

German; for that which distinguishes him and makes him worthy of attention is the Protestant principle, already referred to, of placing the intellectual world in the individual mind — of viewing, and knowing, and of feeling in the self-consciousness that which before was regarded as external. The general idea of Boehme's shows itself thus, on the one hand, deep and fundamental; on the other hand, however, he does not, with all his desire and struggle after determination and distinction in the universe, arrive at clearness and order. There is no coherent system, but the greatest confusion in his distinctions — even in his “Table,” wherein three numbers appear :

I.

What God is, apart from Nature and Creation.

II.

Separableness, God in Love.	<i>Mysterium</i> <i>Magnum.</i>	The I. <i>Principium</i> , God in Wrath.
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III.

God in Wrath and Love.

There is no positive determination of moments here; we only have the sense of struggle; now it is this distinction, and now that, which is laid down; and as the distinctions are separately referred to, they run one into another.

The manner and method of his presentation must, therefore, be called barbaric. The modes of expression in his works prove this; as when, for instance, he speaks of the divine *salitter*, the *mercurius*, and so forth. As Boehme places the life, the movement of absolute Being, in the soul, so he also views all conceptions in an actuality; or he uses actualities as conceptions (that is, natural things and sensible qualities arbitrarily, instead of definitions) to represent his ideas. For instance, sulphur and the like mean, with him, not the things that we so name, but their essence; or a certain conception has this specific form of reality. Boehme is most deeply in-

terested in the idea, and struggles sorely with it. The speculative truth which he wishes to represent, requires, in order to make himself comprehended, essentially thought and the form of thought. Only in thought can this unity, in whose central point his spirit stands, be comprehended, but it is precisely the form of thought which he lacks. The forms which he uses are essentially no categories of thought. They are on the one side sensible, chemical determinations; such qualities as harsh, sweet, sour, grim; or feelings such as anger, love; or tincture, essence, pain, etc. These sensuous forms, however, do not have with him their peculiar sensuous significance; but he uses them in order to give words to his thoughts. It is at once apparent how arbitrary this mode of presentation must be, since only thought is capable of unity. Thus it seems strangely confusing when we read of the bitterness of God, of lightning, etc. We must have the idea beforehand, and then, indeed, we may find it figured in these strange similes.

The second point is that Boehme uses as form of the idea the Christian form, particularly the form of the Trinity, which was that which lay nearest to him. The sensuous form and the religious form of imaging, of sensuous pictures and representations, he strangely mixes together. Crude and barbarous as this is, on the one hand, and hard to endure by those who persevere in reading Boehme and try firmly to hold his thoughts (for one's head is kept whirling with "qualities," "spirits," "angels,"), it must nevertheless be recognized that these pictures and representations speak out of his reality — out of his soul. This rough, deep German mind, that deals with the innermost, exercises, peculiarly indeed, a tremendous might and power to use reality as a conception, and to keep about him and within him whatever goes on in Heaven. As Hans Sachs, in his manner, has represented the Lord God, Christ, and the Holy Ghost as common citizens like himself, and has treated in the same manner the angels and patriarchs, instead of taking them as bygone and historic beings, just so Boehme.

In the eyes of faith spirit has truth, but in this truth the moment of certainty is lacking. That the subject of Chris-

tianity is truth, or the spirit, we have seen. This is given to faith as immediate truth. But faith has it unconsciously, without knowledge, without knowing it as self-consciousness; and since in self-consciousness the thought, the conception, is essential — Giordano Bruno's unity of opposites — faith lacks precisely this unity. Its moments fall apart as separate forms, particularly its highest moments — the good and the evil, or God and the Devil. God is, and so is the Devil; both are for themselves. If God, however, is the absolute Being, the question arises: What absolute Being is this to which all reality, and especially the evil, does not appertain? Boehme is therefore compelled partly to conduct the soul of man to divine life, to place this life in the soul itself, to regard the strife as one in the soul, and to make it the soul's own work and endeavor; and partly, for that very ground, to show that the evil is contained in the good — a problem which also agitates our own time. But as Boehme has not got hold of the idea, and is in so far behind in the culture of thought, this process appears as a fearful, painful struggle of his soul and consciousness with language; and the object of this struggle is to obtain the profoundest idea of God, which may bring together and bind in one the most absolute opposites — not, however, for thinking reason. If one may so express it, Boehme struggles (since to him God is all) to conceive the negative — the evil, the devil — in and from God, to comprehend God as absolute; and this struggle characterizes his entire writings, and is the travail of his soul. It is a tremendous, wild, crude effort of the inner being to bind together things that in form and appearance are so far from one another. In his strong soul Boehme brings both together, and in that act breaks to pieces all that immediate appearance of reality which both possess. When, however, he conceives this movement, this spiritual nature in itself thus internally, the definition of the moments approaches, after all, simply nearer to the form of self-consciousness — of the idea devoid of sensuous form. The speculative thought stands, indeed, in the background; but it does not come to its proper representation. Popular crude methods of representation are employed;

a perfect looseness of speech appears, which to us seems vulgar. With the devil Boehme has especially much to do, and he addresses him often. "Come here," he says, "thou Black-Jack. What wilt thou? I will write for thee a prescription." Shakespeare's Prospero, in the *Tempest*, threatens Ariel that he will cleave an oak and peg him in the knotty entrails for a thousand years; thus Boehme's great soul is pegged in the hard, knotty oak of the sensuous, imprisoned in the knotty, hard growth of the imagination, without being able to come to the free representation of the idea.

I will briefly indicate Boehme's main ideas, and then point out several separate forms in which he revels; for he does not abide in one form, since neither the sensuous nor the religious suffices him. Although he copiously repeats himself, the forms of his main representations are still everywhere different, and students will be deceived who undertake to give a systematic development of Boehme's representations, especially as they advance in their task. One must expect in Boehme neither a systematic representation nor an accurate management of particulars. One cannot speak much of his thoughts without assuming his own form of expression and quoting directly concerning particulars, for otherwise it is impossible to express his thoughts. The fundamental idea of Jacob Boehme is the struggle to maintain all things in an absolute unity. He desires to exhibit the absolute, Divine unity, and the union in God of all antitheses. His main thought — one may indeed say his only thought, that which runs through all his works — is to conceive in all things the Holy Trinity; to recognize all things as *its* revelation and representation, so that *it* is the universal principle in which and through which all is; and this in this way: that all things have only this divine Trinity in themselves, not as a trinity of the imagination, but as the reality of the absolute idea. All that exists is, according to Boehme, only this Trinity; this Trinity is all. The universe is thus to him one divine life, and a universal revelation of God; so that from the one essence of God, the source of all powers and qualities, the Son is eternally born — the Son who is manifested in those powers; and the inner unity of this light with

the substance of the powers is the spirit. The representation is now darker, now clearer. What follows is the explication of this Trinity; and here especially appear the various forms which he uses to denote the distinction which occurs in the Trinity.

In the "Aurora," the "Root, or Mother of Philosophy, Astrology, and Theology," Boehme attempts a classification, in which he places these sciences side by side, yet without clear distinctions, simply passing over from one to the other. "(1.) In Philosophy he treats of the divine power, what God is, and how, in the being of God, nature, the stars, and the *elementa* are made; whence all things have their origin; how heaven and earth are made; also, angels, men, and devils, heaven and hell, and all that is created; also, what the two qualities in nature are, in the impulse and actions of God. (2.) In Astrology, the powers of nature, the stars and the elements are treated; and how from these all creatures have proceeded; how good and evil are wrought, through them, in men and animals. (3.) Under Theology he treats the kingdom of Christ; how this is conditioned; how it is opposed to the kingdom of hell; also, how it struggles in nature with the kingdom of hell."

1. The First is God, the Father. This First has at the same time a distinction within itself, and is the unity of the distinction. "God is all," he says. "He is darkness and light, love and anger, fire and light; but He calls Himself alone one God, after the light of His love. There is an eternal *contrarium* between darkness and light; neither holds the other, and neither is the other; and yet there is but one single Being only with the *Qual*—torture—in distinction; so with the will, there being, however, no separable Being. Only one *principium* divides this: that one is in the other as a nothing, and nevertheless *is*; but according to its quality, wherein it is not manifest." By the *Qual* ("torture") is expressed that which is absolute, even the self-conscious, felt negativity, the self-determining negative, which is therefore absolute affirmation. Around this point all of Boehme's efforts turn; the principle of conception is in him throughout alive, only he cannot ex-

press it in the form of thought. All depends upon this: to think the negative as simple, when it is at the same time an opposite. Thus the torture is this inner self-opposition, and yet at the same time the simple. From this word *Qual* (torture) Boehme derives *Quellen* [sources]—a good play upon words; for the *Qual* (torture)—this negativity passes into vitality, activity; and thus he brings it also together with *Qualität* (quality). The absolute identity of the different is everywhere present with him.

a. Thus Boehme does not represent God as an empty unity, but as the self-dirempting unity of the absolutely opposed. The First One, the Father, has at the same time the manner of natural existence. Concerning this, he speaks thus: that God is the simple *Essence*; quite like Proclus. This simple Essence he calls the Hidden; he defines it also as the *Temperamentum*—that unity of differences in which all is *tempered*. We find, too, in this connection, much about the great *salitter*—now the divine, now the *salitter* of nature—also called *salniter*. When he discourses about this great *salitter* as of something known, one does not immediately understand what he means. It is, however, a cobbler-like murder of the words *sal nitri*, *i. e.*, saltpetre (which, in Austria, is still called *salniter*). This figures thus the *neutral* and truly universal Being; this is the divine *splendor*. In God is a splendid nature—trees, plants, etc. “In the divine splendor, two things are especially to be considered: the *salitter*, or the divine powers, which produce all fruit, and the *mercurius*, or sound.” This great *salitter* is the unrevealed Being, even as the New Platonic unity is without self-consciousness, and so equally unknown.

b. This first substance contains all powers or qualities, as not yet differenced; so then this *salitter* appears as the *body of God*, which contains all qualities in itself. Quality is a main idea, and the first determination with Boehme; and he begins with the qualities in his work, “The Morning Red in its Rising.” With the quality he also afterwards brings together *inqualiren* (inqualitize), and there says: “Quality is the mobility, the *Qualen* (pain), or unrest of a thing.” These qualities he then defines, but it is an ob-

scure representation: "It is as the heat, which burns, consumes, and drives out all that comes into it which is not of its own quality. On the other hand, it lights and warms all that is cold, wet, and dark, and makes the soft hard. But it has two *species* in itself, namely, light and rage" (negativity); "the light—the heart of the heat—is a lovely, joyful sight, a power of life, a part, or a source of the heavenly joy; for it makes everything in this world alive and moving. All flesh, as well as all trees, foliage, and grass, grow in this world by the power of light, and have life therein, as in the good. On the other hand, it possesses rage, which burns, consumes, and ruins. This rage swells, drives, and uplifts itself in the light, and causes the light to move. They struggle and fight with each other in their twofold source. The light exists in God without heat, but it does not exist in nature; for in nature all qualities are one in another, according to kind and manner. Even as God is everything, God" (the Father) "is the heart," says Boehme. In another place (in the work on the "Threefold Life of Man") he says "the Son is the heart of God." Again, the spirit is also called the heart, "or fountain of nature; from Him proceeds everything." Now, heat rules in all forces of nature, and warms them all and is a source in all. The light in the heat, however, gives to all qualities the power that makes them lovely and delightful. Boehme enumerates a whole list of qualities: cold, hot, bitter, sweet, raging, harsh, hard, rough qualities, Sound, etc. "The bitter quality is also in God, yet not after the same sort and manner, as gall is in man. It is rather an eternally continuing force, a great triumphing source of joy. Out of these qualities all creatures are made, and they come thence and live therein as in their mother."

"The powers of the *stars* are *nature*. All things in this world originate from the stars. That I will prove to thee, if thou art not a blockhead, and hast but a little reason. If one considers the whole *curriculum*, or the entire circle of the stars, one soon finds that it is the mother of all things, or nature, out of which all things have grown, and in which all things stand and live, and through which all things have their

movement ; and all things are made out of the same forces, and continue therein eternally." Thus, we say, God is the reality of all realities. Boehme continues: "Thou must here, however, lift up thy feeling in the spirit, and consider how entirely nature, with all the powers which are in nature—the wide, the deep, the high, Heaven, earth, and all that therein are, and that are above the Heaven—are the body of God ; and how the powers of the stars are the chief arteries in the natural body of God in this world. Thou must not think that in the *corpus* of the stars the entire triumphant Holy Trinity—God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—exists. But this is not to be thus understood that He is not at all in the *corpus* of the stars and in this world. Here, then, is the question : Whence does Heaven obtain or take these forces, that it produces such mobility in nature? And here must thou look above and outside of nature into the holy light, triumphant, divine power—into the unchangeable, holy Trinity, which is a triumphant, originating, moving Being ; and all powers are therein, *as in nature*. Therefrom have Heaven, earth, stars, *elementa*, devils, angels, men, animals, and everything arisen, and therein everything has its stand. Thus we call Heaven and earth, the stars and elements, and all that therein is, and all that is above the heavens—GOD ; who thus, in these many enumerated beings, in the power which proceeds from Him, hath *made Himself a creature*."

c. Again, Boehme defines God, the Father, as follows : "When, now, we consider all nature and its qualities, we see the Father ; when we view the Heaven and the stars, we see His eternal power and wisdom. Thus many stars twinkle under the Heaven, innumerable ; thus great and varied are the powers and wisdom of God, the Father. Every star has its own quality. Thou must not, however, "think that every power that is in the Father occupies a certain part and place in the Father, as the stars in the Heaven. No ! But the spirit shows that all powers in the Father are in one another, as one power." This whole is the universal power in general, which exists as God, the Father, in which the differences are united ; but it exists createdly as the totality of the stars, therefore as

diremption into the different qualities. "Thou must not think that God in Heaven, and above the Heaven, stands, as it were, and undulates as a power and quality, which has no reason and knowledge in itself—as the sun, which courseth through its circle and sheds from itself warmth and light, which bring alike harm and help to the earth or the creatures. No! This is not the Father. He is an almighty, all-wise, all-knowing, all-seeing, all-hearing, all-smelling, all-tasting God, who is at the same time in Himself gentle, friendly, lovely, merciful, and joyful—yea, is joy itself."

ON THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY.

[TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF F. W. J. VON SCHELLING, BEING THE NINTH LECTURE "ON THE METHOD OF UNIVERSITY STUDY"—AKADEMISCHEN STUDIUM.]

BY ELLA S. MORGAN.

If I find it difficult to speak of the study of theology, it is because I must consider the method of that science, and the whole standpoint from which its truths should be taken, as lost and forgotten. The collective theories of this science are understood empirically, and as such have been asserted and contested. But they are not native to this soil [empiricism] and altogether lose their meaning and significance.

Theologians maintain that Christianity is a divine revelation, which they conceive as an action of God performed in Time. Thus they resort to the very standpoint from which there can be no question whether the origin of Christianity is explicable on natural grounds. One who could not answer this problem to his satisfaction must know very little of the history and culture of the time of its rise. Read the writings of the learned men, in which the germ of Christianity is shown to have existed, not merely in Judaism, but in a single religious community which preceded Judaism. It is not necessary to go so far, although the account of Josephus, and even the remains of the Christian historical books, have not been thor-

oughly used in order to demonstrate this connection. Enough ; Christ as The One is a perfectly comprehensible person, and it was an absolute necessity to conceive him as a symbolic person, and in a higher significance.

Shall we consider the spread of Christianity as a special work of divine Providence? It is only necessary to acquaint ourselves with the time in which it made its first conquests to recognize it merely as a particular phenomenon of the general spirit of the time. Not that Christianity created the latter ; it was itself only a premonitive anticipation, the first expression of that spirit. The Roman Empire was ripe for Christianity centuries before Constantine chose the Cross as the standard of the new rule of the world. Perfect gratification of all external desire led to the aspiration for the internal and invisible ; a decaying empire, whose power was only temporal, the lost courage in the objective world, the unhappiness of the age, necessarily created a universal susceptibility for a religion which directed men back to an ideal, which taught renunciation and led to happiness.

Christian religious teachers cannot justify any of their assertions without first making their own the higher view of history itself, which is prescribed by both philosophy and Christianity. They have fought against unbelief long enough on its own ground, instead of grappling with the standpoint upon which it rests. They might say to the advocates of the natural view, "You are perfectly right from the point of view which you take, and it is our belief that, from your standpoint, you judge rightly. We only deny the standpoint itself, or consider it as a merely subordinate one." It is the same case as the empiricist, who proves to the philosopher irrefutably that all knowing is posited only through the external necessity of impressions.

The same condition is found in regard to all dogmas of theology. From the idea of the Trinity, it is plain that, unless it is understood speculatively, it has no meaning whatever. The incarnation of God in Christ is interpreted by theologians in the same empirical way, namely, that God took upon Himself the human shape at some particular moment of time—a view

which is simply without any significance, since God is eternally beyond all time. Hence the incarnation of God is the incarnation of eternity. The man Christ is, as phenomenal reality, only the highest point, and in so far, also, the beginning of this incarnation; for from Him henceforth all his successors are members of one and the same body, of which he is the head. History testifies that in Christ, God first becomes truly objective; for who before Him revealed the infinite in such a manner?

It might be shown that, as far back as historical knowledge goes, two distinctly different streams of religion and poetry are distinguishable. The one predominant in the Indian religion, which transmitted the intellectual system and the most ancient idealism; the other, which contained within itself the realistic view of the world. The former, after flowing through the whole Orient, found its permanent garden-bed in Christianity, and, combined with the in itself unfruitful soil of the Occident, generated the growths of the modern world. The other, supplemented by the opposite unity—the ideal of art—brought forth in Greek mythology the highest beauty. And shall we count for nothing the motions of the opposite pole in Greek culture, the mystical elements of an abstract kind of poetry, the rejection of mythology and the banishment of the poets by the philosophers, especially Plato, who, in a foreign and far-removed world, is a prophet of Christianity?

But the fact that Christianity existed before, and independent of this, proves the necessity of its idea, and that even in this relation no absolute antitheses exist. The Christian missionaries who came to India thought they brought unheard-of tidings to the inhabitants when they taught that the God of the Christians had become man. But the Hindoos were not surprised; they by no means denied the incarnation of God in Christ, and only thought it strange that what had taken place but once in Christianity took place often and continuously with them. It is not to be denied that they had a better comprehension of their own religion than the Christian missionaries had of theirs.

On account of the universality of its idea, the historical construction of Christianity cannot be conceived without the religious construction of all history. Hence it is no more to be compared with what has hitherto been called universal history of religion (although they contain less religion than anything else) than with the more partial history of the Christian religion and Church.

Such a construction is in itself only possible to the higher stage of cognition, which rises above the empirical coördination of things; therefore it is not without philosophy, which is the true organ of theology as science, wherein the highest ideas of the Divine Being, of nature as the *instrumentality*, and of history as the *revelation* of God, become objective. No one, of course, will confound the statement of the speculative meaning of the principal theories of theology with the Kantian view, whose chief aim is finally to eliminate entirely the positive and the historical element from Christianity, and to refine it to a pure Religion of Reason. The true religion of reason is to see that there are only two manifestations of religion — the real religion of nature, which is necessarily polytheism in the sense of the Greeks, and that which, wholly ethical, sees God in History. The Kantian refinement sees by no means a speculative, but only a moral, meaning in those theories; and by this the empirical standpoint is not really given up, and the truth of the theories is not accepted in itself, but only in the subjective relation of possible motives of morality. Like dogmatism in philosophy, dogmatism in theology is a transferring of something which can be known only absolutely to the empirical point of view of the understanding. Kant took neither the one nor the other at its root, since he knew nothing positive to put in the place of either. Especially to explain the Bible morally in schools, as he proposed, would be merely to use the empirical phenomenon of Christianity for purposes which cannot be attained without misapplication, but not to rise above it to the idea of Christianity.

The first books of the history and doctrines of Christianity are nothing but a special, and moreover an imperfect, manifestation of the same; its idea is not to be sought in these books,

whose value is to be determined by the degree in which they express the idea and are in consonance with it. Already in the soul of the heathen convert, Paul, had Christianity become other than it was in the first founder. Let us not stop at any single point of time, which can only be taken arbitrarily, but let us have all history and all the world which created it before our eyes.

To the operations of the modern clearing-up (scepticism)—which, in regard to Christianity, might rather be called clearing-out—belongs the pretence of taking it back, as they say, to its original sense, to its first simplicity, in which shape they also call it original Christianity. We should think the Christian teachers must be grateful to modern times because they have drawn so much speculative matter out of the meagre contents of the first religious books, and formed this into a system. It may, indeed, be more convenient to talk of the scholastic chaos of the old Dogmatism, and to write popular dogmatical expositions, and to busy oneself with minute inquiries into the meaning of syllables and words, than to conceive Christianity and its teachings in a more universal relation. Meantime one cannot avoid thinking what a hindrance to the consummation have been the so-called biblical books, which can not stand comparison in real religious value with so many others of early and later times, especially with the East Indian books.

A merely political object has been ascribed to the hierarchy in withdrawing these books from the people, but it might well be the profounder reason that Christianity should continue as a living religion, not as a past, but as an everlasting present, just as the miracles in the Church did not cease, which Protestants very illogically relegated to past times alone. In reality it was these books which, as original records, needed by historical investigation, but not by faith, have constantly put empirical Christianity in the place of the idea, which can exist independent of them, and is more loudly proclaimed by the whole history of the modern world, in contrast to the old, than by those books where it is still quite undeveloped. .

The spirit of the modern time aims with evident consistency

at the annihilation of all merely finite forms, and it is religion to recognize it in this. According to this law, the condition of a general and public life, which religion had attained more or less in Christianity, must be evanescent, since it realizes only a few of the purposes of the world-spirit. Protestantism arose, and at the time of its origin was a new return of the spirit to the non-sensuous, although this mere negative effort, beyond the fact that it broke the continuity of the development of Christianity, could never create a positive union and an external symbolical manifestation of the same as a visible church. In the place of a living authority came the authority of dead books, written in dead languages, and as these from their very nature could not be binding, a much more unworthy slavery, the dependence on symbols which had a mere human authority. It was necessary that Protestantism, since it was anti-universal in its very idea, should again fall into sects, and that scepticism should attach itself to particular forms and to the empirical phenomena, since the whole religion was made to consist of them.

Not genial, but unbelieving; not pious, nor yet witty and frivolous — like the unhappy souls that Dante describes in the limbo of the Inferno, who were neither rebellious nor true to God, whom Heaven thrust out and Hell rejected, because even the condemned would not own them — so, some German *savants*, with the aid of a so-called “sound exegesis,” of a sceptical psychology, and lax morals, have taken away everything speculative, and even subjective symbolism, from Christianity. The belief in its divinity was built upon empirical historical arguments; the miracle of the revelation proved in a very manifest circle by other miracles. Since the divine, from its very nature, is neither empirically cognizable nor demonstrable, the naturalists, on this plane, were sure of the game. It was already a capitulation when the investigations into the genuineness of the Christian books, and the proof of their inspiration from particular passages, was made the foundation of theology. The reference back to the literal text of certain books necessitated the change of the whole science into

philology and the art of interpretation, by which it became an altogether profane science, and where the palladium or orthodoxy is sought in the so-called science of language; there theology has sunk to the deepest depth, and is farthest from its ideal. Its great point consists in taking out or explaining away as many miracles as possible from the Bible—as contemptible a beginning as to prove the divinity of religion from these same empirical and meagre facts. Of what use to get any number of them out of the way, when it is not possible with all? for one alone would prove as much as a thousand, if, indeed, this mode of proof had any value whatsoever.

With this philological attempt is associated the psychological effort to explain as psychological illusions many stories, which are evidently Jewish fables, discarded after the direction of the Old Testament prophecies of the coming of the Messiah (of whose source the originators leave no doubt, as is shown by what they themselves add, viz.: “It must have happened in order that what was written might be fulfilled”).

Closely related to the preceding is the favorite dilution-method, by which, on pretext that certain phrases are but expressions of oriental imagery, the shallow notions which complacent “common sense” has of modern morals and religion are explained into them.

And finally this separation of science from speculation has spread to public instruction, which they would make purely moral, and without speculative ideas. Morality is, undoubtedly, not a characteristic of Christianity alone; it would not have existed in history, and in the world, for the sake of a few moral proverbs like “Love your neighbor,” etc. It is not the fault of this common-sense understanding if such moral preaching does lower itself still more, and teach matters of political economy. Preachers should really be, at different times, farmers, physicians, and what not. They should not merely recommend vaccination from the pulpit, they should also teach the best method of raising potatoes.

I have been obliged to speak of the condition of theology,

because I could not hope to make clear what seemed necessary to be said about the study of this science otherwise than by contrasting it with the prevalent methods.

The divinity of Christianity cannot be known by any mediate method ; it can only be known immediately, and in connection with the absolute view of history. Hence, among others, the idea of a mediate revelation, except it is thought out in behoof of a double meaning in speech, is entirely inadmissible, because it is altogether empirical.

Everything in the study of theology, which is really a matter of empiricism, like the critical and philological treatment of the first Christian books, is to be entirely distinct from the study of the science in and for itself. The higher ideas can have no influence on their interpretation, which must be as independent as the interpretation of any other where the question is, not whether what he says is reasonable, historically true, or religious, but whether he really said it. On the other hand, whether these books are genuine or not ; whether the stories they contain are really undistorted facts ; whether their content is or is not in harmony with the idea of Christianity, can change nothing of its reality, since it is not dependent on this single fact, but is universal and absolute. And if Christianity itself were not understood as a mere phenomenon in time, the interpretation would have long since been given up, and we should have advanced much farther in the historical appreciation of the documents so important in its early history, and should not have continued to seek so many by-paths and labyrinths in a matter so simple.

The essential thing in the study of theology is the union of the speculative and historical construction of Christianity and its principal doctrines.

First, in place of the exoteric and literal put the esoteric and spiritual elements of Christianity, although this beginning contradicts the evident intention of the early teachers, and of the Church itself ; for both were at all times agreed in protesting against the entrance of everything which was not the concern of all mankind and completely exoteric. It proves a right feeling, a secure consciousness of what the early found-

ers, as well as the modern leaders of Christianity, must have desired, that they deliberately kept away whatever could be prejudicial to its publicity, expressly excluding it as heresy, as inimical to its universality. Even among those who belonged to the Church and the orthodoxy, those who insisted most strenuously on the letter, acquired the greatest authority, and it was they who really made Christianity a universal religious form. Only the letter of the Occident could give body and outward shape to the ideal principle from the Orient, as the light of the sun, acting upon the earth, causes to grow thereon the noblest organic products.

But this very condition, which originated the first forms of Christianity, after these forms, in accordance with the law of finitude, have fallen into decay, and it is a plain impossibility to maintain Christianity in the exoteric shape, returns anew. The esoteric side must therefore stand out, and, freed of its covering, shine for itself. The eternal, living spirit of all culture and creation will clothe it in new and more enduring forms, since there is no lack of a material in contrast with the ideal. The Occident and the Orient have approached in one and the same culture, and everywhere, where two opposites touch, new life is kindled. In the ruthlessness with which it has allowed the most beautiful, but finite forms to fall into decay, after the withdrawal of their life-principle, the spirit of the modern world has sufficiently revealed its purpose, which is to bring forth the infinite in ever new forms. It has also just as clearly testified that it is not Christianity as a single, empirical phenomenon which it wishes, but as that eternal idea itself. The lineaments of Christianity, not limited to the past, but spread out over all time, are plainly enough to be recognized in poetry and philosophy. The former claims religion as the supreme, indeed the only possibility of the poetic reconciliation; the latter, with the truly speculative standpoint, has again conquered that of religion, has annihilated empiricism, and its brother, naturalism, not only in part, but completely, and in itself has prepared the way for the new birth of esoteric Christianity and the evangel of the Absolute.

THE SPATIAL QUALE.

AN ANSWER BY J. E. CABOT.

In the interesting and instructive article, of this title, contributed by Dr. James to the January number of the JOURNAL, he takes occasion to object to my description of Space, in the shape in which this notion first dawns upon consciousness, as not sufficiently accurate. It is not, he says, the indefinite *otherness* of the objects of perception, but a quite distinct sort of *otherness*, due to a special form of sensibility which certain objects awaken in us. As to this, I do not see that we disagree; indeed, I think he ought to go still further than he does, and make his distinction deeper — a distinction of categories, and not merely of kinds within the same category. For I hold the feeling of Space to be the first appearance of Quantity, and thus the first intimation of external reference among feelings previously qualitative.

Without sharing Berkeley's view, that the external world is only states of our own consciousness, we may suppose that to some of the lower animals, or even to man in the earlier stages of his development, it would so appear, if they could have a clear view of their own mental situation. To an oyster, we may suppose the universe consists of various affections of the oyster, more or less distinctly classified by their different characters or qualities, as they are felt or remembered. To such a consciousness, the only grounds of relation among its facts would be these characters. Things would be known as pleasant, gratifying, etc., or the reverse, and the only *place* of their existence would be consciousness itself. I do not mean that there would be no *feeling* of position; a polyp, *e. g.*, shows that he has this feeling by searching about for a morsel of food that has escaped him — I only mean that there is probably no reflexion upon the feeling; there is apprehension of external things, but no apprehension of externality.

But, however this may be, for I am not concerned here to

prove that there is a merely qualitative consciousness, I only concede that there may be; admitting that there is, there must come at a certain stage of development the intimation of relations wholly untranslatable into terms of Quality, other distinctions cutting right across the former ones, and in virtue of which a feeling may be at the same time different from itself, and different feelings may coincide, and this without any disturbance of their quality; a consciousness of muchness or many-ness in, say, the single color "blue," or the feeling "warmth," or again, the feeling that the "blue" is also "warm."

The human mind, as we see, relieves itself from this embarrassment by the hypothesis of external objects, which are able, as it were, to hold apart identical feelings, and to identify different ones; so that we find no difficulty *e. g.* in the fact that the fire gives us warmth and light from all its parts at once. But a more accurate psychology, reflecting that these feelings are not in the fire, but in us; and further, that the being in us, the sensibility in which they are manifested, is not the mere form, but the very substance of knowledge, the fact known as distinguished from the inferences we may draw from it — such a psychology, I say, finds it necessary to suppose that this further determination, this muchness or collaterality of the feeling, if it is real, is also a quality, an ultimate characteristic, which is *given* in it, as the character "blue" or "warm" is given in the sensible impression.

When the attempt is made, however, to point out the Quale of position, or extent, it seems so difficult even to make it clear to ourselves that there can be such a Quale — that is, a fixed character of being other than itself, of having dimensions which are not dimensions of blueness, warmth, etc., but only express that there is *more* of the same — that it is not surprising to find many psychologists preferring to suppose that the apparently simple fact of collaterality, or simultaneous otherness in a sensation, is really a complex fact, the indiscriminate impression of several feelings, some answering to the sameness and others to the difference, brought together as one — as *e. g.* in the consciousness of motion, in which

several sensations overlap each other, and so are at once identified and discriminated, or again, in the coexistence of different retinal impressions, etc.

This theory, however, either assumes spatial position to begin with — points from which motion starts, or in which retinal impressions are localized, etc., and then there is no explanation but only a statement of the fact to be explained — or else it merely states a contradiction without solving it; for if these different determinations of the same feeling really meet, they must abolish each other; blue cannot be anything but blue, or warmth than warmth, without ceasing to exist. If they do not meet, but merely coexist, as a sound, a scent, and a taste may co-exist, or several sounds be heard at once — this has nothing to do with extent.

Yet the fact remains that this breadth, this collateral subdivision belongs to all our sensations alike, as something perfectly distinct from their protractedness, number, or intensity — in short, from any contrast inside of the particular quality. In the view of a uniformly whitened wall, or the feel of a smooth marble slab, there is no contrast of feelings, yet there is extent, and equally in the smallest of their parts, in the *minimum visible* or *tangible* as truly as in the widest horizon. Various circumstances — variety of color, consciousness of movement, etc. — may call our attention to this breadth or enable us to measure it, but it is there before.

There is nothing for it, then, Dr. James considers, but to accept this primordial bigness as an ultimate quality of sensations, and of every sensation. The excitement of any extended part of the body, he says, is felt as extended — why, we cannot say. A punctiform organ could not give us the feeling of Space.

By a punctiform organ he means, I suppose, one whereby we should receive sensations having position, but no extent; a sensation say of blue, which is not spread out upon a surface, a feeling of warmth not pervading any body. But then, I ask, what would be wanting to such a sensation — what would have to be added in order that it should give us the impression of extent? Only; it seems to me, that the relation to other points,

which is implied in its position, should be made explicit and visible, or tangible. It cannot really *have* position except by relation to other things, and all that is needed is that this fact should be felt. And such is our actual case. Things are not seen as blue, or felt as warm, except *somewhere* with regard to other impressions, or without their parts being somewhere with regard to the others. They are all somewhere in particular, not merely somewhere in general.

Now, what is this but saying that the qualities of our sensations, are not ultimate or absolute, but relative; that we have no experience of things existing by themselves; that such existence is a mental abstraction, not a reality?

If Dr. James means only that extent may be seen or felt, I quite agree, and even that it may be heard, tasted, and smelt. There is a difference, however, in the readiness with which we ascribe extent to the affection of various organs, and this difference is instructive. Thus, we feel some hesitation, as Dr. James remarks, in speaking of spacious tastes, or voluminous sounds, or pains. Yet there are voluminous sounds, like the rolling of thunder; and extensive pains, like the pain of lumbago; and others that are fine or attenuated, like the prick of a pin, or the squeak of a slate-pencil. This proves, he considers, that they all must have some extent or spatial bulk.

Dr. James does not mean that a pain could be halved and quartered, and its separate parts set up at the right or the left of each other. That is to say, he does not mean that it is a thing having extent or bulk; what he means, I take it, is that in every sensation, over and above the particular quality of blue, warm, etc., a sign is given us, which we are apt to overlook because the import is of more practical moment to us than the sign, but which indicates objective determinations of things. Thus it is that the same extent of excited retina can suggest the most various directions or sizes of the object, according to the circumstances — *i. e.*, according to the interpretation. This is equally true of all our sensations; but, in the case of the impressions of sight and touch, we are so constantly engaged in interpreting the signs they give us that we pass at once to the thing signified, and take for granted that

the nervous affection is the quality of an object—the shock communicated to the retina, a flash of light; the pea between the crossed fingers, two peas, etc.—whereas, in the case of a taste, a sound, or a pain, there is more distinct survival of the subjective affection.

But if this, or anything like it, is Dr. James's position, as I gather from page 84 of his article that it is, then I do not see why he should expect to find in the sign, as one of its native qualities, before it becomes a sign, the objective determinations of the thing signified, any more than he would expect to find in the wood of a finger-post the native tendency to set people on the right road. The thing does not exist until it is so used. And so of extent, it does not exist until those relations of which it consists are in some degree determined by the mind. I do not say that it is a conscious construction, in which separate positions are first distinguished and then brought into relations with each other. On the contrary, I hold the perception that the positions cannot exist without the relations, or the relations without the positions, to be the perception of Space; and that this confused, self-contradictory feeling, when it is accounted for and its contradictions solved by means of an adequate hypothesis, becomes the notion of Space.

Of course, it is possible to imagine ourselves resting content with the feeling, and this seems to be a favorite procedure with the physiological psychologists. We may, if we please, consider the extent of a scarlet nasturtium as a fact of the same order with its color. That is to say, we may, and often do, stop at the fact that each is an impression, a something felt—and this being sufficient for our purpose, we may neglect to inquire farther into what is implied in this fact. Only, I say, this is not philosophizing. It is not the office of philosophy to lead us to feel our thoughts (however useful this may sometimes be, from another point of view), but to teach us to understand our feelings—to find out what they signify, what notions they imply, or what conclusions they oblige us to adopt. In this direction—that is, in the attempt to discover what our feeling of extension means, or what Space

really is—I do not see that the facts cited by Dr. James, showing that we feel extent or motion without knowing what they are, help us much. He says he is not conscious of any mental act of creation or production whereby the notion of Space is put together out of non-spatial feelings. Neither, I suppose, is he cognizant of the exact height of the stairs he daily traverses. But his foot is ; and were the quarter of an inch added to one of them, his foot would not fail to apprise him of it. Now, such a fact as this he could verify with a carpenter's rule, but there are other facts of which our feelings apprise us which cannot be verified by a carpenter's rule, and as to these the question may arise, whether they are real or whether they are only feelings.

Such a fact is this of extent or spatial existence. The carpenter's rule can tell us how much ; but, in the first place, is there any *much* in the case, or how can there be ; at any rate, how can we know for certain that there is, when our feelings apprise us only of their own existence ? How can they tell us that something *else* is ? If we are satisfied with the fact that they do tell us, we may neglect the farther inquiry. But it is the whole business of philosophy. As Dr. James says, the important question is, Do the native forms of sensibility yield us *à priori* propositions, synthetic judgments ? If they do not, one does not see what call there is to continue this laborious trifling.

THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION.

[ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PART OF ROSENKRANZ'S "PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM," WITH A COMMENTARY ON CERTAIN PARAGRAPHS. TO ACCOMPANY THE PARAPHRASE PUBLISHED IN THIS JOURNAL, JANUARY AND JULY, 1878.]

Analysis and Commentary.

§ 1. Pedagogics is not a complete, independent science by itself. It borrows the results of other sciences [*e. g.*, it presupposes the science of Rights, treating of the institutions of the family and civil society, as well as of the State; it presupposes the science of anthropology, in which is treated the relations of the human mind to nature. Nature conditions the development of the individual human being. But the history of the individual and the history of the race presents a continual emancipation from nature, and a continual growth into freedom, *i. e.*, into ability to know himself and to realize himself in the world by making the matter and forces of the world his instruments and tools. Anthropology shows us how man as a natural being — *i. e.*, as having a body — is limited. There is climate, involving heat and cold and moisture, the seasons of the year, etc.; there is organic growth, involving birth, growth, reproduction, and decay; there is race, involving the limitations of heredity; there is the telluric life of the planet and the circulation of the forces of the solar system, whence arise the processes of sleeping, waking, dreaming, and kindred phenomena; there is the emotional nature of man, involving his feelings, passions, instincts, and desires; then there are the five senses, and their conditions. Then, there is the science of phenomenology, treating of the steps by which mind rises from the stage of mere feeling and sense-perception to that of self-consciousness, *i. e.*, to a recognition of mind as true substance, and of matter as mere phenomenon created by Mind (God). Then, there is psychology, including the treatment of the stages of activity of mind, as so-called "faculties" of the mind, *e. g.*, attention, sense-perception, imagination, conception, understanding, judgment, reason, and the like. Psychology is generally made (by English writers) to include, also, what is here called anthropology and phenomenology. After psychology, there is the science of ethics, or of morals and customs; then, the

Science of Rights, already mentioned; then, Theology, or the Science of Religion, and, after all these, there is Philosophy, or the Science of Science. Now, it is clear that the Science of Education treats of the process of development, by and through which man, as a merely natural being, becomes spirit, or self-conscious mind; hence, it presupposes all the sciences named, and will be defective if it ignores nature, or mind, or any stage or process of either, especially Anthropology, Phenomenology, Psychology, Ethics, Rights, Æsthetics, or Science of Art and Literature, Religion, or Philosophy].

§ 2. The scope of pedagogics being so broad and its presuppositions so vast, its limits are not well defined, and its treatises are very apt to lack logical sequence and conclusion; and, indeed, frequently to be mere collections of unjustified and unexplained assumptions, dogmatically set forth. Hence the low repute of pedagogical literature as a whole.

§ 3. Moreover, education furnishes a special vocation, that of teaching. (All vocations are specializing — being cut off, as it were, from the total life of man. The “division of labor” requires that each individual shall concentrate his endeavors and be a *part* of the whole).

§ 4. Pedagogics, as a special science, belongs to the collection of sciences (already described, in commenting on § 1) included under the philosophy of Spirit or Mind, and more particularly to that part of it which relates to the will (ethics and science of rights, rather to the part relating to the intellect and feeling, as anthropology, phenomenology, psychology, æsthetics, and religion. “Theoretical” relates to the *intellect*, “practical” relates to the *will*, in this philosophy). The province of practical philosophy is the investigation of the nature of freedom, and the process of securing it by self-emancipation from nature. Pedagogics involves the conscious exertion of influence on the part of the will of the teacher upon the will of the pupil, with a purpose in view — that of inducing the pupil to form certain prescribed habits, and adopt prescribed views and inclinations. The entire science of mind (as above shown), is presupposed by the science of education, and must be kept constantly in view as a guiding light. The institution of the *family* (treated in practical philosophy) is the starting-point of education, and without this institution properly realized, education would find no solid foundation. The right to be educated on the part of children, and the duty to educate on the part of parents, are reciprocal; and there is no family life so poor and rudimentary that it does not furnish the

most important elements of education — no matter what the subsequent influence of the school, the vocation, and the state.

§ 5. Pedagogics as science, distinguished from the same as an art: the former containing the abstract general treatment, and the latter taking into consideration all the conditions of concrete individuality, *e. g.*, the peculiarities of the teacher and the pupil, and all the local circumstances, and the power of adaptation known as “tact.”

§ 6. The special conditions and peculiarities, considered in education as an art, may be formulated and reduced to system, but they should not be introduced as a part of the *science* of education.

§ 7. Pedagogics has three parts: first, it considers the idea and nature of education, and arrives at its true definition; second, it presents and describes the special provinces into which the entire field of education is divided; third, it considers the historical evolution of education by the human race, and the individual systems of education that have arisen, flourished, and decayed, and their special functions in the life of man.

§ 8. The scope of the first part is easy to define. The history of pedagogics, of course, contains all the ideas or definitions of the nature of education; but it must not for that reason be substituted for the scientific investigation of the nature of education, which alone should constitute this first part (and the history of education be reserved for the third part).

§ 9. The second part includes a discussion of the threefold nature of man as body, intellect, and will. The difficulty in this part of the science is very great, because of its dependence upon other sciences (*e. g.*, upon physiology, anthropology, etc.), and because of the temptation to go into details (*e. g.*, in the practical] department, to consider the endless varieties of schools for arts and trades).

§ 10. The third part contains the exposition of the various national standpoints furnished (in the history of the world) for the bases of particular systems of education. In each of these systems will be found the general idea underlying all education, but it will be found existing under special modifications, which have arisen through its application to the physical, intellectual, and [ethical conditions of the people. But we can deduce the essential features of the different systems that may appear in history, for there are only a limited number of systems possible. Each lower form finds itself complemented in some higher form, and its function and purpose then become manifest. The systems of “national]” education (*i. e.*, Asiatic systems, in which the individuality of each person is swallowed up in the

substantiality of the national idea — just as the individual waves get lost in the ocean on whose surface they arise) find their complete explanation in the systems of education that arise in Christianity (the preservation of human life being the object of the nation, it follows that when realized abstractly or exclusively, it absorbs and annuls the mental independence of its subjects, and thus contradicts itself by destroying the essence of what it undertakes to preserve, *i. e.*, life (soul, mind); but within Christianity the principle of the state is found so modified that it is consistent with the infinite, untrammelled development of the individual, intellectually and morally, and thus not only life is saved, but spiritual, free life is attainable for each and for all).

§ 11. The history of pedagogy ends with the present system as the latest one. As science sees the future ideally contained in the present, it is bound to comprehend the latest system as a realization (though imperfect) of the ideal system of education. Hence, the system, as scientifically treated in the first part of our work, is the system with which the third part of our work ends.

§ 12. The nature of education, its form, its limits, are now to be investigated. (§§ 13–50.)

§ 13. The nature of education determined by the nature of Mind or Spirit, whose activity is always devoted to realizing for itself what it is potentially — to becoming conscious of its possibilities, and to getting them under the control of its will. Mind is potentially free. Education is the means by which man seeks to realize in man his possibilities (to develop the possibilities of the race in each individual). Hence, education has freedom for its object.

§ 14. Man is the only being capable of education, in the sense above defined, because the only conscious being. He must know himself ideally, and then realize his ideal self, in order to become actually free. The animals not the plants may be *trained*, or *cultivated*, but, as devoid of self-consciousness (even the highest animals not getting above impressions, not reaching ideas, not seizing general or abstract thoughts), they are not realized for *themselves*, but only for us. (That is, they do not know their ideal as we do.)

§ 15. Education, taken in its widest compass, is the education of the human race by Divine Providence.

§ 16. In a narrower sense, education is applied to the shaping of the individual, so that his caprice and arbitrariness shall give place to rational habits and views, in harmony with nature and ethical customs. He must not abuse nature, nor slight the ethical code of his

people, nor despise the gifts of Providence (whether for weal or woe), unless he is willing to be crushed in the collision with these more substantial elements.

§ 17. In the narrowest, but most usual application of the term, we understand by "education" the influence of the individual upon the individual, exerted with the object of developing his powers in a conscious and methodical manner, either generally or in special directions, the educator being relatively mature, and exercising authority over the relatively immature pupil. Without authority on the one hand and obedience on the other, education would lack its ethical basis — a neglect of the will-training could not be compensated for by any amount of knowledge or smartness.

§ 18. The general province of education includes the development of the individual into the theoretical and practical reason immanent in him. The definition which limits education to the development of the individual into ethical customs (obedience to morality, social conventionalities, and the laws of the state — Hegel's definition is here referred to: "The object of education is to make men ethical") is not comprehensive enough, because it ignores the side of the *intellect*, and takes note only of the *will*. The individual should not only be man in general (as he is through the adoption of moral and ethical forms — which are *general* forms, customs, or laws, and thus the forms imposed by the *will* of the *race*), but he should also be a self-conscious subject, a particular individual (man, through his intellect, exists for himself as an individual, while through his general habits and customs he loses his individuality and spontaneity).

§ 19. Education has a definite object in view and it proceeds by grades of progress toward it. The systematic tendency is essential to all education, properly so called.

§ 20. Division of labor has become requisite in the higher spheres of teaching. The growing multiplicity of branches of knowledge creates the necessity for the specialist as teacher. With this tendency to specialties it becomes more and more difficult to preserve what is so essential to the pupil — his rounded human culture and symmetry of development. The citizen of modern civilization sometimes appears to be an artificial product by the side of the versatility of the savage man.

§ 21. From this necessity of the division of labor in modern times there arises the demand for two kinds of educational institutions — those devoted to general education (common schools, colleges, etc.), and special schools (for agriculture, medicine, mechanic arts, etc.).

§ 22. The infinite possibility of culture for the individual leaves, of course, his actual accomplishment a mere approximation to a complete education. Born idiots are excluded from the possibility of education, because the lack of universal ideas in their consciousness precludes to that class of unfortunates anything beyond a mere mechanical training.

§ 23. Spirit, or mind, makes its own nature; it *is* what it produces — a self-result. From this follows the *form* of education. It commences with (1) undeveloped mind — that of the infant — wherein nearly all is potential, and but little is actualized; (2) its first stage of development is self-estrangement — it is absorbed in the observation of objects around it; (3) but it discovers laws and principles (universality) in external nature, and finally identifies them with reason — it comes to recognize itself in nature — to recognize conscious mind as the creator and preserver of the external world — and thus becomes at home in nature. Education does not create, but it emancipates.

§ 24. This process of self-estrangement and its removal belongs to all culture. The mind must fix its attention upon what is foreign to it, and penetrate its disguise. It will discover its own substance under the seeming alien being. Wonder is the accompaniment of this stage of estrangement. The love of travel and adventure arises from this basis.

§ 25. Labor is distinguished from play: The former concentrates its energies on some object, with the purpose of making it conform to its will and purpose; play occupies itself with its object according to its caprice and arbitrariness, and has no care for the results or products of its activity; work is prescribed by authority, while play is necessarily spontaneous.

§ 26. Work and Play: the distinction between them. In play the child feels that he has entire control over the object with which he is dealing, both in respect to its existence and the object for which it exists. His arbitrary will may change both with perfect impunity, since all depends upon his caprice; he exercises his powers in play according to his natural proclivities, and therein finds scope to develop his own individuality. In work, on the contrary, he must have respect for the object with which he deals. It must be held sacred against his caprice, must not be destroyed nor injured in any way, and its object must likewise be respected. His own personal inclinations must be entirely subordinated, and the business that he is at work upon must be carried forward in accordance with its

own ends and aims, and without reference to his own feelings in the matter.

Thus work teaches the pupil the lesson of self-sacrifice (the right of superiority which the general interest possesses over the particular), while play develops his personal idiosyncrasy.

§ 27. Without play, the child would become more and more a machine, and lose all freshness and spontaneity — all originality. Without work, he would develop into a monster of caprice and arbitrariness.

From the fact that man must learn to combine with man, in order that the individual may avail himself of the experience and labors of his fellow-men, self-sacrifice for the sake of combination is the great lesson of life. But as this should be *voluntary* self-sacrifice, education must train the child equally in the two directions of spontaneity and obedience. The educated man finds recreation in change of work.

§ 28. Education seeks to assimilate its object — to make what was alien and strange to the pupil into something familiar and habitual to him. [The pupil is to attack, one after the other, the foreign realms in the world of nature and man, and conquer them for his own, so that he can be “at home” in them. It is the necessary condition of all growth, all culture, that one widens his own individuality by this conquest of new provinces alien to him. By this the individual transcends the narrow limits of particularity and becomes generic — the individual becomes the species. A good definition of education is this: it is the process by which the individual man elevates himself to the species.]

§ 29. (1) Therefore, the first requirement in education is that the pupil shall acquire the habit of subordinating his likes and dislikes to the attainment of a rational object.

It is necessary that he shall acquire this indifference to his own pleasure, even by employing his powers on that which does not appeal to his interest in the remotest degree.

§ 30. Habit soon makes us familiar with those subjects which seemed so remote from our personal interest, and they become agreeable to us. The objects, too, assume a new interest upon nearer approach, as being useful or injurious to us. That is useful which serves us as a means for the realization of a rational purpose; injurious, if it hinders such realization. It happens that objects are useful in one sense and injurious in another, and *vice versa*. Education must make the pupil capable of deciding on the usefulness of an object, by reference to its effect on his permanent vocation in life.

§ 31. But *good and evil* are the ethical distinctions which furnish the absolute standard to which to refer the question of the usefulness of objects and actions.

§ 32. (2) Habit is (a) *passive*, or (b) *active*. The passive habit is that which gives us the power to retain our equipoise of mind in the midst of a world of changes (pleasure and pain, grief and joy, etc). The active habit gives us skill, presence of mind, tact in emergencies, etc.

§ 33. (3) Education deals altogether with the formation of habits. For it aims to make some condition or form of activity into a second nature for the pupil. But this involves, also, the breaking up of previous habits. This power to break up habits, as well as to form them, is necessary to the freedom of the individual.

§ 34. Education deals with these complementary relations (antitheses): (a) authority and obedience; (b) rationality (*general forms*) and individuality; (c) work and play; (d) habit (*general custom*) and spontaneity. The development and reconciliation of these opposite sides in the pupil's character, so that they become his second nature, removes the phase of constraint which at first accompanies the formal inculcation of rules, and the performance of prescribed tasks. The freedom of the pupil is the ultimate object to be kept in view, but a too early use of freedom may work injury to the pupil. To remove a pupil from all temptation would be to remove possibilities of growth in strength to resist it; on the other hand, to expose him needlessly to temptation is fiendish.

§ 35. Deformities of character in the pupil should be carefully traced back to their origin, so that they may be explained by their history. Only by comprehending the historic growth of an organic defect are we able to prescribe the best remedies.

§ 36. If the negative behavior of the pupil (his bad behavior) results from ignorance due to his own neglect, or to his wilfulness, it should be met directly by an act of authority on the part of the teacher (and without an appeal to reason). An appeal should be made to the understanding of the pupil only when he is somewhat mature, or shows by his repetition of the offence that his proclivity is deep-seated, and requires an array of all good influences to reinforce his feeble resolutions to amend.

§ 37. Reproof, accompanied by threats of punishment, is apt to degenerate into scolding.

§ 38. After the failure of other means, punishment should be resorted to. Inasmuch as the punishment should be for the purpose of making the pupil realize that it is the consequence of his deed return

ing on himself, it should always be administered for some particular act of his, and this should be specified. The "overt act" is the only thing which a man can be held accountable for in a court of justice; although it is true that the harboring of evil thoughts or intentions is a sin, yet it is not a crime until realized in an overt act.

§ 40. Punishment should be regulated, not by abstract rules, but in view of the particular case and its attending circumstances.

§ 41. Sex and age of pupil should be regarded in prescribing the mode and degree of punishment. Corporal punishment is best for pupils who are very immature in mind; when they are more developed they may be punished by any imposed restraint upon their free wills which will isolate them from the ordinary routine followed by their fellow-pupils. (Deprivation of the right to do as others do is a wholesome species of punishment for those old or mature enough to feel its effects, for it tends to secure respect for the regular tasks by elevating them to the rank of rights and privileges.) For young men and women, the punishment should be of a kind that is based on a sense of honor.

§ 42. (1) Corporal punishment should be properly administered by means of the rod, subduing wilful defiance by the application of force.

§ 43. (2) Isolation makes the pupil realize a sense of his dependence upon human society, and upon the expression of this dependence by coöperation in the common tasks. Pupils should not be shut up in a dark room, nor removed from the personal supervision of the teacher. (To shut up two or more in a room without supervision is not isolation, but association; only it is association for mischief, and not for study.)

§ 44. (3) Punishment based on the sense of honor may or may not be based on isolation. It implies a state of maturity on the part of the pupil. Through his offence the pupil has destroyed his equality with his fellows, and has in reality, in his inmost nature, isolated himself from them. Corporal punishment is external, but it may be accompanied with a keen sense of dishonor. Isolation, also, may, to a pupil, who is sensitive to honor, be a severe blow to self-respect. But a punishment founded entirely on the sense of honor would be wholly internal, and have no external discomfort attached to it.

§ 45. The necessity of carefully adapting the punishment to the age and maturity of the pupil, renders it the most difficult part of the teacher's duties. It is essential that the air and manner of the teacher who punishes should be that of one who acts from a sense of

painful duty, and not from any delight in being the cause of suffering. Not personal likes and dislikes, but the rational necessity which is over teacher and pupil alike, causes the infliction of pain on the pupil.

§ 46. Punishment is the final topic to be considered under the head of "Form of Education."

In the act of punishment the teacher abandons the legitimate province of education, which seeks to make the pupil rational or obedient to what is reasonable, as a habit, and from his own free will. The pupil is punished in order that he may be *made* to conform to the rational, by the application of constraint. Another will is substituted for the pupil's, and good behavior is produced, but not by the pupil's free act. While education finds a negative limit in punishment, it finds a positive limit in the accomplishment of its legitimate object, which is the emancipation of the pupil from the state of imbecility, as regards mental and moral self-control, into the ability to direct himself rationally. When the pupil has acquired the discipline which enables him to direct his studies properly, and to control his inclinations in such a manner as to pursue his work regularly, the teacher is no longer needed for him — he becomes his own teacher.

There may be two extreme views on this subject — the one tending towards the negative extreme of requiring the teacher to do everything for the pupil, substituting his will for that of the pupil, and the other view tending to the positive extreme, and leaving everything to the pupil, even before his will is trained into habits of self-control, or his mind provided with the necessary elementary branches requisite for the prosecution of further study.

§ 47. (1) The subjective limit of education (on the negative side) is to be found in the individuality of the pupil — the limit to his natural capacity.

§ 48. (2) The objective limit to education lies in the amount of time that the person may devote to his training. It, therefore, depends largely upon wealth, or other fortunate circumstances.

§ 49. (3) The absolute limit of education is the positive limit (see § 46), beyond which the youth passes into freedom from the school, as a necessary instrumentality for further culture.

§ 50. The pre-arranged pattern-making work of the school is now done, but self-education may and should go on indefinitely, and will go on if the education of the school has really arrived at its "absolute" limit — *i. e.*, has fitted the pupil for self-education. Emancipation from the school does not emancipate one from learning through his fellow-men.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

PROFESSOR CAIRD REPLIES TO DR. STIRLING.

To the Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:

SIR:—In an article by Dr. Hutchison Stirling on “Schopenhauer in relation to Kant,” which appears in your last number, I find a criticism of some passages of my book on Kant, in relation mainly to the Category of Causality. As Dr. Stirling’s remarks contain an entire misrepresentation of my views, and as the points discussed are also of considerable interest for students of Kant, I must ask you to allow me a little space in your JOURNAL to make my reply.

Passing over some almost verbal criticisms, Dr. Stirling’s strictures may be brought under two heads. He accuses me of asserting, and asserting as the doctrine of Kant, that objective sequence cannot be known except by a mind that connects phenomena as causes and effects. He also accuses me of asserting, and asserting as the doctrine of Kant, that objects are known as objects through the Category of Causality alone. The former of these assertions is mine, and I am now prepared to reassert and justify it. The latter assertion has never been made by me; it is inconsistent with many express statements of my book: and I should never have supposed that any one could ascribe it to me, had not Dr. Stirling actually done so. I shall say a few words upon each of these points.

1. Does Kant assert that the Category of Causality is involved in the determination of objective sequence? To answer this question, I must briefly point out the general bearing of Kant’s Criticism of Pure Reason.

Kant’s view of experience may be summarized thus. In the *Æsthetic* he shows that inner and outer perception, involving as they do determinations of time and place, are possible only through the pure perception of Time and Space. For, he argues, a moment in Time and a place in Space can be represented by us only in relation to other times and other places and, therefore, in relation to the unity of Time and Space as individual wholes. We cannot perceive

any object of experience, as here and now present to us, except by relating it to one all-embracing Space, and one all-embracing Time. The particular is known through the universal, and as determined by it. In the *Analytic*, Kant takes another step; for there he seeks to show that no one thing or event can be known as objectively existing or occurring, except in so far as it is definitely related by means of the categories to other things and events, and, therefore, to the unity of experience as one all-embracing whole. Thus objective determination and reference to the systematic unity of experience are, for Kant, one and the same thing.

In working out this last thesis, however, Kant finds himself obliged to prove that the former determination of things, which was demonstrated in the *Æsthetic*, is not possible except through the latter, which is discussed in the *Analytic*; *i. e.*, that we cannot know things as in Time and Space without determining them by the Categories in relation to the unity of experience. In other words, while we cannot represent an object as existing, or an event as occurring, except in Space and Time, we cannot determine either to a definite place or time, except through the Categories, and especially through the Analogies of Experience. Now, these Analogies force us to treat every object as a permanent substance, standing in relation of action and reaction to other substances, and determined in its successive states by the law of Causality. Hence, although there is no difficulty in *thinking* of coexistence and succession in the abstract, without reference to the Categories of Causality and Reciprocity, it is also true that nothing can be *known* as existing or occurring at a definite place or time, unless it be also determined as standing to other objects and events in those definite relations expressed by the Analogies of Experience. It is in this sense that Kant says that Time and Space cannot be perceived in themselves, but only through the relation of objects and events in Time and Space, and that no object or event is capable of being determined directly in relation to Time and Space, but only indirectly through its determination by the Categories in relation to other objects and events.

Now, it may be alleged (cf. *Phil. of Kant*, p. 458) that men constantly do speak of events as occurring, and of objects as coexisting, without being aware that they are thus determining these events and objects in relation to each other by Causality and Reciprocity, just as men constantly reason without any knowledge of logical laws. But it is Kant's view, as I understand him, that in the determination of objects, as in Time and Space, there is involved an activity of thought which is governed and guided by these Categories, just as it

is also his view that in all our knowledge of objects there is involved a relation to the unity of the thinking self, although that relation is not clearly recognized, except by the reflective consciousness. Just, therefore, as Kant says that the "I think" must be capable of accompanying all our ideas of objects, seeing that all objects imply the activity and unity of the conscious subject, so he also maintains that no determination of objects as in Space and Time is possible except by the Principles of the pure understanding, and especially by the Analogies of Experience.

To say that "ten minutes to nine must absolutely precede five minutes to nine; one o'clock, two o'clock; Sunday, Monday; May, June — in short, every one moment of time another," and that "these are successions absolutely independent of Causality" (Dr. Stirling's article, p. 47), is, therefore, not to the point. For the determination of the separate times is possible, in Kant's view, only through the determination of the successive states of objects in relation to each other; and this, again, implies the permanence of substances, and the causal relation of their successive changes of state. In order to bring these presupposed relations into the light of consciousness, Kant has an expedient of his own which he frequently uses. He asks what would become of the unity of experience if the truth of these principles were denied. If we were to deny the principles of substance or causality, he argues, the consequence would be that we should have two successive experiences between which no relation could be established, and which, therefore, could not be determined by us as comprehended in one time. And in the same way he argues that, if we were to deny the principle of reciprocity, we should make it impossible to determine things as coexisting in one space. It is, therefore, a perfectly accurate account of Kant's position to say that he met Hume's reduction of the *propter hoc* to the *post hoc* by showing that "no mind is capable of the cognition *post hoc* which is not already capable of the cognition *propter hoc*." Nor is it to the point to say that there are many phenomena which are determined as successive, and which yet we do not conceive to be related as causes and effects. This, indeed, is palpable enough; for, even when they are so related we often do not know it, and have to search among the many phenomena which are previous to an effect for that which is its cause. But we *assume* that it is caused by something that went before it, and this assumption we make because it is just in relation to these previous phenomena that we have determined it to a definite moment in objective time. In dating it in short, we *ipso facto* assume it to be necessarily determined in relation to what precedes it, and this

necessary determination is just the causal relation. To date it thus in objective time would be "impossible, except to a mind that connects phenomena as cause and effect." Is it necessary to quote Kant for this? If so, take one passage where many are ready.

"That something happens is a perception which belongs to a possible experience, but it becomes an actual experience only when I regard the phenomena in question as fixed to a definite point in time, and, therefore, as an object which may always be found in the connection of perceptions by the aid of a rule. But this rule for the determination of things in relation to their sequence in time is, that in what precedes an event the condition must be found under which the event always (*i. e.*, necessarily) follows. Therefore, the principle of sufficient reason is the principle by which alone we can have objective knowledge of phenomena in regard to their sequence in time." (Kritik, Rosenkranz's edition, p. 170; Mr. Meiklejohn's translation, p. 149).

In conclusion, upon this point, I may say what I have suggested elsewhere, that Kant's argument would have been free from many difficulties if he had seen the relation of the different categories, and had not taken the principle of substance as pointing only to an underlying permanent identity, and the principle of causality as pointing only to different successive events, without inner identity.

2. The second of Dr. Stirling's charges against me is that I assert, and assert as the doctrine of Kant, that "objectivity results from the Category of Causality alone" (Dr. Stirling's article, p. 48), without the aid of any other category. My answer is that I never asserted anything of the kind, and that in many passages I assert the very opposite. Take one passage, in which I sum up the results of Kant's discussion of the principles of the pure understanding:

"In the last chapter we have considered the principles on which phenomena are determined as objects of experience, under conditions of Space and Time. Taking these principles together, we reach the general idea of Nature as a system of substances, whose quantum of reality always remains the same, but which, by action and reaction upon each other, are constantly changing their states according to universal laws. And the proof of this idea of Nature is not dogmatic, but transcendental, *i. e.*, it is proved that without it there could exist for us no Nature and no experience at all." (Phil. of Kant, p. 473; cf., also, pp. 460, 470, etc.)

In these words I have declared, as clearly as possible, that the test of objective reality is to be found in the connection of experience, as

determined by all the Categories. My view, in fact, is just that which Kant expresses when he says that "nothing is to be admitted in the empirical synthesis which could be a hindrance to the understanding in establishing the continuous connection of all phenomena in one experience.."

Dr. Stirling's charge is based upon the fact that I refer to Schopenhauer, on one occasion, in connection with the Category of Causality. But surely one may refer to an author without adopting, or (as was the case here) without even remembering all his opinions. All that I meant to say in the passage which Dr. Stirling quotes from my book is that Kant, in his deduction of the principle of Causality, sometimes speaks as if we could be conscious of our perceptions as successive states in our minds, before we determine them as objectively successive. And to this Berkeleian way of looking at the matter it seems fair to object that it supposes as known, irrespective of causality *in one instance*, what, according to Kant's own principles, cannot be known at all except through causality. When Kant says that the fact that I see the parts of a house successively is not to be made the ground of an objective judgment of sequence in relation to the house, as it may be in the case of a vessel sailing (or "drifting," if Dr. Stirling thinks the phrase of any importance) down the stream, he supposes me to have determined my perception of the parts of a house as successive. But what I contend is that, on Kant's own principles, it is not possible to determine any series, whether of perceptions or of external events, as an objective or real succession, except through the Category of Causality; and that, therefore, it is not open to him to treat any one succession as if it were purely subjective, and then to use it as a stepping-stone to the determination of other successions as objective. In any case, that is, causality is involved in the determination of succession. That this is my meaning will, I think, be perfectly obvious to any one who will read pages 278-281, or again, pages 352-356 of my book, where another form of the same assumption is criticised. How Dr. Stirling can find in my words anything like the assertion that "objectivity results from the Category of Causality alone," I am unable to discover. The passage in question is concerned only with objective *sequence*, and it is both preceded and followed by passages in which objective coëxistence is shown to involve reciprocity, and objective *existence* (the basis of all) to involve the category of substance.

I have now answered all the matter of Dr. Stirling's attack upon my views, so far as it seems to me to require any answer. The man-

ner of his attack I have no wish to retaliate. Under the torrent of contemptuous words — some of them fearfully and wonderfully made — which he has been pleased to pour upon me, I feel almost inclined to say, with Falconbridge —

“Zounds! I was never so bethumped with words,
Since first I called my brother's father ‘dad.’”

Dr. Stirling is undoubtedly a man of great philosophical powers; I have always regarded him as in some sense a master in philosophy; but I think it were well if he could learn to use the language of those who can afford to respect others because they respect themselves.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

EDWARD CAIRD.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW, March 8, 1879.

VOLUNTARY MOTION.

In the *Popular Science Monthly* for August, 1878, there is an interesting discussion, by Professor Payton Spence, M.D., of the question of the rise of voluntary motion. The muscles involved in the pronounciation of the sound of A are assumed at twenty, including those of the vocal chords, the back part of the mouth, the tongue, the cheeks, the lips, and the chest. Allowing three distinct degrees of contraction of each muscle, he finds 3,113,884,401 possible combinations of muscular contractions, only one of which can produce the sound A. Supposing the child to know nothing about it, and to have no organic tendencies in the direction towards it, in learning how to make this sound by combinations of muscles, the child would experiment for thirty years, making 100 experiments in a minute.

When we consider that the child learns, not only one of the possible combinations of twenty muscles, but the entire command of the combinations of the 450 muscles of the body, we see that the accumulated acquisitions of the slow experience of his race, and of all animals, form a reservoir of inherited acquirement in each individual, and that, in comparison to this inherited ability, the ability that he acquires by his own experience amounts only to the ratio of 1 in 100,000.

TWO SONNETS.

I. — R. W. E.

As pale-blue mountain that I see from far,
 Its classic beauty marked against the sky;
 Or diamond splendor of some midnight star,
 That first in sparkling grandeur awes my eye;
 Look I on him, who, parted from his age
 By measure like none other of our day,
 Stands, like some Teneriffe alone, while rage
 Vain storms, and cast about his feet their spray.
 For those same laws that placed the peak sublime,
 And move each planet in majestic curve,
 This man have guided in such noble rhyme
 That from their limit would he never swerve.
 Who lives on manna fallen from the skies
 Must soon or late all other men surprise.

II. — J. G. W.

Capricious is the Muse; no certain way
 She holds directed by the will of man,
 But ever seeks in fancy's sportive play
 Her course by what strange mazy paths she can.
 Wealth shuns she; scorned are power and place;
 The eager lover toils for her in vain
 Whilst suddenly she bends with shining face
 And showers on some shy boy her golden rain.
 He in his turn power wealth and place doth leave
 To muse on life — to watch the changing sky;
 Till we through him a brighter world perceive,
 With nobler forms, in inspiration high.
 Why thus her course, he who is wise may tell:
 That Fate approves it, be assured well.

F. P. S.

COLLEGE HILL, MASS., September, 1878.

H. K. HUGO DELFF.

WE have received from Dr. H. K. Hugo Delff, of Husum, Schleswig-Holstein, a further series of writings on the life and works of Dante, to the study of whose works Mr. Delff seems to have specially devoted himself of late. The first of these writings is on the relation of Dante's *Convito* to the *Divina Commedia*; the second treats of Dante's philosophical relation to the scholastic and mystic, or the Aristotelian and Platonic schools of his time; while the third, "Miscellanee," is devoted to textual criticism. In another number of the JOURNAL we may publish a translation of one of the interesting essays.

BOOK NOTICES.

OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By John J. Elmen-
dorf, S. T. D., University Professor of Philosophy and English Literature in
Racine College. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876.

This is unquestionably one of the best manuals to place in the hands of the student, as a syllabus of the course in Philosophy, for review and recitation. It is expected by the author that it will accompany the lectures of the living teacher, and not be used as "a substitute for the living guide who elucidates the student's confused thought, and makes him to grow in mind as he traces the development of human thought." The words of Plato (*Phædr.*, p. 276) are quoted: "Nobler, far, is the serious pursuit of the dialectician who finds a congenial soul, and then with knowledge ingrafts and sows words which are not unfruitful, but have in them seeds which may bear fruit in other natures, nurtured in other ways — making seed everlasting, and the possessors happy to the utmost extent of human happiness." "Text-books," our author holds, "will not do this." "Only the living teacher can direct every lecture towards practical ends; books will not answer the purpose." "These outlines are intended, first, to save the delay caused by much writing in the lecture-room; secondly, to aid a free use, by lecturer and scholar, of original sources; and, thirdly, to provide help in review and recitation. If interleaved, the manual may prove still more serviceable."

The book contains seventeen chapters, the first of which is devoted to terms and definitions, subjects, origin and progress, and systems; the second, to an outline of the East Indian philosophy; the third to the sixth, inclusive, to the Greek philosophy; the seventh, eighth, and ninth, respectively, to the rise of Christian philosophy, Scholasticism, and the philosophy of the Renaissance; the tenth, to Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, and the development of English empiricism; the eleventh, to the development of rationalism, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz; the twelfth, to Hume and Skepticism, and Mysticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the thirteenth, to Condillac and the French Sensualistic School of the eighteenth century; the fourteenth, to the Scotch philosophy; the fifteenth, to Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and their opponents; the sixteenth, to English and French empiricism in the nineteenth century; the concluding chapter, to English, American, and French psychologic spiritualism in the nineteenth century. Ernst Kuhn's "*Memorial und Repititorium zur Geschichte der Philosophie*" is the only work of the kind which we regard as of equal or superior merit.

THE ULTIMATE GENERALIZATION. An Effort in the Philosophy of Science.
New York: Charles P. Somerby. 1876.

An attempt to present the doctrine of Evolution somewhat after the style of Herbert Spencer, in a concise, systematic form. "Herbert Spencer has given us

the perception of *likeness* and *unlikeness* as the oneness of all *mental processes*; the *rhythmic cycle of action and reaction* as the *constitution* of all movement; *force*, or the *persistence of force*, as the one *cause* existing in all causes; and *evolution* and *dissolution* as the summing-up of all phenomena in one common movement, tendency, end, or purpose. These are all genuine inductions" (p. 7). "But none of them are ultimate" (p. 12). "Mr. Spencer has accordingly, as I have shown, got down to the unknowable without any induction that is strictly universal" (p. 14). "If, leaving the ground of Science, we look for what has been done by Philosophy, we find that in the system of Hegel there was reached—not, of course, by induction—the conception of a unity in the nature and the mode of all existence, and all movement or evolution, which, regarded simply as a conception—the pure ideal of the law—is apparently the same as that of an all-inclusive generalization. The germ of this was in Fichte's logical process of 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis:' it was imperfectly developed by Schelling, and afterwards modified and completely formulated by Hegel, becoming his celebrated 'Logic.' A similar idea arrived at by an analysis of number, and accompanied, along with other additions, by a full development of the doctrine of Universal Analogy—naturally favored by the conception, but not before so completely elaborated—has been promulgated as the Integralism and Universology of Mr. Stephen Pearl Andrews" (p. 15). "Oppositeness" (p. 18), or "Correlation" (p. 51), is suggested as the "Ultimate Generalization," and the evidence adduced "is the fact that it answers all the tests by which the other great generalizations were at the outset of this discussion shown to be defective" (p. 51). The opposites, Nothing and Something (p. 47), are correlated, the former as the "*continent*" [containing?] or "Space and Time, unconditioned, absolute, and infinite, unqualified (except negatively) and unquantified, considered as two, but really as one;" the latter is the "*content*" [contained?] or Noumena and Phenomena, conditioned, relative, and finite, qualified and quantified." This "content" as the noumena is "self-existent, immutable, and permanent being: dual substance; matter and motion as they are in themselves, or in their simplest conceivable state."

The book ends with the following note: "It will doubtless occur to some that more attention should have been given to the subject of Intelligence. The inability to conceive of intelligence as arising out of matter, when the nature of the two seems so entirely different, will be, as it has always been, an obstacle to the acceptance of any view not in accordance with the spiritualist or idealist philosophies. In regard to this, biological science shows that intelligence actually has grown up by the slowest and most gradual steps of evolution. And notwithstanding the nature of it has been pronounced inconceivable by the whole scientific world, and called one of the mysteries of the Absolute—all of which are past finding out—the author will further say that he has a glimpse of an entirely conceivable, rational, and simple theory of the nature of intelligence as belonging to matter, of consciousness, of the thinking process, of the mental organism, and of the *Ego* or conscious personality."

IMAGINARY CONVERSATIONS. By Walter Savage Landor. First Series: Classical Dialogues, Greek and Roman. Third Series: Dialogues of Literary Men. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1876.

The English edition of Landor's writings comprises, under every head, the completed work, with the author's last revision. Omission is made only of such poetical writings as he had deliberately rejected. It begins with the Dialogues of the

Greeks and Romans, and continues with Shakespeare's Examination for Deer-stealing, the Conversations of Sovereigns and Statesmen, the Five Dialogues of Boccaccio and Petrarca, the first and second series of Conversations of Literary Men, the Dialogues of Famous Women, and the Letters of Pericles and Aspasia. The final volumes contain the Imaginary Scenes and Conversations in verse — including his tragedies and minor dramatic pieces — and the minor pieces in verse and prose.

Every reader of these neat volumes will feel grateful to Messrs. Roberts Brothers for reprinting in so attractive a style the charming pages of Landor.

L'ESTHÉTIQUE DE HEGEL: TRADUCTION FRANÇAISE. Deuxième Édition. Par CH. BÉNARD. 2 vols. in 8. Paris: Librairie Germer-Baillière. 1875.

M. Bénard deserves the gratitude of all non-German students of art for putting in so accessible and manageable a form this completest and most exhaustive of all works on the Philosophy of Art thus far published. The special student of Hegel will indeed miss much of the purely speculative portion of the original, and will perhaps be disposed to think that the translator has not in every instance presented the precise meaning of the author. But the latter point must, of course, remain a question of interpretation — M. Bénard believing in the *Æsthetics* because it does *not* agree with the author's system, and the special student of Hegel believing in it because it *does*! Indeed, we are tempted to suggest that if M. Bénard will take the trouble to carefully review the system, he will find that at least the system agrees with the *Æsthetics*! On the other hand, in point of the omissions made, we can but commend the judgment which prompted them. It is true that, without special preparation, most persons would find the strictly speculative portions quite impenetrable; while, in the form here presented, the work is quite comprehensible and will be read with intense enjoyment by the really earnest student, to whom it will be a constant revelation. It is, therefore, with all heartiness that we commend M. Bénard's translation to the reader, for whose further information, instead of attempting to compress an outline of so vast a work within the limits of a book-notice, we will refer to the translator's extended and admirable essay on the *Æsthetics* published in parts extending through the first three volumes of this JOURNAL.

W. M. B.

SITTENLEHRE FUER SCHULE UND HAUS. NACH DR. WILHELM FRICKE'S SITTENLEHRE FUER KONFESSIONSLOSE SCHULEN. Herausgegeben von Der Deutschen Freien Gemeinde. B. G. Stephan, 403 N. Sixth Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

It is impossible to criticise from a universal point of view any system of applied ethics. To criticise from that same standpoint a system of applied ethics, narrowed down to the spheres of the school-room and the family, is, therefore, altogether out of the question: and we must leave this work, so far as the attainment of the object sought for is concerned, to the judgment of the individual reader. The selections, we may say, however, are made with good taste, though we cannot understand, exactly, why even a *Freie Gemeinde* should show such an apparent aversion to the introduction of Christian subjects in its readers. Why not leave Confucius, Buddha, Mahommed, Socrates, Plato, etc., also, out of our readers, and thus leave children absolutely free of preconceived, or rather prelearned, opinions; that is, in absolute ignorance?

A. E. K

THE JOURNAL
OF
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. XIII.]

JULY, 1879.

[No. 3.

FICHTE'S CRITICISM OF SCHELLING.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE,
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III.

*An Illustration, particularly of the Philosophical Judgment of
our Age.*

[THIS ARTICLE COMPLETES THE CRITICISM: THE FIRST AND SECOND PARTS AP-
PEARED, RESPECTIVELY, IN THE APRIL AND JULY NUMBERS OF THIS JOURNAL
FOR 1878.]

It might be of use to characterize this almost universal insipidness and laziness of our age, particularly in matters of philosophy, in a recent and still existing striking example. Of the age, I say, in general; for I do not desire that the man whose name will be mentioned below should believe that I oppose myself to him as an individual, or even that he is good enough for me to use him as a representative of that universal shallowness; in which case I should, indeed, exaggerate and become unjust towards the others. Only the fact that a public — on the whole, nevertheless, better instructed — could be deceived by him has won for him the honor of being mentioned here by name.

For this public had, nevertheless, through Kant's and our
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our own writings, been so far instructed as to make the younger students — the old students, grown up in dogmatism, were not converted — attain the conviction, in which they seemed firmly to repose, that reality ought on no account to be posited in the things, but in thinking and the laws of thinking, although no one very well knew how this could be accomplished, when at that very time one of the most confused heads of these our days of confusion, Frederick Wilhelm Schelling, through the spectre of a subjectivism of the Science of Knowledge, which only his excessive want of understanding had created, succeeded in reducing this science of knowledge, by his authority, to an error, — an error which the public, so long as left to itself, had been too sensible to discover, — and in scaring the people back from Kant and the Science of Knowledge, to Spinoza and Plato. The public were astounded, and knew not how further to proceed. They called repeatedly and threateningly upon the author of the Science of Knowledge to refute, if he could, what neither Kant nor the Science of Knowledge were needed to refute, and what ought not to have been mentioned as an open question since the days of Leibnitz. That, by such a course of proceeding, this man has expressed his absolute ignorance of what speculation is and should be, and his natural unfitness for speculation is self-evident and needs no further proof. But in so far as the rest of his dialectical art, talent of composition, sophistical wit, and the dexterity of the man may plead as an excuse for the deceived, and to shun what the man really has and can put to use of mind and talent, it may be instructive to develop and follow his views.

In order to proceed in this development with the utmost fairness, we shall neither take up the former writings of this man nor his so-called identity-system, though the latter has been considered so important that we have been called upon by name (by one of our standing literary tribunals) to either refute or recognize it. Was there in this system, as represented in the second volume of the *Magazine for Speculative Physics* — which representation we shall say only a few words about, in passing — error so dextrously and deceptively

worked out as to render its discovery impossible without outside assistance?

This representation commences with the statement (sec. 1): "I call reason absolute reason, or reason in so far as it is thought, as the utter indifference of the Subjective and Objective."

Now that by this starting-point the man commenced at the very beginning to distinguish reason from itself, and to renounce being reasonable himself, as well as to consider how he ever could come to make all the assertions which followed—all this the public could not well be supposed to remark, because such a supposition would presuppose the faculty of speculation, which the public, of course, does not possess. But it might well have been seen at once, even without the faculty of speculation, that the one and absolute reason, outside of which nothing was to be, could not be the indifference of the subjective and objective without being in the same undivided essence their difference; that the man, therefore, beside his own indifferential reason, kept another differential reason in view, which might come in very handy in a quiet way, and that this error was not a small, unimportant mistake, but of most significant consequence.

We will also be generous enough to forgive the public its not perceiving that by this statement of the matter, reason was at once completely determined, and in itself ended, *i. e.*, dead; and that its philosophical hero might now, to be sure, repeat his first proposition as often as possible, but never would be able to find a way of getting honestly and logically out of it to a second proposition. But that when he now really, in his own manner, did begin to resurrect the dead, and to relate to and happily demonstrate into this, his reason, all the determinations of nothingness, totality, unity, self-equality, etc., which arise in his following paragraphs, his readers never felt astonished at how he got at *these determinations*, nor ever asked him about it (for if his first statement of the essence of reason had been really exhaustive, these determinations ought to have been deduced from an analysis of that statement, from reason, as necessarily grounded in it; but they never should

have been taken — God only knows wherefrom — and been held separate from reason by mere arbitrariness !) and that his readers did not yet perceive the movement of that differential reason, in the person of their author, had secretly been calculated upon in section 1 ; nay, that they were not even surprised at his material arbitrariness in the arbitrary succession of the predicates which he chose to apply to reason. All this is a little more difficult to forgive.

But what shall we say when we look at these demonstrations ourselves, and discover the contradictions, subterfuges, and absurdities into which an uncultured and confused imagination blindly plunges the author ; and when we see that a logical development of his first proposition leads to the very opposite of his assertion, and when, nevertheless, we are forced to experience how this monstrous system is received otherwise than amidst universal and unceasing laughter ?

Thus, for instance, section 2 states : “ Outside of *reason* is *nothing*, and in *reason* is *all*. If reason is thought, as we have stipulated in section 1, it immediately appears that out of it nothing can be. For, supposing something were outside of reason, then it is either so for reason itself” — Indeed ! *For itself?* Why, we have not seen a word in section 1 that anything could be *for* reason. This is tacitly assumed here without our perceiving whence, merely so as to furnish a proof ; and in doing so the author himself has not thought reason as demanded in his section 1, but leads the reader rather to the very opposite view. But, certainly, the proof may, perhaps, be obtained by this reasoning. It is obtained as follows : “ It is either outside of reason for reason itself, and then reason is the subjective, which is against the presupposition ; or it is not for reason itself outside of it, and then reason is related to this outside as objective to objective ; in which case reason is objective, which, again, is against our presupposition.”

(By the bye, the second half of the proof is without sense or meaning, as the reader may discover for himself, for we have not time to dwell upon it.)

The correct section 2 of the previous section 1 would have been : *In reason and for reason is simply nothing.* If reason

is thought, as we have postulated in section 1, it is immediately clear that neither in nor for reason can anything be. For, supposing anything to be in or for reason, this could be only in so far as it were itself reason; and this anything could only be the subjective, or the objective, or both; for that is all we have in our section 1. But to think reason as the subjective, or the objective, or both, would be opposed to the first statement, that reason is merely the indifference of both.

It is true, this proof presupposes that the one who furnishes the proof does not reflect, in the meanwhile, that in the proof reason is nevertheless for him, and is posited: and that hence the only practical possibility of the proof presupposes precisely that whereof the proof shows the impossibility; and this presupposition is made justly, since the contrary, in a system which is possible only by not reflecting, would be opposed to the very first agreement.

Thus the beginning of section 3 reads: "*Reason is absolutely one, and absolutely self-equal*: for if it were not the former there would be still another ground of the being of reason"—(Here, therefore, in order to have the second proof, we have the second presupposition stealthily brought in, that every being must have a ground. Whence, then, do we know that? Whence, indeed, all at once, the category of ground, and,—above all things,—with a view to prove by it the [formal] unity of reason? Ground is a much more special category, which arises only in the sphere of finite conditions and consequences.)—"still another ground than itself; for reason itself contains the ground only of its own being, not of the being of another reason." Indeed! How do we know this, again? Is this also contained in section 1, or in section 2? But let us relieve him of the question after the whence! Let us pass over his application of the ground-category, and the unproved assertion that reason alone is the ground of itself; what would his section 3 prove, after all? Why could not reason, inwardly and in itself, as reason, remain qualitatively one, even though there were a ground of its formal existence outside of reason? It is true, however, that in this case being would not be one, and reason not all being, and not

one with being. The unity of being, but not of reason, would therefore be proved, if this doubly and triply false proof could prove anything; but our author adds: *Reason is therefore one!* and thus shows that he does not even understand his own proof.

The correct section 3 (concerning the predicate of unity and self-equality), as resulting from the precedent sections 1 and 2, would be as follows:

Reason is absolutely neither One nor self-equal; for if it were, it could be so only in and for itself, since outside of reason there is nothing. Now, it is impossible (sec. 2) that there is anything in and for reason; hence reason cannot be unity and self-equality in and for itself; hence unity and self-equality cannot be at all; hence they also cannot belong to reason.

True, in this proof, it is also presupposed that nobody must reflect, on any account, how he comes, nevertheless, to present unity and equality in this proof; for then the same contradiction between doing and saying which we discovered in the previous proof would arise again, and the whole joke would dissolve into nothingness.

Now, in this manner the man proceeds throughout the whole *scriptum*, and none of the demonstrations which follow are of another nature than those we have quoted. But the result of all these manœuvres is this: that in an utterly fictitious manner, by absolutely cancelling the first proposition from which he started, the specific difference in many real things is explained from the difference of the quantitative relation of the subjective and objective in them. That this explanation is utterly arbitrary and a mere hypothesis is self-evident, for how can anybody arrive at it who does not presuppose as well-known, as a matter of course, that specifically different things do exist, and who has not got it into his head that he is going to explain their differences, whether it please God or no? But that this explanation contradicts and cancels the first fundamental principle appears thus: If reason is the absolute indifference of the subjective and objective, and if there is no other being than that of reason, then this indifference cannot

be cancelled and replaced by a quantitative difference in any being.

But, as I said before, I will not even judge the man by this antiquated sin, which, though the natural-philosophical public may not have recognized it as yet, has probably been already repented of by its author. I will base my investigation of his mind and talent upon another writing, which he himself considers so holy that, by the inscription on its title-page, "Touch it not, Goat, for it burns!" he bids all profane minds to depart at the very doorsteps, and which is really, also, in my estimation, the best, *i. e.*, the least bungler-like, of the numerous productions of his pen. I refer to his work, *Religion and Philosophy*.

The by far greater portion of this work does not pretend to conceal at all that it is merely a free and open play of the imagination, without even the pretence of thinking or investigating. Assertions, assurances, statements, are put forth without the shadow of a proof. All this part condemns itself, and needs not our attention. We proceed at once to the most prominent part of the whole book, which really puts on the air of thinking, and promises to explain the present highest principles of this philosopher — leaving all the while, as I said before, unnoticed, the man's fundamental error of objectivating, and merely considering the ability and dexterity with which he moves about in error.

Beginning at page 18, we have the announcement of a deduction of finite things from the absolute, and a representation of their relation, which ends as follows: "As sure as this absolutely simple essence of intellectual contemplation" — (by the word *essence* he means the *object* of that contemplation; but he has his good reasons, well known to us, why he does not utter that word in this connection, for to do so might lead him into serious difficulties with the science of knowledge) — as "sure as this essence is absoluteness, no other Being can be ascribed to it than what it has through its own conception; for if there could, it would be determined through something else outside of itself, which is impossible."

Let us stop right here, at the swelling tide of this proof, since we cannot get over some things so easily as the author. I understand clearly: if it were not determined through itself, it would be determined through another; that is, if it must be determined *through anything*, of which *must* the proof furnishes no ground, but merely invents it. I see that this proof tears its absolute, which at first was to be one, into two—the determining and the determined—and that it thus begins with an inward and material disjunction (the original and formal disjunction—that is, the seen of a seeing—we will, according to our promise, pass over), whereof he gives no account, which is the first act of blind arbitrariness. If I look closer at this mode of proceeding, I find that the well-known conception of the Absolute as being of itself, from itself, and through itself, is realized here; (Which—as mere conception, outward characteristic, and scheme of the absolute, and mere description of its form, in opposition to the form of the not-absolute, which is not of itself—cannot at all lead us into the absolute, but rather shut it up forever to our eyes), not to remark which is the second blindness. I see, moreover, that the expression “which is impossible,” as it stands, expresses merely an impossibility of thinking, the real importance of which ought, above all things, to have been ascertained, which is the third very great sin of omission. But if I let all this pass and accept the Absolute in its duality as a determining and determined, I still cannot see why it should be in its first quality, as the determining precisely a conception, as I am required to believe without any show of reason, which is the fourth blind arbitrariness. But I see very well, in the meanwhile, why all this had to be stated thus, namely, because there was no other way to get at the desired result: “hence the absolute is generally not *real*, but in itself only *ideal*.”

I will not only be agreeable, but go further; I will really think what the proof demands of me, and thus do what the author neglected to do, for we shall see, after a while, that he really did not think the required result, but wrote down empty words, which, if we should succeed in the promised proof,

would be the fifth blindness. "No being can be asserted of the absolute but that which it has *through* its own conception."

Now, if I have to think this in real earnest, and truly, but not banteringly, as if it were to be true and not true at the same time, I must think that the absolute has a conception of itself, a contemplation of itself, a pictured Being outside of its Being — for this is a conception — and of itself, *i. e.*, of a determined and limited Being, as which it conceives itself. And now I see very clearly (what the author of the proof, who did not truly think, but merely spoke, could have had but dimly in view), that in this manner the absolute can in itself be only ideal: for I suppose I shall be logical enough to view the absolute itself, and its conception of itself, as altogether one and the same, and not to ascribe to it any other formal or material Being, and any other seat and central point of such Being, than in its conception of itself, immediately and wholly. The absolute now again becomes one, determining and determined at the same time in the formal unity of the conception, and the other half of the real determination (which, doubtless, was drawn merely as an assisting line in the construction of the proof) is now wiped out. It is true that, instead of this duality, I now get into my absolute the five-foldness which is inseparable from the form of the conception into which the absolute is now received; but this is unavoidable, and I had better submit with good grace to the unavoidable. But let me on no account hold on and reflect that it is, after all, myself who has this conception of a conception of the absolute, and that I have formed it with conscious arbitrariness at the persuasion of this glorious proof; for by doing so I should fall into the "empty reflection-system," and thus give a far more difficult appearance to the whole matter.

Having thus far cleared matters up, let us proceed: "But equally eternal with the absolutely ideal is the eternal form." Equally eternal? We learn thus, by the way, that the absolutely ideal is, amongst other things, also eternal. Whence do we derive this knowledge, and what does it signify to be eternal? But let us not worry; the author does not intend to

lead us astray here, or to assume anything; he does not think what he says, and this time does not think anything at all; he has simply accustomed himself to an extravagant use of the word "eternal," and it escapes him here involuntarily; for if he had thought of his uttering it, he would at the same time have thought of what it might possibly mean; which, therefore, is the sixth and seventh blindness at one stroke.

Equally eternal, therefore, the eternal form? This really is a matter of course; for we have seen already that the absolute, as positively nothing but its conception of itself, is absorbed by this form of the conception, which form is, therefore, as absolute as the absolute itself, since it is the same; and also as eternal, if the word "eternal" is to have any significance, and if the absolute is assumed to be "eternal." Now, does the author mean this form of the conception, or another one? He means another one; for that he has already, in the self-comprehension of the absolute, a right good, tenable, and even five-fold form, is still unknown to him, from which it very clearly appears that he himself did not think what he required his reader to think, and that our above assertion of this fact is fully confirmed. Why he requires a second form, however, is thus explained: He erroneously supposes that with the first form, even if he should make this form clear to himself, he would not be able to deduce anything from the absolute, — which, after all, is his real purpose. He supposes this erroneously, I say, — at least we, on our part, would not be afraid, if such a self-comprehension of the absolute were given us, to deduce from it, with the greatest ease, heaven, earth, and all the hosts thereof. For in this conception we should have the whole qualitative Being of the absolute, which it contemplates; and this, I suppose, would doubtless give us all the manifold we might want. All we should have to do would be to open hands and eyes, and accept whatever exists, and hold ready for whatsoever might turn up the always same and easy answer: Why, this is also a qualitative part of the absolute, and this, and this, etc., *ad infinitum*. The only remaining difficulty would be to make comprehensible how others also obtain a knowledge of the Being of the absolute, and a

participation in its comprehension of itself; but since it is incontrovertible that the inner ground-form of the self-comprehension of the absolute is the Ego-form, why, it might be very possible that through this very form every Ego had a participation in the absolute, and became a moment of it; for which somewhat bolder solution of the problem our author is, unhappily, too timid and bashful, holding the absolute, as he does, as far away from him as possible. From this reason the first form remains unused, and a second form must be gotten somewhere, into which, as not quite so bright and noble a form, he hopes, with a somewhat smaller degree of immodesty, to squeeze his personality. There is, therefore, a form of the absolute; and this form is as "eternal" as the absolute. So it has been told us, though without a shadow of a proof. Whence does the author know what he maintains? And how does he get to the assumption of such a form? This we shall doubtless learn best when we see for what purpose he uses it. But he uses it a little further on to deduce by its means the reality from the absolute. Hence his need of this explanation is the true creator, and the real, though concealed, ground of the proof of the Being of such a form.

And thus we have here already exhibited to us, and before our very eyes, this man's conception of philosophy—and his whole course of proceeding. Reality is simply in itself. Of this, not the least doubt is uttered, and it is the fundamental pillar of his system. This can and must be explained, and it is the business of philosophy to furnish this explanation. Of this again, not the least doubt is uttered, and it is the second fundamental pillar of the whole system. In order to get this explanation, we must assume an eternal form, and, for the purpose of filling this form, we must assume an Absolute, which is the third part and realization of this system. Its starting-point, therefore, is the very blindest and stubbornly believing empirism, and an Absolute is assumed only for love of the world. This is the true opinion which this man entertains of the Absolute, for thus he uses it; and if he once and a while, for variety's sake, speaks of immediate cognition and contemplation of the Absolute, such is mere phrase and a

joke, since he does not, in truth, judge and philosophize from such a standpoint, but from its very opposite. At the utmost, there may be the following truth in this, as we will generously suppose to be the case, namely: He comprehends, in a general way, the necessity of an immediate knowledge, if a mediated knowledge is ever to be arrived at; but he knows not how to attain it, nor will he ever get it in his way. As for the rest, this not comprehending his own real opinion, and not remarking his blind empirism, and this, his explaining through an arbitrarily posited hypothesis, characterize the radical blindness of the man, whereof the instance just examined is the eighth in number.

But let us in the meanwhile obtain some further information in regard to this eternal form. "Not the absolute ideal stands under this form, for *itself* is outside of all form, as sure as it is absolute." Outside of all form; hence what was just this moment by the same conception asserted of itself is now denied, without the denial being perceived by our author; which is the ninth blindness. But let us look a little closer, to see what this man is really talking about. The *itself* he italicized also in the original, and it was well to do so, though, from another point of view, it may lead to unpleasant consequences. For I ask: Is this, then, the same one absolute of which it was said above that it must be in the eternal form? I suppose it must be the same; for else we have a second absolute, and have had our trouble with the first absolute all for nothing. But it would surely have been wrong not to take us at once to the true forge of the pregnant and productive absolute. Hence it is nevertheless the absolute which is in the form. But, now again, it is not to be *itself* in the form. Hence we have a self which is at the same time a not-self, an identity which is at the same time a not-identity! Are there, then, no means at hand to show up clearly this utter nonsense? I hope the following will suffice:

I ask, is the absolute wholly and undividedly present in this self-forming, or is it not so present? If the former, then it is in its whole and undivided essence in the form, and it is nowhere and in no other manner except in the form. Our

philosopher does not wish this to be so, because he is afraid of his own independent individuality, which would then vanish away in the absolute. He maintains, therefore, the latter; but if this is so, then the absolute, in thus forming itself, separates into two absolute halves, with one of which it remains out of all form, and with the other one of which itself is in the form. Will our philosopher admit this? I hope not; but in the meanwhile he has asserted it, without knowing what he was speaking about; which is the tenth blindness.

It tires me, and perhaps also the reader, to follow this man step by step and count up his instances of confusedness; and I the more gladly drop the subject here, as the two following lines involve such thick and tough nonsense as to require many words to make it at all current. I add only the conclusion of his explanation of the eternal form.

“This form is, that the ideal, immediately as such, and without, therefore, going outside of its identity, exists also as a real.”

What may this mean: “real?” Well, thinks this man, I suppose every child knows it—and so takes no pains to define his conception. But, nevertheless, we should like to know, what sense he attaches to this conception, and hence must trace it out ourselves from its connections. The author holds real to be the opposite of ideal; the ideal, however, he holds to be—partly according to his own express words, and partly according to the higher degree of clearness which we have thrown upon them by realizing the thinking required by him—that which needs not and is not capable of any other being than it has through its conception; and hence the real must be a being which cannot have any other being than *outside* of the conception, *i. e.*, absolute unconsciousness.

Thus, I say, the real must be thought according to our philosopher, though at other times he is far from thinking it thus; for on page 23 he says: “The form of the *determinedness* of the real enters through the ideal into the soul as *knowledge*.”

At first we had only the self-forming of the ideal, by means of and in the form, into the real, the immediate dissolving of the ideality into reality (I×R); where, then, do we get now

all at once this new form of a higher abstraction, of a *determinedness* of the real through the ideal, which must be reciprocal, and which adds at once to the mere reality the ground of its thus-being (qualitative determination) (I^FR); and, moreover, where do we get the *soul*, into which this form of the form enters? It seems, indeed, as if the Wuerttemberg Catechism [allusion to the charge against Schelling, that the theology of the university in Wuerttemberg, where he was now teaching, had induced him to change his views,] has had as much to do with this system as speculation itself. The real deduction of finite things from the absolute he finally succeeds in accomplishing, thereby getting rid of much trouble and annoyance, as follows: "The absolute would not become truly objective in the real, if it did not give the real the power to change, like it, its ideality into reality, and to objectivate this reality in particular forms."

Very well; thus we have gained everything all at once, and the object of all speculation is solved, to everybody's joy and comfort, with immeasurable clearness and ease. There is no doubt that all of us others are the real, wherein the absolute has become truly objective; the power to change our ideality into reality, and to objectivate it in particular forms, belongs also to us, therefore; and hence the whole world will in all probability turn out to be nothing but the exercise of this, our power. If we now but open our senses, or, to use the terminology of our philosopher, exercise the power communicated to us, to change our ideality into reality, we shall doubtless see how this power does objectivate itself in particular forms; and thus we have arrived, indeed, though by a somewhat rough and troublesome circuitous route, at the very point for which I suggested above that the self-comprehension of the absolute might be useful. Whatever may now happen, we shall always be ready to say this is a manifestation of the power to change our ideality into reality, through which power the absolute has become objective in us.

Unfortunately, the joyful emotions which this result might give rise to are quenched soon after by these unexpected and remarkable words: "In one word, from the absolute to the real

there is no gentle gradation ; the origin of the sensuous world ” (remark that this word is made here to have the same meaning as ‘ the real ’) “ is to be thought only as a perfect breaking off from the absoluteness, through a sudden leap.” Again : “ The ground of all finite things cannot lie in a *communication* of reality to them, or to their *substratum* ; — which communication would have to come from the absolute — that ground can lie only in an *estrangement*, in a *falling-off* from the absolute. This equally clear and sublime doctrine [Indeed ! It seems tastes vary] is also the true Platonian doctrine. Only by a falling off or lapse from the original does Plato represent the soul to sink down from its original blessedness. This was also one of the more mysterious doctrines in the Grecian mysteries, to which Plato refers pretty plainly.”

Well, if Plato and the Grecian mysteries assumed this, we others must, of course, show the proper respect and submit to it also, although it were to appear that there is no sense or meaning in the whole doctrine, and that this assumption can only be spoken, but never realized in actual thinking.

We vastly suspect that the latter will turn out to be the case. For what is that to be which falls off from the absolute. Two cases alone are possible : either it is the absolute itself, in which case this must fall off from itself, *i. e.*, annihilate itself in itself and through itself, which is absurd ; or it is not the absolute itself, and then it is of, from, and through itself, and we have two absolutes. It would not do to say that the absolute has made this other, and has made it good, and that it has fallen off only afterwards ; for then the possibility to fall off (to lapse) must either have been given to it by the absolute — in which act of giving the absolute would have indeed fallen off from itself, which is the first absurdity — or it must have had that power from and out of itself, which would make it absolute at least in regard to this power, which is the second absurdity.

But, supposing that we overlook all this in our author ; how does this expression agree with all his previous operations ? I beg you, is, then, the absolute really and indeed existent or not ? Is there, then, a word of truth in the becoming objective on the

part of this absolute, in a power to change its ideality into reality, and to objectivate this reality again in various forms, or is there not a word of truth in it? If the former, then reality is indeed explained, and the steady progression from the absolute to the real has been found. But if we assume the latter — and the assertion that the real cannot be explained from the absolute, warrants us in it — then everything that has been said before is now taken back and pronounced untrue, and all speculation — the true as well as that of this system — is forever stopped. Why, then, did the author not wipe out his beginning, after he had come to such an end?

But have we, perhaps, misunderstood him? He proceeds to remark that he has indeed thus deduced something, but that this something is, after all, merely the pure idea; and hence it is possible that the objectivating of his ideality into different forms, whereat we so rejoiced, may also signify merely the abstract acting, but not, as we hoped, at the same time the original representations of the universe. I suggest: Is, then, the idea not real, can it not become real, and is it not in fact realized in the first half of the book, in the proud deduction of our author? O, yes, if we were not too humble to accept such an assumption! “This is all very well,” says the man, “but still it is not the true real, not the *real* real. I only permit the sensuous world to pass for the true real.” But did he, then, never, in the course of his philosophical life, hear the assertion that the sensuous world generally has real existence only in the senses, and the senses only in the idea, as spheres of the independent life of the idea? Now, if he does not want to admit this — as he certainly does not — how then does he, first of all, form his conception of reality? Evidently, only through distinction from the idea — a Being of matter, utterly independent of the idea; and since, doubtless, we are not to have a third besides the idea and matter, independent of anything else, hence a true in-itself, and inner Absolute, the second in number; *i. e.*, if he is at the same time in earnest when he claims the Being of an absolute idea. And thus we find in our philosophical hero, when we come to a serious investigation, nothing but the old and well-known

joke of a materialistic dualism. Not Kant, not the Science of Knowledge, but thou, O holy Leibnitz, pray for him !

Again : how does this man imagine that he protects himself against those who insist on the unity of the absolute, and on the idea, as the only possible reality? He will never find another manner than that which he really does adopt, namely, of appealing to the testimony of his senses and to common sense, and maintaining, by all that is holy, that the material objects must exist, since he sees them, hears them, etc., and that nobody can ever alter this, his belief. Thus drops from our man the mask of speculation, which he always carries a little loosely, and we see the natural skin of the coarsest, blindest empiricism ; and indeed he never utters were it but the suggestion of a suspicion of the in-itself-existence of matter.

Since it is necessary to tell our public everything expressly, and never to assume that anybody will follow one's thinking, and admit the consequences of one's assertions, I add that all natural philosophy rests upon this blind belief, this horror and dismay in the face of matter, and this terror to be self-alive, and not a mere product of nature ; and that all such men can never find another answer for those who oppose them than that they lack feeling. Now, since we live probably quite as much as they, it is to be presumed that we also hear and see quite as well as they, the only difference being that we do not accept these appearances of the senses immediately and at once, upon mere belief, but penetrate them with our comprehension, and thus understand them in their significance as the true real of them. Hence what we lack, indeed, is their blind superstition ; and if they mean this by their "feeling," they are quite right in supposing that we lack something which they possess. May they never learn what fools they became when they considered themselves wise.

To return to our philosopher. This immeasurably clumsy and bungling sophist is, therefore, the man who succeeded in leading the philosophers of our age astray. In the meanwhile it might involve injustice as well towards myself as towards this man if herewith I concluded this chapter. Towards myself, because I do not wish that certain opponents of his of

whom he complains, of whom he has found particularly a number in the district of his present residence, should believe that I have joined them; towards him, because there was a time when I judged him less disparagingly, and because, since it is known that we once had personal relations, some one might believe he had thus disparaged himself in my esteem in another manner than as a philosopher: Now, as regards, firstly, my former less disparaging judgments, I would have it considered that in these times the man was utterly incapable of philosophical ripeness and clearness by reason of his youth, and that I therefore neither could nor desired to praise in him that ripeness and clearness; but I hoped that he would be diligent, and did not doubt that by diligence he might succeed in something, and it was only this hope which I expressed. But how I have always judged the philosophical attainments which this man really possesses can be seen in the very first numbers of my *Philosophical Journal*, in one of my notes to an essay written by him, wherein the first traces of the error which has now shaped itself into a "philosophy of nature" can be clearly discerned. Those good hopes of mine he has not fulfilled, but allowed himself to be soon corrupted by senseless flatterers, and since then has paid attention to nothing but his pride and self-conceit, being anxious to run ahead in the race of the man whom but to understand he all the while remained incapable.

To separate myself from these opponents of his, whom I do not like to join, I add: I see clearly that if the system of this man is logically carried out, no God remains but Nature, and no morality but that of the manifestations of Nature. But it is as unjust to impugn men for what they merely say as it would be to interpret it to their advantage. Words are, after all, nothing, and only the life is of significance. But so far as the life, the inner religion of this man, is concerned, I of course refrain from all judgment, and hold that the public should do so likewise. So far as his morality is concerned, it may not be improper to also allude to the following:

It seems to have been believed, and it was but lately that I saw the insinuation repeated in a public paper, that the man whom

I have named belonged to those who did not come up to their pledged word when I left Jena. I deem it proper at the present opportunity to deny this. I stood by no means on such a footing with him as that I should have taken his advice on important steps to be taken. Whatever was told him was told him after the step had been taken. The man who, by his unasked-for interference, changed my fixed resolution to resign my position at Jena, in a certain contingency, into an attempt to capitulate, and who thus gave my just and proper resolve — which I approve yet, after the lapse of eight years, and would repeat in the same contingency — the appearance of weakness and double-facedness, was another man, and was only one, not many. In the meanwhile I bear no grudge even against this one, since immediately after the step was taken I condemned myself. For it serves strength but justly if, making common cause with momentary weakness, it finds itself deserted; and I have been reconciled with myself only by the thus acquired certainty that the same thing will not happen again.

Let this, therefore, be said as a last word on the subject, and let us hope that the confused passionateness of those days may now be cooled off, and that it is now understood how it must be all the same to the whole world, excepting the finances of the duchy of Weimar, whether this or that man is professor at Jena, or whether Jena has a flourishing, or a deserted, or no university at all.

Besides all this, what this man seeks and strives to attain by his speculation is by no means anything bad or common, but rather the highest to which man may aspire, the cognition of the unity of all Being with the Divine Being. His purpose is, therefore, worthy of all honor. Mine is the same, and I fulfil it; but he speaks of it only in a roundabout way, and cannot realize it; he puts himself in the way of those who can realize it, and leads others astray who might, perhaps, have listened and understood, if it had not been for him. It is this which causes him my reproaches. He hates and flies from collected reasoning, in which alone lies the remedy of error; and he does this purposely, because he considers it empty clearness,

and thus he makes diffusedness of thought the fundamental principle of all realism, expecting salvation from a blind nature. Now, this is absolute Anti-Philosophy ; and so long as he clings to this maxim, everything he utters is necessarily false, erroneous, and foolish, and not a spark of philosophy can enter his soul. And thus, leaving him as man in all his possible worth, I cast him utterly aside as a philosopher ; and as an artist, I assert him to be one of the greatest bunglers that have ever played with words.

What I have said here against him, being grounded simply in general logic, suffers no contradiction and no evasion, and cannot be refuted. If his co-disputants, sorrowful to see their leader thus treated, should try to refute it, I shall reply or not, as it may please me, for I do not wish to bind myself to it. But to the man I have named I never speak, since we proceed from utterly opposite maxims ; nor have I here spoken to him, but to his public.

HEGEL ON ROMANTIC ART.

[TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND PART OF THE *ÆSTHETIK*.]

BY WM. M. BRYANT.

CHAPTER III. — OF THE FORMAL INDEPENDENCE OF INDIVIDUAL PECULIARITIES.

If now we take a view of what lies behind us, we see that we have, in the first place, considered personality in its absolute circle ; consciousness in its mediation with God ; the universal process of the spirit reconciling itself within itself. Here the abstraction consists in this : The soul withdrew, by abnegation, into itself from the secular, natural, and human, as such (even where this was moral, and therefore permissible), in order to secure contentment in the pure heaven of the spirit. Secondly, it is true, human subjectivity, without representing the negativity which lay in the former mediation, became affirmative

for itself and for others. The content of this secular (*weltlichen*) infinitude, as such, was, nevertheless, only the independence of honor, the internality of love, the vassalage of fidelity; a content which can, indeed, make its appearance in multiform relations, in a vast complexity and varied degree of sentiment and passion, and under a great variety of external circumstances. Within these phases, however, it is nothing more than the above-mentioned independence of the person and of his externality, that is represented. The third point, therefore, which still remains for us to consider is the form and method (*Art und Weise*) by which the further material of human existence, in accordance with its inner and outer characteristics, may enter into the Romantic form of art; and how nature and its conception and significance for the soul may be admitted to the same realm. Here it is also the world of the particular—existence in general—which becomes free for itself, and, in so far as it does not appear to be penetrated with religion, and to be distinctly comprehended in the unity of the absolute, places itself upon its own feet, and goes forward independently in its own realm.

In this third circle of the Romantic form of art, therefore, the religious material and chivalry, with its lofty conceptions and aims produced in the inner being, and to which nothing in the present and actual immediately corresponds, have vanished. On the contrary, what is now gratifying is the thirst for this present and actual world itself, satisfaction in what *is*, contentment with self, with the finitude of the human, with the finite and particular in general; in a word, with the specifically-realistic (*Portraitartigen*). In his immediate now, man demands, even at the sacrifice of the beauty and ideality of the content and of the manifestation, that the present itself, re-created in still more present vitality by art, shall stand out before him as his own spiritual, human work. As we saw, even at the outset, the Christian religion has not grown out of the ground of the phantasy, as did the Oriental and Greek gods, in respect of both content and form. If now it is the phantasy which creates from itself the significance in order to complete the union of the true internal with the perfected form of the same, and, in Classic Art, actually

brings about this combination ; so, likewise, on the other hand, we find that in the Christian religion the mundane peculiarity of manifestation from the center outward, as it comes and goes, is taken up, as an element, into the ideal, and that the soul is satisfied with the commonplace, and with the accidentality of the external, without demanding beauty. Still, man is, at first, only potentially, and as a possibility, reconciled with God. All are, indeed, called to happiness, but few are chosen ; and the soul to which the Kingdom of Heaven, as well as the kingdom of this world, remains a beyond, must, in the spiritual, abjure worldliness and egotistic temporality (*selbstischen Gegenwärtigkeit*). It (the soul) advances from an infinite distance, and in order that what was to it at first only something to be sacrificed may become affirmative and valid, this positive finding of self and willing of self in its (the soul's) present, — which [phase] is in other respects the beginning, — constitutes the termination in the development (*Fortbildung*) of Romantic Art ; and this is the final stage in which man simply continues to add to the depth and precision of his own inner nature.

With respect to the form for this new content we found Romantic Art burdened from its very beginning with this contradiction : That subjectivity or personality, since it is essentially infinite, is for itself incapable of uniting with external matter and must remain uncombined therewith. This independent opposition of the two sides and the seclusion (*Zurückgezogenheit*) of the internal within itself constitutes the characteristic content of the romantic. Developing themselves within themselves, these two elements are found to ever separate anew until they ultimately fall asunder altogether, and thus show that it is in *another field* than in that of art that they must seek their absolute unity (*Vereinigung*). Through this falling-asunder the elements (*Seiten*) become, in respect of art, *formal*, since they cannot come forth as a whole in that perfect unity which the classic ideal gives to them. Classic Art has its appropriate range in a circle of clearly defined images ; in a mythology completed through art and in the indissoluble forms pertaining thereto. The dissolution of the classic, therefore (as we have already seen in the transition to

the Romantic form of art), is, aside from the very limited region of the comic and satirical, an over-refinement (*Ausbildung*) for the sake of the agreeable; or it is an imitation which is lost in erudition, in something dead and cold, and which finally degenerates into a negligent and clumsy technique. Still, on the whole, the objects remain the same and merely exchange the earlier, more spiritual mode of production for a less and less spiritual representation, and a tradition altogether mechanical and external, or formal. On the contrary, the progress and termination of Romantic Art is the inner dissolution of the artistic material itself, which separates into its elements — into a free-existence of its parts — with which, on the other hand, the subjective skill and art of the representation rises; and, the more completely disengaged the spiritual (*das Substantielle*) becomes, by so much the more does it render itself perfect.

We may now indicate the more precise divisions of this last chapter, as follows:

In the first place, we have before us *Independence of Character*. But this is a particular, definite individual, who, with his own peculiar characteristics and aims, is secluded within himself, within his own world.

Secondly, in contrast with this formalism of the independence of character stands the external form of situations, accidents, and acts. And, since Romantic internality in general is indifferent respecting the external, there appears here the real phenomenon, free for itself, as neither pervaded by the inner [quality] of the aims and deeds, nor formed adequately with reference to the same. Thus, in its unrestricted mode of manifestation, importance comes to be attached to the accidentality of the development, of the circumstances, of the succession of events, of the quality of execution, etc., [and this makes its appearance] as *adventurousness*.

In the third place, finally, there is exhibited the falling asunder of the elements (*Seiten*) whose perfect identity constitutes the specific idea of art; and thus the dissolution and decay of art itself become manifest. On the one side, art goes over to the representation of ordinary actuality as such, to the representation of things present just as they are in their acci-

dental individuality and their peculiarities; and has now for its aim the transformation of this reality into an appearance through the dexterity of art. On the other side, it turns itself about, to the complete, subjective accidentality of conception and representation—to *Humor*—as the inversion and derangement of all objectivity and reality through wit and the play of the subjective fancy (*Ansicht*), and terminates with the productive power of the artistic subjectivity over every content and every form.

I. Of the Independence of Individual Character.

1. Of Outward Energy of Character.—2. Of Concentration of Character.—3. Of the Interest which the Representation of such Character produces.

The subjective infinitude of man considered with reference to his ideal, from which we set forth in Romantic Art, remains also in this present sphere the fundamental characteristic. On the other hand, what enters anew into this substantially (*für sich*) independent infinity is, on the one part, the *particularity of the content* which constitutes the world of the subject or person; on the other part, the being of the subject or person in immediate combination with this its particularity, and the wishes and aims belonging thereto; thirdly, the living individuality to which character in itself sets the limits. We must here, however, not understand by the expression “character” what, for example, the Italians represent in their masques. For the Italian masques are, indeed, also definite characters, but they exhibit this definiteness only in their abstraction and universality, without subjective individuality. On the contrary, the characters of the present stage are, each for himself, a more specific character, an independent totality, an individual subject or person. If, therefore, we still speak here of formalism and abstraction of character, this relates only to the fact that the chief content, the world of such character, appears on the one hand as limited, and hence abstract; while on the other hand it appears as accidental. What the individual is, becomes established (*gehalten*) and sustained (*getragen*), not through that which is substantial and essentially valid in its content, but through the mere subjectivity of the

character. This, therefore, rests only formally upon its own individual independence, instead of upon its content and its sensibility developed to consistency and independence (*für sich festen Pathos*).

Within this formalism *two principal distinctions* are brought to light.

On the one side stands the energetic, self-reliant (*sich durchführende*) firmness of character, which restricts itself to definite ends, and throws the entire force of one-sided individuality into the realization of these ends. On the other side, character appears as subjective totality, which, however, remains uncultivated in its internality, and in the undeveloped depth of the soul, and is not in a position to render itself explicit and to bring itself into complete manifestation.

1. Thus, what we have before us at first is the particular character which chooses to be precisely what it immediately is. As the animals are different one from another, and yet in this difference find their independence, so here the variously-distinguished characters, whose circle and chief peculiarity remain accidental, cannot be given a precise definition through the general conception.

a. Such merely self-related individuality, therefore, possesses no views and aims which it has thought out, and which it connects with some universal sentiment (*Pathos*); but what it has, does, and accomplishes, it creates immediately, and without any further reflection, out of its own particular nature, and this its nature is in that very fact developed to the precise state it is now found to be in. It is not grounded through anything else higher, nor will it accept vindication from something substantial; but, inflexible, and relying unflinchingly upon itself, it goes forward in this resoluteness (*Festigkeit*) until it either accomplishes its purpose or perishes in the attempt. Such independence of character can only make its appearance where the non-religious (*Aussergöttliche*), the specially human, has attained to its completest acceptance. Of this class especially are the characters of Shakespeare, the intense persistence and concentration of which constitute the pre-eminently admirable quality. There it is in nowise a

question of piety (*Religiosität*), and of an activity proceeding from the religious reconciliation of man in himself, and from the moral as such. On the contrary, we have before us individuals who are independent only through self-assertion, who possess particular aims which belong exclusively to themselves, which proceed alone from their own individuality, and which they now, for their own personal satisfaction, pursue to the end with the unswerving consistency of passion, and without accompanying reflection and universality. In particular, the tragedies such as "Macbeth," "Othello," "Richard the Third," and others, have each as its central object *one* such character, who is surrounded by less remarkable and less energetic characters. Thus, for example, Macbeth is distinguished by his characteristic of ungoverned greed of power. At first he hesitates, but presently he stretches forth his hand towards the crown, commits murder to obtain it, and, in order to preserve it, storms onward through every atrocity. This desperate hardihood, the identity of the man with himself and with the aim which proceeds solely from himself, gives him an essential interest. Neither respect for the sacredness of majesty, nor the insanity of his wife, nor the revolt of his vassals, nor the threatening ruin—nothing can cause him to falter. Before nothing, before neither divine nor human right, will he yield his purpose, but perseveres to the end. Lady Macbeth is a similar character, and only the insipid prating of a modern criticism has been able to consider her as possessed of kindliness of spirit. With her first entrance upon the scene (Act I, scene 5), as she reads the letter of Macbeth, which tells of the meeting with the witches and of their prophecy, "Hail, Thane of Cawdor; hail, king that shall be!" she cries out: "Glamis thou art, and Cawdor; and shalt be what thou art promised;—but I do fear thy nature; it is too full o' the milk of human kindness, to catch the nearest way." She exhibits no kindly tenderness, no gladness at the good fortune of her husband, no moral emotion, no sympathy (*Theilnahme*), none of the regret of a noble soul. She fears but one thing: that the character of her husband may become an obstacle in the way of her ambition. As for him, she con-

siders him solely as a means ; and in this respect there is no hesitation, no uncertainty, no deliberation, no faltering. She experiences no regret, as Macbeth himself does at first ; she only exhibits pure abstraction and relentlessness (*Härte*) of character, and pursues to the end, without further thought, whatever serves her purpose, even to her final undoing. This catastrophe, which, with Macbeth, comes storm-like upon him from without, after he has consummated his crimes, is, in the feminine concentration (*Innern*) of Lady Macbeth, insanity. The same may be said of Richard the Third, of Othello, of the old Margaret, and of so many other like characters. This is quite the contrary of the wretchedness of modern characters — of those of Kotzebue, for example, — which appear in the highest degree noble, great, excellent, and yet are at the same time inwardly mere rags (*nur Lumpen*). In other respects the later writers who have majestically spurned Kotzebue, have done no better ; as, for example, Heinrich von Kleist, in his *Käthchen und Prinzen von Homburg* ; characters in whom, in opposition to the rational conditions (*wachen Zustände*) of established sequence, we see represented magnetic states, somnambulism, as the highest and most excellent. The Prince of Homburg is a wholly miserable (*der erbärmlichste*) general ; he is distracted in assigning positions, writes his orders in a bungling manner, at night urges forward puerile affairs with morbid haste, and in the day-time in battle commits gross blunders. With such utter want of unity, and such deeply penetrating dissonance of character, these writers have imagined themselves to be following in the footsteps of Shakespeare. But they are far from so doing ; for Shakespeare's characters are in themselves consistent (*konsequent*) ; they remain true to themselves and to their passion, and whatever they are, whatever opposes them, they perform their deeds with vigor and promptitude, and always in accordance with their own unalterable characteristic.

b. Now, the more peculiar the character is which holds fast only upon itself, and thus so much the more easily joins itself to the evil, by so much the more has it, in concrete actuality, not only to sustain itself against hindrances which

present themselves in its way and check the realization [of its designs], but so much the more, also, will it, through this very realization, be driven onward to its own ruin. For, even while it is attaining its end, there falls upon it the destiny that proceeds from the particular character itself, which thus incurs the ruin it has prepared for itself. The maturing of this destiny is, however, not merely a development from the *deeds* of the individual, but it is at the same time an inner unfolding (*Werden*), a development of the *character* itself, in its stormy violence, in its wild raging, until it becomes shattered, or sinks exhausted. With the Greeks (with whom pathos, the substantial content of deeds, rather than the subjective character, is the thing of importance), destiny does not so closely concern this peculiar character, which, it is true, does not in its deeds attain essentially to any further development, but is at the end what it was at the beginning. But at the present stage, the development of the action is, none the less, a further unfolding of the individual in his subjective internality. It is not merely an external progress. The deeds of Macbeth, for example, appear at the same time as a maddening (*Verwilderung*) of the soul, with this consequence: that, so soon as indecision ceases, the die is cast, and from this moment he no longer permits himself to pause at any obstacle. His wife is decided from the first moment. In her the development shows itself only as an inner anxiety which rises to physical and spiritual ruin, even to insanity, in which she perishes. It is so, also, with the greater number of the characters, the principal and as well as the subordinate. Antique characters, indeed, also show the same firmness, and even with them it happens that there are contradictions wherein no help is any longer possible, and where, for the deliverance [of the character], a *Deus ex machina* must enter. Nevertheless, this firmness, as for example that of Philoctetes, is rich in significance (*inhaltsvoll*), and on the whole filled with a sentiment which is grounded in morality.

c. In the personages of the present circle, with the accidentality which characterizes their aims, and with the independence of their individuality, no *objective reconciliation* is

possible. Their inter-relation, what they are, and what befalls them, remains partly indefinite, but is also for itself explained in part as no whence and no whither. [It is capricious, rather than rational.] Fate, as the most abstract necessity, here makes its appearance once more, and the sole reconciliation for the individual is his infinite potential being, his own inflexibility, in which he stands above his passion, and above the destiny involved therein. "It is so," and whatever happens to him, whether it comes from an overriding fatality, from necessity, or from accident, it nevertheless *is*, without reflection as to why or wherefore. It happens, and the man, by his resolution, becomes firm as a rock in presence of this imperious power.

2. In the second place, again, and in a wholly opposite fashion, the formal or abstract phase of character may have its foundation in *internality* as such. Here the individual, not being able to attain to the real enlargement and completion [of his own powers], remains at this stage of internality [or concentration upon self].

a. These are the substantial souls which contain a totality within themselves, but, in simple concentration (*Gedrungenheit*), complete each deep movement only in themselves, without being developed or rendered outwardly explicit. Formalism, as we have already considered it, relates to the definiteness of the content, to the existence of the individual completely focused in a single aim. This aim is permitted to appear in perfect clearness, while the individual develops himself, presses toward his aim, and in this effort, according as circumstances permit, either perishes or attains to success. The present and *second* phase of formalism, on the contrary, consists in non-development, in formlessness, in the lack of manifestation and unfolding. Such a soul is like a costly precious stone which emits light only at a single point; it sends forth one ray alone, but this is like a flash of lightning.

b. Such a concentration is of interest and value; for it is in this that we find a more spiritual (*innerer*) realm of the soul which permits its infinite depth and fullness to be known, but only in rare and, so to speak, mute manifestations directly

through this silence (*Stille*). Such simple, naïve, silent natures can exert the strongest attraction. But their silence must be the unmoved stillness upon the surface of the unfathomable sea, not the silence of shallowness, emptiness, and dullness. For we sometimes meet men who are altogether ordinary, and yet who, through a careful reserve, giving out only here and there something to be but half understood, create the impression of immense wisdom and spiritual depth, so that one is led to think it a miracle that all this should be hidden away in this heart and soul; and yet we discover at length that there is nothing in them. On the other hand, the infinite content and depth of those quiet souls become manifest (and this demands great address and skill on the part of the artist) through isolated, scattered, naïve, and unintentional but deeply significant utterances, which escape without reference to the ability of others to comprehend them. From which it is evident that such souls seize in a profound manner the substantial in whatever relations lie before them; that, nevertheless, their reflection does not extend through the entire chain of particular interests, motives, and finite aims — from which they are free (*rein*) and with which they are unfamiliar; and that, finally, they do not permit themselves to be distracted by the ordinary emotions, by eagerness, and affections of that type.

c. For a soul thus shut up within itself there must none the less come a time in which it will be aroused (*ergriffen*) at a definite point of its inner world and thenceforward throw its undivided force into a single sentiment determining its entire life. To this sentiment it will cleave with undiminished (*unzer-splitterter*) energy, and either attain to happiness, or perish while yet its purposes are unfulfilled. For, to realize his purposes, man requires a developed breadth of moral substance, which alone gives an objective permanence (*Festigkeit*). To this class of characters belong the most charming personages of Romantic Art, such as Shakespeare has created them in most admirable perfection. Such, for example, is Juliet to be esteemed, in “Romeo and Juliet.” * * * She may be considered at the commencement of the drama as a childlike,

simple maiden of fourteen or fifteen years. She appears to have no consciousness of herself or of the world, no emotion, no agitation, no desire; but, in her native simplicity, has beheld the surrounding world as in a magic lantern, without learning anything therefrom or arriving at any reflective idea. Suddenly we see the development of the entire strength of this soul, — cunning, prudence, force, sacrifice of all things, submission to the most dreadful [experiences], — so that now the whole appears to us as the bursting forth at once of the perfect rose in all its leaves and folds; as an infinite outpouring of the innermost pure sources of the soul in which hitherto nothing had become distinguished, defined or developed, but which now, as an immediate product of the awakened *single* interest, steps forth unconscious of itself, in its beautiful fullness and power, out of the previously closed spirit. It is a brand which a single spark has inflamed; a bud which, scarcely touched by love, unexpectedly stands out in perfect bloom. And yet, however swiftly it has unfolded, it is stripped of its leaves and sinks away more swiftly still. Even more distinctly is Miranda, in “*The Tempest*,” of this class. Reared in solitude, Shakespeare presents her to us in her first acquaintance with man. He pictures her in two simple scenes, but he gives us therein an absolutely complete representation of her. So, too, Schiller’s *Thekla*, though she is a product of a more reflective poetry, may be named as an example of the same class. Though in the midst of so great and rich a life, she does not become affected by it, but remains without vanity, without reflection, in the naïveté of one single interest which alone animates her. In general, those are especially fine, noble, feminine natures for whom the world, as well as their own inner being, unfolds for the first time in love; so that they seem to be born only then into spiritual life.

It is to the category of such internality, which is unable to bring itself into complete development, that popular songs mainly belong. And this is especially true of the German, which, in its rich concentration, however much it may show itself to be affected by one specific interest, is still able to bring about only isolated manifestations, and by this means to reveal

the depth of the soul. It is this mode of representation which, in its muteness, likewise returns to the symbolical, since what it gives is not the open, clear presentation of the whole inner being, but only a *sign* and intimation thereof. Still we have not here a symbol whose significance, as in the earlier stage, remains a mere abstract generality, but a manifestation whose central significance is precisely this subjective, living, actual soul itself. In the later days of a thoroughly reflective consciousness, which is far removed from the naïveté to which we have referred and which is concentrated upon itself, such representations are of the utmost difficulty, and give proof of an original poetic genius. Goethe, as we have already seen (and especially in his songs), is a master of this art of symbolic portrayal; that is, of laying open to view the whole truth and infinitude of the soul in a few simple, apparently external, and insignificant characteristics. Of this class is, for example, the King of Thule, one of the most beautiful things Goethe has written. The king gives no sign of his love, save through the cup which he has long preserved as a memento from his loved-one. The carousing old man is about to die. Around him, in the great hall of the palace, are ranged the knights; he makes for his heirs the division of his kingdom and of his treasures; but the cup he casts into the sea. None other shall possess that.

“Er sah ihn stürzen, trinken,
Und sinken tief in's Meer,
Die Augen thäten ihm sinken,
Trank nie einen Tropfen mehr.”

Nevertheless such deep, silent souls in which is contained the energy of the spirit, like a spark shut up in the flint, do not assume definite outward form; their existence and their reflection thereon do not attain to perfection. Thus they fail to become free through this culture. They remain exposed to this violent contradiction: that when the dissonance of misfortune resounds in their life they possess no aptitude, no bridge to reconcile their own hearts with the actual world, and thus to shield themselves against external circumstances, to support themselves in presence of the same, and to preserve themselves

within themselves. Drawn into collisions, they know not how to escape; they plunge heedlessly into action, or passively permit events to take their own course. Thus, for example, Hamlet is a fine, noble soul. He is by no means weak, yet lacks energetic, vital feeling (*Lebensgefühl*). Hence, in the torpor of melancholy he gropes, heavy-hearted, in a maze. He has his own keen scent. There is no outward sign, no ground for suspicion, but he has a feeling of insecurity; all is not as it should be; he divines the monstrous deed that has been perpetrated. The shade of his father gives him the clue. From that moment he is inwardly ready for revenge. He thinks constantly of the duty which his own heart has prescribed for him; but he does not permit himself, like Macbeth, to rush at once to action; he does not kill, does not rage, does not strike at once, like Laertes, but preserves in inactivity a fair inner soul which does not make itself actual, and cannot identify itself with the present state of things. He waits, seeks in the fine integrity of his own soul for objective certainty; and yet, even after he has attained to this certainty, he comes to no firm resolution, but permits himself to be guided by outward circumstances. In this unreality he now errs, even in respect of what actually lies before him. Instead of the king he kills the aged Polonius. He proceeds with precipitation where he had desired to be discreet; and, on the contrary, where he has need of active energy, he remains absorbed within himself so far that, without his participation in this broad course of circumstances and accidents, the destiny of the whole has become unfolded along with that of his own inner being, which is ever anew withdrawn into itself.

In modern times, however, this moral disposition makes its appearance among men of the humbler classes, who are destitute both of the culture leading to general aims and of the manifoldness of objective interests. For this reason, when the *one* aim escapes them they are unable to find in any other a support for their inner life and a basis (*Stützpunkt*) for their activity. This lack of culture explains why these taciturn characters (*Gemüther*), in proportion as they are undeveloped, hold fast only so much the more inflexibly and obstinately

to what they have once undertaken, though that be ever so narrow and one-sided. Such monotony of men essentially without words, and shut up within themselves, lies especially in German characters, who for this reason are likely to appear headstrong, bristling, knotty, unapproachable, and in their deeds and manifestations completely uncertain and contradictory. As a master in delineating and representing such reserved (*stummen*) characters of the lower classes, I will here name only Hippel, the author of the *Course of Life in the Ascending Scale*, one of the few really original German works of the humorous type. He holds himself completely aloof from Jean Paul's sentimentality, and from the bad taste of his situations; yet possesses, on the contrary, a wonderful individuality, freshness, and vitality. He understands especially how to delineate in the most striking manner those intense characters who know not how to make room for themselves, and who when they come to act, do so in a violent and fearful fashion. They solve the infinite contradiction of their inner being, and of the unhappy circumstances in the midst of which they are themselves developing, but it is done in a dreadful manner, and thus they complete what would otherwise be accomplished by an external destiny; as, for example, in "Romeo and Juliet," external accidents bring to nought the prudence and ingenuity of the monk and occasion the death of the lovers.

3. Thus, then, these abstract characters show, in general, on the one part, only the immeasurable force of will belonging to particular subjectivity, which assumes importance just as it is, and storms forth in its resoluteness; or contrariwise, it shows us an independently total, unrestricted soul which rests upon some definite phase of its own inner being, and concentrates the breadth and depth of its entire individuality upon this single point; and yet, since it (the particular subjectivity) is still undeveloped outwardly, it falls into collisions, in the midst of which it is unable to collect itself or to act wisely in its efforts to extricate itself. A *third* point which we have now to mention consists in this: that if those characters which are altogether one-sided and limited in their aims,

though still developed in their own consciousness, are to interest us not merely in a *formal* but also in a *substantial* manner, we must form our conception of them in such wise that this narrowness of their individuality shall seem only as a fatality ; that is, only as a development of their special peculiarity along with profounder spiritual qualities. This depth and this wealth of the spirit, Shakespeare makes visible to us in his characters. He exhibits them as men of a free imaginative force and of a genial spirit, while their reflection stands above, and renders them superior to what they are in respect of their surroundings and their particular aims, so that they appear driven to the performance of what they bring about only through the misfortune of circumstances, or through the collisions growing out of their position. Still this is not to be understood as if, with Macbeth, for example, what he dared do were to be imputed to the wickedness of the witches. The witches are, far rather, only the poetic image or reflex of his own settled will. What the Shakespearean characters bring about — their particular aim — has its origin and the root of its power in their own individuality. But in one and the same individuality they preserve at the same time that elevation which causes us to forget what they are actually — that is, what they are in their aims, interests, and deeds — and which aggrandizes and ennobles them in their essential natures. So, too, the coarser characters of Shakespeare — Stephano, Trinculo, Pistol, and the absolute hero among all these, Falstaff— remain sunk in their vulgarity, but at the same time they give evidence that they are intelligences whose genius comprehends all in itself, and possesses a wholly free existence. In short, what great men are, these might also be. On the other hand, in French tragedies the greatest and best are, when seen in full light, often enough found to be but strutting, base creatures (*Bestien*) in whom there is only spirit enough to justify themselves by sophisms. In Shakespeare we find no justification, no condemnation, but only the contemplation of a universal destiny whose stand-point of necessity is assumed by the characters without complaint or regret, even though these behold all things, themselves included, sinking in the abyss.

In all these respects the realm of such individual characters presents an infinitely rich field, but one wherein, also, there is great danger of falling into emptiness and platitude; so that there have been very few masters who have possessed sufficient poetic genius and genuine insight to enable them to seize the true [and properly represent it in such themes].

II. *Of the Spirit of Adventure.*

1. Accidental Character of Enterprises and Collisions. — 2. Comic Representation of Adventurous Characters. — 3. The Modern Romance.

Since now we have considered the phase of the inner or subjective, so far as this can appear in the representations of the present stage, we must, in the second place, turn our attention also to the external, to the particularity of circumstances and situations which arouse the character, to the collisions in which the character is developed, as well as to the total form which the internal assumes in the midst of concrete actuality.

As we have already more than once observed, it is a fundamental characteristic of Romantic Art that spirituality, the soul as reflected into itself, constitutes a totality; and that, therefore, it relates to the external, not as to something belonging to and pervaded by itself, but as to the merely external which is separated from the inner, or spiritual. [Thus considered, the external is] something which is distinct from and abandoned by spirit, and which thus isolatedly persists (*für sich fortreibt*), develops, and whirls about as a finite, forthcoming, perpetually changing, confused accidentality. To the soul, firmly enclosed within itself, it is thus quite indifferent what are the circumstances it finds itself in presence of; as, again, it is quite accidental what the circumstances may be which present themselves to the soul. For, in its activity, it is of far less importance to the soul that it should bring to completion an independent and thoroughly permanent [external] work than that it should develop itself into universal validity and perform [moral] deeds.

1. In this way there comes to light what may in other respects be called the undeifying of nature. Spirit has with-

drawn itself from the externality of phenomena into itself. Since, therefore, the inner being of subjectivity or spirituality no longer beholds itself in the external, the latter, on its side, also takes shape independently and aside from and without reference to the former. In accordance with its truth, indeed, spirit is in itself mediated and reconciled with the absolute; but in so far as we here stand upon the ground of independent individuality, which proceeds from itself as it immediately finds itself and thus holds fast to itself, in like degree does this undeifying [of nature] concern also the actively employed character, who therefore makes his entrance with his own accidental aims into an accidental world, with which, however, he does not unite himself at once to [the extent of forming with it] an essentially congruent totality. This relativity of aims in the midst of relative conditions — whose determinateness and development do not lie in the individual (*Subject*), but are determined externally and accidentally, and thus bring about accidental collisions as strange, confusedly-intertwined (*durch-einandergeschlungene*) ramifications — constitutes the adventurous, which, for the form of events and deeds, provides the fundamental type of the Romantic.

To action and event, in the more precise sense of the ideal, there belongs an end which is in itself truer and essentially more necessary; in whose content, besides, the determining cause, with reference both to the outer form and to the order and mode of execution, lies in actuality. In the deeds and circumstances of Romantic Art this is not the case. For when here, also, essentially universal and substantial ends are to be represented in their realization, these ends still do not possess within themselves definiteness of action, the ordering and arrangement of their inner course, but must let go this side of the realization, and leave it, therefore, to accidentality.

a. The Romantic world has only an *absolute* work to bring to completion. It has for its task the dissemination of Christianity, the showing forth of the spirit of the Church. In the midst of a hostile world (partly that of incredulous antiquity, partly that of the barbarism and rudeness of the consciousness) this work, until it departed from mere doctrine and entered

upon deeds, was in the main a passive work of the endurance of pain and martyrdom, the sacrifice of individual temporal existence for the eternal welfare of the soul. The further fact (*That*) which relates to the like content is, in the Middle Ages, the work of Christian knighthood, the expelling of the heathen (*der Mauren*), the Arabs, the Mahometans generally, from Christian lands; and, above all, the conquest of the Holy Sepulchre. This was, however, not an end which concerned man as man, but which had to be completed only through the collective totality of particular individuals, so that these now also poured forth voluntarily (*beliebig*) in accordance with their own individuality. In respect of this phase, we may pronounce the Crusades to be the grand collective-adventure of the Christian Middle Ages, an adventure which was, in itself, disjointed (*gebrochen*) and fantastic. It was of a spiritual type, yet without true spiritual aim; and, with reference to its deeds and character, it was false. For, with respect to the religious element, the Crusades have an external scope which is in the last degree empty. Christianity must now find its permanent well-being only in the spirit, in Christ, who is arisen and is at the right hand of God, and whose living actuality finds its dwelling-place in the spirit; not in his tomb, and in the sensuous, immediate present places of his one-sided, temporal abode. The impetuosity and religious aspiration of the Middle Ages, however, sought only for the place, the external locality of the history of the passion and of the Holy Sepulchre. In no less contradictory fashion was the purely secular phase of conquest and gain immediately bound up with the religious aim; for the secular bears in its externality a wholly other character than that of the religious. Thus the people sought to attain to the spiritual and internal, and yet aimed at the mere external locality, from which the spirit had departed. Again, they strove after temporal advantage, and joined this temporality on to the religious as such. This twofoldness constitutes here the disjointed, phantastic quality in which the external perverts the internal, and the internal the external, instead of bringing both into harmony. Thus, in their realization, these two terms appear as two irreconcilable

opposites which have been joined together. Piety becomes transformed into rudeness and barbarous ferocity, and this rudeness, which permits every species of selfishness and human passion to break forth, casts itself again, on the contrary, into the perpetual, deep emotion and contrition of the spirit upon which it specially depends. With these opposing elements, then, there is wanting any single and same purpose in the deeds and events, so that there is no unity or sequence of direction. The totality dissolves, breaks up into adventures, conquests, defeats, promiscuous accidentalities; and the sequel does not correspond to the means and vast preparations. Nay, even the very end itself becomes cancelled through its own attainment. For the Crusades would again verify the words: Thou wilt not permit Him to remain in the grave; neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption. But this longing to seek Christ, the living, to find the satisfaction of the spirit, in such a place—in the place of the dead—is itself, however much vitality (*Wesen*) Chateaubriand may ascribe to it, only a corruption (*Verwesung*) of the spirit, above which Christianity must rise in order to return to the fresh, full life of concrete actuality.

A similar aim, mystic on the one side, fantastic on the other, and in its pursuit adventurous, is the Quest of the Holy Grail.

b. A higher work is that which each man has to complete within himself, namely, his own life, through which he determines his own eternal destiny. This object has, for example, been conceived by Dante in his *Divina Commedia*, according to the Catholic conception, since therein he conducts us through hell, purgatory, and heaven. Even here, in spite of the rigorous arrangement of the whole, there are not wanting either fantastic conceptions or adventurous phases, in so far as this work of reward and punishment (*Beseligung und Verdammniss*) appears in the representation, not merely in and for itself in its universality, but as completed in a countless number of individuals in their particularity. And, aside from these, the *poet* arrogates to himself the right of the Church, takes in his own hand the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, pro-

nounces blessing and condemnation, and constitutes himself the judge of the world, and assigns the most renowned individuals of the ancient and the Christian world — poets, citizens, warriors, cardinals, popes — to hell, to purgatory, or to paradise.

c. The other materials which lead to actions and events exist, then, upon a secular basis. They are the infinite, manifold adventures of the imagination, the external and internal accidentality of love, honor, and fidelity. Here, to enter into conflict for the sake of one's own honor; there, to fly to the aid of persecuted innocence; to accomplish the most marvelous exploits in honor of one's mistress; or, through the might of one's own hand, and the ability of one's own arms, to relieve oppressed right, even though the "innocence" (*Unschuld*) should appear under the form of a chain-gang of criminals [such are the aims in the present sphere]. In the greater part of this material there is at hand no crisis (*Lage*), no [critical] situation, no conflict through which the action becomes *necessary*; but the individual sets forth and deliberately *seeks* adventures. Thus, for example, the deeds of love have here (for the most part, and in accordance with their special content) no other purpose (*Bestimmung*) than this: to give proof of the firmness, of the fidelity, of the permanence of love. The surrounding actuality, with the entire complex of its relations, is of value only as a material through which love is to be made manifest. Thus the definite fact of this manifestation, since it depends only upon the verification itself, is not determined through itself, but is subject to caprice, to the whim of the woman, to the arbitrariness of outer accidentality. Quite the same thing occurs in case of the aims of *honor* and *valor*. They belong for the greater part to the individual (*Subjekt*), far removed as it still is from all further substantial content, and which introduces itself into every content that by chance lies at hand, and finds itself wounded therein, or can find therein an opportunity to prove its courage and its adroitness. As no standard is here given by which it might be determined what shall be content and what not, so also there is complete lack of rule as to what may be consid-

ered an actual wounding of honor, and what is the true object of valor. With the maintenance of *right*, which is likewise an aim of knighthood, there is no essential difference. Right and law, indeed, do not here prove to be an essential, independent, and (in accordance with law and its necessary content) always self-completing object and aim. Rather they prove themselves to belong only to subjective caprice; so that not only the interference, but also the judgment of the same — what in this or that case may be right or wrong — is still left to the accidental opinion of subjectivity or individuality.

2. What we have before us in general, therefore, especially in the sphere of the secular — in chivalry and in the formalism of character [pertaining thereto] — is, in greater or less degree, the accidentality both of the objects within which the action takes place and of the soul which wills [the performance of the action]. For those one-sided individual figures may accept for their content the wholly accidental, which can be sustained (*getragen*) only through the energy of their characters, and which will be carried out or prove abortive in consequence of collisions which are conditioned from without. Thus it happens that in chivalry the higher or truly moral is placed upon the same level with honor, love, and fidelity. On the one hand, through the particularity (*Einzelheit*) of circumstances, upon which it [the moral] reacts, it comes to be directly an accidentality, since, instead of a universal work, only particular aims are to be realized; and [in such case] essential and necessary relations are wanting. On the other hand, in respect of the subjective spirit of the individual, there is found caprice or deception, with relation to [fantastic] projects as opposed to [rational] plans and undertakings. This entire phase of adventurousness, therefore, consistently carried out, proves in its deeds and enterprises, as well as in the consequences of the same, to be a self-destructive, and, therefore, comic world of accidents and fatalities.

The decay of chivalry is portrayed with especial effect in Ariosto and Cervantes, while the peculiarity of individual

characters belonging thereto is most adequately represented in Shakespeare.

a. What is especially amusing in Ariosto is the boundless development of destinies and aims, the fabulous entanglement of fantastic relations and comic (*närrischer*) situations, with which the poet plays adventurously, even to frivolity. It is sheer folly and madness, which the hero must take quite seriously. Above all, love here sinks away from the divine love of Dante, and from the fantastic tenderness of Petrarch, to sensual, obscene stories and ridiculous collisions, while heroism and valor appear strained to such a point as no longer to excite a credulous astonishment, but only to occasion laughter at the fabulousness of the deeds. But along with the indifference in respect to the form and fashion in which the situations take shape, in which strange divisions and conflicts are occasioned, begun, broken off, again become involved, are cut short, and at length are ended in an unexpected manner; with all this, no less than with the humorous treatment of chivalry, Ariosto knows quite as well how to preserve and bring to light whatever there is that is noble and great in chivalry — courage, love, honor, and valor — how to portray in a striking manner the other passions, such as craftiness, cunning, presence of mind, etc.

b. If Ariosto inclines rather to the *fabulous* side of adventurousness, Cervantes, on the contrary, adopts the style of *Romance*. In his Don Quixote, it is a noble nature with whom chivalry has become a madness, while we find the adventurousness of the character placed in the midst of the settled, definite conditions of an actuality portrayed precisely in accordance with its external relations. This presents the comic contradiction between a rational, self-regulated world and an isolated soul which desires to create this order and fixity (*Festigkeit*), in the first place, through itself and through chivalry, notwithstanding the fact that, through chivalry, regularity and order could only be overthrown. In spite of this comic aberration, however, there is all that in Don Quixote which we have previously commended in Shakespeare. Cer-

vantes has also created his hero with an originally noble nature, possessing many-sided spiritual gifts which at the same time always truly interest us. Don Quixote is a soul who, in his madness, has become perfectly assured of himself and his affairs, or rather the madness consists precisely in this: that he is and remains so assured of himself and his affairs. Without this unreflecting tranquility with respect to the content and consequence of his deeds, he would not be genuinely romantic; while at the same time this imperturbable assurance in relation to the substantial nature of his conceptions is throughout great and genial, and adorned with the most beautiful characteristics. Nevertheless, the whole work is, on the one side, a perpetual scoffing at Romantic chivalry. It is throughout a genuine irony, while with Ariosto the like adventurousness remains only a frivolous amusement. On the other side, however, the occurrences belonging especially to Don Quixote are only the thread on which are ranged, in the most delightful manner, a whole series of genuinely romantic novels, in order to show that to be preserved in its true worth which the other portion of the romance dissolves by ridicule.

c. Just as we here see chivalry, even in its more serious interests, reduced to ridicule, so Shakespeare either places comic figures and scenes in opposition to his firm individual characters and tragical situations and conflicts, or he elevates those characters, through a profound humor, above themselves and their vulgar (*schroffen*), narrow, and false aims. For example, Falstaff, the fool in King Lear, the scene of the musicians in Romeo and Juliet, are of the first, while Richard III. is of the second class.

3. To this dissolution of the Romantic, as far as concerns its form up to this point, there is joined in the third place, finally, the *romantic* in the modern sense of the word, and which is chronologically preceded by the romances of chivalry and those of a pastoral type. The romantic in this sense is again something to be taken seriously. It is chivalry become an actual content. The accidentality of external existence has become transformed into a substantial, secure order of civil society and the State, so that now magistrates, courts of jus-

tice, armies, the general government, make their appearance in the place of the chimerical aims which the knight formed for himself. Thus the chivalry of the heroes of modern romances becomes transformed. These, as individuals, with their subjective aims of love, honor, ambition, or with their ideals for the improvement of the world, assume a hostile attitude toward this existing order and prose of actuality which upon all sides lies as difficulties in their way, whence the subjective wishes and demands intensify themselves, in this contradiction, to an immeasurable degree. For each finds before him a world under enchantment and to be condemned,—a world which he must do battle against, since it closes itself against him, and in its stern inflexibility refuses to yield to his passions, but interposes as a hindrance the will of a father, of an aunt, of a civil relation, etc., etc. These modern knights are generally youths who, since the course of the world does not realize their ideal, must break through the same. They hold it to be a misfortune that there should be such relations as those of the family, of civil society, of the State, of law, of a calling, etc., because these substantial relations of life with their limitations grimly oppose the ideals and the infinite rights of the heart. It behooves, then, to make a breach in this order of things, to transform and improve the world; or at least, in spite of the world, to carve out of it a heaven on earth, to seek and find a maiden who is what she should be, and to gain her, by persuasion, or by conquest and defiance, from morose relatives, or other unfavorable connections. But these conflicts are, in the modern world, nothing further than the disciplinary period (*Lehrjahre*), the education of the individual for the succeeding actuality, and thus preserve their true significance. For the end of such apprenticeship consists in this: that the individual attains to wisdom through his experience (*die Hörner abläuft*), conforms in his wishes and beliefs to the existing relations and their rationality, takes his place in the established order of the world, and in it acquires a favorable standpoint. However much he may have fallen out with the world, however much he may have been jostled about, at last, in most cases, he obtains his maiden, and per-

haps a position, marries and becomes a Philistine¹ just like others. The wife superintends the household; children are not wanting; the adored woman, who was at first the "only" one, and an "angel," proves, perchance, to be precisely like all others; responsibility brings work and vexation, marriage its domestic difficulties, and so there is the whole story of commonplace and tedious triviality. We perceive here the same character of adventurousness, only that this now finds its true significance, and the fantastic must thus undergo its necessary correction.

JACOB BOEHME.

[TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, BY EDWIN D. MEAD.]

(II.)

While Boehme calls all forces the Father, he distinguishes these, again, as the *seven first fountain-spirits*. But here there is confusion; no determination of thought, no fixed distinction, by reason of which the number is precisely seven; such accuracy we do not find in him. "These seven qualities are also the seven *planets*, which work in the great *salitter* of God; the seven planets signify the seven spirits of God, or the princes of the angels." But they are in the Father as one unity; and this unity is a source, and stirring in itself. "In God triumph all spirits as one spirit, and one spirit always helps and loves the others, and there is nothing but simple joy and delight. One spirit stands not beside the other, as the stars in the heaven, but all seven are in one another, as one spirit. Each spirit of the seven spirits of God is with all the seven spirits of God pregnant." Each is thus in God himself a totality. "One produces the others in and through itself." This is the illumination of the life of all qualities.

2. As the First is the source and germ of all forces and qualities, so the Second is their sprouting (arising, or manifesta-

¹ *I. e.* an unromantic prosy individual.

tion). This second principle is a cardinal idea which appears in Boehme, under very many forms and methods — as, the Word, the Separator, the Revelation, the selfhood generally, the source of all separation, of the will, and of the being-in-self which exist in the powers of natural things ; so that, however, at the same time, the light therein arises which leads them back to rest.

a. God, as the simple, absolute Being, is not God absolutely ; in Him nothing is perceivable. What we perceive is something else ; but this something else is contained in God himself, as God's contemplation and conception. Concerning the Second, Boehme, therefore, says : A separation must have occurred in this "temperament." "No thing can become apparent without *opposition*; for if it has nothing which opposes it, it forever goes forth out of, but enters not again into itself. But if it enters not again into itself, as into that out of which it originally proceeded, then it knows nothing of its *Urstand*." He uses the latter expression (*Urstand*) for *substance*; and it is a pity that we cannot use this and so many other strikingly suitable expressions. "Without opposition life has no *sensibility* — willing, working, understanding, or knowledge. If the hidden God, who is a simple Being and Will, had not manifested Himself with His will out of Himself, out of the eternal knowledge, in *Temperamento*, in separateness of the will, and this separateness in an identity — in a natural and creaturesome life ; and if this separateness in life were not engaged in a struggle, how could the will of God, which is but one, become manifest to it? How can there be, in a single will, a knowledge of itself?" We see that Boehme has risen infinitely above the empty abstraction of the "highest Being," etc.

Boehme continues : "The beginning of all beings is the *Word*, as the out-breathing of God ; and God has been from eternity the eternal One, and so eternally remains. The *Word* is the eternal beginning, and as such it eternally remains ; for it is the revelation of the eternal One with which and through which the divine power is brought to a knowledge of somewhat. By the Word we understand the revealed will of God ;

by the word "God," the hidden God out of whom the Word eternally flows. The Word is the outflow of the divine One, and yet God himself, as his revelation." *Λόγος* is more accurate than Word; and it is a fine ambiguity of the Greek expression that it signifies at the same time reason and language, for language is the pure existence of spirit; it is a thing that, perceived, is returned into itself. "That which flows out is *Wisdom*, of all powers, colors, virtues, and qualities the beginning and the cause."

This is the *Son*, of whom Boehme says: "The Son is," from the Father and "in the Father — the Father's heart or light; and the Father brings Him forth forever, from eternity to eternity. The Son is," therefore, indeed, "another person than the Father, yet not another," but the same "God as the Father," whose resplendence he is. "The Son is the heart," that which pulsates "in the Father. All powers which are in the Father are the Father's property. The Son is the heart, or kernel, in all the powers of the Father; yet He is the cause of the joy which rises in all the powers of the Father. From Him arises the eternal heavenly joy, and flows forth into all the Father's powers, even as the sun is the heart of the stars. The sun represents rightly the Son, the circle of the stars represent the Father's varied powers; the sun illuminates the heaven, the stars, and the space above the earth, and works in all things which are in this world. It gives to all the stars light and power, and tempers their power. As the sun is born of the stars, so from eternity is the Son of God ever born of all the powers of his Father, but not made, and is the heart and resplendence of all powers. He shines in all powers of the Father, and His power is the moving, forth-flowing joy in all powers of the Father; and He shines throughout the Father as the sun throughout the world. For if the Son shone not in the Father, then were the Father a dark valley; and the Father's power would not flow from eternity to eternity. The divine Being could not exist." This activity of the Son is a main point in Boehme's system; and, concerning this forth-flowing and manifesting, Boehme brings the most important determinations possible to bear.

b. "From such a revelation of the forces in which the will of the Eternal One views itself, flows the understanding and the knowledge of the Aught — the Ego — because the eternal Will contemplates itself in the Aught, or Ego." Aught is a pun on the word naught; for, although it is the negative, it is at the same time the contrary of the naught, since the aught — the somewhat — is the Ego of self-consciousness. The Son, the aught, somewhat, is thus an Ego, consciousness — self-consciousness; God is, therefore, not alone the abstract neutral, but also the self-gathering into the point of being-for-self. Thus the *other* of God is the *image* of God. "This image is the *mysterium magnum*, as the Creator of all beings and creatures; for it is the *Separator* [of all] in the outflow of the will, which makes the will of the Eternal One separable — the separableness in the will, out of which proceed all powers and qualities." This Separator is ordained the governor of nature, by whom the eternal Will rules, makes, forms, and shapes all things. The Separator is the active, the self-distinguishing; and Boehme names this aught or Ego, also Lucifer, the first-born son of God, the creaturesome, first-born angel, who was one of the seven spirits. But this Lucifer fell, and Christ came in his place. This is the connection of the devil with God, viz.: the *otherness*, and then the being-for-self, or being-for-one, so that the other is for one; and this is the origin of evil in God and from God. This is the profoundest attainment of Jacob Boehme's thinking. This fall of Lucifer he makes conceivable, thus: that the Ego — *i. e.*, the knowledge-of-self, the Egohood (a word which he uses), the self-imaging-in-self, the self-forming-in-self (the being-for-self) — is the fire that consumes all in itself. This is the negative in the Separator, the torture; or it is the *wrath* of God. This wrath of God is hell, with its devil, who images Himself through Himself to Himself. This is very bold and speculative. Boehme thus seeks to prove the source of the divine wrath to be in God himself. He also calls the will of the Ego, or aught, the selfhood; it is the transition of the aught into naught which the Ego images for itself to itself. He says: "Heaven and hell are as far from each other as day and night, as aught and naught."

Boehme here, indeed, has entered into the very depth of the divine Being; the evil, matter, or whatever it may be called, is the I=I, the being-for-self, the true negativity. Formerly the *nonens*, which is itself positive, was called darkness. The true negativity, however, is the Ego. It is not something bad because it is called the evil; in Spirit alone the evil is as it is in itself, since in spirit it is comprehended as it is. "Where the will of God wills in a thing, there God is revealed; in such revelation the angels also dwell. And wherever in a thing God wills not with the will of the thing, God is not there revealed to Himself; but he dwells [there] *only in himself*, without the co-working of that thing. In that case there is in the thing its own will, and there dwell within it the devil and all that is out of God."

The next form of this appearing, Boehme represents, figuratively, in his manner, thus: This "*Separator* produces qualities out of Himself. From this comes the infinite manifoldness, and through this the eternal One makes itself sensible [so that it is for others], not according to the unity, but according to the outflow of the unity." Even thus are being-in-self and manifoldness absolutely opposed through a conception which Boehme lacks, namely, being-for-self is at once being-for-another and the taking it back, as the other side. Boehme strays hither and thither in apparent contradictions, not rightly knowing how to help himself. "But the outflow carries itself, even to the greatest *sharpness*, into the fiery condition" — the dark fire without light, the darkness, the closedness, the selfhood — "in which fiery condition," however, while this fire lifts and points itself, "the eternal One becomes majestic and a *light*;" and this there-outbreaking light is the form into which the other principle proceeds. This is the return to the One. "Through this [through fire] the eternal power becomes eager and active, and [the fire] is the original condition of the sensitive life, because in the *Word* of the powers an eternal, sensitive life is its original condition. For if life had no sensibility, it would have neither willing nor working; but the *pain*, [the agitation, torture] makes it [all life] first working and willing. And the light of such kindling,

through the fire, makes it joyful; for it is an anointing with salve, the joy and loveliness of pain."

Boehme expounds this in many forms, in order to conceive the Ego, the Separator, as he "uplifts" Himself out of the Father. The qualities rise in the great *salitter*, move, lift, "censure" themselves. Boehme has in the Father the quality of *bitterness*; and he represents the appearing of the Ego as a becoming harsh or sharp, a drawing together, as a stroke of lightning that flashes forth. This light is Lucifer. The being-for-self, self-perceiving, Boehme calls drawing together into one point. That is harshness, sharpness, penetration, *fierceness*; to this pertains the wrath of God; and here, in this way, Boehme conceives the *other* of God in God Himself. "This source can be kindled through the great censuring and uplifting. Through the drawing together the created being is formed, which is imaged for the understanding as a heavenly *corpus*. If it, however, [the harshness,] be kindled through uplifting (which is only possible to the creatures that are created out of the *salitter*), then it is a burning artery of the wrath of God. Lightning is the mother of light, for the lightning gives birth to light from itself; and it is the father of fury, for fury abides in the lightning, as a seed in the father. And the same lightning also produces *tone or sound*;" — lightning is, in general, the absolute producer. Lightning is still accompanied by pain; the light is the self-explaining. The divine birth is the appearing of the lightning, the life of all qualities. All this fire-giving is from the "Aurora."

In the *Questionibus Theosophicis*, Boehme uses — and especially for the *Separator* — the form of *yea* and *nay* to signify this opposition. He says: "The reader must know that in *yea* and *nay* all things consist, be they divine, devilish, earthly, or whatever they may be called. The One, as the *yea*, is mere power and life, and is the truth of God, or God himself. This were in itself unknowable, and there were therein no joy or uplifting, nor sensibility [life] without the *nay*. The *nay* is a rebound of the *yea*, or the truth; [this negativity is the principle of all knowing, of understanding] in order that the truth may

be manifest, and become something wherein there may be a *contrarium*, and wherein the eternal love, working, feeling, willing, and the to-be-loved may be. Yet we cannot say that the yea is asunder from the nay, and that these are two things side by side; but they are only one thing, separating, however, into two beginnings, and making two *centra*; since each works and wills in itself. Without these two, which yet stand in unceasing strife, all things were a nothing, and would stand still, without movement. If the eternal Will flowed not out from itself, and directed itself not into pleasure, then were there no form nor distinction, but all powers were only one power. So, also, could there be no understanding; for understanding originates [has its substance] in the differences of the manifoldness, since one quality observes, proves, and wills the others. The outflowed Will wills the unlike, in-order that it may distinguish from the like and be its own somewhat; in order that there may be somewhat which the eternal Seeing may see and feel. And from the Will itself originates the nay; for it lives in its own essence, as its self-agreeableness. But it wants to be somewhat, and hence likes not the unity; for the unity is an out-flowing yea, which remains eternally a breathing out of itself, and is an insensibility; having nothing wherein it may feel itself, since only in the reabsorbtion of the sent-forth Will, as in the nay, which is a contrary of the yea, does the yea become manifest, and only therein it has somewhat which it can will. And the nay is called a nay because it is an inward-turned craving, including the naught in the aught. The outflowed, desiring Will is contracting, and grasps itself in itself; from this arise forms and qualities: (1) sharpness, (2) movement, (3) sensation. (4) The fourth property is the fire, as the lightning of the brightness, which originates in the joining of the great, troubled *sharpness* and the unity. There is, therefore, a shock in the joining, and in this shock the unity is seized as a glance or brightness, as a rising joy." This is the breaking of the unity. "Thus the light originates in the darkness; for the unity comes to a light, and the desire of the craving Will in the qualities comes to a spirit-fire, which has its source and origin in the harsh, cold sharpness. And, accordingly, God is

an angry and jealous God ;” and therein lies the evil. “ (a) The first quality of the contracting is the nay, (b) sharpness, (c) hardness, (d) sensibility, (e) fire-source, hell, concealment. (5) The fifth quality, love, makes in fire, as in pain, another *principium*, as a great love-fire.”

These are the chief outlines of the characterization of the Second. In this depth Boehme struggles about, because he lacks logical terms, and has only religious and chemical forms of expression ; and since he uses these in forced meanings, in order to explain his ideas, the result of the effort is, not only barbarism of expression, but also unintelligibility.

c. “ Out of this eternal working of the sensibility the visible world has risen ; the world is the outflowed word, which develops itself into qualities, since in qualities the particular will has originated. The *Separator* has brought it into a particular willing, after such a form.” The Cosmos is nothing other than the essence of God made creaturesome. “ When thou beholdest,” therefore, “ the depth ” of the heavens, “ the stars, the elements, the earth,” and their productions, “ then thou gatherest with thine eyes,” indeed, “ not the bright and clear Godhead, although it is ” also “ therein.” Thou beholdest only its creaturesome exhibition. “ But if thou liftest up thy thoughts and thinkest on God, who reigns in holiness in this all, then thou breakest through the heaven of all heavens, and seizest God at His holy heart. The powers of heaven work ever in images, plants, and colors to reveal the holy God, that He may be recognized in all things.”

3. The third, finally, in these forms of the Trinity, is the unity of the light or the *Separator*, and the power. This is the Spirit, which already is implied partially in the foregoing. “ All the stars express the power of the Father ; from them is the sun ” (they make themselves an opposition to the unity). “ Now, out of all the stars goes forth the power that is in every star ; now, also, goes forth the power of the sun, heat and brightness, into the depth,” back to the stars, into the power of the Father. “ In the depth is the power of all the stars, with the brightness and heat of the sun, one thing — a moving agitation like a spirit. Now, in the entire depth of the Father,

outside the Son, is nothing but the manifold and immeasurable power of the Father and the light of the Son; this is in the depth of the Father a living, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-hearing, all-seeing, all-smelling, all-tasting, all-feeling Spirit, in which are all power, and brightness, and wisdom, as in the Father and the Son." This is love, the softening of all powers through the light of the Son. We see that the sensuous thus belongs to it.

Boehme has substantially this representation: "God's essence [gone forth from the eternal depth as world] is thus not something remote, belonging to a certain place or region; for [the essence] the ground of nature and creation is God himself. Thou must not think, that there is in heaven a *corpus*, as it were," — the seven fountain-spirits produce this *corpus*, or heart — "which above everything else is called God. No, but the whole divine power which is itself heaven, and the heaven of all heavens, is also born, and is called God, the Father, from whom all the angels of God, also the human souls, are eternally born. Thou canst name no place, neither in heaven nor in this world, where the divine birth is not. The birth of the Holy Trinity takes place also in thy heart; all the three persons are born in thy heart, God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. In the divine power everywhere is the fountain of divine birth; there already are all the seven fountain-spirits of God, as if thou enclosedst a spacious, creaturesome circle, and hadst the Godhead therein." In each spirit all are contained.

This Trinity is to Boehme the entire, universal life in every individual; it is the absolute substance. He says: "Everything in this world has become after the likeness of this Trinity. Ye blind Jews, Turks, and heathen, open the eyes of your mind; I must show you in your love, and in all natural things — in men, animals, birds, and worms, as well as in wood, stones, herbs, foliage, and grass — the likeness of the holy Trinity in God. You say there is a single nature in God — God has no Son. Open now thine eyes and observe thyself! A man is made after the likeness, and from the power of God in His Trinity. Observe thine inner man; then wilt thou see

this clearly and purely, if thou art not a fool and an unreasoning animal. Thus observe: in thy heart, arteries, and brain thou hast thy spirit: all the power which moves in thy heart, arteries, and brain, wherein stands thy life, denotes God the Father. Out of the power thy light uplifts [produces] itself, that thou in this power canst see, understand, and know what thou shouldst do; for the same light shines in thy whole body, and the whole body moves in power and perception. This is the Son, who is born in thee." This light, this seeing, understanding, is the Second determination; it is the relation to itself. "Out of thy light there go into this power reason, understanding, art, and wisdom, to rule the whole body, and also to distinguish all that is out of the body. And these two are, in the constitution of thy mind, one thing — *thy spirit*; and this denotes God the Holy Ghost. And the Holy Spirit from God rules also in this spirit in thee, if thou art a child of the light, and not of darkness. Now observe: in wood, stones, and herbs are three things, and nothing can be born or grow if, in a thing, one of the three should be wanting. First we have the power out of which a body originates, be it of wood, or stone, or a plant. Next there is in this [thing] a sap, which is the heart of the thing; and, thirdly, there is in the thing an uprising force, smell, or taste, which is its spirit, and by which it grows and increases. Now, if one among the three is wanting, no thing can exist." Thus Boehme contemplates everything as this Trinity.

When he deals with the particulars, we see that he becomes obscure; out of these particulars we cannot, therefore, obtain much. As a specimen of his manner of conceiving natural things, I will give only a single example more, showing the way in which the further pursuit of the idea of the existence of nature as an opposition to the divine knowledge, he uses, as logical terms, what we call things. The creaturesome, he says, has "three sorts of powers, or *spiritus*, in different *centris*, but in one *corpore*. (a) The first and outer *spiritus* is the coarse sulphur, salt, and *mercurius*, which is a substance of the four elements [fire, water, earth, air] or of the constellation. It forms the visible *corpus*, according to the constellation of

the stars, or quality of the planets, and now inflamed elements — the greatest power of the *spiritus mundi*. The *Separator* makes the designation or *mark*” [the selfhood]. The salt, the *salitter*, is the neutral; the *mark*, the working, the unrest, in reference to the nourishment; the coarse sulphur, the negative unity. (b) “The other *spiritus* lies in the *oil* of the sulphur, the fifth essence, as a root of the four elements. This is the softening and joy of the coarse, painful sulphur, and salt spirit; the real cause of the growing life, a joy of nature, as the sun is in the elements” [the immediate life-principle]. “In the inner ground of that coarseness we see a fair, clear *corpus*, in which shines the light of nature therein formed from the divine outflow.” That which is taken up is signified by the outer Separator in the forming and form of the plant, which takes into itself this coarse nourishment. (c) “The third is the *Tincture*, a spiritual fire and light: the deepest ground, from which originates the first distinction of qualities in the substance of this world. *Fiat* is the Word of everything, and belongs, according to its very quality, to eternity. Its source is the holy power of God. The *smell* is the sensibility of this Tincture. The elements are only a receptacle and opposition to the inner power, a cause of the movement of the Tincture.” The sensible things lose entirely the power of this sensible conception; Boehme uses them, but not as such, for determinations of thought; this makes the hardness and barbarity of the Boehmian presentation, but at the same time produces this unity with the reality and this presence of the infinite Being.

The opposition in creation Boehme describes as follows: If nature is the original outflow of the *Separator*, two sorts of life are to be understood, in the opposites of the divine Being: beyond that temporal life, an eternal life, to which divine understanding is given. It stands in the ground of the eternal, spiritual world, in the *mysterio magno* of the divine opposition [selfhood]; a receptacle of the divine Will, through which it manifests itself, being manifested in no particularity of particular will. The man who stands in this centre has both lives in himself; he is of time and of eternity; is (a), in general, in

the "eternal understanding of the sole good Will, which is a *temperament*; (b) the original Will of nature, as the comprehensibility in itself of *centrorum*, since each *centrum* in the diversity contracts itself into a point, to Egohood and self-willing — as a particular *mysterium*, or mind. The former wants only an opposition to its identity; this — the self-born natural will, in place of the Egohood of dark Impression — wants also an identity, as an opposition, on account of its own comprehensibility; through which comprehending it wants nothing except its corporality as a natural ground." This Ego, now — the dark, the torture, the fire, the wrath of God, the being-in-self, the conceiving-in-self, the harshness — this it is which, in the new birth, is broken up; the Ego is broken to pieces; the torture is brought into the true rest, as the dark fire breaks out into light.

These are the chief thoughts of Boehme. The deepest are: (a) the generation of light, as the Son of God, from the qualities, through the most living dialectic; (b) God's diremption of Himself. As little as the barbarism in the execution can be denied, even so little can we deny the great profoundness which exercises itself with the uniting of the most absolute contradictions. Boehme seizes the contradictions in the harshest, crudest manner; but he does not allow himself to be prevented by their brittleness from fixing the unity. This crude and barbaric profoundness, which is without conception, is ever a presence, a speaking out of itself, which has and knows all in itself. There still remains to be mentioned Boehme's religious nature, his edifying discourse, the progress of the soul in his writings. This is in the highest degree deep and earnest; and if one is familiar with his forms, one will find this depth and earnestness. But it is a form to which one cannot reconcile one's self, and which admits of no accurate representation in detail, although no one can deny that this man possessed a profound speculative impulse.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

[TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF IMMANUEL KANT.]

BY A. E. KROEGER.

§ 29. — CONCERNING THE SENSUOUS POWER OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION ACCORDING TO ITS DIFFERENT KINDS.

There are three different kinds of the Sensuous Power of Productive Imagination. These are the *constructive* power of contemplation in space (*imaginatio plastica*), the *associating* power of contemplation in time (*imaginatio associans*), and the *relating* power, which deals with the common derivation of our representations from each other.

A. *The Sensuous Power of Imagination as a Constructive Power.*

Before an artist can represent a bodily form palpably, as it were, he must have constructed it in his Power of Imagination, and the form is in that case a fiction, which, if it arises involuntarily, as in dreams, is called a *phantasy*, and does not belong to the artist; but which, if directed by free will, is called a *composition* or an *invention*. If the artist, furthermore, works after images that resemble the works of nature, his products are called *natural*; but if he works after images that do not occur in nature, such objects are called fantastic, unnatural, caricatures; and such works are, as it were, dream-pictures of a waking man (*velut ægri somnia vane finguntur species*). We often and enjoyingly play with our power of imagination; but our imagination also plays very often — and frequently very inopportunately — with us.

The play of imagination with us in our sleep is called dreaming, and occurs even when we are healthy. But if it takes place when we are awake, it betrays an unhealthy condition. Sleep, as the relaxation of all our faculties of external perception, and specially of arbitrary motions, seems to be neces-

sary for all animals, nay, even in plants (in accordance with the analogy between the latter and the former), in order that they may recuperate the forces used up while awake. But the same seems to be the case in regard to dreams; so that our vital forces, if they were not always kept aroused in sleep by dreams, would expire, and the deepest sleep would necessarily bring death along at the same time. If we do say sometimes, nevertheless, that we have had a profound sleep, without dreams, it means, after all, probably nothing more than that we do not remember those dreams when waking up. This, indeed, when our fancies succeed each other quickly, may happen even when we are awake — as, for instance, when we are *distract*; in which condition, when some one asks us what we have been thinking about all the time — we having gazed with fixed look at a certain point all the while — we answer, Nothing! If there were not on awakening many gaps in our memory (connecting links between the images of our dreams, which we have passed over through inattention), and if we were in the following night to begin dreaming again where we left off on the previous night, I do not know but we should fancy that we were living in two different worlds. Dreaming is a wise arrangement of nature to excite our vital force by means of emotions which are related to arbitrarily conceived events; while those movements of the body that depend upon our free will, namely, those of the muscles, are suspended. But we must not take the visions of our dreams to be revelations of an invisible world.

B. The Sensuous Power of Imagination as an Associating Power.

The law of association is this: that empirical representations, which follow each other, effect a habit in the mind of connecting the last one with the one preceding it. It is in vain to seek for a physiological explanation of this phenomenon, whatsoever hypothesis one chooses (which hypothesis is, after all, again a fiction) — as, for instance, that of Descartes, with his so-called material ideas in the brain. At any rate, none of these expla-

nations are *pragmatical*; that is, they cannot be used for any practical purpose, since we have no knowledge of the brain, and the places therein, in which we might discover the traces of representative impressions sympathetically harmonized by contact with each other, as it were, at least mediately.

The close vicinity however, oftentimes goes so far, and the power of imagination goes from the hundredth to the thousandth link often so quickly that it seems as if we had skipped certain connecting links in the chain of our representations, although not having become conscious of them; so that we often need to ask ourselves, Where was I? At what point did I begin the conversation, and how did I arrive at this conclusion?¹

C. The Sensuous Power of Imagination as a Relating Power.

In speaking about the relation of representations, I speak of the union which results from the derivation of the manifold from one common ground.

In social intercourse it is in form a sort of nonsense, breaking off and disturbing all conversation, for people to jump from one topic of discussion to another utterly foreign subject; a bad habit, which is caused by the empirical association of notions that are of purely subjective origin. (In one man notions are associated in one way, and otherwise in another). It is only when one topic of conversation has been exhausted, and a short pause intervenes, that a person can introduce another interesting subject. When the power of imagination is made to roam about without rule or guidance, simply by the change of representations that are not connected by anything

¹ Hence a person who starts a social conversation must begin with that which is near and present to him, and thus gradually lead on to that which is more remote, in so far as he can make it interesting. The bad weather is, for this purpose, an excellent medium for any one who comes in from the street and enters a social gathering. But to start a conversation, for instance, by citing the latest news from Turkey, as ascertained from the newspapers, would do violence to the imagination of others, who cannot understand why conversation should be turned precisely on the subject of Turkey. The mind needs for the communication of all its thoughts a certain order, as much in conversation as in a sermon.

objective, the brain gets so confused that a person who comes from a conversation of this kind feels as if he had been dreaming. There must always be a theme, as well in solitary thinking as in the communication of thoughts, by which we connect the manifold of our representations; and hence the understanding also must always be employed in our thinking; but in the present instance of association the play of imagination follows the laws of sensuousness, which furnishes the material for the imagination. Hence the association is here formed without consciousness of a rule, although according to a rule, namely, of sensuousness; or, it is here formed *conformably* to the understanding, though not *derived from* the understanding.

The word relation (*affinitas*) recalls here to mind an analogical reciprocal relation — taken from the science of chemistry — of two specifically distinct, material ingredients, intimately acting upon each other and striving to effect a unity; in which case this uniting of both, forms a third body, with qualities that can be produced only by the union of two heterogeneous elements. In spite of their heterogeneousness, our understanding and sensuousness so assimilate of their own accord towards the production of our cognition that it seems as if the one were the product of the other, or as if both had a common origin, which, however, cannot be the case; at any rate, it is to us incomprehensible how heterogeneous elements can originate from one and the same source.²

² The two first mentioned kinds of the combination of our representations might be called *mathematical* combinations (of enlargement), and the third a *dynamical* combination (of generation), whereby an entirely new substance is produced — as, for instance, a neutral salt in chemistry. The play of forces in inanimate as well as animate nature, in the soul as well as the body, is based upon the analysis and synthesis of the heterogeneous. It is true that we arrive at a cognition thereof only through our perception of their effects; but the highest cause and the simple components wherein their substance can be analyzed are for us attainable. What may be the cause, that all organic beings of which we have knowledge propagate their species only through the union of the two sexes, which we call the male and the female? We surely cannot assume that the Creator arranged it so only as if He were at play, or for curiosity's sake, and for no other cause than to have such an arrangement set at work on this earth-globe of ours? It seems, rather, that it must be *impossible* to have organic creatures originate from out the substance of our earth-globe by propagation in any other manner than by means of two sexes. In what darkness does human reason lose itself here when it attempts to fathom — nay, merely to guess at, the origin!

§ 30. — ILLUSTRATIONS.

The power of imagination is, however, not so creative as is sometimes asserted. We cannot imagine rational beings as existing in any other shape than the human form. Hence the sculptor or painter, who sketches an angel or a god, always sketches a human being. Every other figure seems to his mind to have ingredients which cannot be united in his mind with the construction of a rational being; for instance, wings, talons, or hoofs. But he feels at perfect liberty in regard to the size.

Deception, occurring through the *force* of the imagination, reaches sometimes such a degree in a man that he believes he sees or feels outside of himself what, after all, is merely in his head. Hence the dizziness which seizes a person who looks down into an abyss, although he stands on a platform large enough to prevent his falling, and perhaps even has hold of a stout railing. Very odd is the fear which some people of sickly mind have of an inner impulse to throw themselves voluntarily down from a steep height.

Seeing nauseating matters swallowed by others — as, when the Tungusees suck out and swallow the dirt of their children's noses — affects the spectator towards vomiting, in the same manner as if he himself were forced to do it.

The *Homesickness* of the Swiss — and, as I have been told by a General of experience, also of Westphalians and Pomeranians from certain districts — which befalls them when they are removed to other countries, is the effect of a yearning for the places where they have tasted the very simple enjoyments of life, which yearning is produced by recalling the pictures of their youthful years, with their freedom of care, and neighborly social intercourse. When they return, however, after a longer absence, they find themselves greatly deceived in their expectations, and thus become cured. It is true, they attribute this to a notion that everything has changed at home while they were gone; but the real cause of their disappointment is, that they cannot take back their youth to the scenes of their

youth. It is curious, however, that this homesickness occurs more amongst the country people of a province *poor in money*, but for that very reason more closely united by ties of brotherhood and cousinships, than amongst those who are busy making money, and have chosen *patria ubi bene* for their motto.

If we have heard of some one that he is a villain, we are inclined to think that we can see malice written in his face; and thus imagination consolidates with perception into one sentiment, especially when passion is added. Helvetius tells of a lady who, looking through a telescope, saw in the moon the shadows of two lovers. The clergyman, who took the glass after she was done with it, said: "Oh, no, madam, those are the two towers of a church."

To all this we may add still further the effect produced by imagination, through sympathy. The sight of a person in a convulsive or epileptic attack inclines others to similar cramp-like movements, just as yawning infects others with a desire to yawn; and Dr. Michaelis says, in speaking of a man belonging to the army in North America, who was seized by violent raving, that two or three of the spectators fell into the same condition, though the attack was but temporary. Hence weak-nerved people, hypochondriacs, should not visit mad-houses from motives of curiosity. Usually, however, they avoid it of their own accord, fearing for their minds. It will also be found that persons of a lively disposition, when very attentively listening to some one who is speaking in a passion (especially when the passion is anger), are involuntarily betrayed into a play of their features corresponding to that passion.

People also pretend to have observed that married people who live happily together gradually assume a similarity of features; and the explanation given is, that they married each other on account of this similarity (*similis simili gaudet*), which, however, is wrong. For, in the instinct of the sexes, nature impels rather towards differences in the persons who are to fall in love with each other, so that all the manifoldness which nature has implanted in their germs may be developed. The explanation is, that the intimacy and inclination, where-

with, in their private intercourse, being close together, they look often and long into each other's eyes, produces sympathetic, similar plays of features, which in course of time become permanent forms of countenance.

Finally, we may count as belonging to this unintentional play of the productive power of imagination, which is then called *phantasy*, the inclination to unmalicious *lying*, which is always found in children, and in grown people (however good-natured they are otherwise) *now and then*, and sometimes almost as an inherited disease. In these cases, when a story is being told, events and adventures crowd upon each other like a down-rolling snow-avalanche, being constantly cast forth by the imagination without the story-telling person's having any other benefit to himself in view than to make himself interesting. As an instance, I may cite Shakespeare's knight, John Falstaff, who changed two men in buckram into eleven before he finished his story.

§ 31.—CONCERNING THE MEANS OF AROUSING AND TEMPERING THE PLAY OF THE POWER OF IMAGINATION.

Since the power of imagination is more rich and fruitful in representations than our sensuousness, it becomes, when passion is added to it, more active under the absence than it is in the presence of its object; that is to say, more aroused when something occurs which recalls to the mind the representation of that object which seemed to have been eradicated for a while by other matters. Thus a German prince, a noble-minded man, though otherwise a rough warrior, had undertaken a voyage to Italy in order to rid himself of his love for a lady of common birth; but on his return, the first view of her dwelling-place stirred up his imagination far more powerfully than permanent intercourse could have done, and he yielded without further delay to his inclination, which happily fulfilled all his expectations. This disease, being the effect of a fantastic power of imagination, is incurable except through *marriage*. For marriage is truth. (*Eripitur persona, manet res.* LUCRETIVS.)

The fantastic power of imagination creates a sort of self-communion, and, although merely with phenomena of the internal sense, yet in analogy with the external senses. It gives life to night, and elevates it above its actual state; even as the moon, which in broad daylight is to be seen only as an insignificant cloud, makes a grand figure on the skies at evening-time. It is at work in him who lucubrates in the silence of the night, or disputes with his imaginary opponent, or, pacing his room, builds castles in the air. But everything that appears to such a one important at that time loses all its importance on the next morning following the night's sleep, and in the course of time he will experience a decline of his mental faculties as the result of this bad habit. Hence it is a very useful rule, as a measure of psychological diet, for such a person to tame his imagination by going to sleep early in order to be able to rise early; although women and hypochondriacs—who generally derive their morbid state from that very cause—prefer the opposite.

Why can we still listen late at night to ghost-stories, which in the morning, soon after getting up, appear to everybody absurd and utterly unfit for conversation; whereas at that time we rather ask what has happened new in the house, or in the world at large, or continue our labors of the previous day? The reason is, because that which is in itself mere *play* is appropriate for the relaxation of the forces exhausted in the day-time, while that which is *business* is proper for the man who has been strengthened by his night's rest, and been born anew, as it were.

The shortcomings (*vitia*) of the power of imagination are these: that its working is either *unbridled*, or, worse still, *ruleless* (*effrenis aut perversa*). The latter is the worst fault. For the first class of production might, after all, find a place in a possible world—in the world of fable; but the latter have no place in any world, since they contradict each other. As an instance of the former class of imaginations, I may refer to the shudder with which the Arabs regard the stone figures of men and animals so frequently met with in the Lybian desert; looking upon them, as they do, as human beings petrified by

the curse. This is unbridled imagination. But it is a contradiction when the same Arabs imagine that these images of animals will, on the day of universal resurrection, snarl at the artist who made them, and upbraid him because he was not able to endow them with souls. A merely unbridled phantasy can, after all, always take a side-turn; as, for instance, in the case of the poet, of whom Cardinal Este asked, when he was presented with a copy of the book dedicated to him: "Master Ariosto, where the devil did you pick up all this mad stuff?" This sort of phantasy is superabundance and luxury from pure wealth; but ruleless phantasy approaches insanity, wherein the imagination plays unlimited revel in the mind, and the unhappy victim has no control whatever over the course of his ideas.

It is still to be remarked that the political artist has, as well as his æsthetical brother, the power to rule and govern the world (*mundus vult decipi*) by the power of imagination, which he causes to pass current as actuality; for instance, of liberty (as in the English Parliament), or of equality (as in the French Parliament), which, however, consist of mere formalities. Nevertheless, it is better that mankind should have were it but the semblance of this ennobling good, than feel itself palpably deprived of it.

RAPHAEL AND MICHAEL ANGELO.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF HERMANN GRIMM BY IDA M. ELIOT.

The first of Raphael's letters is dated at Florence, in the year 1508, and contains nothing of importance; the second, written in the same year, is only a few lines in length, and is addressed to Domenico Alfani:

"I beg you, Menecho," he writes, "send me 'Ricardo's love-songs, which tell of the passion that once overcame him when travelling.'" Also, he wished for a sermon, and asked Menecho to remind Cesarino to send it to him; and he would

like to have Menecho ask Madonna Atalanta for the money — he preferred gold. Love-songs, a sermon, and gold — in these few lines we find the whole century.

The next letter, also in 1508, is written from Rome. Bramante, who was related to Raphael, had caused him to be recalled there. The pope commanded him to come, that he might paint the Vatican. Here he met Michael Angelo. Until now he had seen him only a few times in Florence. In this letter he thanks Francesco Francia for the portrait which he has sent, and excuses himself for not having had his own painted, that he might send it in return for the present, according to agreement. Passavant believes that Raphael had in person sought out the famous old master in Bologna. The way in which he gained Francia's love, his expressions of praise, and at last his confidence in him, all show a charming youthful feeling. How Francia felt towards him is shown in a sonnet which is quoted, and in which he gives Raphael the highest place in art, while he himself modestly steps into the background.

Next is a letter to Simon Ciarla, written in 1514, in which he speaks of marriage, and will not consent to any plans in regard to it. He treats this subject in a business-like way, and still not without the graceful ease with which he always handles great subjects as well as trifling ones. From these things he passes to the building of St. Peter's, and breaks out into hearty praise of the life in Rome. Every day, he concludes, the pope summons him, and converses with him concerning the building. It is to be the first temple in the world. It will cost one million in gold, and the pope thinks of nothing else than its completion.

Raphael wished to remain unmarried. He says in his letters that in Rome he would have expected quite different matches from those offered him. He did not wish any wife; with a wife he would never have reached the point where he now stood, and every day he thanked God because he had acted so wisely.

In spite of these reasons, afterwards he did not feel himself in a condition to refuse the hand of the young Maria di Bibbiena, niece of the cardinal of the same name. The proposal was as

advantageous as it was honorable for him. His death and Maria's occurred at almost the same time. The grave-stones stand side by side, and the inscriptions say that Maria and Raphael died betrothed lovers.

He died, therefore, without having been married. Michael Angelo also, as well as Leonardo da Vinci and Titian, died unmarried. Dr. Guhl has remarked, on this subject, that perhaps it may be advisable for artists thus to take their freedom, and seems to give the lives of these three men in a certain way as illustrations. I cannot agree with him. The similarity of these three lives seems to me only accidental in this respect. It is well known how people married in Italy at that time, and above all, in what relation the women stood to the men. One can most easily obtain an insight into this from the life of Benvenuto Cellini. The most unlimited freedom ruled. Titian had children, for whom he provided very handsomely. It is nowhere recorded of Michael Angelo or Leonardo da Vinci that they had any dislike to women. Legitimate marriage through the church and before the law was not at that time the means by which the favor of beautiful women was gained. It was no reproach to be an illegitimate child. If Michael Angelo had met Vittoria Colonna in his younger days, and a marriage between them had been proposed, he would not have considered marriage a hindrance to his artist career. Everywhere — among artists as well — it is a sad sight when wife and children change free work into an oppressive burden, but all such doubts may be answered where one happy marriage gives the purest impulse to work and true development.

Raphael liked women. Vasari tells how once love drew him off from his work, and his friends at last knew no better plan than to bring the beautiful lady to his scaffolding, where she sat the whole day with him, and he, not missing her, kept at work. In Arnim's novel, "Raphael and his Women Neighbors," the artist's life is pictured in the midst of beauty. Without care, and with a fancy full of noble thoughts, he gave himself up to their charms, obeying without any constancy the pleasant law of indolence till at last, the life he was leading grated upon him.

He must have had misgivings; he tried to tear himself away, but at his work his thoughts gave him no rest. One of the three sonnets which were in his handwriting on the back of some studies, and in that way preserved to us, gives us this most direct insight into the soul whose passion he was trying to conquer. He seems to have written the poem to get free from the thoughts which hovered around him, alluring him on; one feels his struggle, and how impossible resistance will finally become.

The next letter is written to Count Castiglione. In it he speaks of Ideals. He expresses himself in the clearest way. What cannot be understood by those who lack the inspiration of the creative spirit—that the Ideal is no mere universal, abstract, vanishing, to be obtained out of things like an essence by persevering individuals, but that it is a form of the thing itself, created by a real mind; that it hovers over everything which we call nature, but is revealed only to him who has received the power to see it, to each one by himself, and in his own way—all this Raphael now declares, and he does it in such ordinary words that one feels he is speaking of something very usual and common.

“With regard to Galatea,” he writes, “I should consider myself a great master if there could be found in it only half the great things of which your highness writes. I recognize in your words the love which you feel towards me. For the rest, I must tell you that in order to paint a beautiful woman’s figure, I must see many beautiful women, and also your highness must stand by me to select the most beautiful. But since a just decision is as rare as a beautiful woman, I shall make use of a certain fancy which has come into my mind. I do not know whether it possesses artistic excellence or not, but I shall strive hard to carry it out; and herewith I commend myself to your highness.”

Count Baldassare Castiglione was one of the most brilliant and honored men of his time, distinguished on account of his intellect and his good taste. This letter is dated in the same year that Raphael was definitely appointed by the pope as director of the building of St. Peter’s, with a yearly salary

of three hundred gold scudi. Raphael undertook the building under the worst conditions; he changed it from the foundation, for he put aside Bramante's plan, to which years afterwards Michael Angelo returned.

At the same time with Raphael's appointment appeared a letter from the pope, in which he announces to the people of Rome that no stone shall be cut for building St. Peter's except with Raphael's consent. Under a penalty of from one hundred to three hundred gold scudi, to be enforced according to Raphael's own discretion, all the stone-cutters in the city were constrained to obey the command. By these means Raphael was enabled to control the excavations, and save many monuments of ancient art. The greater part of the beautiful statues of antiquity which are now admired in the museum of Rome were discovered here and there about this time.

Four years later the artist gave an account to his master of his acts as conservator of the city of Rome, and the document, with his quiet, clear statement, should be taken as a model for such reports. He begins by recognizing the superiority of the old Romans—at that time nothing was known of Greek art—who accomplished very easily many things which we consider impossibilities. He tells how he has searched through the city with this thought in mind, how he has studied the old authors, and how it has filled him with pain to see the body of the beautiful city, once the queen of the world, so grievously torn to pieces.

He then speaks of those who took part in the work of destruction, and does not hesitate to say that popes themselves formerly gave up the splendid buildings to ruin, but that now Leo X. was called upon to restore them.

He afterwards describes how he has drawn a plan of ancient and modern Rome; gives his opinion about some single buildings; and then general statements about the architecture of the old Romans, and its progress down to his own time; and ends with an account of technical geometric expedients which one might use.

The whole letter is divided in the clearest way into different parts, and contains, besides this account, from a practical point

of view, the noblest enthusiasm for the art of the old Romans. Involuntarily one places himself by Raphael's side and follows him from time to time, as if these things were the most important affairs of to-day, and as if centuries had not passed since then. One feels with what freshness he attempts every thing and how easy to him were the things which he undertook. During the time that such a commission formed one of the incidental works which he carried on, and when even the direction of the building of the enormous church is of less importance than his paintings, which followed one after the other, each being a new and unexpected revelation of his soul, still he found time to spend with his friends, and with women, whose society he enjoyed. He did not seek solitude, like Michael Angelo; he spread out his arms and drew to his heart the world, for which he cared. And with this power was united what youthful beauty! When he died there was no artist in Rome who did not follow his body weeping, and when the pope received news of his death he burst into bitter tears. "*O felice e beata anima!*" exclaims Vasari, after he has described with what honors and solemnities his funeral was celebrated, "who does not like to speak of thee, to praise thee and thy works. When such an artist died, the art of painting might well lay itself in the grave, for when he closed his eyes, it was left upon the earth, as it were, sightless. We who survive him, must imitate the good, yes, the excellent example which he has set us; and according to the merit of his art, and following our duty toward it, must speak of him forever with honors a thousand-fold. For creative genius, coloring, and power of execution have been brought to perfection by him; no one has imagined how far he could advance, and no one may hope to reach higher than he."

When Vasari writes in this way, he seems for the moment to have forgotten Michael Angelo entirely. At other times he always mentioned the latter as the greatest artist, and the same feeling was shared by many of his contemporaries, who gave Raphael a subordinate rank.

But it seems as if the thought of the death of this wonderful spirit had erased even the memory of Michael Angelo, who,

after Raphael was gone, continued working alone and without rivals for many years, preventing by his powerful creations that decline of art which immediately followed his death.

Michael Angelo was in Florence when Raphael died. From what we learn, more through suggestions than direct information, it appears that these two men stood in opposition to one another. The one had no need of the other; each sought to surpass the other, and to contend for mastery. This seems quite natural to us, as it does when in old poems we read that two heroes who meet begin at once to fight with one another, until it is decided which is the victor. But when two eagles fly towards the sun in emulation, on that account they need not be enemies, and the feeling between them is not the jealousy which holds lower natures apart. These men felt their strength, and each strove to be first; modesty was out of place. Both placed the art of the ancients higher than their own, as Goethe considered Shakespeare very far above him, but neither of them wished that any living person should call his rank in question. It was the same feeling which kept Schiller and Goethe apart for so many years, although they lived close together; and this gives to their correspondence that strange admixture which is called coldness by those who must give a name to everything.

Each recognized the greatness of the other, but neither would descend from his height. One thing, however, will serve least of all as an index of their feeling towards one another — that is, the disputes of their disciples, and the hate with which they persecuted each other. Parties may hate each other, as nations may do, while the leaders quietly and respectfully defend each his own standpoint. When men like Raphael and Michael Angelo stand as opponents, there is no use in repeating single incidents or expressions. If one observes them both, weighs their power, tries to picture to himself Rome at that time — the centre of political power and the fine arts — remembers popes like Julius and Leo — one sees that necessarily there must have been a personal rivalry, and this may be described in a poetical form, just as the scenes of a drama unfold in the fancy, as soon as characters which

are noble and freed from all narrow relations meet each other in their full power. The usual enmity which results from mutual misunderstandings occasioned by ignorance, or when one intentionally holds his hands over his eyes, and when there is also a feeling of weakness on both sides, had no place between these men. Michael Angelo may have said that Raphael accomplished nothing through his genius, but everything through effort. Would Michael Angelo have intended by this to disparage Raphael — Michael Angelo, who knew so well what work meant? In my opinion this speech is such great praise that I do not know how he could have spoken so as to express more clearly that he understood his youthful companion, admired, and honored him.

Raphael's never-failing loveliness of character — by which, as Vasari says, he showed all artists how they should behave towards nobles, the middle class, and the poorest people — was not at all a trait of Michael Angelo's. He did not hover over the mountains of life as if borne on clouds; he seized hold of the solid stone, threw the pieces on either side, and so made a path for himself over these mountains. He gave rough, brusque answers, and never troubled himself about any one. When Pope Julius was urging him to finish one of his works, and asked when he would be ready with it, he answered, "When I can" — "*quando potio.*" The pope broke into a passionate rage, and raised his staff against the artist, and as he echoed the words "*quando potio,*" "*quando potio,*" he struck him. That was the position these two men held towards each other. They were even with one another. They knew one another too well to separate. They quarrelled whenever together, for this was not the only time; but neither could do without the other, and since each had his own footing, upon which he stood his ground proudly before the world, it came to pass that they were drawn together by the very things which would have separated weaker natures.

Every one who feels himself great is attracted to any one whom he recognizes as his equal in that respect. Even the bloodiest quarrel cannot drive these asunder. Involuntarily their glances seek and find each other, for every one searches

out him whose character is a measure of his own, and the desire to compare himself with him conquers all obstacles. Thus it follows that the great attracts the great; the common, the common. This law determines the lives of beggars and kings. Some relations could not be explained without it. Voltaire and Frederick learned to know each other thoroughly. The king knew that Voltaire was false, deceitful, and much more vain of the connection with him than attached to him. Still he wrote to him, opened his heart to him, and waited for his answers. He felt that this man stood high enough to understand him, and all other feelings sank into insignificance before this.

If one should read through Michael Angelo's poems, and his life, as written by Vasari and Condivi, one would have an impression of a man who travelled over a terrible road entirely alone. But if one looks through the notices of the lives of contemporary artists, then one will see how boundless was his influence over all, and how all rays of art centred in him. Everywhere his hand is busy; unselfishly he helps one and another in their work; blocks of marble wrongly cut, and lying spoiled and useless, excite him to see what can be made from them; in the midst of the fortification-work of his native city, he carves in the stone of the wall the Flying Victory. Work itself interests him — it makes no difference what it is. His impetuous nature continually carries him away, but he always returns to himself; and the way in which this happens is doubly touching and affecting. No one can be in doubt as to whether the heart of this man was hard and unfriendly, or whether it was gentle, and full of a noble love of humanity. When I read how Beethoven loved mankind, and still avoided them, the reserved bearing of the great Florentine occurred to me, while Mozart's sociable manners toward all who met him reminded me of Raphael. But how different were the lives of these two. Like two butterflies from the garden of the Hesperides, the storms of life blew them out into the world, where they perished, — one because he was carried into the fields of too luxurious bloom; the other, because he flew over stony places, till wearied out, he fell to the ground.

Mozart's creations, like Raphael's, stand complete, as if they had arisen so at first. There is nothing to change in them. They show no effort; they exist; their only aim is to fill a void which could not be filled without them. They may be studied from all points. One walks around them as round a blooming aloe. Shakespeare's poems, also, are so made. But although they are so finished and perfect, one thing is wanting to them—one thing that Michael Angelo's works possess, that Beethoven's music has, and that brings these men into such a human relation with us—the evidence of a divine yearning for expression which filled the souls of these composers, and which is the true origin of their works. They do not let us sink into careless rapture, but represent the struggle and the victory, or perhaps only the anticipation of victory, in vivid light and forms that cannot be forgotten. When I study Raphael's Madonna, in the Dresden gallery, the whole world around seems to dissolve in mist, and this figure alone is present to my eyes. In one word, it deprives the mind of freedom; it takes possession of one, and soars with him into higher regions.

How different is the impression which a piece of sculpture by Michael Angelo, though unfinished, has upon me. I know it only through a plaster-cast in the new museum. The original is in Paris. It represents a dying youth, one of the figures which were to surround the monument of Pope Julius, according to the first plan and beginning of the work. These were meant to represent the conquered provinces of the kingdom. The body stands upright; a band passing round below the breast holds it up like a chain, and keeps it from falling to the ground; one arm touches the breast, the other stretches up over the head, that bends on one side wearily, with the look of death. The divine tenderness of youth is shed all over the figure. A dying smile plays around the lips; an expression of the deepest grief weighs down the eyes. One stands before it, and his very soul is touched with grief for the beauty thus dissolving in death. One feels himself more free and noble, and he would like to perish in the same way. Every line carries out the same thought. The narrow hips, the powerless knees,

the relaxed hands, the eyes over which the lids have fallen, before which the vanishing world already surges back and forth, soon to disappear altogether — this work draws me forcibly to the heart of a man who is so powerful an artist; and thinking of Michael Angelo, the dark clouds under which he walks seems to me more home-like than the unending clearness to which Raphael carries me on wings.

We Germans place the artist above all his works. Goethe is greater than all his poems; Schiller himself dearer to us than what he wrote. This is the reason that for us Hamlet is Shakespeare's greatest work, for it reveals most deeply his own soul, while the others give only visions which do not come near to us. In Hamlet one plunges with the poet into the great questions of life, and realizes with a shudder the narrowness of the lines between clearness and madness that form the paths on which the soul travels. This play does not let us rest; it drives us on at its own pace. Michael Angelo does the same; and I would more willingly follow him, although his path is lighted by dim stars, than rest with Raphael in the full light that bestows everything, but leaves nothing for which one's thoughts can strive.

The "Artist Letters" contain nothing written by Michael Angelo at the time of Raphael's death. His first three letters are dated 1496, 1504, 1529; they cover a long space of time; his youth, his first stay in Rome, and the troubles in Florence; after which, again in Rome, he entered upon that period of his life when, ruling alone in the realm of art, he piled work upon work until his death. There are extant numerous letters written at this time; to this period belong most of his poems, and, generally, what we have learned about him from his contemporaries relates to these later years of his life.

The first letter, of July 2, 1496, announces his arrival in Rome. Born in 1474, he was in his twenty-second year, but he had already experienced a great deal. His whole life was one continued struggle with men and circumstances, beginning with his first step in his artist career. When a child at school, he passed all his leisure hours in drawing. No persuasion, no punishment, could break up this fancy. He conquered his

father's opposition, and at fourteen years was apprenticed to Domenico Ghirlandajo. His friendship with young Granacci, who was studying painting there, led him to the workshop of the master. He made astonishing progress. We have still preserved one specimen of his style and manner, which shows how his capability and his character were early developed. One of his fellow-students had a study of drapery by Ghirlandajo to copy. Michael Angelo took the sheet, and with a few touches improved the figure and the style of the teacher. Granacci preserved the sketch, and afterwards gave it to Vasari, who sixty years after showed it to Michael Angelo. Laughingly he recognized his work, and added, "At that time I knew more about art than now." He often felt a desire to test himself on new work, and to compete with others. It was a delight to him to perceive in visible form what he could do—a kind of rejoicing in the consciousness of power. Where he felt it belonged to him to be first, he did not wish to seem to be second. There is a trace of the rivalry of the artisan in this striving. He was not satisfied with the consciousness that he himself was the greatest, but desired the public to perceive it also. It must know that he understood more than all others. He wished for favor, but he insisted upon justice. Schiller had somewhat of this feeling when he criticised severely the poems of Bürger and Matthisson, and even Goethe's Egmont. He was considering then only the works, not the persons; while Goethe, when he in his youth attacked Wieland, had in mind the person, and disposed of the works in a few lines. But although Michael Angelo was jealous of his position, still he never entertained the thought that because he was great, others were small. He gave assistance in their work to many artists, made sketches for their pictures, gave them good advice as to how they should progress. Had a greater artist than he appeared—had he been forced to confess to himself in his inmost heart, "He knows more than you"—he would not have hesitated a moment to declare openly what he thought. We can see how true this is from an anecdote which De Thou has preserved for us in his memoirs. This shows that the pride of the great master was very different from the self-

laudation of people with limited power, and his modesty sprang from a source quite distinct from that of the deceitful self-depreciation of lower minds, who blame themselves in the presence of other people, in the hope of hearing their own praises in answer.

De Thou was once in Mantua, where the Princess Isabella D'Este was showing him and others the art treasures in her palace. Among them was a Cupid, a work in marble by Michael Angelo. After the company had studied it admiringly for a long time, some one unveiled a second statue which was standing near, covered with a silk cloth, a work of antique art. The two were now compared, and every one was ashamed that he had estimated so highly the work of the Florentine. The antique was still covered with traces of the earth in which it had lain; but it seemed to be alive, while the other was merely a stone, without life. Then the guests were told that Michael Angelo had enjoined upon the princess never to show his work except with the Greek, and, moreover, in this unexpected way, so that connoisseurs could judge how far the art of the ancients surpassed the modern.

It has been asked what has become of these two statues, and the truth of the story has been by some altogether doubted. But that makes no difference; whether it has happened or not, the story bears in itself a truth which is higher than the so-called historic truth. At any rate, Michael Angelo is considered capable of such a courageous act. The reason that general characteristics are concentrated into special cases is owing to the mysterious power of the mythical element concealed in the lives of great men, and in the significant events in the development of nations, for in these it plans and arranges till nations and men are brought into harmony with the national Ideal. Things that have happened do not remain memorable in the lap of memory, but are tossed hither and thither as the sea tosses the stones, until they are rounded off and take a new shape.

The memory of the human race will not endure general traits, but demands definite, visible events; if these are missing, they must be found, and suddenly they appear; without one's

knowing whence they come. Corneille died in poverty. That is well known, but how much does it mean? Mankind demanded a definite illustration, and now it is said that he was so poor that at last he had not enough to buy a pair of shoes.

At Schiller's death there is not money enough to pay for a coffin. Goethe is married to his wife amidst the thunder of cannons. Francesco Francia dies of grief when he sees Raphael's Saint Cecilia; Racine of sorrow on account of the king's displeasure. Belisarius, with sightless eyes, goes begging through the land; Philip of Spain causes the death of Don Carlos; Napoleon, with his banner in his hand, rides over the bridge of Arcola, into the mouths of the Austrian cannon; Cambronne says, "The guard dies, but does not surrender;" or, turning to more distant ages, an Egyptian king at one blow strikes off the heads of a dozen prisoners.

All this is false. It grows like tares among the wheat; no one has sowed them, and they have no right to the ground where they are. But they cannot be rooted out. Always the blue and red flowers will appear among the grain. But many things that we consider as true and fixed are perhaps worth no more, and seldom is an historic book written that does not in this respect correct traditions.

At the foundation of every lie there is an arbitrary statement which is easily shaken off; but in the tradition, even when it springs up in modern times, there is an inextinguishable life-force. The acts of mankind often appear truly artistic; here and there, things which have been done are confirmed; lights are thrown upon some, others are veiled in darkness, so that finally something new is made to appear, that bears about the same relation to what has really taken place that the idealized figure in the painting does to the model which was used.

Schiller worked himself to death — that is acknowledged; Goethe himself says so; and all the reproaches which that fact brings upon the German people are expressed in one line — there was no money to pay for his coffin. Goethe's whole character on one side is expressed in what is related of his marriage. All Racine's faults are shown in the story of the

cause of his death. All the honor of the Spanish papal policy is concentrated in the fable of the death of Don Carlos; all admiration at the rising power of Napoleon, in the story of how he met danger and conquered it so magically. There is no more touching way of showing the power of poetry than to relate the story of Sophocles, which has also grown into a fable. When he was an old man his children sought to deprive him of the authority of managing his property, because he had grown childish. He went before his judges with his *Œdipus* at Colonus in his hand, and the divine chorus which he read to them from it brought tears to their eyes, and acquitted him. If that is an invention, it could have been invented about Sophocles only; and in the same way, it could be said of no one but Michael Angelo that he placed his own works by the side of those of the old masters, in order to show how much greater the ancients had been than he himself. The modesty which is shown in the story is not so conspicuous as the pride which made him consider his work worthy to be compared with an antique, even though it fell below it in perfection.

While he was still almost a child, under Ghirlandajo's teaching, Lorenzo di Medici, the most powerful man in Florence, formed the plan of starting a school for sculptors. He owned a garden which was adorned with paintings and old statues, and the pupils were to use these as studies. He wished to have for this school Ghirlandajo's best pupils, and among them were Michael Angelo and Granacci. Michael Angelo worked now with doubled energy. He had the keys of the garden always in his pocket, was there even on holidays, and tried to excel all others, in which he succeeded. He surpassed also young Torrigiano, and, besides, seems to have made of him a sort of laughing-stock, so that one day Torrigiano was so furious through his jealousy that he struck him in the face with his fist, and broke his nose, thus marking him for life. Torrigiano was forced to flee; Michael Angelo remained in Lorenzo's palace. Lorenzo favored him in every way; invited him to sit at his table, gave him five ducats every month, and gave his father a government position. At Lorenzo's death,

in the year 1492, Michael Angelo returned to his father's house. He was now eighteen years old. But he had already produced works which were acknowledged as masterly. Now he bought a block of marble, and carved a Hercules four ells in height. This work was everywhere admired, and afterwards was taken to France, where it has since disappeared.

Two years after the death of Lorenzo, his son and successor, Pietro, had carried matters so far that he and his whole family were banished from Florence. Their palace was plundered by the people, the school of old Bertoldi broken up, and all the materials that could be found sold at public auction. Michael Angelo had gone to Bologna before the fall of his patron, and from there to Venice; but finding that his money gave out, he returned to Bologna, where the Bentivogli, friends of the Medici, were rulers of the city, and received him in the heartiest manner. He worked there, and studied Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio. His works gained him many friends, but enemies, too, as it seems. This was, perhaps, the reason why he returned to Florence a year after.

At this time was made the Sleeping Cupid, of which I spoke. It was so beautiful that Michael Angelo was advised to bury it, and then pretend it was an antique. Perhaps the Mantua story and this have been confused. Vasari and Condivi tell the account differently, and the former puts at the end a very different moral. He says this work shows that the ancient art could not have excelled the modern — a statement which may be as consistent to the mind of Vasari as the words attributed to Michael Angelo in Mantua are true to his spirit.

The Cupid was sent to Rome; it drew Michael Angelo himself there, and made him famous. Other works which he executed through a series of years increased his fame. I name specially the "Pieta," of which we have a cast in the new Berlin museum, although only a part of it, — the "Body of Christ." This is a magnificent work, full at once of tenderness and strength, the union of which gives to the figure a truly divine light. It has none of the superhuman strength which forms the characteristic of his later works; there is nothing gloomy or gigantic, such as one imagines when his name is

mentioned. Vasari tells that once some strangers from Milan were admiring the work, and attributed it to Gobbo, one of their fellow-citizens. Michael Angelo entered St. Peter's by night, with a light and his tools, and cut his name on the girdle of the Madonna.

His reputation increased the desire which Florence felt to claim him again. In the court of the Palazzo Vecchio lay a huge block of marble, on which some sculptor of indifferent talent had wrought, and which had been left lying there partly cut. The stone was offered to Michael Angelo if he could do anything with it. He went there and made from the block a colossal David, which now stands before the Palazzo Vecchio. Other commissions followed this beginning. He painted and worked in marble and bronze unwearingly, but what increased his fame most of all was the rivalry with Leonardo da Vinci, who at that time was almost fifty years old, while Michael Angelo was not yet thirty. It was for this reason alone that he afterwards left Florence and went to France.

Each of these artists was making an enormous cartoon, representing a battle scene during the time when the Florentines conquered the Pisans. It has been said of these two works that together they furnished the content of all Italian art. All in the city were much excited about the two, and all took sides as to the victor. There is nothing left of the two works. The sculptor Bandinelli destroyed Michael Angelo's, from envy and jealousy. During the disturbances of the year 1512, he procured the keys to the hall in which it was kept, slipped in, and cut it into pieces which have one by one disappeared. Here and everywhere the anger of his rivals pursued Michael Angelo. When the statue of David was put into its place, it had to be guarded at night because stones were thrown at it to injure it.

Meanwhile, Pope Alexander had died; and shortly after, Julius II. became his successor. He called Michael Angelo back to Rome, and his agent in Florence paid him one hundred scudi for travelling expenses. He wished to have a magnificent tomb erected for himself, and he gave the commission to Michael Angelo, who made a plan which Julius approved.

The work began at once, but forty-five years passed before its completion; the plans were altered and abridged; war and every kind of fate delayed its execution; the marble was stolen from Michael Angelo; he was arrested on account of some money which it was said he received and used for himself; he was promised more money, and it was not paid; and the whole thing at last became a burden, which he bore with pain for many years, without being able to free himself from it.

But at that time he anticipated nothing of all this. He stood in the bloom of his years and fame. He had sought to surpass Da Vinci, and Raphael had not yet come upon the stage. When he appeared, the rivalry of art raised a crowd of distinguished artists. They all found plenty of work, and rich reward. The popes knew how to create means for these. Rome was to be the queen in the kingdom of beauty. These were the times when in Germany they were just beginning to act against a supremacy which caused all the gold in the world to be turned into channels centring in Rome. There a very profligate life was the rule. At that time, Ulrich von Hutten wrote his papers against the city, whose tyranny had become unbearable. I mention this here, for, while we study the lives of the great artists who grew up then, observe the tone which prevailed in the dealings of the day, — the blending of the unlimited freedom of the old philosophical way of thinking with the slave-like subjection to the religion of the popes, — if then we see the flowers of literature and art unfold in the midst of all this, this development of things in Italy seems necessary and natural. Quite natural, also, was the newly awakened opposition in the German mind. We see that each side was not understood by the other, and could not be understood. The vices of the priesthood, the crimes of the Borgias, overshadowed for the German view all the intellect and all the beauty; and what were Germans, at that time, to the Italians? Germany was a distant, barbarous region, full of rude fanaticism, without any national literature, and without any educated nobility; a province of the enormous empire, which was brought into contact with its ruler only when he was obliged to punish rebels, and whose language he could not speak. The emperor was a

Spaniard: the central point of his policy lay in Madrid. In Germany, the learned always wrote in Latin; and when Hutten first made use of his own language, it was as strange to him as if we to-day should write editorials for the papers in Latin. In Rome, they had just disposed of Savonarola, who, by his doctrines, had excited a city like Florence to insurrection. Why should they trouble themselves about a disturbance in a country beyond the Alps? It is very possible that Luther and Raphael may have passed one another in Rome, and looked into each other's eyes: the one thinking of his Madonna, his School of Athens, or his beloved one; the other, with gloomy brow, noting only the ruin which surrounded him, and made of the ground under his feet a desert over which the Roman walked so joyfully and free of care.

While Raphael was steadily rising higher in his art, and in the favor of mankind, through the loveliness of his nature, which was never vexed by any discord in himself, nor by harsh contact with thoughts outside his sphere, Michael Angelo more quietly was working his way up to his great height, and not only fulfilling his art, but also his character, which was growing ever more unbending and severe against the world. There are some irregularities about the payment of the money promised for his work. He wishes to speak to the pope about it. He is rudely sent from the door. Indignant, he goes home, writes a furious letter, sells what he owns to the Jews, and leaves Rome at once. Julius sends couriers after him; one messenger after another is sent with letters; but Michael Angelo is unyielding, and goes to Florence. Now three requisitions follow in quick succession, requesting the authorities to send him back. The artist did not obey; but he feared the power and vengeance of the pope, and, doubting his safety, he meditated a journey to Constantinople, whither the Sultan had invited him, to build a bridge over the Bosphorus. At last he was persuaded to go to Bologna, and meet Julius there. He goes there, has hardly time to change his boots before an ambassador of the pope takes him away to see his holiness in the Palace of the Sixteen.

He enters, and drops upon his knee. The pope looks at him as if he were angry with him, and says, "Instead of coming to find us, you wait until we come to find you out." By this he meant that Bologna is nearer to Florence than to Rome. Michael Angelo begged for pardon. He spoke freely, and without in the least yielding his point. The pope hesitated about answering. But now the scene changes in a very characteristic way: for the bishop who has escorted Michael Angelo to the pope tries to excuse him, and says that artists are ignorant people, who know nothing but their art; that his holiness may condescend to pardon Michael Angelo. In a sudden rage the pope turns upon the bishop, raises his staff, lets it fall on him, and cries, "You alone are ignorant, since you dare to say to this man what I dare not say." Thereupon he blessed Michael Angelo, and gave him a commission to execute a statue of his holiness which should be five ells high.

In the statue he was represented with the hand raised. "Am I giving my blessing or curse?" asked Julius. "You are advising the people of Bologna to be wise," answered Michael Angelo. When he wished to put a book in the left hand, the pope exclaimed, "Give me a sword; I am no scholar." In this position did Michael Angelo, then thirty-two years of age, stand towards the man of seventy, who in the winter of life entered upon a war, and conquered the cities upon which his eyes fell. He took Bologna from the Bentivogli, and even Ravenna from the Venetians. But not long after, his statue was made into a piece of artillery. The head alone was left. So end works of art which are intended to last for centuries.

After the completion of this commission, Michael Angelo returned to Rome, and now painted the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. It is remarkable that although he was called by himself and others a sculptor, still he has gained his greatest fame by his painting. The cartoon in Florence is the greatest work of his youth; the Last Judgment, that many years later was painted in this same Sistine Chapel, is the greatest work of his

old age ; but the ceiling of the chapel is the most splendid production of his mature fancy. Even to-day it is considered a marvel of modern art which cannot be excelled. Goethe says of it, that even Raphael's paintings are not worth looking at when this has been seen. Other distinguished men confirm this opinion. There is a large space which is covered with representations, and the whole gives one an idea of Michael Angelo's great skill in being able not only to give to his figures the right position as ornaments of the space, but also to make a rich filling-in, thus separating and at the same time uniting the drawings into one great whole. Smoke and dust, and breaks in the walls, have destroyed much of this. Three hundred and fifty years have passed since these paintings were first admired.

Julius II. had striven for the papacy ; his successor, Leo X., from the house of the Medici, strove for his family. Italy bloomed. There was an overflowing population ; the trade of the world was in the hands of its cities ; the sale of indulgences brought into the country sums of money which could not have been obtained by merchants ; everywhere there was building in the cities, and the houses and palaces were decorated.

The greater part of the magnificent paintings which form a foundation for the art of to-day were made at that time. Michael Angelo and Raphael developed an astonishing activity. Michael Angelo was not always in Rome, though he was as much at home there as in Florence ; and both cities overwhelmed him with commissions. It is nowhere recorded that he was silent and reserved. He enjoyed life, that smiled upon him. He belonged to the Academy at Florence, which was founded by Lorenzo, and whose members wrote poetry and philosophized.

ON THE STUDY OF HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE.

[TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF F. W. J. VON SCHELLING, BEING THE TENTH LECTURE "ON THE METHOD ON UNIVERSITY STUDY"—(*des akademischen Studiums*).]

BY ELLA S. MORGAN.

As the Absolute itself in the two forms of Nature and History appears as one and the same, so Theology, as the point of indifference of the real sciences, separates on the one side into History, and on the other into Natural Science, each of which contemplates its subjects apart from the other, as well as from the supreme unity.

This does not prevent each from presenting the central point in itself, and so returning into primal knowing.

The common conception of Nature and History is, that in the former everything takes place through empirical necessity; in the latter, through Freedom. But these are themselves but forms or modes of being sundered from the absolute. History is in so far the higher potency of Nature as it expresses in the ideal what Nature expresses in the real world, but essentially it is the same in both, changed only by the determination or "Potenz" under which it exists. If the pure essence could be seen in both, we should recognize that which is reflected ideally in History as identical with that which is reflected really in Nature. Freedom, as Phenomenon, can create nothing; it is a universal, which expresses the two forms of the reflected world each for itself, and in its own kind. Accordingly the complete world of history would be itself an ideal Nature, the State, as the external organism of a harmony of necessity and freedom attained in freedom itself. History, so far as it has the formation of this union as its chief object, would be history in the narrow sense of the word.

The question that now meets us, namely, whether history can be a science, seems to allow no doubt as to its answer. If history as such — and this is the point — is opposed to science as we have generally assumed in the preceding remarks,

then it is plain that it cannot itself be science; and if the real sciences are syntheses of philosophical and historical material, for this reason history itself cannot be such a science any more than it can be philosophy. It would take the same rank, in this respect, as philosophy.

In order that this relation may be seen more clearly, let us consider the different stand-points from which history can be considered.

The highest which we have recognized is the religious stand-point, or that in which all history is conceived as the work of Providence. This cannot be used in history as such, because it is not essentially different from the philosophical stand-point. Of course, it is evident that I do not deny either the religious or the philosophical construction of history; but the former is part of theology,—the latter belongs to philosophy, and is necessarily different from history as such.

The opposite stand-point to that of the absolute is the empirical; which, again, has two sides: that of pure investigation as to what has happened, and acceptance of the same, which is the business of the naturalist who represents only one side of the historian as such; and that of the union of empirical matter according to an identity of the understanding, or, since the latter cannot exist in the events in and for themselves, because these appear empirically, or rather accidentally and not in harmony; or the arrangement according to an end planned out by the subject, which is in so far didactic or political. This treatment of history according to a definite and not a general view is called the pragmatic treatment, in accordance with the meaning of the word as determined by the ancients. So Polybius, who explains himself expressly in regard to this idea, is pragmatic on account of the particular aim of his histories, they being directed to the technicalities of war; so Tacitus, because he traces step by step the fall of the Roman State to the effects of immorality and despotism.

The moderns are inclined to consider the pragmatic spirit to be the highest in history, and to deck themselves with its predicates as if it were the highest praise. But for the very reason of its dependence upon subjective caprice, no one of

sense will put the two historians just cited in the first rank. The German writers of history, with their pragmatistical spirit, are, as a rule, in the condition of "Famulus," in Goethe's *Faust*: "What they call The Spirit of the Times, is their own spirit, in which the times are reflected." In Greece, the noblest, ripest, most experienced minds seized the stilus of history, to write with it eternal characters. Herodotus is a true Homeric soul. In Thucydides the whole culture of the age of Perikles is concentrated in one divine spectacle.

In Germany, where science is more an affair of industry, it is the weakest minds which venture to undertake history. What a disgusting thing to see the picture of great events and characters sketched by a short-sighted, stupid man, especially when he makes a great effort to show off his understanding, and for this purpose, perhaps, explains the greatness of times and peoples by narrow theories, such as the importance of commerce, this or the other useful or dangerous discovery, and, in short, measures everything great and noble with the most common-place standards; or, perhaps, on the other hand he shows his pragmatism by reasoning on the events, or ornamenting his material with empty rhetorical flourishes,—as, for instance, "the continuous progress of man, and what splendid things we have at length achieved!"

Nevertheless, there is among sacred things nothing more sacred than history—this great mirror of the world-spirit, this eternal poem of the Divine Mind. There is nothing which should be kept more carefully from the touch of unclean hands.

The pragmatic aim of history, from its very nature, excludes universality, and necessarily demands a limited object. The purpose to instruct demands a correct and empirically justified connection of events, by means of which the understanding is perhaps enlightened, but the reason remains unsatisfied unless the view is made complete. Even Kant's plan of a history, in the world-citizen sense, purposes a mere construction of history according to canons of public utility, on the whole, and thus to explain what is only to be explained in the universal necessity of Nature. According to his plan, peace fol-

lows war ; finally, the everlasting peace results. From many complications there is to arise true constitutional liberty. But this "plan" of Nature is itself only the empirical reflection of true necessity, just as the purpose of a history ordered in accordance with it should be called, not a "world citizen," but a *citizen* "plan," inasmuch as the progress of mankind is towards peaceful inter-communication, to business and commercial enterprise, and these things are represented as if they were the most precious fruits of human life and its aspirations.

It is evident that the mere connection of events according to empirical necessity can never be anything but pragmatic. But history in its highest idea must be free, and independent of every subjective relation ; hence the empirical stand-point cannot be the highest of its presentations.

True history, moreover, rests on a synthesis of given facts and reality with the ideal ; but not by means of philosophy, since the latter rather abolishes reality and is wholly ideal, while history should be wholly actual, and at the same time ideal. This (perfect union of actual and ideal) is nowhere possible except in art, which allows the actual to exist, as the drama admits real events or histories, but presents them in a complete form and in a unity whereby they become the expression of the highest ideas. Since it is by means of art that history, while it is the science of the actual, as such, is at the same time lifted above the actual to the higher realm of the ideal, to the level of science ; accordingly the third and absolute stand-point of history is that of historical art.

We must now show the relation of this stand-point to what has already been said.

Of course the historian cannot, for the sake of his supposed art, change the matter of history, for the supreme law of history should be truth. Nor can the higher presentation of history neglect the actual connection of events. The case is rather the same as the justification of the actions in the drama, where each follows its predecessor, and finally everything follows of necessity from the first synthesis. The connection of one with the other, however, must not be empirical, but must be comprehensible from a higher order of things.

History does not become complete enough to satisfy Reason until the empiricist causes that satisfy the understanding are used as tools and means of the manifestation of a higher necessity. In such a presentation, history cannot lack the effect of the greatest and most wonderful drama, — a poem conceived by an Infinite Mind.

We have made history the equal of art. But the former presents an identity of necessity and freedom; and this phenomenon, especially in tragedy, is the proper object of our admiration. The same identity is also the stand-point of philosophy, and even of religion, for history recognizes in providence nothing but the wisdom which in the plan of the world unites the freedom of man with universal necessity, and *vice versa*. But, in reality, history rests neither on the philosophical nor the religious stand-point; accordingly it must present that identity of freedom and necessity, in the sense in which it appears, from the point of view of actuality, which it must never lose sight of. But from this point it is recognizable only as uncomprehended and wholly objective identity — as fate. It is not meant that the historian shall talk of fate, but that it should appear in the objectivity of his presentation, itself, and without his aid. In the historical books of Herodotus, destiny and compensation move as invisible but omniscient gods; in the higher and perfectly independent style of Thucydides, who shows dramatic power by the introduction of speeches, that higher unity is expressed in perfect form, and completely revealed.

Regarding the method of studying history, the following may suffice. On the whole, it must be considered as one considers an *epos*, without definite beginning, and without definite end. Taking the point which seems the most significant or the most interesting as the beginning, from this construct and expand the whole in every direction.

The so-called universal histories which teach nothing are to be avoided, but no others have yet appeared. The true universal history must be written in the epic style; hence in the spirit such as we see an example of in Herodotus. Those which are now called universal histories are only compendiums

wherein everything special and important is obliterated. Even he who does not choose history as his special field, should go as far as possible to original sources and particular accounts — these will give him most instruction. Let him learn to love in modern history the naïve simplicity of the chroniclers, who make no pretentious descriptions or psychological analysis of character.

He who wishes to educate himself as an artist of history, let him keep solely to the great models of the ancients, which could never be attained again after the decline of general and public life. If we except Gibbon, whose work has the broad conception, and the complete power to portray the great turning-point of history from ancient to modern, although he is only an orator, not a writer of history, there are none but national historians; and of these, modern times would only name Macchiavelli and Johann Müller.

What heights are to be climbed by one who wishes to delineate history worthily, those who consecrate themselves to this vocation can see from the letters which the latter wrote when a youth. Indeed, everything, all science and art, all that a public life rich in experience can furnish, all must unite to make the historian.

The original types of the historic style are the *epos* in its original form, and tragedy; for if universal history, whose beginnings, like the sources of the Nile, are undiscoverable, loves the epic form and richness, particular history, on the contrary, must be built up concentrically around a common point. It is not necessary to mention that, for the historian, the tragedy is the true source of great ideas and of noble thinking, toward which he must be educated.

We pronounced the formation of an objective organism of freedom or of the State to be the object of history in the narrow sense. There is a science in this, as necessarily as there is a science of Nature. Its idea cannot be derived from experience, for experience itself is created according to ideas, and the State should appear as work of Art.

If the real sciences in general are separated from philosophy only by the historic element, it is also true of jurisprudence;

but only so much of the historical element can belong to science as is the expression of ideas, and consequently nothing which is from its nature merely finite, as all forms of laws which relate only to the external mechanism of the State — where belongs almost the sum total of those laws which are now taught in jurisprudence, and in which is seen the spirit of a public state of affairs dwelling still in the ruins.

In regard to such laws there is no other advice to give but to learn and teach them empirically as it becomes necessary to use them in special cases before the courts or in public affairs, and not to desecrate philosophy by mixing it in things which have no part in it. The scientific construction of the State would, as regards its inner life, find no corresponding historic element in later times, except in so far as a contrary serves as a reflex of that of which it is the opposite. Private life, and with it private right also, have separated from public life; but the former abstracted from the latter have no more absoluteness than there is in particular bodies in Nature, or in their special relation to each other. Since in the entire withdrawal of universal and public spirit from private life, the latter is left behind as the mere finite side of the State, without any vitality, so in the conformity to law, which governs it, there is no application of ideas; the utmost possible is a mechanical ingenuity in bringing forward the empirical grounds of the law in special cases, or in deciding doubtful ones in accordance with it.

The only thing in this science which might be susceptible of a universal-historical view, is the form of public life and its particular determinations as far as they can be comprehended from the antithesis of the modern with the ancient world, and as far as they have a universal necessity.

The harmony of necessity and freedom, which necessarily expresses itself in externality and in an objective unity, differentiates itself in this phenomenon again in two directions, and has different forms according as it is expressed in the real or in the ideal. The complete realization in the first is the perfect State, whose idea is attained as soon as the particular and the general are absolutely one, when everything that is neces-

sary is at the same time free, and all that is free is also necessary. While external and public life disappeared in an objective harmony of both, it had to be replaced subjectively in an ideal unity, which is the Church. The State, in its antithesis with the Church, is the nature side of the totality in which both are one. In its absoluteness, the State would necessarily supplant its opposite (the Church) as an external existence, for the simple reason that it comprehends it; as the Greek State knew no Church, unless the Mysteries are so considered, which were, however, a branch of public life. The Mysteries are exoteric; the State, on the other hand, is esoteric, because in the State the particular dwells in the whole, in relation to which it is the element of difference, but the whole does not also dwell in the particular. In the real phenomenon of the State, unity existed in multiplicity, so that it was completely one with it; with the antithetic relation of the two, all other antitheses included therein make their appearance in the State. The unity necessarily became the dominant power, not in the absolute, but in the abstract form, that is monarchy, whose idea is essentially interwoven with that of the Church. On the other hand, multiplicity or the many must, by its opposition with unity, fall into mere singularity, and be no longer the instrument of the universality. Multiplicity in Nature, as the reflection of the infinite in the finite, and the elevation of the latter to the absolute, is in itself both unity and multiplicity, so in the perfect State, the many, for the very reason that it was organized into a separate world of servitude, was absolute within its limits, the separate and independent real side of the State, while for the same reason the free men moved in a pure ether of an ideal life resembling the life of ideas. The modern world is in all respects the world of participation (intermingling), as the ancient was the world of pure abstraction and limitation. The so-called civil freedom has only the most dismal intermixture of slavery and freedom, but has produced no absolute, and hence free, existence of either the one or the other. The antithesis of unity and multiplicity in the State made mediators necessary, who, however, in the mediation between governing and governed, formed no absolute world,

and existed only as antithesis, but never attained an independent reality peculiarly and essentially their own.

The first effort of one who desires to comprehend the positive science of Law and the State must be this : by means of philosophy and history to create a living conception of the modern world and the necessary forms of its public life ; it can scarcely be imagined what a source of culture could be opened in this science if pursued with an independent spirit, free from regard for utility, and for its own sake.

The essential presupposition for it is the pure construction of the State derived through ideas, a problem of which Plato's Republic has been the only solution. Although we recognize in it the contrast of the modern and antique spirit, this divine work will still remain the archetype and model. Whatever is possible to be said of the true synthesis of the State in the present connection has at least been indicated, and cannot be explained further without the reference to a visible document. I therefore limited myself to pointing out what has heretofore been arrived at and accomplished in the treatment of the so-called Natural rights.

The spirit of formalism and analysis has prevailed more obstinately than elsewhere in this department of philosophy. The first ideas were either taken from Roman law or from some accessible form, so that the law of Nature has gradually passed, not only through all possible instincts of human Nature, but through all conceivable formulæ. By an analysis of the same, a series of formal propositions has been discovered, by help of which it is expected to attain to positive jurisprudence.

Especially have Kantian jurists begun diligently to use their philosophy as the handmaid of their science, and so properly enough always reformed the system of natural rights. This mode of philosophizing shows itself in catching after ideas, no matter of what kind they are, if only they be single and individual, in order that he who has caught them may appear to have a system of his own, because of the trouble he takes to distort everything else into harmony with them ; but it is a system which is soon replaced by others of the same kind.

The first endeavor to construct the State as real organization

was Fichte's Law of Nature. If the merely negative side of the form of government which aims only at security of law could be isolated and separated from all positive institutions for the energy, the rhythmic motion, and beauty of public life, it would be difficult to reach any other result, or to discover any other form of State than is presented in that one. But the emphasis of the merely finite side extends the organism of the form of government into an endless mechanism, where nothing unconditioned is found. And, indeed, all attempts heretofore made may be accused of subordinating their efforts to an endeavor to make a State in order that certain ends might be attained. Whether this end is universal happiness, the satisfaction of the social instincts of human nature, or in something purely formal, as the common life of free beings under the conditions of utmost freedom, is alike indifferent in this connection; for in every case the State is considered as a means, as conditioned and dependent. All true construction is from its nature absolute, and always directed towards oneness, even in its particular form. For example, it is not construction of the State as such, but of the absolute organism in the form of the State. Hence, to construct it is not to conceive it as the condition of the possibility of something external to it. For the rest, if the State is the immediate and visible image of absolute life, it will of itself fulfil all other ends, just as Nature does not exist in order that there may be equilibrium of matter, but this equilibrium exists because Nature is.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

DR. KARL ROSENKRANZ.

The death of Dr. Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz (June, 1879) is announced by the public press. Since 1833 he had occupied at Koenigsberg the same chair of philosophy that the illustrious Kant had occupied. His position in philosophy was in the centre of the three divisions into which the school of Hegel divided after his death. Rosenkranz's expositions of the Hegelian system are characterized by an attempt to bring the same into line with the philosophy of the ancients — a very rational endeavor. His contributions to literature are very extensive — his work on Goethe's Life and the philosophic genesis of his writings, being one of the most noteworthy (extracts from this work were published in the *JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY*, vols. IV and V). His *Science of Pedagogics* (1848) remains still the most scientific work on the subject (translation of the same published in the *JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY*, vols. VII and VIII). His work on *Hegel as German National Philosopher* (the larger portion of it published in the *JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY*) is in the same spirit as the work on Goethe, and an admirable composition.

Recently he has issued from the press of Erich Koschny, Leipzig, autobiographical volumes — *Von Magdeburg zu Koenigsberg* (1873), *Neue Studien Zur Culturgeschichte* (1875), *Zur Literaturgeschichte* (1875), *Zur Literatur und Culturgeschichte* (1877). An extended notice of these volumes awaits publication in this *Journal*. — [ED.]

DR. APPLETON.

The death of Dr. C. E. Appleton, the founder of *The Academy* (London), occurred in Egypt, on the first of last February, after two years of failing health. Dr. Appleton contributed, to *The Contemporary Review* in 1876, two articles entitled "A Plea for Metaphysic," in which he ably considered the brilliant, but negative essays of Matthew Arnold in their bearings on speculative philosophy. In the same periodical, for July, 1874, he had reviewed the theological works of Friedrich Strauss. Mr. Arnold affects an ignorance of accurate thinking, and congratulates himself not infrequently on the incoherence and inconsistency of his ideas, as on an English-

man's privilege. Dr. Appleton showed that this affectation of horror at Metaphysics is accompanied, on Mr. Arnold's part, with a silent appropriation of various metaphysical ideas — used, however, at hap-hazard. He explains and justifies this criticism in reference (1) to Mr. Arnold's negative criticism of current ideas in politics and religion; (2) his assumption and method in applying those ideas; (3) his criticism of the ideas of Descartes, and of other philosophers; (4) his new religious construction — "The eternal not-ourselves that makes for righteousness."

The assumption that "thought and speculation is an individual matter" is shown to be the fundamental disease of the Philistines whom Matthew Arnold has attempted to slay, as well as of Mr. Matthew Arnold himself. "It is the same assumption," says Dr. Appleton, "as that of the individual as something given on the one side, and of experience as something given on the other; and this assumption is itself metaphysical, only it is bad metaphysic; it is a petrified fragment of a metaphysical synthesis, instead of the living whole of a synthesis of the *Zeit-Geist*."

Dr. Appleton had projected (so he informed us, once on a visit to St. Louis) a translation and exposition of Hegel's most profound work — *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*. We hope that his labors in this direction will be given us, even if in an incomplete form, by his literary executors. — [Ed.]

DR. STIRLING AND PROFESSOR CAIRD.

In our October number we expect to publish an article from Dr. J. H. Stirling, in continuation of his article in our January number, wherein we will discuss Kant's idea of causality, in relation to Prof. Caird's interpretation of Kant.

In the same number we hope to print a more extended exposition of Dr. Caird's views on the same subject. — [Ed.]

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.

Prof. B. L. Gildersleeve, of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, issues a circular proposing to start a new journal with the above title. The able editor has received assurances of coöperation from Professors Whitney and Carter, of Yale; Child, Lane, and Goodwin, of Harvard; March, of Lafayette; Short, of Columbia; Green, of Princeton; Boise, of Chicago; Peters and Price, of the University of Virginia; Toy, of Louisville; and Humphreys, of Vanderbilt. The subscription price will be three dollars. — [Ed.]

BOOK NOTICES.

THEISM: Being the Baird Lecture for 1876. By ROBERT FLINT, D.D., LL.D. Published by William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh. For sale by Charles Scribner's Sons. Price, \$3.75.

The high position of the author, and his reputation as a philosophical writer, make the title of this volume a promise of something valuable. In many respects the promise is fulfilled. The spirit of the book, abating only a little petulance, not more than a sentence or so in length, is admirable. It would be difficult to find a fairer statement of the problem in all its issues, and of the temper which its treatment demands, than is presented in the first three lectures. It is a problem for reason, and reason is competent to solve it. Theologies of intuition and of feeling are shown to be subterfuges of an arbitrary faith, which is only another name for unconscious scepticism. True theology is a science, and the crown of sciences, — the science of supreme truth, to which all other truths lead up, and in which they find their unity, as the absolute Reason, whose thoughts are creations, and forever complete their processes in images of its own personality. Theology, therefore, is a progressive science, and moves with the step of all knowledge. Every discovery in the natural, or social, or metaphysical world has a distinct nerve of relations communicating with the central and omnipresent Reason of the Universe. Says Prof. Flint — and he is one of the strictest sect of Scotch orthodoxy: “I have, indeed, heard men say — I have heard even teachers of theology say. — that the knowledge of God is unlike all other knowledge, in being unchanging and unprogressive. To me it seems that, of all knowledge, the knowledge of God is, or at least ought to be, the most progressive. And that, for this simple reason, every increase of other knowledge — be it the knowledge of outward nature, or of the human soul, or of history — be it the knowledge of truth, or beauty, or goodness — ought also to increase the knowledge of Him. If it do not, it has not been used aright; and the reason why it has not been used so must be that we have looked upon God as if He were only one among many things, instead of looking upon Him as the One Being of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things.” With such an estimate of the task he has set for himself, and after so fine a clearing away of embarrassing rubbish, it surprises us that Prof. Flint has not succeeded better. He seems to know what ought to be done, but not how to do it. He would prove the existence and perfection of God, but adopts a method which can never attain to proof. His arguments may confirm the faith of those who already believe, and who would still keep the comfort of believing; but they can never convince a sceptic, who may, and indeed does, use the same method just as logically to defend his scepticism. He looks for evidence in categories that cheat the mind to an endless chase, and leave it spent, in the despair of truth. It is only by a leap out of the category itself, which he still pretends to follow, that he reaches the desired conclusion. In the argument of causality, for instance, he accepts the rule that every thing which happens must have a cause; and since every such cause turns out to be an effect, and the chain would thus run on and on, and never get any nearer a beginning, there *must* be a first cause who is not caused. But why *must* it be? and how is that which *must* be, demonstrated to exist, and to exist in harmony with its own seeming contradictions? This “*must* be” is a sudden flight of need, when the proposal, at the outset, was to foot the

entire distance of proof. Hence the materialist complains, with good reason, that the arguer for a *first* cause violates the terms of evidence. He says: "I have learned not to jump. Science trains me to touch heel to toe, and cover every inch of ground, in my inferences. The most precious truths have been passed over by your long-striding manner of deduction. The diamond-seekers who find the most jewels are the ones who get down on their hands and knees into the mud. Your leap is a leap in the dark, while I can only walk in the light. In the light, I can see that every physical effect has a physical cause: and it is surer footing to believe that this continues the case endlessly, than that it is arbitrarily interfered with at some unknown and unreachable point by an unscientific mystery, by an eternal contradiction." Prof. Flint's effort, excellent as it is in certain qualities, fails—as all like efforts have failed—because of the inadequacy of the method. And, since this is the only method that has been tried in our later English Apologetics, they have never produced any thing better than the special pleading of probability, the vain Babel-building of considerations—cumulative proof, as it is called—whose end is our present confusion of tongues.

If we are not to look upon God as a thing, why should we look for him in a category of things? Yet it is there that the author, who in the early lectures laments such procedure, is found until nearly the end, when he indicates that there is another path which he might have pursued, though with less easy and inviting travel, and doubtless with a smaller company. When will our theologians find out that that other is the *only* path of demonstration? that their reflections about First Cause, Universal Substance, Supreme Being, and Biggest Thing of Things are subjective and formal, satisfactory to no minds but those whose simple faith they strengthen because they appear to establish what they themselves had first disturbed—anointing wounds of their own infliction? Popular proofs, if defective, may be harmful in proportion to their popularity. Better dogmatism outright than weak argument, that brings truth into disrespect.

The task which Prof. Flint has undertaken, and so admirably half-done, remains to be finished. The completion will wait for other tools than those of English, or Scotch, or even of Kantian philosophy. They will be furnished by a logic which not only thinks in categories, but thinks through them; which sees how one category negatives itself into another that is more concrete; how the effect causes the cause to be a cause, as much as the cause makes the effect to be an effect; how, instead of dependence leaning backward only, it leans forward also, and thus props and sustains itself in *Reciprocity* as the union of parts which have no being except in their union as an organic Whole; how the Whole, because it is the Whole, and has nothing outside of it to determine or cause it, must cause or determine itself, and therefore be free—creative—its own aim and the aim of all things which it creates; not substance, merely, but subject; self-conscious, and accordingly conscious of a self, which likewise is conscious of a self that in its turn is conscious of a similar self; and so on, throughout endless generations of rational selves. That logic is the logic of Hegel. Prof. Flint, in the appendix to his lectures, refers to Hegel's *Beweise für das Daseyn Gottes*. He surely has not read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested it.

R. A. H.

A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM. By PHYSICUS. Published by Houghton, Osgood & Co., Boston.

Physicus imagines that he has, by searching, found out the Almighty to perfection, and names him the Persistence of Force. Persistence of Force, we are told,

explains every mystery of matter and of mind. It bolts the categories of theology, and of metaphysics which theology has suborned. Cause and effect, substance and accident, design and will, disappear in its throat. Force is everywhere, and eternal. The apparent diversity of the world—organic, chemic, and mechanical—its many-named things and distinct agents, are the changing moods and masks, of one and the same omnipotence, which never loses a pulse of strength, and in every act remains at home with itself. It is the gravity and light of the stars, and the law of their motion. It is the growth of plants, the instinct of animals, the conscience of men. Every cubic inch of space is crowded with its presence, and has no room to spare for a rival god. Such a god, if he could get room, would have nothing to do but to loaf and look on. None of the old-fashioned arguments against Atheism apply to this new-found substitute for a divine Person. It does not work by chance, but by the necessity of its own nature. It does not make a universe as a piece of handicraft, but is the universe forever, making and unmaking itself. It does not coerce the wills of men, but constitutes them: they are one of Its modes, as heat is another. Even religious sentiment It kindly leaves as a very fine volatility of upward escape—an inner laughing-gas—to ease the hurt of Its own presence upon human life. Therefore let the absolute *It* be seated in the vacant throne of Theism.

But before we bow down to this strange Pronoun, we should like to know a little of Its nature, — to see, at least, the back parts of Its glory. Physicus has told us what It is not, rather than what It is. This description leaves It the absolute Neuter of thought. The Force that persists is not a *thing*, for things perish; nor is it any mere particular force, like electricity, for electricity, as such, passes into heat, or magnetism, or motion, and therein ceases to be electricity. In what, then, does this power, which never perishes like things, nor changes like particular forces, differ from them so as to have a positive attribute of its own, which shall at the same time include all their contradictory characteristics. If particular forces are as inadequate to define it as particular things, why call It Force, rather than Thing. Forces are only manifested in the decay of things, and distinguish themselves by vanishing one into another. But the secret might of the universe persists. Why, then, give to the abiding a name that signifies evanescence? No modifying adjective can prevent the imposture of association in such an *alias*. The stress of the definition is on Force: and popular thinking, which is careless and one-sided, will conceive the universal as one of the family of particulars whose surname it has adopted, while its Persistency will count for little more than an initial.

When Physicus tries to define this abiding totality, he will discover that, having nothing else to necessitate It, It is Its own necessity, and therefore free: that having nothing else to act on, It acts on Itself, and hence creates; that, acting as a totality on each of Its creatures, It thereby manifests Its whole nature on the creature's finitude, and so makes all change, or *progress*, from lack to fulness; that, active and passive—identical with and different from itself—in the same instant, It contains a most unphysical contradiction, the like of which is only found in self-consciousness, where the thinker is his own thought, and the thought, to be correct, must correspond to the thinker's entire energy. Then Physicus will see that in Persistent Force he had stumbled against the feet of Personality, and recognize above him a look which owns his stumbling as a prayer of ignorant worship.

R. A. H.

DIE PHANTASIE ALS GRUND PRINCIP DES WELTPROCESSSES. VON J. FROISCHAMMER, Professor der Philosophie an der Universitaet in Muenchen. Muenchen. 1877. THEO. ACKERMANN.

The object of this work is to introduce a new principle into Philosophy, and to make an attempt to explain, by its means, the development of the universe in all its stages; a principle which makes clear at the same time cognition and Real Being and Becoming, and the Ideal and Real in Existence, and which explains the unity of this existence, as well as the multiplicity manifested therein. A principle of this kind, which suffices all requirements, and which corresponds with the facts to be explained, has not been furnished by any of the previous philosophical systems, all of which suffer from onesidedness. The spiritual and ideal phenomena or facts cannot be explained from realistic principles—that is, from material atoms or mechanically operative forces; and, *vice versa*, matter or physical force cannot be explained from idealistic principles—from spiritual, self-conscious beings. If such an explanation or derivation is attempted, it can be accomplished only by denying one of the two actual factors of the existence of the universe—be it the idealistic or realistic factor—or by causing one of them to be swallowed up, as it were, by the other. It may also be done, however, by simply asserting both to be identical, without proving the identity—as does Spinoza, and as do some modern natural science men and philosophers. The same holds good in regard to the explanation of the unity of the world, and of the multiplicity of the phenomena in the world. Those systems that maintain the unity cannot seriously establish or explain the multiplicity and diversity of the universe, as Spinoza again shows; and those, on the other hand, who maintain multiplicity and diversity are not able to explain the unity of complicated, uniform substances—at any rate, not on natural principles, but only by taking refuge in a supernatural, divine influence or agency. This is clearly shown in the case of Leibnitz, who brings unified order into his monads only by a preëstablished harmony; and is, in point of fact, also the case with Herbert. Again, if the fundamental principle is taken to be logical and rational—for instance, a Logical Idea, as Hegel takes it—we cannot understand how illogical, irrational facts are possible, the occurrence whereof are nevertheless undeniable, at least in human, spiritual life. If, on the other hand, we make the Illogical and Irrational our fundamental principle, as Schopenhauer does with his blind and unconscious will, we do not comprehend whence the Logical and Rational came—which, after all, can also not be denied altogether—and which Schopenhauer himself is compelled to admit as a fact, at least so far as his own philosophy is concerned, in so far as he regards it as true. If, finally, we assume consciousness, as Personality or the Ego, to be the fundamental principle of the universe, we find it absolutely impossible to derive the unconscious from the consciousness thereof as such; while, if we take the unconscious to be that principle, we cannot comprehend how consciousness can arise from it.

Thus the problem remains to discover, if possible, a fundamental principle which will satisfy claims of an utterly opposite nature, and be able to explain all those opposites from its own essence and peculiar nature; a principle which may be shown to be, at least factually, the source of all the multiplicity of facts—even if its own nature should remain incomprehensible—as is really always, in the end, the case in regard to every principle applied by human cognition.

This fundamental principle the author formulates as “Phantasy;” that is, he takes the fundamental principle of the world-process to be in analogy with that

peculiar faculty of the human spirit which is called Phantasy, or power of imagination, or power of representation. In this faculty and its activity we see the original character of the principle which entered into the world-process, and it itself is the subjective and liberated product of the analogous objective creative principle. Of course, Phantasy must here not be taken in the ordinary limited sense, as a faculty whereby we represent things that do not at all exist, or whereby we represent them differently from their actuality. It is true that this faculty also exhibits a chief quality of the world-principle, namely, its creative and plastic faculty; but the other qualities of Phantasy can be explained only when we consider the original significance of the word and the essence and actuality corresponding to it. Phantasy is in fact the faculty, the power, to produce appearances, — that is, to form appearances for our consciousness, or to form images in our consciousness. Now, in this activity of Phantasy it happens that all three opposites, which we spoke of above as insurmountable for the various philosophical principles, appear as cancelled, at least in a formal manner and for our consciousness. Phantasy operates idealistically, and yet at the same time (in a formal way) realistically; for it always creates in consciousness sensuous forms for spiritual contents, fixing and revealing the latter in internal images. On the other hand, sensuous images gain through Phantasy also a spiritual significance. They are spiritualized; as, for instance, in the case of symbols. Hence Phantasy connects the spiritual and the sensuous, and this connecting constitutes essentially its activity. Hence it operates, at least temporarily, for consciousness, in both a realistic and an idealistic way. Again, the opposition of unity and multiplicity is cancelled in Phantasy and its activity; since, while remaining unity, it produces a multiplicity of images or representations, and, furthermore, understand how to gather a multiplicity into a unity. It is both a creative and a synthetic faculty. It furthermore produces for consciousness, from out of unconsciousness, its images or signs, whether the incitation comes from the outward or from the inward (from the depth of the soul itself); and hence it unites the sphere of the Unconscious with that of knowledge. Furthermore, the activity of Phantasy is the ground of the rational as well as of the irrational; it makes possible the realization of logic and of the teleological, while it also contains the possibility of the irrational, arbitrary, and illogical, as exhibited mainly in childhood, before real intellectual activity is aroused. Finally, Phantasy, or the inner power of representation and imaging, is also the incessantly active element in the psychical nature of man. This is specially manifested in the abnormal state of our physical-psychical life — in sickness, dreams, narcotic conditions, etc. But in the conscious state also — nay, even when our mental activity is quite fresh, and works with clearly known intent — the images of our Phantasy obtrude themselves obstructionally, cause our attention to flag, confuse us, and produce, as it were, a permanent conflict between the self-active mind and the unconsciously arising and obtrusive play of divers representations.

Now, if we should succeed in proving that the plastic power of nature, especially in its organic and living products, its plants and animals, works in a like manner and exhibits similar qualities, especially in generation, to those we discover in the Phantasy of man, which is everywhere considered the really creative power in man, we should, at least, have shown a sameness of action and occurrence. But, if it could be further shown that the activity and developing process of the plastic power of nature, or objective Phantasy, produces continually higher, more subjective individuals, and that, in this process of nature, there

occurs a steadily increasing wealth of external form and of internal significance—we should have discovered, indeed, the universal principle of the World-Process, and this principle might be best characterized as Phantasy.

To establish this is the object of the work in question. It is divided into three books, the first of which discusses Phantasy as a special subjective mental faculty, and contains mostly investigations relating to theoretical cognition. The second book shows how objective (real) Phantasy manifests itself in the process of nature and strives to subjectivate and spiritualize itself. Its contents are, therefore, of a natural science character. The third book, finally, seeks to establish how the human mind, how self-consciousness and the fundamental faculties of the mind are formed by the activity of the creative World-Phantasy.

It is impossible to enter here into the details of the investigation; we must content ourselves with a few suggestions concerning the problems treated and the manner of the solution. The investigation proceeds from the ordinary significance of the word Phantasy, and its manifestation or activity. It then shows how the fundamental activity of this peculiar mental faculty is to be found in all spiritual activity as the real motive power, the life-inspiring element, and first condition: in the Will as well as in Feeling, but especially in the faculty of cognition, from the function of the senses upward to the most abstract logical operation. The importance of the (productive) power of imagination in regard to the process of cognition, however, has been already pointed out by Kant, in his Critic of Pure Reason, and introduced in the very central part of that work, in order to utilize the categories and connect them with the sensuous forms of contemplation. He remarks expressly: "This schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their mere form (the transcendental producing of the power of imagination) is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, the true working of which we shall not likely ever discover from nature, or place uncovered before our eyes." In another passage, Kant calls the power of imagination a blind faculty, it is true; but he adds, expressly, that without this faculty cognition would be simply impossible. With the same, nay, a still more emphatic decidedness, J. G. Fichte states this in his Science of Knowledge. He says: "Without this wonderful faculty (the productive power of imagination), positively nothing of the human mind can be explained; and it is very probable that the whole mechanism of the human mind can be easily explained from it." It thus lay near at hand to undertake a thorough investigation of this power of imagination, or Phantasy, since Kant and Fichte had after all not done so, however much use they made of that faculty in their constructions, and emphatically recognized its importance: especially as owing to their neglect to do so it happened that, in the time after Kant and Fichte, Phantasy continued to be generally considered simply as an organ of artistic creation and enjoyment, and turned over to the science of *Æsthetics* for investigation, though also regarded with curiosity as the source of strange conditions and manifestations of human nature. In the activity of cognition there are, mainly, two moments only in which Phantasy manifests itself; we can characterize them as the thetical and the synthetical moments. The formative, as it were creative, power of the mind is needed to posit as well as to cancel, to relate as well as to negate in thinking. It is also necessary for the abstract activity of thinking in the synthetical development and combination of judgments and conceptions. If anything is to be posited or affirmed in consciousness, we need always an image or sign, which is produced by our inner power of imaging; and even in negating, the creative power of the

mind must, at least, formally manifest itself in and for consciousness; for the Nothing, the negation, must itself operate in the mind as a power in order to cancel the positive, and hence in order to produce a specific effect in consciousness. In the same way the inner power of imaging is necessary for the creation of abstract conceptions, which, as such, have no existence at all in actuality, but are formed, or rather conceived, in the mind. Again, the productive and combining power of the mind is necessary in the formation of judgments, the connecting or separating of two thought-elements; for the conceptions and their union must be produced in the mind at the same time for consciousness, and kept hold of for the sake of comparing them and forming a judgment on them. Thus Phantasy, which, to be sure, so far as it shapes things in consciousness that do not exist at all, or shapes things otherwise than as they exist, appears as the source of error, is, nevertheless, also the fundamental condition and organ of the cognition of truth, and, moreover, of logical, real, and ideal truth, all of which forms are elaborately explained in the above work, according to their nature and essence. The ground-forms of truth, and of the cognition of truth, the categories and ideas, proceed also from Phantasy, as Kant has already suggested, and form the leading points of view for the higher power of cognition.

Now, then, arises the question whether this subjective Phantasy, which is so important for the process of cognition, has an original character and principle of its own, or whether it is merely a secondary, derived function of the mind? The investigation here shows that it cannot be derived from any of the other mental faculties, the functions whereof are rather conditioned by it; but that we certainly find everywhere in objective, real nature, in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, certain effects which indicate an analogous, real, formative power, which may well be the source and cause of the analogous, subjective faculty, Phantasy. Thus arises the further problem, whether this objective plastic principle which manifests itself in nature is an original force, a fundamental principle of the process of nature, or is itself produced by other causes, be these substances or physical forces? We have thus arrived at the real fundamental problem, the question concerning the origin of the organic, of life, of sensation, of consciousness, etc., which has excited in recent times so many investigations and disputes between the men of natural science and philosophers for and against materialism, and concerning the correctness or incorrectness of Idealism and Theism. Here, also, an answer has already been suggested by Kant and Fichte, and expounded at length by Schelling and Hegel, the decision being in favor of Idealism. According to Kant's Critic of Pure Reason, time and space are not objective, but subjective forms of contemplation, the things in themselves whereof give, through their effect on us, the material contents of our cognition (experience), whilst the understanding, by means of the categories, furnishes cognition the form. Out of this arises the world of our knowledge, the world of appearances. Now, if this combination of forms of contemplation and conceptions of the understanding, and hence the only possible real cognition, is conditioned and realized by the productive power of the imagination, the world of appearances, so far as we know it, is also essentially conditioned by it. In a more emphatic way this thought appears in Fichte's Idealism. In his view the non-Ego as well as the Ego are products of the Ego; the science of Knowledge is also a science of Being. If, then, Knowledge—that is, the construction of science—is effected by means of the productive power of imagination, Being, or the non-Ego, must be effected in the same way. In Schelling we note already the objective tendency of the view of this world some-

what in his system of transcendental Idealism, and more decidedly in his Natural Philosophy and the Identity System. The formative principle in the process of nature is now real and objective, and not merely ideal and subjective. In Hegel, finally, the objective moment gains even the ascendancy, as the objective dialectic of nature and of the world. It is everything, and subjective thinking, with its formal logic, is the limited, the untrue. The productive power of imagination of Kant and Fichte is thus, to be sure, replaced by the logical idea; but this idea has a real, objective character.

But we have to deal here, not with these general thoughts and constructions, but with the question whether, in objective nature, a formative (plastic) power is necessary and effective for the production of the organic and living formations in all their gradations and kinds. This question has put itself forth in quite a definite form by the revival of materialism, that is, of the assertion that the elementary substances, or atoms, with their physical and chemical forces, suffice to produce, not only life and organisms, but also physical, and, finally, even spiritual functions.

This, of course, involves another assertion, namely, that the first organisms themselves originated through *generatio spontanea*—that is, through the material substances alone—without a special external or internal principle of formation. To refute these assertions, it was necessary to prove that neither organization generally, nor life, sensation, and consciousness can be explained merely out of material substances and mechanical forces, and that a *generatio spontanea* can be neither empirically demonstrated nor artificially produced. In fact, of late the most prominent men of natural science acknowledge, more and more generally, that at least sensation and consciousness cannot be explained from the physical and chemical qualities of the material substances, and from merely mechanical movements. They are, therefore, of opinion that we must assume a special quality in the material atoms, a faculty of sensation, which lies concealed in them, but becomes actualized and manifest when the substances are properly combined and formed. But, in granting this, natural science recognizes the assertion of a special peculiar principle, from which life, sensation, and consciousness originate, the only difference being that we represent this as a universal, original unit-principle, while the men of natural science represent it as pluralistic, and posit it in their (very problematic) material atoms.

This universal, real-effective, but, in the manner of the human Phantasy, plastically and teleologically formative principle, is thus established as the original principle, from which all organic and living formations of nature are derived, even the human mind itself, and its peculiar formative and creative faculty, Phantasy, from which the investigation took its start.

To represent this process of formation and development of the universal principle, or of the creative World-Phantasy, at least in its general features, and thus to show how the particularization of this principle, immanent in the world itself, or the concrete formations of the world, become more and more internal, psychical, and hence subjective; this is the object of the second book of the above work. In analogy with all development and all known facts of paleontology, it is to be assumed that this formative world-principle was at first itself in a condition of universality and undeterminedness, or of a certain indifference, and that it only gradually concentrated itself into concrete forms, thereby always developing itself to a higher degree. This, of course, also involved a continual withdrawing and distinguishing of itself from the material substances and the merely physically

effective power, but on no account a real separation: since we can never think the principle without force and material substrate, and hence without a real basis. At the very beginning of organic development, therefore, nature resembled already, on the whole, an organism, though an undeveloped and unarticulated organism. Its differentiation and development into the infinite fulness and multiplicity of plants and animals occurred only gradually, and not according to mere chance, or mere external relations, but under the rule of a law of formation. Hence it is the theory of descendance which lies at the basis of this work; and due recognition is also made of Darwin's theory of transmutation, although it is not held to be fully sufficient to explain the species in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, which indeed needs a teleological and ideal law for their explanation. This ideal law must at the same time be understood as a fundamental impulse, immanent in nature, by virtue of which the whole development of nature strives, not only after an infinite multiplicity of external forms, but also after an *internalizing*, through which nature seeks to get hold of itself in the individuals, to find itself in them, and to enjoy their rationality, their lawfulness, and purposefulness. This occurs, above all, in the culture and activity of the senses and the sensory nerves. Both result from the teleological and ideal impulse of nature, which is inherent in the fundamental principle as a law or rule, and are organs of rationality itself, which strives after self-perception. The senses are already in their arrangement a work and expression of the understanding. By their activity, which is not merely receptive, but really active, and as it were creative, they reveal a sphere of existence which would not be open to us otherwise: for instance, the sphere of life and color through the eyes, and that of tones through the ear. Here, then, we have already a self-perception of nature, which not only the individual sees and hears, but which nature itself reveals unto itself; since in its own immanence and unity seeing and hearing is realized. It is similar in regard to sensation. We do not derive sensation from the material atoms and their combination, but from the teleological or rational essence—from the lawfulness of nature. For sensation is conditioned by this: that in a given individual, internal, normal relations receive a change from parts or moments, which is either beneficial or harmful to that relation. This, by the by, gives rise to the feelings of satisfaction (joy) or dissatisfaction (pain), and is everywhere applicable. In a being that is wholly uniform, without any relation, sensation is impossible; since no change can take place in a being that is utterly uniform and indifferent. If we wish to ascribe sensation to material atoms, we must endow them with an articulated, rationally, or teleologically arranged internality—that is, we must represent them no longer as mere atoms, but as organic formations, in the way of Leibnitz's monads. We cannot, therefore, escape the assumption that sensibility is conditioned by teleological arrangement, which is an expression of rational and ideal lawfulness, in such a way that sensitive organisms have a feeling of what ought to be and what ought not to be; by which exposition we obtain, and have furthermore revealed to us, an ideal moment accompanying material occurrences. Sensibility and sensation itself gives us the basis of internality and of the larger part of psychical culture, which in animals manifests itself especially in their impulses and instincts, but develops even in them already into a sort of intellectual capacity, and a capacity of feeling. We cannot discuss this matter here more at length, and must refer to the exposition of the work itself. One important circumstance in the process of development, however, must be mentioned: the propagation and transmission of culture through generation. Real, objective

Phantasy, namely, or teleological plastical power of formation, manifests itself in the process of generation, by which a continuation of that which is organic and living, as well as a development and higher grade of both, is transmitted. But gradually psychical life arises out of both, and in it appears more and more, as the higher development rises, Phantasy as a subjective condition: at first still in a latent state in the instinct, but next also as a free faculty of representation; still limited, however, altogether to its own existence and life. And thus we have suggested the transition, or the potentializing, of the formation of the creative World-principle for the production of the nature of man and the spirit of man.

The third book treats of the human mind itself, and attempts to explain its origin and qualities from the action of Phantasy, as the fundamental principle of the World-Process. The first point is to explain the higher independence of the human soul, in comparison with the animal souls; and, next, self-consciousness. Both are conditioned by the psychical organism, which forms itself on the basis of physical-psychical organization, and which, to be sure, does not manifest itself in human nature all at once and unmediated, but can be found in its traces and beginnings already in the higher animal world. This psychical organism, it is true, develops itself out of the physical world as a soul by means of the *real*-working Phantasy, which becomes subjective, and finally a subject; but it grows independent—that is, capable of self-consciousness and of an independent Will—only by means of liberated and formal-working Phantasy—that is, of Phantasy in the limited sense of the word. For Phantasy, as a formative (plastic) principle, works *real* only in intimate conjunction with physical laws, and is in so far subjected to the lawfulness and necessity of nature. But gradually, and as the animating principle of the body, it grows ever more concentrated and independent; so that, even in the animals, it elevates itself, as it were, above the organism, so that it can determine the organism no longer merely through impulses (as *causæ efficientes*), but also through representations (*causæ finales*), making it in so far already capable of the application of Will and arbitrariness. But in human nature this principle, as soul, has, so to speak, a superabundance of power, which liberates man from the compulsion of natural laws, manifests itself in arbitrary activity, and operates as subjective, or subjectivistic, Phantasy. This appears clearly in the character of children, in whom the real mind is as yet altogether Phantasy, and breaks out in arbitrary plays and games, changing things as whim dictates, and in accordance to fictitious images, and paying no heed to any law of nature. The mind, having become liberated, takes a pleasure in rising above all ordinary lawful occurrences, and, disregarding the laws of nature and of logical thought, manifests itself thus in games, stories, fairy tales, etc. By this sort of play the mind strengthens itself in its independent power; and, after having absorbed considerable experience, and various kinds of spiritual food out of history, the psychical organism rises over that of the body, and the soul, gifted with consciousness, enters self-consciousness, and becomes spirit, or personality, with the Ego as its centre.

For, since consciousness has no longer the merely eternal—nature and bodily existence—for its contents, but is now based on the psychical organism, it presently arises into self-consciousness, which knows nothing of bodily functions (at least not directly), but only of psychical being and working. This psychical organism, gradually grown up, as it were, out of the physical organism, is not a simple, uniform being, but has its own inner articulation. It is a unity of faculties, that manifest themselves in various functions and activities, and which are,

therefore, designated different fundamental faculties of the mind. It has been justly deemed proper to point out three such fundamental faculties in the one (unit) spirit or mind: the faculty of feeling, the faculty of cognition, and the power of the will; for this triplicity is also found in all real things, and especially in the physical organisms. We distinguish matter as their real substrate, form as their determining law, and force as their executive power. All three moments together constitute their essence or substance—taking the latter word in the Aristotelian sense, as an individual being, composed of matter and form. Thus, the mind, in spite of the unity of its essence, embraces a multiplicity of moments or forces, which, far from endangering its real unity, actually condition it; for the merely in itself uniform constitutes only a mass, but not a true unity.

We have not time here to enter at length on the genesis and modes of activity of the separate spiritual faculties, and must, therefore, refer to the work itself, wherein they are elaborately set forth—feeling, especially, being treated very fully. So far as the faculty of cognition is concerned, a definite distinction is made between the understanding and reason: the former representing the *logical* power of the mind—the faculty of forming judgments, conceptions, and conclusions—and the latter the faculty of feeling and cognizing *ideal* truth. Both faculties are explained, not merely in regard to their nature and contents, but are, in accordance with modern requirements, developed in their genesis and growth; since they, also, surely do not spring suddenly into existence without mediation. They, also, are determined in their genesis, as well as in their functions, by the plastic power of Phantasy. The understanding arises, to state the matter in a few words, through the union—marriage, as it were—of Phantasy with the universal laws and forms of Being, from which the laws and the universal forms of thinking, and hence the laws of logic and the categories, arise in the spiritual subject. In a similar way, Reason is genetically constructed by the union of Phantasy and the Ideas. For the ideas, like the universal laws, have not arisen suddenly into existence; they lie concealed in the depths of existence as eternal truths, and are only shaped and revealed by Phantasy. They are thus existent in the human soul, primarily, as capacities or faculties, or as germs that spring into activity and development only by means of a corresponding influence. The Ideas express an eternal being—truth, beauty, the good, etc. They have not been arbitrarily elaborated, or adopted through habit, use, common agreement, or force, in a manner as if they could just as well be otherwise than they are; but they express something necessitated in its being, as well as in its essence—something which cannot not be, and which cannot be otherwise than it is. So far as the Will is concerned, it is true that in the great World-Process it develops itself from the physical-psychical organization, and especially from the impulse; but the power working by means of it receives in the psychical organism, through the free element of Phantasy, a basis for self-determination, or independent decision. It can thus not only determine itself by representations, and arise above mere impulses and instincts like the animals, but is able to give unto itself its self-determination from the depths of its own essence: that is, it can determine itself from out of the psychical organism, and the central point thereof—the Ego. But this sort of freedom is also not something that has suddenly, and without mediation, arisen in the human mind: it likewise, only in a much more imperfect degree, pervades all nature. For the World-Phantasy conceals an element of freedom which, in conjunction with the lawfulness of nature, produces its infinite multiplicity and its most remarkable forms.

These are the main contents of the above work, in brief outline. At its close appears, however, an investigation into the relation of Phantasy to some abnormal conditions of human nature, dreams, somnambulism, spiritism, and diseases of the mind. On this we cannot dwell any longer; but, in conclusion, would meet an objection that may be raised against the main argument of the book. The mind, it will be noticed, is represented as the creature, or product, of the World-Phantasy—nay, as part thereof, since itself has entered the World-Process in a way, and no longer stands above it; and yet this same mind, which has been formed in its Essence by Phantasy, in conjunction with the laws of nature, is again endowed with Phantasy as its special faculty. How, then, can the mind distinguish itself from its special faculty? In the same manner in which the bodily organism, which is a product of the power of generation, is distinguished from that Power which the organism itself possesses, and manifests in new generations. Thus, the mind is the product of Phantasy as the World-Principle, but possesses at the same time Phantasy as a mental power of production. In fact, all creations of the human mind are possible only through the activity of subjective Phantasy; and human history, with all its great spiritual achievements and advances in language, religion, art, morals, etc., is essentially conditioned by it—a matter which the author promises to develop in a future work on the same subject.

[The foregoing notice of the remarkable work of Dr. Frohschammer was furnished, at our request, by a friend of the system residing in Germany, and translated by Mr. Kroeger. It is, one will perceive, the polar-opposite of the system of Schopenhauer. While the latter makes Will to be the fundamental principle of the world, and sets up the doctrine that *Vorstellung* (which includes the intellectual activities, and might be called Phantasy, as in this book) is a derivative faculty, created by will for a specific end. On the contrary, Dr. Frohschammer makes Phantasy the fundamental principle, and the evolver of all else. Schopenhauer's system, founded on the Will alone, ends in Pessimism; and so every system that lays great stress on the Will is like to do. Even Calvinism contain elements of pessimism, because it emphasizes the Will and human responsibility. The doctrine of eternal punishment—of endless hell—is a figurative expression of Will utterly free—so that all its deeds return wholly to itself (without the interposition of grace, without the interposition of the mediation of human society, or the human race, between the individual and his deed).

Dr. Frohschammer's theory, it would seem from this, ought to be optimistic. For its application, we shall await with interest the appearance of his promised new work on the subject.—EDITOR.]

THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD, AND COGNATE THEMES IN THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. By L. D. McCabe, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Ohio Wesleyan University. Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Welden. 1878.

The position of the author as briefly stated by Dr. Hurst, who writes the introduction to this book, is: "That universal prescience is incompatible with human freedom; that there can be no tenable system of theology, or of moral philosophy, based upon that doctrine; but that the whole Christian system may be made consistent, defensible, and satisfactory by the denial of it; and that all the doctrines and prophecies of Scripture are plainly reconcilable with such denial."

"The important distinction," says Dr. McCabe (chapter XXI.), "between the action of a free will and the movement of a material force is, that every event in the domain of the latter has a necessary antecedent, whereas a volition has really

no antecedent. It has precedents, but those precedents involve nothing coercive, or necessary, or uniform. There is in them nothing that can indicate with certainty a particular choice; nothing that can afford omniscience any certainty as to the future production of that volition, of which there are, and can be, nothing more than the occasions.

“The moment we admit that the precedent of a volition is of such a nature as to afford omniscience ground for absolute certainty as to that volition, that moment we annihilate, to all human discrimination, the distinction between freedom and the great law of cause and effect, and we introduce confusion into our thoughts; that instant we logically destroy human freedom, accountability, and the possibility of a divine moral government. True, the human will requires reasons, motives, considerations, and even temptations, as the occasions of its rewardable exercise. But these are always numerous, various, and uncoercive. There can be nothing coercive in the character of the precedents of those choices which entail endless destiny, if a man is a free agent.” “Between the antecedent of an effect and an occasion of a volition there is, and there can be, therefore, no element of resemblance or oneness.”

The difficulty, it will be noticed, which leads to the denial of foreknowledge lies in the assumption that causality is the supreme condition of what is foreknown; hence it is inferred that the products of a free activity transcend the sphere of foreknowledge. If one replies: “God sees the act as free, but he sees it in and by and through that particular influence that is finally the occasion of the choice and of the volition,” Dr. McCabe answers: “If a foreknowledge of a volition is obtained through perceiving the final desirability which will, in fact, prove to be the occasion of that volition, this does not in the least relieve the great difficulty. We do not, and we cannot, remove volition from the category of the action of cause and effect. In so doing we remove the cause of the determination of the will from the subjective to the objective, and then from the objective we estimate the movement of the subjective.”

Every human being, according to this doctrine,—

* * * “Contains
 A something that defies precalculation,
 Exhausts all motives known to sense and reason,
 All likelihoods, all probability,
 And in the event disables the conclusion;
 For Reason, though it placed the stake correctly,
 'Tis Madness casts the die. There is not space
 In the wide universe of amplitude
 Sufficient to swing the balance, wherein
 To weigh the sequence of one puny act.”

Still another view might be presented:—

If we consider for a moment the conditions under which prediction, or foreknowledge is possible, do we not find two very different grounds?

A knowledge of the totality of conditions which determine the being of any somewhat that is under fate or necessity—*i.e.*, is externally constrained—will give us a knowledge of its future. A knowledge of the objects and aims of a free being, combined with a knowledge of the means or instrumentalities that he has to work with, gives us sufficient ground to foreknow what he will do; and the more free the being, both in purpose and instrumentalities, the more certain is our foreknowledge of his course of action. The less his degree of insight, and the

more capricious his purposes — so much the less possible is it to predict his action on the grounds of freedom. But, on the contrary, it becomes easier to predict his career from external circumstances; for, just in proportion to the lack of insight and the dominance of caprice in a being, the same is under the control of external circumstances.

Just because God is perfect Insight and perfect Will, and uses perfect instrumentalities to realize a perfect purpose — it is possible for us to foreknow his action, in proportion as we ourselves grow in ability to penetrate the universal and necessary nature of perfect knowledge and will, and the final cause of the world. We are able to be most certain about God's action, because he is perfectly free. His actions, being partly free, and partly controlled by outside fate for the reason of man's imperfect insight and imperfect will, are to be foretold partly on grounds of freedom and partly on grounds of fate, or natural laws of cause and effect. Causality is the law of external constraint — that of nature and fate. *Final cause*, or teleology, is the law of freedom. Causality appertains to the relation of dependence on others; final cause to independence and self-determination.

That the law of final cause transcends the law of cause, and is its logical condition, is the great insight of Aristotle, and the true basis of all spiritual explanations of the universe.

God's knowledge being perfect, both as to the subsidiary laws of causality as the world of mere nature, and also as to the transcendental laws of freedom and self-determination, is equal to perfect foreknowledge of necessitated events, of free events, and of events that partake partly of one and partly of the other category.

However this may be, we may thank Dr. McCabe, in behalf of the theological public, for his candid discussion and clear statement of the issues involved in the question.

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Contents: Chapter I. — General argument in favor of a proportionate or symmetrical development, and against the common practice of cultivating individual bias, *i. e.*, disproportion. The vulgar error refuted that intellectual power is in proportion to the number of subjects acquired, or that quantity is of greater importance than quality. Chapter II. — The modifiability of human nature renders its symmetrical development or rectification possible. Chapter III. — The transfer of power from one part of the system to another. A balanced or equable distribution of power amongst the faculties to be aimed at. Chapter IV. — The right constitution of the preparatory or educational setting-up schools of the kingdom. With *addenda* on technical education.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

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1. The Talmudic Proofs of Jesus' Existence. 2. Who was Jesus? 3. The Distinction between Jesus and Christ. 4. The Moral Estimate that Leading American Spiritualists put upon Jesus of Nazareth. 5. The Commands, Marvels, and Spiritual Gifts of Jesus Christ. 6. The Philosophy of Salvation through Jesus Christ. 7. The Belief of Spiritualists and the Church of the Future. By J. M. Peebles, M. D. London: James Burns. 1878.

A PLEA FOR CANDOR IN BIBLE-READING; OR, SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE BIBLE EXAMINED. By a Citizen of Jackson, Tenn. (William T. Hamilton, D. D.) Jackson. 1878.

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LOI GÉNÉRALE DE L'ÉVOLUTION DE L'HUMANITÉ.

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Address to the Members of the Society of Anthropology at Paris, by Professor Émile Acolas, October 5, 1874.

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L'ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE ET LE DROIT.

Address'd to the Members of the Society of Political Economy of France, by Professor Émile Acolas, October 20, 1874.

ON SOME DISPUTED POINTS IN PHYSIOLOGICAL OPTICS. By Henry Harts-horne

I.—On the Theory of Erect Vision, with Inverted Retinal Images. II.—On *Estuition* as a new Term in Psychology. III.—On Ocular Color Spectra, and their Causation. A paper read before the American Philosophical Society, April 21, 1876.

INDEX TO THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY. Volumes I—XXXVIII (1857–1876). Boston: H. O. Houghton & Co. New York: Hurd & Houghton. Cambridge: The Riverside Press. 1877.

I.—Index of Articles: (a) General Articles; (b) Editorial Departments. II.—Index of Authors.

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I.—Index of Subjects. II.—Index of Writers. By William Cushing, A. B. (late assistant in Harvard College Public Library). Cambridge: Press of John Wilson & Son. 1878.

BULLETIN No. 39 AND BULLETIN No. 40. October, 1876, and January, 1877. pp. 115 to 184. Boston Public Library.

Containing, among its bibliographical notes, a special list of reference works on the History of Mental Philosophy. I.—General Histories of Philosophy. II.—Ancient Philosophy Generally, and Oriental Philosophy. III.—Greek and Roman Philosophy. [*To be continued.*]

THE JOURNAL
OF
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. XIII.]

OCTOBER, 1879.

[No. 4.

TIME AND SPACE CONSIDERED AS NEGATIONS.

BY PAYTON SPENCE.

“Two hypotheses are current respecting them (Space and Time): the one, that they are objective; the other, that they are subjective. To say that Time and Space exist objectively is to say that they are entities. The assertion that they are nonentities is self-destructive. * * * By implication, to call them nothings involves the absurdity that there are two kinds of nothings. * * * We cannot think of them as disappearing even if every thing else disappeared. * * * Extension and Space are convertible terms; by extension, as we ascribe it to surrounding objects, we mean occupancy of Space; and thus, to say that Space is extended, is to say that Space occupies Space. * * * (We find ourselves) totally unable to imagine bounds beyond which there is no Space. * * * We are under like impotencies in respect to Time. * * * Shall we, then, take refuge in the Kantian doctrine (that Time and Space are subjective)? * * * The direct testimony of consciousness is that Time and Space are not within, but without the mind. * * * They cannot be conceived to become non-existent, even were the mind to become non-existent. * * * It results, therefore, that Time and

Space are wholly incomprehensible. * * * The abstract of all sequences is Time. The abstract of all coexistences is Space.”¹

The above embarrassments are the traditions of metaphysics. They almost persuade us that we know nothing about Time or Space. Yet we handle the words as freely and as familiarly as we do the words, man, tree, house, or any of the commonest words of our language; the most uneducated persons using them apparently as judiciously as the most highly educated—every body, in fact, seeming to know all about them, except the metaphysicians. We think that the metaphysicians have mystified the subjects by endeavoring either to put into them what does not belong to them, or else to take from them that which is their real constituent.

It happens in this case, as it has happened so often before in the discussion of unsolved questions, that much of the confusion which seems inseparable from the subjects, Time and Space, is caused by the want of an accurate nomenclature. It is true, there are words enough in use to express all that can be said about those subjects; but they are used with unsettled, fluctuating meanings, and interchangeably with each other, so as to be, in many respects, a hindrance rather than an aid in the attempted solutions of the real or imaginary difficulties of the subjects. This will more plainly appear from the manner in which the nomenclature pertaining to the discussion of Time and Space is handled in the following quotations from several distinguished modern authors: “Extension and Space are convertible terms” (Spencer); “Extension is only another name for Space” (Hamilton); “Time or succession is the simpler fact” (Bain); “Movement *in vacuo* is unable to indicate the vital difference between succession and coexistence—Time and Space” (Bain); “Our consciousness of Space is a consciousness of coexistent positions” (Spencer). Of course, there can be neither an elaboration nor an expression of precise thought upon any subject without precise and well-defined words.

¹ Spencer's First Principles.

With the above preliminary considerations, we proceed to the elucidation of our subject.

A Negation is the absence of any subjective or objective reality. An Affirmation is, of course, the subjective or objective reality itself. Thus, darkness, silence, rest, etc., are Negations of light, sound, and motion, respectively; and, on the other hand, light, sound, motion, are the Affirmations or the realities themselves. It is evident that a Negation must bring into consciousness simply the absence of its corresponding affirmation, and nothing more. Of ordinary correlatives, such as whole and part, father and son, etc., each one of the terms brings into consciousness something more than the absence of the other; therefore neither of them is a Negation, but both are Affirmations. It is but repeating the same thing, in a little different form, when we say that a Negation must not bring into consciousness any other absence but that of its corresponding Affirmation. Thus, while nothing is a Negation—meaning the absence of all things or of every thing—yet the Negations darkness, silence, rest, etc., are not nothings. To make darkness a nothing, would be to make it call up into consciousness the absence of every thing, whereas it should call up into consciousness the absence of light only; and so of silence, rest, etc. Therefore, to regard all Negations as nothings is to confound totally different elements of thought, by making a consciousness of the absence of any one thing the same as the consciousness of the absence of any other thing, because it makes the consciousness of the absence of each thing the same as the consciousness of the absence of all things. Hence the error into which Spencer seems to have fallen in indirectly stating that Negations, being mere nonentities, may be used interchangeably. His language is as follows: “If, in such cases, the negative contradictory were, as alleged, ‘nothing else’ than the negation of the other, and therefore a mere nonentity, then it would clearly follow that negative contradictions could be used interchangeably: the Unlimited might be thought of as antithetical to the Divisible; and the Indivisible as antithetical to the Limited.”¹ If Nega-

¹ Spencer's *First Principles*, p. 90.

tions were nothings, one could be substituted for another in the processes of thought; but we have seen that such is not the case; and, therefore, neither darkness, silence, rest, nor any of the true Negations can be used interchangeably. A Negation, as an element of thought, has a merely relative value or significance, which can be estimated or determined by reference to its Affirmation, and to that alone.

If, in imagination, we blot out of existence the two cosmical constituents, matter and mind, we have, of course, their absence or their negation. But what are the mental residua which we find in consciousness, when both matter and mind are supposed to be annihilated. We ordinarily call them Time and Space. We cannot possibly conceive of any thing except Space and Time remaining in consciousness when we suppose matter and mind to be annihilated, or, in other words, when we suppose matter and mind to be absent from consciousness; nor, on the supposition of the annihilation of matter and mind, or of their absence from consciousness, can we then, by any possibility, banish Space and Time from consciousness, because they are Negations, and, like all true Negations, can only be displaced in consciousness by the presence there of their Affirmations. This displacement, however, cannot be brought about; because matter and mind are supposed to be annihilated, and thus irrevocably banished from consciousness. There is nothing unique and mysterious, as is often erroneously supposed, in this persistence of Space and Time in consciousness and this inability to annihilate them in thought, even if we suppose every thing else to be annihilated. Darkness persists in the same way, if we suppose light to be annihilated; and we cannot then banish it from consciousness even by a supposed annihilation of every thing else; and the same is true of every proper Negation. A Negation can be displaced, in reality or in thought, only by the presence of its Affirmation; and, in this respect, Space and Time are true Negations.

Our discussion of Space and Time, considered as Negations, would be incomplete, however, without a separate consideration of Space as the Negation of matter, and of Time as the Negation of mind.

We can have no other consciousness of Space but that of

the absence of matter ; and we can have no other residuum in consciousness but that of Space when matter is absent. If we watch the movements of our own mind, when we endeavor to call up the idea of Space, we find that the effort consists simply in banishing or absenting matter from our thoughts ; for while matter is present, Space cannot be ; and, on the other hand, if matter be negated or banished from our thoughts, Space becomes the inevitable resultant of that very absence of matter — a resultant which irresistibly persists in consciousness as long as (and because of) the continued absence of matter. Space, however, is often regarded as the “continent” of matter — a blank reservoir that can be filled with matter ; and, therefore, it is believed that both can exist at the same time, in the same place. A little observation and reflection will make it clear that such a coexistence is as impossible in reality, or even in thought, as the coexistence of light and darkness. If we look at any material object — a book, for instance — we cannot imagine that there is any Space where the book is. Sound does not fill silence, nor does light fill darkness ; the one simply displaces the other ; and in the same sense, and for the same reason, matter does not fill Space, but only displaces it.

A Negation cannot be negated. A Negation being the absence in consciousness of some reality, a further continuance of the negating effort or process only intensifies the present Negation, by making us more distinctly aware of its presence in consciousness. In this respect Space is a Negation, as we have already seen. It persists in consciousness, in spite of all our efforts simply to negate it or banish it from thought ; we can only be got rid of it by calling up into consciousness its Affirmation, matter. Though it will be anticipating what belongs to a subsequent part of this discussion, we may as well call attention to the fact that Time, as we have already seen, cannot be negated, and in this respect resemble, the true Negations.

Darkness begins where light ends, and ends where light begins ; and the same is true of silence and sound, motion and rest, and of all undisputed Affirmations and Negations. They mutually limit each other. A similar relation exists between

Space and matter. Hence Space is extended as well as matter ; the extension of Space being defined by its material boundaries, and the extension of matter by its Space boundaries. Extension, being thus predicable of Space as well as of matter, is not properly an attribute of either matter or Space, but is, strictly speaking, a phenomenon of the relation the one to the other. Therefore, matter in the absolute (matter unrelated, and hence unrelated to Space) could have no extension ; and Space in the absolute (Space unrelated to matter) could have no extension. This enables us to understand the nature of the confusion into which Spencer, Bain, Hamilton, and others seem to have fallen in saying that "extension and space are convertible terms." Space being the Negation of matter, and extension being the limitation of matter by Space, or of Space by matter, they have confounded an element of thought with its relations.

Having seen that the imaginary annihilation of both matter and mind leaves the Negations, Space and Time, as the only possible residua in consciousness ; and having, moreover, seen that one of those residua, Space, is the Negation of matter, it follows that the other residuum, Time, must be the Negation of mind. In confirmation of this inevitable inference, we present the following considerations.

As we said in the beginning of this discussion, the nomenclature of this branch of our subject, like that of Space, is unsettled ; so that it frequently happens, when the word time is used, even in attempted analysis of the subject, nothing more is meant than duration, or, perhaps, succession. Thus, the words time, duration, and succession being often used as synonymous, if either is ever used in its proper, restricted sense, we can only learn the fact from the context. The point to which we now wish to call attention is, that the word Time is sometimes used to represent the Negation of mind : and we think it should always be used in that sense. When the word Time is used without qualification, meaning time without relations, or when the expressions, "Time in the absolute," and the "duration of Time," are used, what meaning does the word carry? Time in the absolute means Time unrelated. But the only thing to which Time can be related is

that something which can limit or define its duration ; and as mind is the only thing which can limit or define the duration of Time, therefore mind is the only thing to which Time can be related. Hence, Time in the absolute means Time unrelated to mind — Time in the absence of mind, and because of that absence — Time as the Negation of mind. While in the expression, “Time in the absolute,” the word means Time *unrelated*; on the other hand, in the expression, “the duration of Time,” the word means Time *related*. The duration of Time does not mean the duration of duration ; but it is a legitimate form of expression, like the phrase, “the extension of Space,” and grows out of the relations between Time and mind ; that relation, like the relation between matter and Space, being one of mutual limitation — Time beginning when mind ceases, and ceasing when mind begins. Without such limitation, Time would be absolute. Any attempted analysis of the subject, therefore, that confounds the duration of mind, which is a conscious duration, with the duration of Time, which is an unconscious duration, confounds things that are as wide apart as consciousness and unconsciousness — mind and not-mind.

We have already defined Space to be the Negation of matter, and extension to be the limitation of matter by Space, or of Space by matter. We now present the corresponding definitions of Time as the Negation of mind ; and of duration as the limitation of mind by Time, or of Time by mind. As to the terms coexistence and succession, it is evident that they both convey the idea of a break in the continuity of extension on the one hand, and of duration on the other. Coexistence, then, may be defined to be an alternation of extended matter with extended Space ; and succession, an alternation of the duration of mind with the duration of Time.

A few general remarks will bring this article to a close.

A Negation and its Affirmation mutually explain and interpret each other ; nor can they be explained or interpreted by any thing else. He who has been blind from birth has not the faintest conception of that darkness in which he forever dwells ; and if, from birth, he had been immersed in perpetual light, it would have been just as meaningless and just as unin-

telligible to him as his present state of unrevealed darkness. If we imagine a person to have been immersed forever in light, and then imagine it to be for the first time withdrawn, we can realize that now, but never before, he knows what light really is; and that neither science nor philosophy could by any possibility have brought light to his consciousness, and made it a definite element of thought, as is instantly done by the simple presence of its Negation, darkness. The most complete explanation and interpretation that can be made of an Affirmation is to say that it is the Affirmation of its Negation; and the most complete explanation and interpretation that can be made of a Negation, is to say that it is the Negation of its Affirmation. Negations and Affirmations are, therefore, coequal and coextensive elements of thought, running parallel with each other; and no one of either series can become an element of thought until it is revealed to consciousness by its opposite.

Do matter and Space, mind and Time, mutually explain and interpret each other in the same way that the undisputed Affirmations and Negations do? If we ask ourselves, what is matter? and endeavor to answer the question without the introduction of Space into consciousness, we may seem to succeed because familiarity with the subject renders our mental operations so rapid and so automatic that we either lose sight of, or are in no wise conscious of, the Space element in the process. But if we imagine a person to know absolutely nothing, and if we further imagine that the only impression which has ever been made, and is still being made, upon his consciousness, without break or interruption, is that of the resistance of matter, how can he know what matter is by that resistance, since it is impossible for him to understand the resistance itself? But remove that resistance, and now he understands it by contrast with its absence—its Negation. And so we might go through with all the so-called attributes of matter, and show that we cannot know any one of them except by contrast with its absence—its Negation. This is tantamount to saying that we can only know matter by Space, as the absence of all the attributes of matter leaves Space as a residuum in consciousness.

In the same way, mind can be revealed only through its Negation, Time. Consciousness is the constituent of the mind. To realize consciousness, or mind, our states of consciousness must be obliterated; and then, as we return from the unconscious to the conscious state, we realize them both by their contrast; but the obliteration of conscious duration, the duration of mind, leaves unconscious duration, or the duration of Time; or, in brief, the obliteration of mind leaves Time; and mind, rising out of Time, has both itself and its Negation revealed by their contrast.

In conclusion, it appears that the principles of Affirmation and Negation are coextensive with consciousness, and are the essential elements of all mental phenomena. All the phenomena of mind, from the simplest sensation up to the most complex intellectual operation, are but states of consciousness, simple or complex. Now, we have already seen that the simplest state of consciousness, if perpetual, would be no better than a state of perpetual unconsciousness. The latter would be tantamount to annihilation; the former would be the same. Hence the simplest form of consciousness, or mental life, must consist in an alternation of a state of consciousness with a state of unconsciousness—a regular rhythmical revelation of the Affirmation, consciousness, by its Negation, unconsciousness, and *vice versa*. We might call it a pulsation, or an undulation of the constituent of the mind, provided such an expression did not fasten upon us a premature theory as to the nature of that constituent. Perhaps it would be safer, for the present, to call it a pulsation, or an undulation of the brain, or a vibration of the molecules of the brain, paralleled in consciousness. This pulsation or vibration is, of course, very rapid; otherwise, we would not have to infer its existence, but would know it by perceiving the alternations of one state with another. We may make it to some extent perceptible, however, by interfering with the regularity of its rhythm, as by making a determined, persistent effort to retain any state of consciousness for a length of time. Thus, if we fix the eye upon any object, and try to keep up a steady, unbroken consciousness of it, we will find that, in spite of our most determined efforts, the mind will

alternately flash off and on the object, and we catch ourselves losing our consciousness of it, and then returning to it. If the experiment be persevered in, it ultimates in a certain bewilderment and confusion of mind, as well as of vision; and, during brief intervals, not only does the object cease to be visible, but the mind seems to go out. The simplest state of consciousness, therefore, of which we are susceptible has its dual elements—its Affirmation and its Negation; and as all other states of consciousness, even the highest and most complex, are aggregates of such simple states; and as the complex must retain the dual character of the simple, and, like the simple, must have its affirmative and negative elements, therefore Affirmation and Negation are the dual foundations of mental life, and the essential elements of all thought, feeling, emotion, and volition.

COTTAGE HYMNS.

BY WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING.

I. OUR COTTAGE.

My cottage dear, my cottage home,
 Around thee spread the greensward fields;
 Then let my happy fancy roam,
 Such inward peace thy presence yields.

I cannot pine for learning's store;
 Nor wealth, nor might, nor fame ask I.
 My palace is the opening door,
 Where softest falls the bending sky.

Afar, I feel thy gray roof shine,
 When hastening from the woods at eve;
 A beam that draws time's firmest line
 For my "*sweet home*" ne'er will deceive.

Then give to men more roofs like this,
 Blest genius of domestic grace,
 And may their hours dance on in bliss,
 Like thoughtless youth, a buoyant race.

II. THE BELOVED.

In thy loving eyes I see
The rich landscape of the South :
And sweet Merey's breath to me,
Murmurs from thy rosy mouth.

And thy steps light graces give,
Joys that tread upon the sky ;
Softened virtues in thee live,
Such as in the angels lie.

III. OUR POVERTY.

Of our small store love we to give,
And share our want with those that need,
For who can grateful feel and live,
Unless his pains enrich his deed.

Gold may not purchase laughing health,
Nor joyful talk, nor passions calm :
And from our home I reap more wealth
Than in the alchemist's great charm.

Our simple tastes adorn the time,
And thankfulness feeds more than splendor ;
A cheerful mind, a healthy prime,
Can more than short-lived falsehood render.

Our torches' flame the watchful stars,
Our carpets nodding reeds prepare,
Our banners — not the spoil of wars,
But green trees whispering to the air.

IV. FOREST HYMN.

Heavily, heavily falling,
Rushes to earth the tree,
Afar the echoes are calling
Thro' the forest to me, —
“When labor is o'er and daylight's done.
We shall be going at set of sun.”

We have parted the strand that Time
Wove in his loom of air,
Interrupted the prime,
And severed the oaken hair,
Yet its ashes enrich the land again.
Time will deal so with you — careless men !

You, also, heavily falling
 Down to your bed of clay,
 While the tearful clouds are calling
 To them in the house of day, —
 “As in the woodland crasheth the tree,
 So the tall trunks of humanity!”

V. CHILDREN'S DANCE.

Dance around the red wood-fire,
 Faster, as it rises higher;
 Dance and sing, a merry ring,
 While your life flies on the wing.

In your frantic merriment,
 Ye have taken to my tent,
 And the care-encircled brow,
 Smooths to feel your sunshine now.

As a warm wind feeds the flowers
 In the fresh-robed Spring's green hours,
 As the willows on the stream
 Dancing in their verdant dream,

So, small revellers, caress
 Me, with your light-heartedness.
 In our cheerful cottage-hall,
 Glorious is your festival.

VI. HYMN OF THE HEARTH.

This good I ask, — a humble mind
 That prizes God's perpetual care,
 A gratitude His mercies find
 Unsleeping, bent in reverent prayer.

For me, the heaped wood blissful sings
 Soft fancies to the frosty wind,
 And briskly raised, the keen axe rings,
 Tho' forests dark are left behind.

The flickering shadows dance and play
 Upon the dim, the twilight wall,
 And much romance endears the day
 That ventures in our cottage-hall.

The tale so light it charms the time,
 Some memory of a friend's kind deed,
 The summer of a warmer clime
 Within our glowing coals we read.

VII. ABSENCE.

My toiling feet o'erpass the rough hill's crest,
Surging its mighty billows far and near,
Yet onward must I, nor conceive my rest,
Till I have clomb that purple atmosphere
So faintly pictured on the horizon far,
Where day is sealed by eve's first crystal star.

Then, in a stranger's home I rest the night,
Nor list upon the sweet lips thy soft voice,
Repeat in eloquent numbers the delight
Which makes the thankful heart with love rejoice.
I see the wood-fire blaze, — O not for me;
I hear their joyful talk, — 'tis no society!

VIII. THE SUNSET.

To mark the Day sink calmly down,
While burning hills to shadows fade,
How deep are Nature's sympathies,
How soon her mute demands obeyed!

She braids the softening twilight's trees,
The gentle shade dissolves the light,
Her noiseless wheels all faintly roll,
Unheard the dewy dance of Night.

And view his western palace flame,
Where dwells the Prince of fruit and flower:
Our lowly aspects bound the pride,
The glories of his dying hour.

Who boasts his richer heritage?
Our cottage windows brave the west.
Who feasts his eyes on robes more rare?
We see day's Monarch drape for rest!

IX. STORM IN SHELTER.

Hear the wild, rushing blast!
And the sky is o'er-cast
While the rain washes o'er
The brown fields of the fall,
And the bare trees whose pall
Frost is weaving once more!

Wail louder gray breeze
Thro' the murmuring trees,

Thou seem'st music for me,
 So sweet is my pleasure
 At hearing thy measure
 In the dear cottage lee.

On the green ocean-tide
 Where the mariners bide,
 There is death in thy rage.
 At home thou art lending
 Repose, and art sending
 Calm thoughts o'er my page.

X. EVENING LIGHTS.

From the lone night you take
 Part of the solitude away,
 And gleam above the brake
 With sheltering, hospitable ray.

Pale evening lights! man's soul,
 Thus in his solitary hour,
 Gleams forth and points the scroll
 Of an else darkened fate, with power.

I see your rays divide
 The ploughman's shelter, — near, his wife,
 Weaving, with ruthless pride,
 Fit emblems of the stoic life.

And all around is still!
 Save the low phantom of day's sound;
 You kindly mark the vanished hill,
 You scatter ruby hopes around.

XI. HOPE FOR SONG.

Come to me, once again, sweet power,
 Pour from my mind the stream of song,
 And dress life's transitory hour
 In during fabrics rich and strong.

As thro' the trees some roaming gale
 With fitful murmurs bends the soul,
 As onward drives the snow-white sail,
 Yet in the mariner's control,

Thus, spirit that in waking dreams
 Fills with its harmony the day,
 Arise and light with kindling beams
 The hopeful music of my lay.

XII. THE DREAM.

I dreamed the summer wind blew cold;
I dreamed that youth and age were vain, —
That I was young, who now am old,
When spring nor hope will bloom again.

In nature's secret some are blest;
From time's strange lesson should I learn,
If old myself, there's youth imprest
On fresher hearts, to pulse and burn.

A few, short years and I shall be
Where all I loved has sunk to sleep, —
In Nature's arms, fit company
For careless Ages, buried deep.

If those we trust desert their trust,
If those we love despise and wound,
To-morrow we are formless dust,
Swept like the dry leaves off the ground.

HEGEL ON ROMANTIC ART.

[TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND PART OF THE ÆSTHETIK.]

BY WM. M. BRYANT.

III. Destruction of the Romantic Form of Art.

The final point which still remains to be established is : That as the Romantic has already proven to be essentially the principle of the dissolution of the Classic Ideal, so now it permits this dissolution to stand forth in fact clearly *as dissolution*.

The first thing which here presents itself for consideration is the complete accidentality and externality of the material which the artistic activity seizes, and to which it gives form. In the plastic character of Classic Art the subjective inner nature so permeates the external that the latter is the exclusive form of the internal, and cannot be separated from it as an independent term. In the Romantic, on the contrary, where internality withdraws itself into itself, the entire content of the

external world attains to the freedom of proceeding independently, and of maintaining itself in its own peculiarity and particularity. On the contrary, when the subjective internality of the soul becomes the essential element for the representation, it is of like accidentality in what particular content of external actuality and of the spiritual world the soul dwells. The Romantic inner principle is able, therefore, to present itself under all conditions whatever, and to adapt itself to thousands upon thousands of conditions, circumstances, relations, errors and perplexities, conflicts and reparations; for it is only its subjective formation in itself, the manifestation and mode-of-assimilation (*Aufnahmsweise*) of the soul, not an objective and independently significant content, which comes to be sought and should be valued. In the representations of Romantic Art, however, everything has its place—all spheres of life and phenomena, the greatest and the least, the highest and the most restricted, the moral, the immoral and base; and the more art becomes secularized, so much the more does it take up its abode in the finite things of the world, conceive a preference therefor, procure for them complete validity; and the artist is fortunate in them when he represents them as they are. Thus, for example, in Shakespeare: while with him the acts, in general, flow on in the closest connection, there also appears throughout a certain phase pertaining to the accidental which is thrown in here and there. All objects, indeed, have their value, from the highest regions and weightiest interests to the most insignificant and non-essential—as, in Hamlet, the night-watch near the king's castle; in Romeo and Juliet, the domestics; and elsewhere, not to mention buffoons, clowns, and every species of commonplace of daily life; * * * just as in the religious circle of Romantic Art, with the birth of Christ and the adoration of the kings, ox and ass, crib and straw must not be omitted. And thus it proceeds throughout, so that even in art the word is fulfilled: That which is abased shall be exalted.

Within this accidentality of the objects (which partly, indeed, take their place in representations as a mere wrappage for an essentially more important content, but also, in part,

independently) the *ruin* of Romantic Art, of which we have already made mention, is fully brought to light. On the one side, namely, real actuality, presents itself in its *prosaic objectivity*, considered from the standpoint of the Ideal. It is the content of ordinary daily life, which is not seized in its substance (in which there is something moral and divine), but which is seized in its changeableness and finite transitoriness. On the other side it is subjectivity, which, with its feeling and thought, with the right and the might of its native talent, knows how to raise itself to the mastery of all actuality, which it does not permit to remain in its accustomed relations, and at the value which it possesses for the ordinary consciousness. It is, besides, contented only in so far as all that enters into this realm proves itself, through the form and position given it by subjective opinion, caprice, or originality, to be, in itself, destructible, and, for the perception and sentiment, destroyed.

In the first place, therefore, we have in this respect to speak of the principle of those numerous works of art in which the mode of representing the ordinary present (*Gegenwart*) and external reality approaches to what we are accustomed to describe as "imitation of nature."

Secondly, we must consider subjective humor, which in modern art plays an important rôle, and, with many poets especially, presents the fundamental characteristic of their work.

Thirdly, there remains for us, in conclusion, only to indicate the standpoint from which art is still at the present day in a position to be exercised.

1. *Of the Subjective Artistic Imitation of the Immediately Present.*—The circle of objects which may be comprised within this sphere extends itself without limit, for art does not here take for its content the essentially necessary, whose circle is closed in upon itself, but rather it takes accidental reality in its unrestricted modification of forms and relations—nature and its widely varied play of individual images, the daily actions and pursuits of men in their natural necessities and their comfortable satisfaction, in their accidental customs, conditions, activities of family life, of civic occupations, and,

generally, the incalculably changeable in external objectivity. Thus art becomes not merely (as the Romantic is throughout in greater or less degree) portraiture; but it permits itself to enter completely into the execution (*Darstellung*) of portraits, whether in sculpture, in painting, or in the representations of poetry, and returns to the imitation of nature; in fact, to the deliberate approximation to the accidentality of immediate existence which, taken in itself, is ugly and prosaic.

The question presents itself, therefore, whether such productions generally are still to be styled works of art. If by this we have present to our minds the conception of works of art in the sense of the ideal, strictly speaking, and with which there is to do, on the one hand, with a content which is not essentially accidental and transitory; on the other, with the mode of representation absolutely corresponding to such content, then the products of the present phase must, in respect of such work, unquestionably fall short. But art has still another element, which is here of especial importance; it is the subjective mode of conceiving and executing the work of art—the side of individual talent which knows how to cause that the truly substantial life of nature, as well as the forms of the spirit, even in the uttermost extremes of accidentality to which these extend, shall remain constant; and which also knows how, through this knowledge, as well as through the most admirable skill in the representation, to render that significant which, for itself, is destitute of significance. Along with this there comes, besides, the subjective vivacity (*Lebendigkeit*) with which the artist, with his spirit and sensibility (*Gemüth*), devotes himself to the existence of such objects conformably to their entire internal and external form and manifestation, and presents such existence in this animation for the imagination. In this respect we cannot refuse to productions of this class the title of works of art.

To enter more into detail, it is chiefly poetry and painting which, among the special arts, have turned toward such objects. For, on the one hand, it is the essentially particular which here provides the content; and, on the other hand, it is the accidental (though, in its circle, genuine), peculiarity of the external

world which must here serve as the form of the representation. Neither architecture, nor sculpture, nor music is capable of meeting such a requirement.

a. In poetry it is the usual domestic life, which has for its substance the probity, practical wisdom, and morality of the day, that is represented, in ordinary civic transactions (*Verwicklungen*), in scenes and characters from the middle and lower classes. Among the French, Diderot in particular has, in this sense, striven after naturalness and the imitation of what is immediately present. With us Germans it was Goethe and Schiller who, in their youth, though in a higher sense, entered upon a similar path, but who sought within this vital naturalness and particularity after a deeper content, and after conflicts essentially richer in interest. Then came Kotzebue and Iffland. The one sought to portray the daily life of the time through his superficial rapidity of conception and production; the other, through his serious exactness and commonplace morality, in the prosaic, more restricted relations, and with little of the sense of true poetry. But, in general, our art has, though only in the latest times, taken up this tone by preference, and has attained to a masterly performance therein. For a long time art was to us, more or less, something foreign, borrowed,—not an original production. But in this turning to present actuality there lies this necessity: that the material for art shall be immanent, native (*heimisch*),—the national life of the poet and of the public. Upon this point of the appropriateness of art, which with us must be native absolutely, in respect both of the content and of the representation, even though it be at the sacrifice of beauty and ideality, the tendency which led to such representations is now fairly established. Other peoples have rather disdained such spheres, or are coming even now, for the first time, to have a genuine interest for such material, taken from daily and commonplace existence.

b. If, however, we would have present to our minds that which is the most worthy of admiration of all that can be accomplished in this respect, we must turn our attention to the *genre* painting of Holland. I have already, in the first

part of this work, in considering the Ideal as such, pointed out the substantial basis of this class of art, upon which basis it arises in accordance with the universal nature of spirit. With the Hollanders, satisfaction in the present things of life, even in the commonest and smallest, results from this: that what nature furnishes to other peoples immediately, these have been able to acquire only through severe conflicts and stubborn toil; and, shut up within a narrow space, they have become great in the care and preservation of the smallest things. On the other hand, they are a people of fishermen, sailors, burghers, peasants; whence they have learned thoroughly how to estimate the value of the necessary and useful in the greatest and in the least things, all which they know how to construct with the most assiduous industry. In religion — and this constitutes an important feature — the Hollanders were Protestants, and it belongs to Protestantism alone to settle down wholly in the prose of life, and to permit this to be valued for itself, independent of religious interests (*Beziehungen*), and to develop in unrestrained freedom. To no other people, placed in the midst of different conditions, would it occur to make of such objects as the Dutch painters present to view, the chief content of works of art. But in all these interests the Hollanders have not lived in the sorrow and poverty of existence and oppression of spirit. They have themselves reformed their Church, — have overthrown religious despotism, as well as the Spanish temporal power and the grandezza; and have, through their activity, their industry, their valor, and their economy, come to possess the feeling of a freedom which they owe only to themselves, and have at the same time attained to prosperity, a comfortable competency, probity, courage, a joyous gaiety, and even to the haughtiness of a tranquil daily existence. This is the justification of the choice of their objects in art.

A deeper meaning, which proceeds from an essentially valid content, cannot be satisfied with such objects. But if emotion and thought are not satisfied with them, they at least gratify the more immediate sensuous intuition; for it is the art of the painting and the skill of the artist by which we are

to be delighted and charmed. And, in fact, if one would know what painting is, he must examine these little pictures. It is then that he will be able to say of this or that master: *He can paint*. Hence, it is no part of the artist's task to give us (in his production, and through a work of art) a conception of the objects which he presents to us. Of grapes, flowers, stags, trees, dunes; of the sea, of the sun, of the sky; of dress and ornament; of the implements of daily life; of horses, warriors, peasants; of smoking; of pulling teeth; of domestic scenes of the most various kinds,—of all these we have, in advance, perfectly adequate conceptions. Nature presents us the like in abundance. What is to charm us, then, is not the content and its reality, but the semblance (*Scheinen*), which, with respect to the object, is wholly destitute of interest. Similarly, the semblance is fixed for itself, as such; and art is a masterly power for the representation of all the secrets of this self-within-self-concentrating semblance of external phenomena. Art consists especially in seizing, as if by stealth, the world as it lies at hand in its particular phases, and yet also in its vitality, which is quite in harmony with the universal laws of appearance; and, again, it consists in laying hold of the instantaneous, thoroughly changeable lineaments of the existence of this present world, and in truly and faithfully retaining and fixing the fleeting. A tree, a landscape, is already for itself some thing fixed and abiding. But the glitter of metal; the shimmer of a well-lighted cluster of grapes; a vanishing gleam of the moon, of the sun; a smile, the expression, so rapidly effaced, of an effect produced in the soul; comic gestures, attitudes, expressions of countenance; all that is most fugitive, most fleeting—to seize all this, and to cause it in its fullest vitality to continue present to the imagination, this is the difficult task of this stage of art. If Classic Art, in its ideal, gave form essentially only to the substantial, so here, changing nature, in its passing manifestations—a stream, a waterfall, a foaming sea-wave; still-life, with the chance gleam of glass, plate, etc.; the outer form of spiritual actuality in the most incidental situations, a woman threading a needle by a light; a camp of bandits in accidental

bustle; the most momentary phase of a gesture, which again swiftly changes; the laughter and grinning of a peasant, subjects in which Ostade, Teniers, and Steen are masters — is here seized and made present to our view. It is a triumph of art over transitoriness, in which even the substantial or spiritual comes to be deceived respecting its power over the accidental and fugitive.

Since, now, semblance as such here furnishes the essential content of the objects, art, while it gives permanence to fleeting appearance, goes still further. Indeed, apart from the objects, the means of representation become for themselves an end; so that the subjective skill and handling of the means of art is raised to the rank of an external object of the work of art. Even the early Netherlanders studied most profoundly the physical [qualities and effects] of color. Van Eyck, Hemling, Schoreel, knew how to imitate the gleam of gold, of silver; the brilliancy of precious stones, silk, velvet, fur, etc., even to the point of deception. This masterly power of producing the most striking effects through the magic of color, and the secrets of its spell, now assumes an independent value. As the spirit, by thinking and reasoning, reproduces the world itself in imagination and thought, so now, apart from the objects themselves, the subjective re-creation of externality in the sensuous elements of color and light come to be the principal facts. It is, as it were, an objective music — tones in color. Indeed, if in music the individual tone is, when isolated, nothing, but only produces effect in its relation to another — in its oppositions, correspondences, transitions, and blendings — so with color the same thing occurs. If we examine closely the appearance of a color which [a little removed] gleams like gold, or presents the lustre of lace, we see only somewhat whitish, yellowish strokes and points — only a colored surface. The individual colors, as such, do not possess this brilliancy which they [unitedly] produce. It is their juxtaposition that causes this gloss and glitter. If, for example, we take Terburg's satin — each fleck of color is, for itself, a dull gray, more or less modified by white, blue, or yellow; but at a certain distance the beautiful, mild glow which belongs to the

actual satin makes its appearance. So also with velvet, with the play of light, with the vapor of the clouds, and, in general, with all that comes to be represented. It is not the reflex of the soul which will be brought out in the objects, as is, for example, often the case in landscapes, but it is the entire subjective ability, which gives proof of itself in this objective manner as the capability of the medium itself, which, in its vitality and creative-energy (*Wirkung*) appears able to produce through itself an objectivity.

c. In this way the interest for the represented object undergoes this change: that it now comes to be the pure (*blanke*) subjectivity of the artist himself that thinks to present itself. Here, then, the point of concern is not the formation of a work that shall possess an independent interest on its own account; rather it is a production in which the *subject* [or individual intelligence] creating it only presents himself to view. In so far as this subjectivity no longer relates to the external means of representation, but only to the *content* itself, art becomes by this means the art of caprice and humor.

2. *Subjective Humor*.—In Humor, it is the person of the artist which presents itself to view, in accordance with its particular as well as its deeper phases; so that thus it deals essentially with the spiritual value of this personality.

a. Since, now, humor does not appoint for itself the task of permitting a content to unfold and take shape objectively in accordance with its essential nature, and to artistically complete and finish itself in this development within and from itself; and since it is rather the artist himself who enters into the material, his principal activity consists in the permitting or causing all that would render itself objective, and win a fixed form of actuality, or which appears to possess it in the external world, to fall asunder and to perish; and this he does through the power of subjective fancy, flashes of wit, or striking forms of conception. Whence every phase of independence of an objective content, as well as of the essentially firm connection of the form [with the content] — such connection being given through the fact — is annihilated; and the representation becomes only a play with objects, a derange-

ment and perversion of the material, as well as a rambling hither and thither, an extravaganza of subjective manifestations, views and demeanor, through which the author loses sight both of himself and of his objects.

b. The natural illusion here is to imagine that it is very easy to construct pleasantries and witticisms upon self and every thing present, and hence the humorous form is frequently grasped after; but it also frequently happens that the humor is spiritless when the individual permits himself to wander in the caprice of his whimsies and jests, which run on without connection into the indefinite, and join together the most heterogeneous things in heedless, fantastic fashion. Some nations are indulgent toward this sort of humor, while others are more severe. With the French the humorous, in general, makes little progress; with us it succeeds better, and we are more tolerant respecting deviations [from what is customary]. Thus, for example, Jean Paul is with us a popular humorist; and yet, more than all others, he seeks to produce effect by *bizarre* associations between objects farthest removed from one another. He throws together, pell-mell, objects which have no relation except in his own imagination. The tale, the content and progress of events, is in his romances the least interesting portion. The chief thing, always, is the strokes and sallies of humor. Each theme is made use of only as an occasion for the author to display his subjective wit. In this acceptance and combination of materials collected from all parts of the world, from all the regions of reality, humor retrogrades to the symbolic, where significance and form likewise lie asunder, except that now it is the mere subjectivity of the poet which rules over the material as well as over the significance, and combines them in a wholly arbitrary manner. But such a succession of capricious conceptions fatigues us presently, especially when it is demanded of us to penetrate with our imagination into the often scarcely decipherable combinations which have floated accidentally before the mind of the poet. With Jean Paul in particular, metaphors, sallies, witticisms, clash together and mutually destroy each other; it is a continual explosion, with which we are only dazed. But

what is to be destroyed must first have been developed and prepared. On the other hand, when the individual is essentially destitute of the germ and content belonging to a soul of true objectivity, humor readily falls into the sentimental, into false sensibility, of which Jean Paul likewise furnishes us an example.

c. To true humor, which will hold itself altogether aloof from this excrescence, there belong, therefore, much depth and wealth of spirit, in order that what has an appearance of some thing merely subjective may be brought into prominence as actual and full of expression, and that the substantial may be caused to rise out of its accidentality, out of mere caprice. The self-abandonment (*Sichnachgeben*) of the poet in respect of his manifestations must, as with Sterne and Hippel, be a *naïve*, easy, simple throwing off [of thought], which, in its unpretentiousness (*Unbedeutenheit*), gives precisely the highest idea of depth; and since these are particulars which spring up without order, the inner connection must lie so much the deeper, and cause the luminous point or focus of the spirit to shine out in these very particulars themselves as such.

With this we have arrived at the conclusion of Romantic Art, at the standpoint of the most recent time, whose peculiarity we can find in this: that the subjectivity of the artist stands above his material and his production, since it is no longer dominated by the given conditions of an already essentially determined circle of content as well as of form, but holds in its own power, and subject to its own choice, both the content and the mode of embodying the same.

3. *End of the Romantic Form of Art.* — Art, as we have thus far considered it, has for its fundamental principle the unity of significance and form, and, thus, the unity of the subjectivity of the artist with his wealth of conception (*Gehalt*) and production (*Werk*). More precisely, it was the definite modè (*Art*) of this union which supplied for the content and its corresponding representation the substantial norm pervading all images. In this respect, at the commencement of art in the Orient, we found spirit to be not yet free for itself. It was still in the natural that spirit sought an Absolute, and hence it conceived

the natural as in itself divine. Later, the imagination of Classic Art represented the Greek gods as unconstrained, animated individuals, and yet, at the same time, as essentially encumbered with the human form as with an affirmative element. Finally, Romantic Art enabled the spirit, for the first time, to penetrate into its own internality, in opposition to which the flesh—outer reality and temporality in general—was at first esteemed as nugatory, notwithstanding the fact that the spiritual and Absolute had been able to make its appearance only in this element; and yet at last the external and secular knew how, more and more, to secure recognition (*Geltung*) in a more positive way.

a. These various modes of apprehending the world constitute religion, the substantial spirit of peoples and epochs, and permeate both art and all other spheres of the actual, living present. Since, now, every man in each field of activity—whether political, religious, artistic, or scientific—is a child of his time, and has the task of perfecting the essential content and the form necessarily belonging thereto, there thus remains for art the task (*Bestimmung*) of finding for the spirit of a people the appropriate artistic expression. So long as the artist is inwoven in immediate identity and firm faith with the characteristic of such conception of the world and with such religion, so long this content and this representation constitute for him matters of the most genuine seriousness; that is, this content remains for him the infinite and true of his own consciousness—a content with which, in accordance with his innermost subjectivity, he lives in original unity—while the form in which he sets forth the same is for him, as artist, the final, necessary, and highest mode of bringing the Absolute and the soul of objects in general into [the range of] sensuous perception. It is through the substance (immanent in himself) of his material that he comes to be bound to the definite mode of exposition. For the artist then bears immediately in himself the material, and therewith the form belonging to the same, as the very essence of his existence, which he does not imagine, but which he himself *is*; hence he has only the labor of causing this genuine reality to become objective, of setting it forth

from himself, and of bringing it to completion [as an external image]. Only then is the artist completely inspired for his subject-matter and for the representation; and his inventions come to be in no wise a product of caprice, but spring forth in him and from him, out of this substantial ground, out of this source, the content of which will not rest until it has attained, through the artist, to an individual form commensurate with its idea. On the other hand, if we would now make a Greek god, or, like the Protestants of to-day, the Virgin Mary, an object of a work of sculpture, or of a painting, there is for us, with such material, no real seriousness. It is the innermost faith which is wanting in us, even though the artist, in times of still undiminished faith, did not need to be what is commonly called a pious man. And, indeed, artists have not, in general, always been the most pious persons. The demand is merely this: that the content shall constitute for the artist the substantial, the innermost truth of his consciousness, and provide for him the necessity for the mode of representation. For the artist is, in his production, at the same time a natural being; his skill, a *natural* skill; his efforts are not the pure activity of comprehending, which puts itself wholly in opposition to its material, and unifies itself therewith in free thought, in pure thinking, but, as not yet liberated from the natural side, unites immediately with the object, believing in it, and, according to its very self, identical with it. For, if the subjectivity lies wholly in the object, the work of art likewise proceeds from the undivided internality and force of genius; the production is firm, flexible (*umwankend*), and the full intensity is preserved therein. This is the fundamental condition upon which art presents itself to us in its totality.

b. But, again, when we consider the position which we have found it necessary to assign to art in the progress of its development, we find that the entire relation has become completely changed. We must not, however, look upon this as in any wise an accidental misfortune by which art has been overtaken from without, through the unhappiness of the time, through the prosaic sense [of the people], through lack of interest [on their part], etc. Rather it is the result and

progress of art itself, which, while it brings to light for the sensuous perception the material dwelling within itself, furnishes [at the same time] upon this self-same way, through each step of progress, a contribution toward freeing itself from the represented content. Whatever, through art or thought, is so completely present as object to our sensuous or to our spiritual eyes that the content is exhausted — that *all* is made present, and nothing remains of the dark and hidden — can no longer possess an absolute interest for us; for interest finds place only in fresh activity. Spirit exerts itself upon objects only so long as some thing secret, some thing unrevealed, remains in them. This is the case so long as the material is identical with ourselves. If, however, art has rendered explicit upon all sides the essential conceptions of the world which lie within the idea of art, and [has also brought into representation] the phases of the content belonging to these conceptions of the world, then is it [art], once for all, dissolved for this particular people and this particular time, and the genuine need of taking it up again awakes only with the need of assuming a hostile attitude toward the hitherto solely valid content; as in Greece, for example, Aristophanes placed himself in opposition to his own time, and Lucian arose against the whole Greek past, and in Italy and Spain, with the close of the Middle Ages, Ariosto and Cervantes began to combat chivalry.

Now, in contrast with the period in which the artist, through his nationality and his time, in accordance with his substance, stands within a definite conception of the world and its content and forms of representation, we find an absolutely opposite standpoint, which, in its complete development, has first attained to importance in modern times. In our day, with almost all peoples, the cultivation of reflection, of criticism — and, with us Germans, freedom of thought also — has seized likewise upon the artists, and (in respect both of the matter and of the form of their productions, after the necessary particular stages of the Romantic form of art have been passed through) converted them, so to speak, into a *tabula rasa*. The state of being bound to a particular con-

tent, and to a mode of representation suitable for this material alone, is for the artist of to-day a thing of the past; and art has by this means become a free instrument, which he can make use of equally, in proportion to his subjective ability, in respect to each content, of whatever class it may be. Thus, the artist stands above the definite, consecrated forms and images, and moves freely for himself, independent of the content and mode of conception in which, till now, the holy and eternal was present to consciousness. No content, no form, is any longer identical with the internality, with the *nature*, with the unconscious substantial essence of the artist. Every material may be of like importance to him, so long as it does not violate the formal law of being, in general, beautiful and suited to an artistic treatment. At the present day there is no material which in and for itself stands apart from this relativity; and if, besides, it is also sublime, there is at least no absolute necessity that it should be brought into representation by *art*. Hence the artist assumes the same relation to his content or subject-matter, in the whole, as that assumed by the dramatist toward his, and who brings upon the scene others — personages foreign to himself — and expounds them. True, he now introduces his own genius, weaves throughout from his own material; but [the result is] only the universal on the one hand, or, on the other, the accidental. But, again, the more precise individualization is not his own. Rather, in this respect, he has recourse to his fund of images, types (*Gestaltungsweisen*), earlier art forms, which, taken for themselves, are indifferent to him, and only assume importance when they appear to him as the most suitable to precisely this or that material. Besides, in most of the arts — especially in those of visible representation — the object comes to the artist from without. He works to order, and has now only to accept from sacred or profane history what is there already at hand for him — scenes, portraits, church-building, etc. For, however much the artist may inweave his own soul into the given content, the latter, nevertheless, always remains to him a material which is not, for itself, immediately the substantial of his own consciousness. Nor

does it any the more avail to substantially appropriate, so to speak, the past modes of viewing the world; that is, to wish to establish oneself in one of these modes of view — as, for example, to become catholic, as has been done by many in recent times on account of art, in order to fix their souls and to enable the definite limitation of their representation to become for itself self-sufficing and independently existing. There is no necessity that the artist should first feel the need of coming into a state of purity with reference to his own soul, and that he should be concerned respecting his own salvation. His great, free soul must, before it enters upon production, know and possess, from the centre outward, that whereon it exists, and be secure and confident in itself. Especially does the great artist of the present day require the free culture of the spirit in which all superstition, and all faith which remains limited to definite forms of sensuous perception and representation, are reduced to mere phases and moments or elements over which the free spirit has made itself master; since it sees in them no essentially and independently sanctifying conditions of its exposition and mode of imagery, but only ascribes value to them through the higher content which, by a sort of re-creation, it introduces into them as commensurate with them.

In this way every form, as well as every material, is at the service and command of the artist whose talent and genius are now essentially freed from the earlier limitation to a definite form of art.

c. If, finally, we ask what is the content and what are the forms which at this stage may be considered as *characteristic*, the following presents itself [as the answer]: —

The universal forms of art were related, first of all, to the absolute truth to which art attained, and found the origin of their division in the definite conception of that which, to the consciousness, assumed the character of the Absolute, and bore within itself the principle of its mode-of-embodiment (*Gestaltungsweise*). In this respect we have seen the phases of the significance of nature (*Naturbedeutungen*) appear as content; the things of nature, together with human personifications as forms

of representation, [have played the principal part] in the Symbolic phase. In the Classic, [the content made its appearance] as spiritual individuality, but as a present which is corporeal and without reflection, and above which stands the abstract necessity of fate. In the Romantic [finally the content stands forth in its completeness] as spirituality, with its inherent subjectivity or personality; and for the internality hereto belonging, the external form remains some thing accidental. In this last form of art, just as in the earlier, the divine, in and for itself, was the object of art. But this divine has now to objectify, to determine itself, and thus also to enter into the mundane (*weltlichen*) content of subjectivity. In the first place, the infinitude of personality lay in honor, love, fidelity; then, in the particular individuality, in the precise character which united itself with the particular content of human existence. This increasing development into accidental existence (*das Verwachseneseyn*), together with such specific narrowness of the content, finally caused the reappearance of humor, which knew how to cause all definiteness to prove unstable and to dissolve, and thus left art free to pass beyond itself. But in this passing of art beyond itself there is no less a return of man into himself, a descent into his own breast, through which art strips from itself all fixed limitation to a definite circle of content and conception, and for its new sacred [object] takes the *human*—the depth and height of the human soul as such, the universally Human in its joys and sorrows, its struggles, its deeds, and its destinies. Here the artist contains his subject-matter (*Inhalt*) within himself. He is the actual self-determining human spirit, who contemplates the infinitude of his feelings and situations, who originates [conceptions] and gives expression [thereto], and to whom nothing is any longer foreign which can become vital in the human breast. It is this sort of content which does not, in and for itself, remain artistically determined. On the contrary, the definiteness of the content and of its external fashioning is replaced by arbitrary invention. Still, no interest is excluded, since art is no longer accustomed to represent that only which is absolutely in harmony with a definite phase; but every thing in which man in

general finds something familiar to himself possesses fitness [for artistic uses].

Now, in this breadth and manifoldness of material there is, above all, to be established this demand: that, with respect to the mode of treatment, the contemporaneity (*Gegenwärtigkeit*) of the spirit with the present day shall likewise everywhere give evidence of itself. The modern artist can undoubtedly make himself the contemporary of the ancients, even of the most remote antiquity. It is a fine thing to be one of the Homeric heroes, even though it be the last. So, too, those images which reflect the change undergone by Romantic Art in the Middle Ages have their usefulness. But quite another thing is this universal indifference, depth, and peculiarity of a material; still another, its mode of treatment. In our epoch, no Homer or Sophocles, no Dante or Ariosto, or Shakespeare, can arise. What has been so grandly sung, what has been so perfectly expressed, is expressed once for all. This material and these modes of contemplating and comprehending them are exhausted. Only the present is vital; the rest is pale and cold. We must, indeed, utter against the French a reproach with respect to the historical, and a criticism with reference to beauty, in that they have represented Greek and Roman heroes, and even Chinese and Peruvian characters, as French princes and princesses, and have given them the motives and views of the time of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. Still, if only these motives and conceptions had been in themselves more profound and more beautiful, this anachronism in art would not even be reprehensible. On the contrary, all material, of whatever nation or time it may be, preserves its truth for art (*Kunstwahrheit*) only as this vital actuality — in which it fills the heart of man, its own reflex — and brings truth to our sensibility and imagination. It is the manifestation and exertions of the human as imperishable, in its many-sided significance and infinitely rounded culture, that, in this realm of human situations and experiences, must now constitute the absolute content of our art.

If, now, after this general definition (*Feststellung*) of the peculiar content of this stage, we turn our attention again to

that which we came finally to consider as the forms belonging to the dissolution of Romantic Art, [we will see] that we have especially emphasized the disruption of art, [which has fallen assunder into] the imitation of the externally objective in the accidentality of its form on the one side; and, on the other, into humor, the free-development (*Freiwerden*) of subjectivity in accordance with its inner accidentality. In conclusion, we may still, within the previously mentioned material, suggest a summary view (*Zusammenfassen*) of the other extreme of Romantic Art. Thus, as with the progress from Symbolic Art to Classic Art we considered the image, the comparison, and the epigram as transition-forms, so here, in Romantic Art, we have to make mention of a similar form. In the previous modes of conception, the chief thing was the falling asunder of the inner significance and the external form—a separation which was partially cancelled through the subjective activity of the artist—and, in the epigram especially, was transformed, in the utmost degree possible, into identification. Romantic Art, again, has, from the centre outward, constituted the deeper dualizing of the internality, [whose nature it is to find] its own satisfaction within itself; and which, since the objective did not, in general, completely correspond to the independently-existing spirit, continued to be in a divided state, or was indifferent respecting the objective. This contradiction has, in the course of Romantic Art, developed in consequence of this fact: that in accidental externality or in equally accidental subjectivity, we must concern ourselves with exclusive interests. But when this satisfaction in externality as well as in subjective representation rises, in accordance with the principle of the Romantic, to the point of absorbing the soul in the object; and when, on the other hand, it also arrives at humor in the object, and its embodiment (*Gestaltung*) within its subjective reflex, then we have, by this means, preserved a union in the object, [which constitutes] at the same time an *objective* humor. Such union, however, can be only partial, and can appear only, as it were, in the compass of a song, or only as part of a greater whole. For, to extend itself and complete itself within external reality,

would be to involve itself in deeds and events, and in an objective representation. On the contrary, what we have here to consider is rather a self-activity (*Sich-ergehen*) of the soul in the object—an activity rich in sentiment, and which, it is true, attains to development, but which also remains a *subjective* spiritual movement of the fantasy and of the heart. It is a caprice, and yet not merely some thing accidental and whimsical, but an inner movement of the soul, which devotes itself wholly to its object, and preserves it for interest and as content.

In this respect we may contrast such final art-blossomings with the ancient Greek epigram, in which this form made its appearance in its earliest and simplest guise. The form here intended manifests itself first, not when the account (*Besprechen*) of the object is a mere name, an inscription which only tells in general what the object is, but when there is exhibited a deeper sentiment, a more striking thought, a significant reflection, and richly spiritual movement of the fantasy which verifies and expands the smallest thing through the poetry of the conception. Such poems, indeed, relating to various objects—to a tree, a mill-stream, the spring-time, etc., to the living or the dead—can be of infinite variety, and may arise among any people. Still, they remain always of a subordinate class, and are very liable to degenerate into insipidity. For, especially with a more cultivated reflection and language, some thing may occur to each, with respect to most objects and relations, which (since every one knows how to write a letter) he also has the ability to express. With such universal, oft-repeated sing-song, even though it may present new phases, one soon becomes weary. At this stage, therefore, the aim is that the soul, with its internality—that a deeper spirit and a rich consciousness—may enter, with its whole life (*ganz hineinlebe*), into objects, situations, etc.; that it may abide therein, and may thus make of the objects something new, beautiful, and in themselves valuable.

It is especially in this respect that the Persians and Arabs, in the Oriental splendor of their images, in the free felicity of the fantasy, which deals with its objects in a wholly theoretic-

cal fashion, present a brilliant example for the present age, and its subjective internality. Even the Spanish and the Italians have done admirable things of this sort. Klopstock says, indeed, of Petrarch: —

— Laura besang Petrarke in Liedern,
Zwar dem Bewunderer Schön, aber dem Liebenden nicht.

Yet Klopstock's love odes are themselves full only of moral reflections, of unhappy longing, and of unnaturally intensified passion for the joy of immortality; while in Petrarch we admire the freedom of the essentially ennobled sentiment, which, however intensely it expresses the longing for the loved one, is still substantially contented. For the longing, the desire, cannot indeed be lacking in the circle of these objects, even though the circle be limited to wine and love, to the banquet and the cup-bearer. Of this class the Persians present images of the highest luxuriance, but the fantasy, in its subjective interest, removed the object altogether from the circle of actual longing. It has an interest only in this richly imaginative activity, which contents itself in the freest fashion in its hundred changing phases (*Wendungen*) and caprices, and plays with utmost vivacity alike in joy and in grief. At the standpoint of such spiritual freedom, but also subjective inner depth of the fantasy, stand, first of all among modern poets, Goethe in his *West-Easterly Divan*, and Rückert. Especially do Goethe's poems in the *Divan* contrast essentially with his earlier ones. In *Wilkomm und Abschied*, for example, the language, the description, is indeed beautiful, the sentiment sincere; but yet the situation is altogether ordinary, the sequel trivial, and the fantasy and its freedom have added nothing thereto. Quite otherwise is the poem in the *West-Easterly Divan* — *Wiederfinden* — written. Here, love is wholly transferred to the phantasy, to its movement, its fortune, its felicity. Generally, in similar productions of this class, we have before us no subjective longing, no amorousness (*Verliebtseyn*), no desire, but a pure fancy or liking for the objects, an inexhaustible self-activity (*Sich-ergehen*) of the fantasy, a harmless play, a freedom in the sportiveness, also, of the rhyme and artistic

measure, and thus an internality and gladness of the soul, self-moved within itself, which, through the serenity of the form, raises the soul high above all painful entanglement in the limitation of actuality.

With this we may close the consideration of the *special* forms into which the Ideal of art, in its development, comes to be divided. I have made these forms the object of an extended research in order to present the content of the same, and from which also the modes of representation are derived; for it is the content which, in art, as in all human work, is of chief moment. Art, in accordance with its idea, has no other vocation than to develop that which is essentially rich in content, to an adequate sensuous reality; and the philosophy of art must therefore undertake, as its chief business, to thoroughly comprehend what this wealth of content and its modes of manifestation are.

THE MATTER AND THE METHOD OF THOUGHT.

BY MEEDS TUTHILL.

“What is Mind? No matter.
 What is Matter? Never mind.
 What is Spirit? It is immaterial.”

— *Punch.*

I. *The Matter.*

It may not be easy to say how many methods there are of thinking, especially if we count the ways that are not methods. But we may affirm that there are but two methods of getting knowledge—and indeed only one, since each of these two is partial, and needs the other for its own completion, and for the attainment of complete knowledge. For “knowledge” now seems to be divided into “facts” and “ideas,” neither of which is willing to admit the existence of the other “as such,” although they bear a family resemblance. This feud arises because one of these methods founds itself upon “external perception”—a contradiction in terms; the other, upon

“internal perception,” or, as it prefers to call it, “innate ideas” — which is begging the question, because it assumes the “knowledge” to be “innate” to begin with. These two methods, therefore, seem to be correlative extremes, neither of which can really do without the other, and which must in fact, consciously or unconsciously, find and use a common basis. For, indeed, when severed, and each pursued abstractly, they lead to the same substantial result, though the former only points to it — since it refuses all basis, it can have no capstone; while the latter, we may say, begins with its result, and from that seeks to deduce all the particulars of the other method, and naturally finds no end in that process; or if, as it usually does, it refuses all reality to the material basis of the other, it ends, of course, in — nothing. Idealism is too fond of abolishing facts, especially *hard* facts, just because they are hard and gross. Materialism, on the other hand, would fain return the compliment by showing thought to be “a mere secretion of the brain;” but, in its zealous pursuit of the “positive,” it finds the “solid” attenuating itself and escaping from scientific grasp like a very “spirit.”

Shall we contemplate this deadly quarrel with *Punch's* philosophy of indifferentism, or can we find a common ground in which the “differences” disappear?

Each of these methods takes a double direction — one of analysis, to find the infinitesimal element; the other, of synthesis, to find the Infinite All.

Thus, by the first method we have, on the one hand, an analysis of Matter into simpler components, — into infinite divisibility, and, therefore, into a single element, for no other would be indivisible; on the other hand, it proceeds by a classification of classes to mount to an unattainable first class, or Universal; and, by inference, merely, as in the other case, concludes a unity in that direction. The results of this method are well known; there is no real demonstration, but only an inference, that, since there is a gradual elimination of life in a corresponding progression from “homogeneity to heterogeneity” of organization, therefore what we call “life” is only organic action, that, by reason of a growing complexity

which gives infinite relation, and consequent harmonization within and independence without, may develop into automatic freedom of action, and even into consciousness of self.

It is obvious that the logic of this method must be, like its own processes and results, merely formal and inferential. Its syllogisms are no proof, for want of a recognized basis, but are, as Mill admits, mere repetitive declarations of the same general fact, which finds its demonstration elsewhere, viz., in a conviction, "derived from experience," that Nature is uniform in its course of action; but, this "elsewhere" being thus found within us, there is really no conviction, only an inference, and hence no demonstration, after all. The difficulty in the logic is, that the *genus* is not found, or not admitted as such, and hence can receive no true definition. Hence, a *species* "connotes" more — *i.e.*, means more than its *genus*; and the individual "includes" most of all, and therefore, as mere matter of form, can, least of all, be included in the *genus*. All this difficulty would disappear if the *genus* were really genetic — *i.e.*, if, by its definition, it were that primary element from which all else is necessarily formed by mere composition. Hence Herbert Spencer's confusion of language in speaking of the "homogeneous" as being transformed into the "heterogeneous." It is only in this method of External classification that one *genus* could be conceived of as changing into other *genera*; for here there is no Universal, which is alone capable of developing itself into *genera*, and so on to individuals, and yet being itself in all, and most of all itself in the individual.

The other method — that of introspection — naturally begins by detecting this illogicality of its adversary's logic, and seeks to rectify that by also taking its first direction in analysis to determine the real genetic element of our ideal combinations; for the results of External Science exist only in these ideal combinations, and are to be tested therein, and their essence thus found. In the depths of Consciousness, therefore, we seek and find, upon analysis, that the first definition of a thing is found only in that which it is *not*. The *It* is fully defined or bounded by the *not-It*. But if the *It* be finite, the *not-It* must be infinite; and the *It* is null in comparison — essentially

nothing — existent only *in* and *by* the Infinite. We must begin, therefore, with the Universal. But, on the same principle of definition, every Infinite or Universal involves its own utter contradiction; for we can think such conceptions only in correlatives of the Such and the not-Such. This method of absolutely clashing and self-resolving antithesis is, therefore, as necessary, the true and really logical method of thinking, if we are to begin with Universals. We can know the Universal only by reaction of the thought into it from the Particular; and, conversely, the Universal is fully characterized — fully reveals itself to itself — only by development into the Particular; otherwise, it is only elemental, simple, identical, indefinite, indeterminate, indefinable.

This method, therefore, finds its synthesis in its analysis; for its element is its Universal, and both are single, and hence capable, the former, of all varieties of composition, the other, of all conceivable determinations or forms. The logical process of thought proceeds, like evolution in material Nature, from the simple to the complex; and this is seen to be from the Universal to the Particular, not from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, in the sense of from one nature to another nature, but it is the fuller and fuller development of the same nature in the Particular, for the sake of particularization, or self-inclusion. Classification, therefore, proceeds downwards, instead of upwards, according to particular and specific forms, and not according to different natures. For the One exists in all as a potentiality; the differences *in esse* are only different developments. We must begin, then, with this element — this potentiality — in which are involved all possibilities, and whose development necessarily proceeds by antithesis, or self-contradiction.

Let us carry out this method fully in its results. This Universal, this elemental, absolute Infinite, contains all possible contradictions (or it would not be such); but it contains them in solution; the moment you release the one, the other starts up in antithesis as its definition — *i.e.*, as its own true nature. Extremes meet, and resolution is possible only by recognition of both in some common medium. This reduces every such

manifestation to mere particularity or special *form* of the Universal (and if, as is assumed by Idealism, "Thought" is the only universal *element*, its initial form is "The IDEA," and all subsequent *manifested* forms will be "Begriffs," or particular forms of developed Idea). But it is just as possible for this "element" to exist in one form as in another; nay, it *must* exist in all forms, and it only. The most abstract allegation we can make of any thing is, that it *is*; but this, to be defined, involves the contradiction, that it is *not*, and thus makes of the particular being only an appearance, or "becoming" of the Universal being. The universal being itself involves "nothingness" as its only complete definition — *i.e.*, it can really exist only as continual, active Change. In this result alone we see that its nature is necessarily Variety as well as Unity, and that this universe is not a crystallization, not a frame-work finished and hung up, nor a Voltaire's "clock," which kindly "presumes a clock-maker;" for the spirit that pervades it may be essentially defined as ceaseless "activity."

Now, among the infinite possibilities, Chance also exists — infinite chance; and that, too, not as a mere technicality, but as springing up with its counterpart, Necessity, as its inevitable mate; only so can the two nullify each other, co-terminate each other, and so form the round of change. The casual may be said to exist infinitely in respect to time and space; *all* might have been thus a moment sooner, or a hair-breadth elsewhere. And so, also, in the infinite interrelations of this congeries of particulars — of each to all the others, an infinity of infinities — there is the merest chance of any one particular being just so related as it actually is to every other. The relation of cause as consistency of the whole is found only by direct reference to the original One — to the centre; and other relations must be traced, like those of a genealogy, by ascent to the ancestor, and then by descent to the individuals. Hence any particular thing is a mere chance, except in regard to that with which it stands in immediate relation; only through the *next* has it any causal or consequential relation to other things, for the possible divergencies, at any point whatever, are infinite in number. This is illustrated in our inner

world. Every train of thought swarms with collateral invitations; to diverge is easier than to go on; choice must be positive, or chance will lead; and even in choice, chance often decides. So, in the external world, there is "infinite contingency," varying, warping, deforming, and wasting far the most of even the persistent types of organic life. "Mere Nature is too weak to keep its *genera* and species pure when conflicting with alien elementary influences." Accidental variation is the rule in perpetual design.

But all this is mere superficial observation, and can tend only to melancholy reflection, as in the case of Mill, who gave up Cause, because he saw so much Chance. Let us go deeper, and see if there is not Design, even in Chance itself.

We have seen that only the immediate stands in causal relation; all else is contingency—that is Mill's doctrine, that Cause, to us, is only succession. But, were not this the case—were there an absolutely necessary and inflexible connection between things—Man could use neither Nature nor his own thoughts. As it is, he causes, creates even, by diverting the general flow of forces into particular channels of his own. It is this Chance which gives him Choice. On the other hand, this necessity of Nature, which binds immediates, is for him only a necessity for using means—for *imitating*. Once he finds these links, these laws, they become transformed by his use into his largest Freedom; they constitute his creative power, and make him dominant over Nature through her own Absolutism. This looks as though the "Absolute" in the universe were seeking to realize its own meaning—to develop itself into action entirely free, self-moved.

Thus may all absolute contradictories, which seem to deny each other as absurdities—*i.e.*, irresolvable—resolve themselves into each other through the mediation of some thing in which they exist in common. Mere change may result from Chance or from Cause; hence it may be relatively (for it is in its nature finite) either rational or irrational, good or bad, order or disorder, without departing from its strict, though devious derivation from the Absolute. For Chance also is Necessity, not merely in the Pagan sense of blind Fate, but because the

Absolute or unlimited involves all variety, and because Causality itself must reach its limit in Chance, in order that it may there be reflected back upon itself, and transformed into itself, as we see it is by Man. This elementary Caprice, in which absolute Volition loses itself, in order to find itself again, is the turning-point of its characterization, which gradually proceeds through Nature, till in Man volition is restored in its true character as rational.

Caprice is the most elementary form of Volition. The self may be said to be conscious of it rather as a being-acted-upon, than as an acting; for in it Act bears the simplest possible relation to self, its last and ultimate relation. In this respect the act of "creating" what we call Matter, merely, may be conceived as only the creator's most external caprice, of which he is conscious only in its reaction; that is, Matter is null until it passes into relations other than this simple one where it seems a non-self and this consciousness of self-in-it increases more and more as the relations of self-activity in it become more diversified and complex.

But, as the Finite cannot escape beyond the Infinite, so Matter is not, even in its simplest forms, unrelated to the Divine; the Divine activity is in it in *some* relating forming power. It may be the ultimate Divine differentiation; but, as we see it, it is proceeding to integrate itself in various relations. And just so fast and so far as Man can reproduce, in himself, these integrations, these relations of form, can he perceive and comprehend the Divine in Nature in the Universe.

For, let us observe that man begins with the simplest possible consciousness of sensation, which reacts into him as mere perception of a non-self; and his first act is one of the merest caprice, which can scarcely be called volition at all. He, as finite, *does* find some thing beyond him; and it is long, even after he deems his Will as his own, before it is truly such. Thus, he begins where the most external Divine activity ends; like meets like — activity meets activity, and comprehends it in a common element of relation. And this element is competent to integrate forms in Man as it does in Nature; only his inner universe must be of ideal forms, the creation of his own

activity. His thought exists, at first, only as perception, and that of the simplest sort; yet that alone is a world-wide change in point of form, for it is the translation of Appearance into *Beholding* (*Begriff*) of the outer, static form into the inner, dynamic form; and hence it is the beginning of a process of concretion in thought, which, like that in Nature, builds the complex upon the simple, and makes compounds the material for new and higher compounds; yet all this world within is to be realized, integrated, from that single vanishing element of relation, in perception.

This primitive thought in Man is, therefore, a mere potentiality — an elementary capacity to be, do, and suffer. But in him this Divine element is seen, not merely as activity, but in its character as free activity. That introversion of the primitive, capricious, chaotic Nature upon itself has in him passed the limit of mere passivity — of merely being moved, and entered the sphere of freedom — of self-moving, and hence of consciousness. It is no longer mere reaction, but re-*Act* — that is, it is no longer merely felt, or suffered, or artifice in outer, passive forms, but is realized in its inner form as Being, Doing, Will. This is a capacity for attaining Divine *character*, and indicates an intent to represent the Divine *self* therein.

Here, then, is a liberation — a birth of Spirit from Matter, of Freedom from Caprice, of opposite from opposite. Where is its turning-point? and how is the human Spirit — this interior image of the Divine — there related, in its origin, to the exterior activity of the Divine in Matter?

That is the question of questions, upon which the materialist and the idealist meet in absolute contradiction, and yet in agreement; for their difference is only about names — the one says all is matter; the other, all is spirit. The one has begun with Matter, and traced its development into Spirit; the other has begun with Spirit, and traced its development into Nature — into Matter. When extremes thus meet, their solution is unity. Neither party has really dealt, in its theories, with any thing but activity and relation. When it comes to the question of *Substance*, the one says the Substance is that in which the activity and relation are found; the other says

the same, but insists that, on this very ground, Spirit is the substance, since that alone is conscious of possessing activity and power to relate — *i.e.*, to reason.

To be sure, the materialist pools at this “ideal” substance, this matter of “thought,” as no Matter at all compared with the solid and appreciable Matter of the senses; it exists only in thought — it comes from nothing, and goes for nothing.

But the idealist retorts: And how, pray, do you assure yourself that any thing of your material universe exists, except by thought? You can doubt of every thing except this “nothing” of thought. You are sure of but one thing: that there is thought, and a thinker, if it be only yourself.

And this answer is very just, as bringing all our knowledge down to its elementary basis in self-consciousness; but does it justify the counter-assertion that “Thought” and its “Ideas” are the only real existence? “Thought,” to be sure, is precisely that “existence” which springs from Nothing, and disappears in Nothing, and so answers to the Hegelian definition of Being — it *is*, yet is *not*. But, logically, this permits “Thought” to exist in *any* form — in Matter as well as in Spirit. And so it does, in this same purely abstract sense — *i.e.*, it exists in both as the *form* of the activity. But this abstraction has dropped out the vital element of *relation*, which is essential to integration in *any* form, particular or universal, outer in Act, or inner in Thought. And if we seek, in self-consciousness, for “Thought” as a “universal element,” we must connect it by relation to a Thinker, and thus see that it is only Knowledge. But we have the same right, and duty, to find in self-consciousness the relation of “activity” and Actor. This complements things, and enables us to conceive that mere “Thought,” or Knowing, may have its inner forms, to which will correspond, as partial or complete, particular or universal, the outer forms of Activity. Thus, Matter may be outer forms of the same various activity which exists also in the inner forms of mere thinking, feeling, semi-passivity as knowing. This is very apparent in Man, who knows that he has a body as well as a thinking faculty; and that, though this body seems

“another self,” yet is it thought into form and preserved in its own activity by a “non-self.”

Here is a marked distinction between three things which are sometimes said to be identical, to wit, the relation between Spirit and Matter, Soul and Body, God and Creation.

The relation between Spirit and Matter is really treated as an abstract one — *i.e.*, the one side is set in utter opposition to the other ; Spirit is regarded as mere activity, and Matter as that which is acted upon ; and the question of Substance is not determined, or is left in the ambiguous position above indicated. The relation of God to Creation, if treated in the same abstract way, results in a similar mere abstract separation ; only here, as the terms are taken in a concrete sense, there is a separation also of substances, but no determination of either. (And here “Substance” gets treated after the Chinese fashion of resting the Earth on an elephant, tortoise, etc. ; the difficulty is removed by *only* removing it — out of sight. This building a series toward an Infinite is quite unnecessary ; for the “self” is near at hand, and in that, itself an infinite wonder, must be found and solved the question of Substance). But the relation of Soul to Body presents the question in a double aspect, abstract and concrete, neither of which can be escaped. Its solution, therefore, calls for the union of the abstract and concrete methods of thought. For our minds do not wait for ideal abstraction before they conceive of God, although such idea of God as is formed undoubtedly depends for its details upon the progressive development of ideas. But conception passes at once from the concrete idea of self to that of the non-self without defining the “self” in either case — *i.e.*, without separating Substance from its activity.

The whole question and its solution, therefore, is in Man ; and he is not allowed to delude himself with mere abstractions — a good reason, perhaps, for the junction of *sóul* and body. We know very well that our thoughts do not constitute the Universe, nor our self, God. But we are equally certain that our thoughts are our means of knowledge and our means of creation — the link between ourselves and our acts ; and hence they are the only analogies by which we can con-

ceive of the abstract relations between Spirit and Matter, as our "self" is the only analogue we have for concrete conception of God in relation to Creation.

Now, our thoughts, as such, are mere abstractions from *acts*; they are not concrete as acts, and yet they are products of the mind's activity. Hegel may tell us that, in this activity, the Spirit "uses its own material." But what material?

It is conceivable, to be sure, that, since Idea may take form in any material, so the mind may use a different material than that of the senses—a spiritual material, or plasticity. But this does not explain the *Beholding* of ideas, in its active sense, nor prove that these inner forms are not still "material" in the sense of ethereal; in fact, it only "removes" the difficulty, and leaves the Idea itself still only an abstraction relatively to the thinking act and the *Beholder*. Why seek, then, to remove the "material" at all? A thousand removes will not "change the matter," in this aspect of it.

Hegel, therefore, means nothing more, practically, than the use of simple conceptions to form the complex—the construction of thoughts from thoughts. But the mind uses quite another material, in addition to this, even in its most abstract activity; for it wastes and devours the bodily tissues in this process. Its reactionary effect, in this respect, is presumably the same as would be the direct effect upon the body from receiving the same thought, in the same form, through the sensations. In both cases, then, there is this unconscious interaction of soul and body, as a necessity of the *expression* of thought, whether it be by others to us, or by us to ourselves. We are in this intimate and direct contact with God's Matter. There is this union of His activity and ours, as method, means, and effect of thinking, in any of its forms; for thought resolves itself, in sense, as mere motion and relation of motions, in the form of nerve-vibrations, etc. Perception is what the Beholder first knows as Beheld, in sensation.

That thought exists only in Man, therefore, *especially in his utterance*, may well be dependent upon organization; since it requires a complexity of organization to develop a sufficient complexity of relation, in mere motion, to make it a carrier of

this sort. And we observe that experience and training are necessary to enable us to appreciate the more complex sensations of eye, ear, and taste; childhood prefers the simpler combinations, the broader contrasts in color, music, flavor, etc.

Hence the absurdity of the contempt which "Idealism" affects for Matter, and especially of its *dictum* to avoid "the sensuous" in the expression of "pure thought"; although it is obvious that "the sensuous" is an absolute necessity for expression of any thought. Such silly Pharaosism may be tolerated when "pure thought" has produced some thing purer than a lily, more beautiful than a rose, or more exquisitely spiritual than God's living poem in a love-lit eye. And as God does not find Matter beneath His use, so Man is never divinely creative, but his thought rushes to his senses and "wreaks itself upon expression," like Shakespeare's, in words and images concrete with an infinite meaning. Mr. Conway tells us that "many excellent people in London" confess that they have seen Madame Blavatsky "make lilies blossom from the end of the cigarettes of which she is fond," etc. Which shows, if nothing more, that the imagination can transport itself into the senses so powerfully that its vivid impression seems to us a reality; a cause of credulity, but, nevertheless, a source of power both to receive and to express. It is a well-known fact that every human face "lightens" more or less with the inner thought and feeling, and especially takes on a permanent expression, in its "lines of thought," of the habitual, characteristic activity of the soul within, which thus draws its own portrait in Matter.

And when we consider this fashioning of the body itself by the mere reaction of the inner spirit, we see the error of that "pure Religion" which makes the same pretension as "pure thought" to *not* use, or even abuse, this body — to discard it as an implacable enemy, instead of recognizing it as an indispensable and Divinely-given means both for receiving and expressing spiritual activity. Is it not wiser to note that even in this "flesh" the spirit's habitual action imprints its own "lines of beauty" or of ugliness, and thus declares itself responsible for that which is permanent in this perpetual

change — this flow of Matter, which we call a body, — and whose motions are at once our source of knowledge and our means of action? The body is, indeed, practically nothing but this motion; it cannot exist organically except by this constant change; and this very fact is what subjects it to the spirit; for that may have permanency of purpose by which to give form and character to this change.

And as for that “pure philosophy” which takes a similar opposition to “the sensuous,” it equally “negates,” or else stultifies itself; for, even if it did not have its own birthplace in “the sensuous,” and therefore have no right to disown its own mother, yet must it go there for a second and real birth in expression, or else confess itself an impracticable philosophy — a religion that no one can either preach or practice.

While our thoughts, therefore, are mere abstractions when unrelated to acts, our *thinking* is an activity which has a *real* as well as an ideal effect; it produces a change in the relations of matter, by motion. But if this is so in our case, why not also in the case of the Universal Thinker? How is Matter to exist at all except as the minimum form of that Universal Activity in its *quasi*-passivity — in its infinitesimal element of relation — just capable of being taken up and integrated in the conceptions of our thought, first as simple perception of Being as change, then as perception of other relations, and so on in various rational completeness as concrete idea?

In other words, the activity of The One may be susceptible of such distinctions as we make, in our own, between act and thought, thought and feeling, and so on, down to the mere existence of our activity, dying away into its passive relation to sense. In this view, Matter would not exist as a “creation,” but rather by passive permission of God, as only one condition or state of His activities; and His act in it, instead of being an absolute one, as we are taught to consider it, would be the least absolute of all, except in the sense of absolute simplicity — a letting-be. Thus, Matter would exist for spirit only as this “let-be,” this external cessation of its own activity; and creation would really begin with that activity which is formative, relational, and proceed to that which is

positive and willed, gradually bringing this mere elemental activity of universal being out of its mere "let-be," and through the chaotic state of feeling into the definite forms of thought. Creation, in this sense, is *conception* — definite selection, adaptation, and formation of activity; and thus it is a bringing into birth of the inner self as an object of contemplation.

This is the genesis of thought and act in us. Is not such, also, the genesis of Spirit from Matter? Spirit is the "Be;" Matter, the "Let-be." One is the *Act* of the Will, and the production of *Self*; the other, mere act and progressive product of various *thinking*.

Says Hegel, in one of those side-remarks which, like side-glances, are most penetrating: "Perception is the *birthplace* of a new and higher principle," *i.e.*, of a new and higher form of activity—free, rational activity—will. Hence, Matter is not a nonentity, but only the outermost form of activity—a mere striving-to-be—the last pulsation of the Infinite activity in its remotest capillaries before the inevitable return towards the Heart Divine. And in that glad return it takes on all those forms of blushing flower and song of bird which can express or voice what is beautiful, in approaching the inmost of that Divine Activity.

"The Essence of Matter," says Hegel, "is gravity: It seeks for its being out of itself; and, could it find this unity it seeks, it would vanish, and be no longer matter." We know not, to be sure, what would happen if all matter could amass itself, by cataclysm or otherwise, in one world instead of so many; but we may suspect, from present appearances, that "transformation," not "annihilation," would be the proper word. Matter "vanishes" now in quite the opposite direction to that of gravity, and takes the earliest occasion to do so; for there is no affinity which it does not prefer to that of gravity. Could it move the other way, and get outside the Infinite, it must cease to be; but, as it is, gravity is only its first, and not its only characteristic. Gravity is only its means of entering into more complex relations; that seems to be its only thought. Looking at its movements on

the largest scale, we see that gravity combines at once with another force, and these two alone form the grand harmony of unnumbered spheres — the first pæan of Matter over its return to that Order which is “Heaven’s first law” — the first step back to spirituality.

And what before that first organization? Chaos! Matter only in relation of that blind and furious activity of Caprice, a condition which might well give rise to the myth of “fallen angels.” Elemental Spirit-forces, banished into the uttermost of outer darkness, and rushing back, like an army with banners, to rescale the lost Heaven by sheer violence — a violence which defeats itself.

Poor Slave, Matter! We pity you! But take courage! Even in your blind fury you did not take the road to annihilation, but that to freedom. Yours is that pathetic myth — the perpetual PASSION of the Universe — God made manifest by *self-denial* therein, that he may reclaim and reconquer this Material World to Himself, by transforming it, “bringing its immortality to light,” making of it, a new and Spiritual World.

Accordingly, we find that, though by gravity matter tends to unity, as if to signify that in its element it is single, and represents divine activity in its utmost simplicity, yet does it seek complexity rather than singleness, so much so that we have not yet been able to find the latter (we can no more find the infinitesimal than the Infinite of Divine action). It shuns death, and seeks living forms; but, to attain these, must previously build itself up into food for them — as, *e.g.*, the mineral for the vegetable, the vegetable for the animal. It “uses its own material,” and yet, through all this toilsome process, is indestructible, for it reproduces *itself*, in all its forms, from that of the simplest carrier of force, up to that of living germs. Truly, there is nothing worthy of contempt here, if we are to regard Matter, as we do spirit, abstractly, as a “self,” or a “substance.”

And what is this question of “substance,” which figures so largely in metaphysics? We may be told to spare our sympathy for “dead matter;” that it has no “substantial being,”

if there really be life in it, yet is it blessed with unconsciousness of that fact, etc. And truly, in the vegetable we detect no consciousness, even of its own existence. To the animal we conceded only a consciousness of being; and to man himself, in fact, self-consciousness is a thing of growth, and rarely is it developed to that degree in which one is conscious of the subtlest movements and relations of his thoughts. But we may say that even the mineral has a "natural selection;" the vegetable, a chance choice; the animal, an unconscious choice; and man has all these, and all the way up to conscious choice, and thereby morality, self-regulation, and responsibility.

And, unfortunately, he has also the capacity to ask, What is Substance? but not the capacity to answer that query. The word itself is a misnomer, as it is used, and betrays its origin in the mere habit of a being dependent upon something external. When it is sought to apply it, therefore, to an independent being, it is no wonder the attempt is a profound failure. Such a being could never ask himself, What is my substance? What stands under me to support me, or enables me to act? So the power of metaphysics has shown itself in the fact that, by long, though useless, repetition of the question, the word has gained in general use a quite different meaning, though, naturally, a very vague one — *e.g.*, the query commonly means, What is the gist, the amount, the *sumstance* of it all? And in metaphysics it asks, really, What is the nature — the whole nature of the thing? — or it asks for nothing. For, to make it inquire merely what is stable, permanent, static, in contradistinction to dynamic, is only to ask for a condition, a state of things, — the passive or, at least, quiescent state, in contrast with the active state. Thus, we conceive of Matter as in its "natural," and only stable condition, when *at rest*, and we have just the opposite conception of spirit, as purely dynamic; and hence it puzzles us to conceive of any thing static, or substantial in spirit, because we abstract it from everything static by making that only its object — the passive receiver of its action. And so, carrying out these abstract notions to the universal scale, Philosophy separates God

from the material universe — the one as creative action, the other as passive creation ; and when, after such a separation, it seeks to find the substantial again in God, it finds that it has made of Him only a Power, and put all His “ substance ” in the Universe itself. Refusing to join these two, from horror of Pantheism, it makes both God and Creation “ incomprehensible,” to mend the matter. Matter is “ made out of nothing,” yet is left to take care of itself. And God, even as a Power, is powerless, for He is “ unchangeable,” and hence must be inactive, since change itself must be the only permanent “ state ” of an active being. Thus, the notion of substance as *object* sets God, as *unsubstantial*, outside the “ material universe.”

And so, the other abstract notion of substance as *subject* — as Actor — has a similar result of setting God, as “ Perfection,” in opposition, and even enmity to Man, as Imperfection, in what is called “ the Spiritual Universe,” — another “ incomprehensible ” creation. For Spirit, being associated with mere ideas, is, in man, reduced to a mere nullity. In *this* creation all the “ Substance ” remains in God, but remains there, in accordance with its conception, as an abstraction. To render Him completely “ Perfect,” this substance is “ indefectible ” and “ immutable,” so that He ceases to be an actor ; He “ cannot act but once.” “ He is an Eternal Act.” Such is the effect of being Perfect. So that God, as Spirit, even ceases to be dynamic. He has no occasion to think any more ; and in this eminently and only static condition He must be regarded as merely “ a Fixed Idea.” But Man’s spirit, being only Imperfection, is, of course, of a contrary type ; and he, too, must become “ a fixed idea,” if possible, for “ thinking ” is one of his most diabolical characteristics. In this worse than nonentity of all his spiritual activity, Man has only the consolation of lashing his body as even more Satanic than himself ; though it has the advantage of being of a perishable substance, and so can see an end to its misery, which the soul cannot.

And Idealism comes in to cap the climax of abstraction, by declaring that what is ideal is real, and what is real is ideal, or

nothing; that Thought is the only substance, and Ideas the only entities. As for the THINKER, it leaves us in doubt whether He might not have been a mere development from this all-powerful substance, and whether we other Thinkers have not the right to claim an equal independence in the same origin. For here the only "substance" is Activity.

Is it not obvious that the concrete method is necessary to offset and rationalize these vagaries of abstraction; to bring God into the world as a fact—as a Self; to give him fellowship with Man; to restore to Him that compassion which makes Him even a fellow-sufferer with His children; and, in fine, to make of this Universe a living thing, and such a reality of good and evil, perfection and imperfection, as we know it to be?

Each of these notions of Substance, we see, is an attempt at abstraction; for it seeks to sever the Actor, the Activity, and the Object—or, in other words, the Self and the non-Self. But in an Infinite One there must be "substantially" the same—*i.e.*, the Self is only a consciousness of the All in its one source of activity; and the non-Self, or Object, is only a form of this activity, shaped in the one substance, whether this activity be what we call "ideal" or what we call "material." This, in fact, may be called Hegelian doctrine, except that it claims translation of Matter into the ideal form, as well as the reverse. And how escape this double result? If ideal substance is capable of getting into material form, does it thereby render itself incapable of getting out of it, or else destine itself thus to perish? In short, does not the All-substance necessarily imply all-capability both to take and to change form, through infinite gradation of appearance? And this, too, whether such appearance be of the Self, or the non-Self. The main point here is to distinguish between consciousness of self, as self, and consciousness of object of activity as a non-self, *e. g.*, of ideas or other forms of partial activity. In *The Self*, this substance may have special spiritual or celestial form, in which is displayed, at least, the whole character of the Self; or the latter may thus retreat, for full self-consciousness, into a thousand removes of unutterable

forms of Divine Thought in this same substance. On the other hand, this Divine self, for aught we know, may, at any time or place in the Universe, take any special form or manifestation, according to the capacities of the Beholders thereof; but such form must, at least, fully characterize that Self. Hence Hegel, regarding Man's "Thought" as wholly continent of the Divine Self, was logically obliged to recognize the possibility, and, indeed, the fact of Divine Incarnation in Man; though he has done so in a somewhat ambiguous way, which leaves some of his disciples free to regard it as of merely "ideal" significance—*i.e.*, merely as a recognition of the "unity" of man with God—and thus a species of spiritual Pantheism; while others see in it, not a special, but a general fact—a proof of Divine Nature even in the brutal savage—and thus a no-God, but a sort of Pantheon, in which all are gods, by reason of possessing the elementary "Idea."

But this ambiguity disappears when we dismiss this "Thought" as a mere abstraction, and consider it only as it is—an object which takes form from active substance as a non-Self, whether as Idea or as external "thing." Let us consider this more in detail. And let us remember that *the* Self is known, and is knowable, only as *consciousness* of one's own activity, which is susceptible of all shades and degrees, from unconsciousness of this Self in an Object up to that Infinite consciousness of all in the God-Self. Hence, this self retreats infinitely before us, whether we regard it within as Actor, or without as Object; and, in both directions, our knowledge vanishes as infinitesimal. On the one hand, Self is a deep within deep of hidden power, that can show itself only as Activity; on the other hand, it unites this power with its object, even in the ideal element of mere contemplation, in the last shred of its substance as Self—*i.e.*, when that object exists for it only as relative, either real or imagined. Thus, we have the Actor, the Activity, and the Object all in the Self; so that, when differentiated down to an abstraction, Self is nothing more nor less than that infinitesimal element of relation which is null in itself, but not so when reconnected with our own or another's thinking, for then it is what con-

stitutes thought and ideas in every form. Hegel's immense power consists wholly in this: that he has fully realized this method of thinking by self-relation.

Let us note, then, that the conception or the consciousness of Self, as such, escapes wholly, and in both directions, from the idea of substance. On the one hand, it seeks in vain, with the varying form of substance, to reach its inmost; on the other, it loses the notion of substance, exteriorly, in the conception of mere relation. Thus, self-consciousness is wholly independent of substance, and dependent only on activity. To constitute a *self*, therefore, it is necessary only that an activity should be consciously free, whether in substance of its own or in that of another. The distinction between Selves—between the Man-self and the God-self—is not in the consciousness of activity, not in the reality of the self, but in the additional consciousness in the one that this activity is dependent upon another for its substance; and in the other, that he is not so dependent.

Thus, self resolves formally—*i.e.*, really—into selves within self, as does substance into substance within substance, no one can say to what remove. And this we find, in fact, to be the Reality, both in nature and in thought: there is but a successive transformation of substance into an inner substance, and of self into an inner self.

Of Substance, then, we can know nothing, except in the various forms which are given it by the Divine activity and our own; and this will test the “substantiality” of our products and the “Reality” of God's, for it shows us wholly dependent upon His substance for our means of activity.

Thus, the Divine substance cannot be known apart from the Divine activity—separate, static, “by itself,” and thus at rest. Such a substance would be a mere Brahm, such as the foregoing static theory of “Perfection” makes it; for it could have no consciousness of itself, since even that would be an act of contemplation. We know neither our own nor God's real nature apart from activity, for there *is* no such nature; it is “incomprehensible,” because it does not exist. Nature is not an abstract, but a concrete; God there puts His activity

into form, and thus partially displays His thought, His character, but not His *self*. Man, also, can recognize his own character in his acts; his ideas, in the forms he gives them. "That is substantially my idea," says an artist, meaning his composition of form, *e. g.*, in a statue. He does not say it is himself, nor his own form, but only that it expresses the substance of his idea; and so it does, for that idea has no substance except form, and hence is equally presented by any suitable form. In *any* form, an idea is a self only in the abstract sense of relation of parts constituting a *whole*.

And so, we may conceive that God also has ideas apart from substantial form, or inexpressible save to Himself, in His inmost forms of substance; or ideas expressed elsewhere in the Universe, and not here, too complex, or otherwise inapt for expression by such forms as we can either contemplate exteriorly, or comprehend with our undeveloped interior forms of idea. But, if there is that in Divine ideas thus beyond expression to us (even in a Divine man), so, on the other hand, must the Divine activity combine with substance, in forms of the utmost simplicity of relation, and of the merest transiency of static condition; the one extreme is as necessary as the other to Divine perfection. Everywhere this elementary activity is only a potentiality, but one which asks only for relation to constitute it a higher and higher form or expression of Divine thought in the Divine substance. Thus, God says to us, *e. g.*, in the flower: "That is My idea; repeat it, and comprehend it in the ideal form of your activity." The flower is a reality, therefore; not a mere idea, but an idea expressed in the Divine, substantial form, and hence with a being of its own, a life and an identity of its own; it is not absorbed in abstract Reason, and thus annihilated, but it remains concrete, as it is, and lovable for its own sake — "a thing of beauty and a joy forever."

Thus, Divine ideas, when realized in any form, remain "immanent" in the Divine substance as long as the form itself subsists; and this without at all destroying the Divine inner-self, but, on the contrary, as the only means of distinction of the Divine activity from the Divine self by the reac-

tive effect of an object of contemplation which is not self. This is not "a lonely God," who thus lives in a self-consciousness which depends upon creative, formative activity; any more than a fruitful mind is lonely, when expanding itself in multiform creation of ideas which seem to it like the unconscious blossoming of a Divine life in it.

But this makes of Reason only a free activity of spirit, and of spirit only a form of the Divine substance? Even so; for every real form must inhere in the Divine substance, and be in itself, only a secondary whole, or self. To render this statement more explicit, and possibly more clear, let us bear in mind that we are only *to be* free—that we must "be born into the spirit," which is the only form of our freedom; and then let us first conceive of this "spirit" as an interior elimination of another from this bodily, *slave*-form of substance—a transformation of the *same* substance into the *free* form of spirit. Have we, in fact, any warrant to believe that this spiritual form is any more our own than this bodily form? Can Spirit, any more than Matter, wrench itself from the Divine whole, and be independent thereof? In fact, they are brought, in Man, into actual contact and intimate interrelation, as if to intimate that this Divine substance is every where identical, and capable of all forms of activity. Shall it be susceptible of the slave-form, and not also of the free? Of the non-self, and not of the self? And here we see, again, that the self escapes substance—*i.e.*, resolves it into an infinite series of transformations of the same thing. And in the larger, Divine aspect of this transformation, a self—a free-born potentiality—completes the round of the Divine activity in or upon its substance, and returns it from that objective, or out-looking phase—changes it into this form of in-looking—this consciousness of self. Both these aspects are contained in Man; his body also is a "Begriff," a be-grasp, or *beholding* of the Divine thought, expressed in substantial, but passive form; and his "spirit" is, or becomes, a beholder, in the freely-active sense, and finds God in His whole character, not by looking outward (for there He is seen only objectively and partially), but only by looking inward into this infinite mystery of self.

But yet this does not explain the EGO — the reality of self-being? it reduces it, in fact, to a mere nullity? For, if we have no substance of our own, even in the Spirit, how can we have any real activity of our own? Is not that thus made a mere return of God's activity into his own self-consciousness?

That, truly, is a vital question, and it calls to mind Descartes' intense efforts at introspection, and the characteristic French precision with which he expresses its results. His first conclusion is this: —

“I am a substance of which the whole essence, or nature, is merely to think.” Thus disconnecting himself from his body, as not being a “thinker,” and therefore not his real self, nor any thing he knows “certainly,” he proceeds to reflect whether there be any other “certain” knowledge than this self-knowledge; and, from the presence in himself of imperfection of nature, in conjunction with his idea or conception of “perfection,” he concludes that there is another self — another thinker, God — from whom alone he could have derived this idea of perfection; and he “judges that if there be any bodies in the world, or indeed any *intelligences*, which are not wholly perfect, their being must depend upon His power, in such sort that they could not subsist without Him a single moment.”

Thus, he really vacates Man of all “substantial” being, even in his “intelligence,” and finds, like us, that he is only “a thinker” in another's substance. And, indeed, what is the difference between a “body” and a “soul”? They both “hold” God's Thought; the only difference is that one holds it statically, the other dynamically — the one holds it passively, the other echoes and repeats it. Is this mere repetition, imitation, of God's Thought in us really our own?

We find here, first, a question of fact, which is fundamental to all knowledge. However mysterious it be that this free activity is linked to substantial dependence, the fact, itself, of our free action in Thought cannot be even denied without affirming it; for, to deny it is to do an act which is claimed to be free. There is in us, beyond dispute, this translation of the involuntary activity of the body into the voluntary action of

the soul, though it be gradual, infinitesimal in its beginning, and all along rather "I wish" than "I will." And thus, on further reflection, we see that this very freedom is only in that same imperfect form from which we inevitably derive, as from all other imperfections in us, the idea of the "Perfect" by mere antithetic and necessary correlation. The mere *idea* of God is, therefore, necessarily associated with this fundamental and only "certain" knowledge of our selves, though it be only that we "think."

But, as *fact*, God must be Infinite Freedom to correlate this finite freedom and make *it* a reality. Only in such a *relation* to an Infinite Other can this infinitesimal self have any assured being as activity; but *in* such relation it is not only conceivable, but necessary. It is necessary that this subordinate self should exist, not as substance, but only as free activity — not as Quantity, but as Quality; for, as we have seen, Substance is only the means, the form of the self, and not the Self itself, which escapes all form. Man's dependence upon Substance is, therefore a proof, and not a contradiction, of *his* finite freedom; for it is also his formal independence of Substance — *i.e.*, he is not dependent upon this body, or this Spirit, or other particular form of that Substance, but has a capacity for free activity in any form thereof, if so be he develop that capacity to repeat God's forms of activity therein.

On the other hand, for Man to exist as "substance" would be to have a *fixed* and limited independence, instead of an independent freedom of development; the former places him outside the Infinite — *i.e.*, he ceases to exist, even as Quantity, for he is deprived of all *relation*. It is only as free activity that he can either be a Self, himself, or represent the inmost Self of the Divine nature. So, also, Man, as this image of God, must be finite, because it is not the ALL of the Universe that can show the inmost of the Divine, or reveal its highest capacity, or even represent its Self; but the highest glory and inmost power of the Divine is shown only in this: that it can repeat its whole Self in its least act — can be infinitesimal as well as Infinite. Hence, as we have seen, this uttermost of Self comes up only from an infinite depth in the Divine, and

so it returns to God objectively from a similar depth of apparent nothingness — of mere vanishing infinitesimal relation — which is yet the germ of the All.

Thus, we find that consciousness of self depends merely upon free activity, not on Substance ; that such a self in Man, because it is finite, depends upon the Divine Substance, and in that relation only could exist as such ; and that, in the Divine, or Infinite Being, such subordinate selves, or free activities, are necessary as a return toward Himself, or re-transformation of His own activity into His own consciousness in its free form — its in-look toward Self. Souls are the first forms of God's introspection.

Hence the whole nature of Man — of his free Self — is to imitate, to repeat God's activity, to translate it into higher forms of Substance, and thus to return it to Him as a *recreation* of His own inmost thought. Only in this sense can Creation become a complete or perfect work of God — one which is not merely objective and static, but dynamic and perpetual, like Himself, and existing in His consciousness of Self, as his own constant and whole activity therein. This work is progressive, after the production of "Spirit," as well as before ; all before that is only preparatory, partial activities, having their results in merely objective forms of the Divine thought, in its ever-changing idea, feeling, let-being. This only is the full act of Will that commands the *Self* to "Be !" If we may admit the common statement that God *lets* be what He does *not* "Will," as well as what He wills, we shall have, at least, a practical distinction between this passive, or partial, embodiment of the Divine thought in Nature, and its complete and vital characterization in Man's inmost being as a Self.

This self, as we have seen, can find its real being, not in any substance of its own, but only and simply in its free, but limited and finite activity. It is so related to substance, however, that it can translate even the relation of motion in matter into ideal form. And as thus it transforms Divine activity in Matter into its own in thought, so does it exchange activities with other selves. Conversely, every thought it builds up within is at the expense of this "natural" material, upon

which it reacts, as if to send its electric message through, or leave its impress on, this Divine substance, and thus make it reach the consciousness of that Infinite Self-of-All. And as for expression to others—in word, act, life—it is obviously wholly dependent upon a substance not its own. Thus utterly dependent for substance, it is only measurably and potentially free. It is free to develop, but not free in scope; it has, so to speak, the element of time at its command, but not that of space. It begins with Thought, not in its infinite quantity, but only in its infinitesimal element of relation, and is free to integrate it and test its results by comparison with God's thought in Nature. Thus, there is no "infinity" in its thought, any more than in itself. Most assuredly, *this self is Man, and not God.*

This discussion of "substance" may not be wholly fruitless, therefore, if it helps us to understand how there can be a God-self, and also other selves in the image of His own, and yet practically, "substantially" dependent, just because they are free. For the penalty of Freedom is to be free—to be necessitated to re-create Earth, Heaven, and God for one's self, and in order to be really a Self. This Freedom, as we have seen, has its only *real* character and design as an *imitation*,—a repetition and return of God's activity into His own consciousness, as truly *like* His own. In this, its only *real* aspect, Man's Freedom involves Necessity, both for him and for God. It is Necessity for God, because He cannot lay the hand of force upon it without destroying its moral character, and He must, therefore, freely offer to it of His substance as means of action—as He does, both in particular forms and in those general forms which we call "laws," in the use of which Man finds his largest material freedom, so to speak, in following the material Will of God. And this fact itself is a revelation to Man, and suggests to him, when he comes to be cognizant of "moral laws," that inasmuch as power almost infinite—power to "remove mountains"—accrues to him from identifying himself with "material laws," so these higher, spiritual laws, or Will of God, though he is free to dis-

obey them, and be a slave, are yet offered him as means of his largest Freedom. Thus his Freedom is Necessity for him, because he can reach it only through the Mediation of God as Substance, Law, Goodness — in short, by an activity which is *imitation* — thus showing him that if he would be truly Man, he must be, not God, but *like* God. For his freedom remains forever in the womb of Time; it must be “born again” before it can even become truly Freedom; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that its course will be through similar, successive palingeneses, which bring their higher forms suited to higher capacities, for even a pure “spiritual,” and still another “celestial” form of our poor “*Begriff*” may be inadequate to comprehend the whole of God’s “*IDEA*” in all the complexity of its Universality.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

DR. STIRLING AND PROF. CAIRD.

The length of Dr. Stirling’s discussion of “Kant’s Idea of Causality, in Relation to Prof. Caird’s Interpretation of Kant,” which we announced in our last number, compels us to defer its publication to the January number. Prof. Caird’s article on “Kant’s Deduction of the Categories, with special Relation to the views of Dr. Stirling,” is in hand, and will appear in the same number. — Ed.]

PHILOSOPHY AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

[We have received from Prof. George S. Morris (who has recently entered upon his duties in the chair of philosophy at the above-named institution — both professor and university are to be congratulated on this auspicious event for philosophy) a circular announcing his programme for 1879-80. The list of topics is inviting. — Ed.]

“History of Philosophy, and Ethics. Instruction in these subjects will be given during the last half of the academic year, and will include (a) a course of public lectures; (b) critical and expository

lectures, for students of the university; and (c) private readings and examinations."

(a.) *Public Lectures.*—The public course will be on "British Thought and Thinkers." *Special Topics.*—(1) The General Characteristics of the English Mind; (2) Mediæval Anticipations of Modern English Thought (John Scotus Erigena, John of Salisbury, Roger Bacon, John Duns Scotus, William of Occam); (3) Englishmen of the Renaissance (Edmund Spenser, Sir John Davies, Richard Hooker); (4) William Shakespeare; (5) Francis Bacon; (6) Thomas Hobbes; (7) John Locke; (8) George Berkeley; (9) David Hume; (10) Sir William Hamilton; (11) John Stuart Mill. Of these lectures, the last seven will be largely biographical, though in each case the attempt will be made to state pointedly the special purport of the speculative thought of the writer under discussion. These lectures will be given on Mondays, at five o'clock, P. M., in Hopkins Hall, beginning February 23, 1880.

(b.) *Lectures for Special Students.*—For special and advanced students, expository and critical lectures on the "History of British Philosophy," on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursday, at four o'clock, P. M., beginning February 24, 1880. Undergraduate students, previously instructed in Logic and Psychology, who shall follow this course and pass a satisfactory examination on the general subject-matter of the same, and also upon some one or more of the masterpieces belonging to the History of British Philosophy (for example, Bacon's *Novum Organum*, Locke's *Essay*, Berkeley's *Principles* and *Siris*, Hume's *Treatise*, Reid's *Intellectual Powers*, Hartley on *Man*, James Mill's *Analysis*, Sir William Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, the *Logic* of John Stuart Mill, or the like), may be credited with the completion of the minor course.

(c.) *Private Readings.*—Readings and discussions in Ethics. One session of two hours every Friday (or Saturday), beginning February 27, 1880. *Topic.*—Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, with reference to current works on Ethics. Private reading of other philosophical works will also be directed by Prof. Morris, with or without reference to the university examinations. Heretofore, instruction has been given by the same professor in courses of public lectures only, viz., in 1878, twenty lectures on the General History of Philosophy, ancient and modern; and in January, 1879, fourteen lectures on selected topics in the History and Theory of Ethics. The line of instruction here announced will be continued in 1880-81, by lectures, public and private, on German Philosophy; and in 1881-82 by lectures on Systematic Ethics, and on some phase of the History of Ancient Philosophy.

HEGEL'S ÆSTHETICS.

[With the present number is completed Mr. Bryant's translation of the most interesting portion of Hegel's *Æsthetics*—the part in which he characterizes the three great epochs of Art, corresponding to the three great divisions of the world-history. Not only Art, but the philosophy of history and of religion, may be seen in this treatise. Mr. Bryant proposes to reprint his translation in a book form—making a work of nearly two hundred large pages. It will

form by far the best work in English on *Æsthetics*, and could be used to advantage in colleges, high schools, and seminaries as a text-book. The first part of the translation follows B nard's French translation, the original German being constantly consulted, while the latter part is translated from the German direct.

Mr. Bryant furnishes the following notice of the complete work of Hegel, published in three volumes in German, and in five volumes in French. — ED.]

The entire work of Hegel's *Æsthetics* is divided into three portions. The *first* treats of the *Ideal in Art*. The idea of the beautiful is here philosophically accounted for, its characteristics fully traced, and the course of its development foreshadowed.

The *second* division treats of the *Development of the Ideal in the Various Forms of Art*. The profound historical significance of art is here fully set forth. Art-activity is but one phase of the development of spirit. *Æsthetics* is, therefore, but one branch of the Philosophy of Spirit. Hence, the forms developed by *æsthetic* endeavor will be found to conform to the successive stages of the development of spirit. During the early period of human history, the spirit of man was crude, and, so to speak, altogether in the potential mode. Here, thought could at best be but vague and abstract. Properly speaking, it could not as yet be said to be *expressed*; it was only vaguely *suggested* in sensuous form. Such sensuous forms, vaguely manifesting spirit, are *symbols*. The Orient — the cradle of the race — and, above all, Egypt, is the land of the symbol.

But, with the progress of spirit, the inadequacy of these forms becomes apparent. Man gradually recognizes himself as a spiritual being, and the higher powers as intelligences. Let us say: "As man became more godlike, the gods became more human." Thought became at once definite and *finite*, and it here found its perfectly adequate *expression* in the finite human form. This is the stage of the absolute perfection of sensuous beauty. Form and Idea are now, for a moment in the world's history, absolutely blended; and the product is Greek Plastic Art.

It is manifest, however, that the infinitely progressive spirit of man must ultimately pass beyond this stage of finite sensuous thought. Finite divinities can be supreme only for a limited period. The vigor of Greek thought itself, indeed, was quite sufficient to transcend this limited sphere, and to reach and fairly grasp the conception of the necessary, absolute, self-differentiating unity of the

Supreme. Thus Idea is once more separated from Form. Christianity completed the realization of this conception, but in such wise as to afford abundant material for art. The absolute, divine *One* was manifested sensuously in an actual human being. The anthropomorphism of Greek religion, and hence of Greek Art also, was dissolved only to give place to an anthropomorphism of a vastly higher significance. With the Greeks, man discovered in himself the ideal of his gods. Christianity shows man that his own infinite Ideal is found realized in the one supreme Divinity. The human and the divine are now united by an absolute bond—a spiritual bond—and the beauty which art seeks in this new realm is, above all, the *beauty of the spirit*. The art which develops within this sphere is thus appropriately styled Christian, or Romantic Art.

We have thus three necessary stages of the development of spirit, and three fundamentally distinct phases of art corresponding severally thereto. With three strides, the dwarf of Hindu mythology takes possession of the world. The dwarf proves to be Vishnu, who is, indeed, first of all the *Preserver*, but who also wields and embodies within himself both the destructive power of Siva and the creative energy of Brahma. Spirit, dwarfish and impotent at the outset, so soon as it realizes and formulates its own demands, speedily reveals its godlike might, and proves, in its ultimate potency, to be itself both the universal solvent and the vital element of the world.

The *third* part of the *Æsthetics* presents the *System of the Particular Arts*. Of this third part we can here say little more than that it is but the carrying out, in detail, of the system presented in the second general division, as the second is itself foreshadowed and contained in germ in the first.

Architecture, with its abstract mathematical forms and vast, ponderous masses, is peculiarly adapted to symbolism. *Sculpture*, still occupying the three dimensions of space, yet solves the problem of reducing heavy matter to the most exquisitely refined representation of the *human form*, which, of all sensuous forms, is the most perfect and most beautiful manifestation of spirit. Form and content, spirit and its manifestation, are here viewed as constituting one and the same simple totality. It is the point of mediation between the simple, abstract infinity of symbolism and the concrete, vital infinity of the Romantic World. *Painting* possesses, in respect of its material, practical freedom from the law of gravity; to it belong the powerful effects of color, the magic of light and shade, and the two-fold miracle of perspective. These render it capable of satisfying

demands immeasurably beyond the reach of the other arts of visible representation — immeasurably beyond any demands that were definitely made of art during either the period of symbolism or that of Classicism. Hence, it was only after the human spirit had reached the profoundly concrete stage of a well-defined and vital faith in the personal immortality of the individual, with all that is implied by this, that the utmost capabilities of this richly endowed form of art were called into activity, and its loftiest achievements realized. Painting is thus a distinctively Christian, or Romantic form of art. Its highest purpose is to express *spiritual* beauty, independent of, and often in opposition to, sensuous beauty; nay, at times, even by means of the physically ugly and repulsive.

Of *Music* and *Poetry* we can here permit ourselves to utter but a single word, and that mainly by way of comparing the one with the other. Music wholly rejects sensuous form from its products. Poetry retains such forms, but presents them only for the imagination, through the subtle medium of language. Speaking generally, music may be said to be the more *subjective* of the two, since in its realization it is a series of states of the soul. Poetry, on the contrary, is more *objective*, since it excites definite images, which appear to the imagination as external realities. Music may, in short, in comparison with poetry, be called the manifestation of spirit under the passive form of feeling, while poetry is the manifestation of spirit under the active form of intellectual comprehension. But both are, in their range, commensurate with the entire range of the human spirit, in so far as spirit manifests itself under appropriate sensuous form. They are the wings on which the human phantasy first fluttered from its nest, and which carry the full-fledged imaginative spirit nearest the sun of truth. Music expresses, with exquisite exactitude, every phase of feeling, from the simplest to the subtlest. It is the *absolute philosophy of the emotions*. Poetry expresses, with equal power and skill, every phase of thought, from the child-like fancies of the Arcadian shepherd to the loftiest conceptions within the range of imagery. This immense range and subtlety of power to sensuously manifest spirit, proves the superiority of these two forms of art over the arts of visible representation; and of these two, poetry, as the more active and virile, must unquestionably be recognized as holding the first rank.

Thus, from architecture to poetry we have an ascending series, at each progressive stage of which there is less dependence upon the material, and greater power to express the spiritual.

It is, of course, impossible, in so brief a compass, to more than dimly indicate the direction of the current of thought in this extraordinary work, which, in the second (German) edition, extends through three volumes, containing, in all, more than 1,600 closely-printed pages, throughout which is exhibited the compact style for which Hegel is noted. It is, besides, written with great clearness and force, and often with genuine eloquence and beauty.

WM. M. BRYANT.

St. Louis, Mo., August, 1879.

IMMANUEL HERMANN VON FICHTE.

Germany has lost two of her greatest philosophers this year. Prof. Dr. Karl Rosenkranz, of Königsberg, the most renowned of Hegelian philosophers, and Immanuel Hermann von Fichte, the son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. He died last month, at his residence in Stuttgart, at the advanced age of eighty-two years, from a brain disease. His master-work — “Anthropology” — he styles, himself, in the preface of the book, “*a Prolegomena to every future scientific Anthropology.*” In close connection with this work, he wrote his “Psychology,” and then “The Immortality of the Soul, and the Cosmic Position of Man.”

In 1869, it happened that the learned and wealthy Belgian, Baron L. de Guldenstable, author of “Positive Pneumatology,” arrived, with his sister, at Stuttgart, the residence of Fichte. Both these personages were possessed of very remarkable mediumistic powers, and, after having become intimately acquainted with Fichte, they proved to him, by undeniable facts, the truthfulness of some of the spiritual phenomena. After having investigated and studied the somewhat perplexed and mystified problem of Spiritualism, Fichte stated in 1875-6, when writing a preface to a new edition of his “Anthropology,” his full conviction of the facts of the spiritualistic phenomena, as far as they had come to his observation. In 1878, he published a volume on this subject, under the title, “Modern Spiritualism; Its Value and Delusions — An Anthropological Study.”

After that time he was busily engaged in writing “Spiritualistic Memorable Events,” of which forty pages were finished and published, when, on the twenty-second day of April, 1879, a serious affection of the brain closed his very active and successful literary career; and his death, in the middle of August, ended his noble life.

A. E. KROEGER.

ASSOCIATIONS OF TONE AND COLOR.

[From Prof. Moritz Wirth the following letter has been received (Leipzig, April 10, 1879), which explains itself. Mr. Kroeger translates both the letter and the circular which follows. — Ed.]

"I do myself the honor to send you a sheet of questions for gathering statistics upon the subject of certain associations referred to in his "*Vorschule der Æsthetik*," I, p. 176, and II, p. 315, by Prof. Fechner, who desires to have them answered. I beg that you, yourself, will do us the honor of interesting yourself in the matter, and will also kindly stir up the circle of your friends and acquaintances to note and gather facts belonging to this subject.

"In view of the different pronunciations pertaining to the same signs in English and German, I have taken the liberty to put down such English words as contain the sound required for these statistics. It is understood that all replies to the questions may be made in the English language.

"I further make free to inform you of a class of associations which have come to light only since these questions were first started. It has appeared that in many cases the *tone-keys* associate with colors. For instance: C major is seen as white; D major as yellow; D flat major, golden; E major, green; G minor, dark red; C minor, gray, etc. At the same time, passages are to be found in some musical works, which may appear to be influenced in the choice of keys by such associations. Thus, Haydn, in his "Creation," after the words, "And there was *Light!*" brings in the C-major chord, having previously painted the chaos in C minor. Similarly, in his "Seasons," the fogs of winter are sketched in C minor. The association of the tone-keys with colors being thus of quite immediate interest for experimental Æsthetics, I beg you to direct your attention also to this matter. Should you consider the undertaking a proper one for a small notice in your journal, Prof. Fechner will certainly be very grateful. It is, of course, left altogether to your own inclination whether you care to collect the observations and information thus drawn out, in larger circles of interested persons, for your own use, or whether you will cause them to be sent to the address on the enclosed cover, so as to reach Prof. Fechner directly."

Tone and Color.

It is a well-known fact that many persons associate colors with vowels; frequently it happens, also, that the major and minor keys of tones, and also temperaments, are associated with vowels. It would be, in many respects, interesting to know whether there is any regularity in these phenomena; but only a very extensive compilation of statistics can make this known.

Prof. Fechner, who has exerted himself for a long time to fix æsthetical laws empirically, has appealed to the Academical Philosophical society to aid him in gathering the necessary material. Authorized by the society, the undersigned take the liberty to submit to you the enclosed sheet of questions.

In explanation, we add the following: —

1. Colors include black, white, and mixed colors. It is desirable

that any particular shading — if any — be also specified, *e.g.*, metallic, dim, glossy.

2. For the sake of clearness it is well to designate the species of tones (major and minor), and also the temperaments (sanguine, choleric, melancholic, and phlegmatic), merely by their first letter, using capitals for the former, and small letters for the latter.

3. A special sheet is enclosed for any other associations — as, for instance, of numbers, temperaments, connections of diphthongs and consonants with colors, etc.

4. Of course, it is also of importance to ascertain the percentage of such persons as have no association at all. We request them to sign their names and address on the second enclosed sheet.

5. We beg that, on all three sheets, the occupation and place of residence be added to the signature.

Prof. Fechner desires, in general, only the judgment of cultured persons. The coöperation of ladies will be specially valuable to him. It is understood that only such associations are to be inserted as arise unforced of themselves, and without systematic reflection.

Should the interest in this matter grow in your circle, further sheets are at your service.

Allow us to remark, in conclusion, that a speedy return of the sheets will be very agreeable to Prof. Fechner. We request you to use the enclosed envelope for that purpose.

At the instance of Prof. Fechner, the commission of the Academic Philosophical Society.

[Signed by]

GEORGE WENDEL, Stud. Arch.

MORITZ WIRTH, Stud. Philos.

ADOLF FORSTRIK, Stud. Math.

LEIPZIG, February, 1879.

[These tables require information in regard to correspondence of *color*, *major* or *minor*, and *temperament* in respect to each of the following vowel-sounds: *a* (as heard in *ah*, *calm*), *e* (English long-a-sound, as heard in *shade*, *hail*, or *they*), *i* (English long-e-sound, as heard in *scene*, *sheep*, *fatigue*), *o* (as in *hope*, *note*, *cloak*), *u* or *oo* (as in *rule* = *oo* in *fool*, *pool*), *a* (in *back*, *bad*, *shall*), *u* (in *hut*, *gun*, *luck*), *a* or *au* (as in *fall*, *naught*, *talk*).

Any persons who feel an interest in the question will confer a favor by making the experiments indicated, and collecting the information in a tabular form and transmitting the same to the editor of THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, or *An dem Akademisch-Philosophischen Verein*, Leipzig, Germany. — Ed.]

RAPHAEL'S "SCHOOL OF ATHENS."

In the year 1508. Julius II., the haughty and violent conqueror of Bologna, was in the fifth year of his pontificate, and at the very acme of his destiny. His warlike deeds had established his reputation as an earthly ruler, and the keys of St. Peter, which he held, were the indisputable sign of his spiritual authority. Although no lover of art for art's sake, his ostentatious mind, seeking to perpetuate itself, accepted that as the nearest road, and the number and character of his works have stamped him one of the greatest figures of the Renaissance. Already St. Peter's, his glory and his crown, was far advanced, and Bramante, its architect, stood high enough in favor to be one of his chief advisers. Michael Angelo was engaged in constructing for him a tomb, on a plan which, had it been completed, would have put all former efforts of the kind to shame, and have driven all future artists to despair. Julius was happy in the possession of the first architect and sculptor of his time, and his glory seemed like to live again, fresh and green, in their works.

It is said that Bramante conceived a jealousy of the sculptor; he feared that Michael Angelo's project would eclipse his own; he looked with an eye of some thing stronger even than disapprobation upon the work which was destined to be enshrined within his own. Casting about for a means of supplanting him, he bethought himself of his townsman, Raphael, the young artist of Urbino. He presented him to the old pope, and asked for him the task of painting the unfinished *stanze* of the pontifical palace. Julius II. was ravished at sight of the young and graceful painter, and, satisfied with the account of his fame, "caused all other painting to be effaced, and gave him the immensity of the Vatican to decorate."

Raphael d'Urbino, the first painter of all time, was now at the flowering time of his genius. He had gradually disentangled himself from the net of Perugino's influence; he had passed through the stage of his subjection to Fra Bartolommeo, and was now ready to stand forth in the might of his own unapproachable genius — a genius which had no flaw in the early development, no stain of vain-glory in its onward progress. Beside that "fire off the altar" with which he had been touched by nature, he was presented by the Fates with the two best gifts they have in their power to confer on man; he was born well and died early — died in the zenith of his powers and of his fame.

Art, beauty, and grace were his by legitimate inheritance. Born of

an artist father, whose devotion to his art, whose high sense of the artist's calling, is best expressed by his own words: "Care never weighs so cruelly as on a man already laden with the magnificent burden of art, a burden which would be heavy even for the shoulders of an Atlas;" he had for a mother one whose best epitaph was, "She made her husband's life happy." Added to this, she was so lovely that Giovanni often used her and his beloved young son as models for his Holy Families. Thus Raphael imbibed, with his earliest breath, his taste, his grace, his beauty of mind and of person. His first years were passed in an atmosphere of love, beauty, and sweetness, and amid all the refinements and ennoblements of art. He here learned of his father to paint those images of maternal love which haunted his imagination through life, and which he ever labored to embody, passing onward through every grade of excellence, until at last his conquering brush gave to the world, as its lasting inheritance, that apotheosis of all that is loveliest and purest in womanhood and childhood, transfigured by all that is most divine in nature and in God, the Madonna di San Sisto.

We have listened long, we must still continue to listen, to the futile comparison of Raphael with Michael Angelo. We must hear one rated as to his repose, the other as to his power, forgetful all the while that there is a power in the calm of a summer sea, that has no thought of the tempest; and another power of the calm after the storm, the sea of which is as motionless, as still as the other, but whose quiet wave broods over the wreck of brave barks and loving hearts which lie deep beneath its shimmering surface. Michael Angelo's repose is a conquered peace. He is the only artist who has united the deed to its consequence; who has rounded the circle, so that we can find in all his great works the power that comes of a free-will acknowledging necessity. Raphael's is the repose of a soul that has never sinned. Not for him the conflicts and the questionings, not for him the doubt and surmise; he is safely anchored, and his faith is sure.

Raphael's art was his whole life. He lived for a time in Florence, amid the contentions of Michael Angelo, Da Vinci, and the lesser artists, without a thought of engaging in their disputes, only seeking to learn of them their methods, and always endeavoring to perfect himself. At Urbino he was an *habitué* of the court—one of the most brilliant of the time, full of lovely women and gifted men— at whose feasts and revelries he was ever a welcome guest. But we find him chiefly delighting in the conversations upon Plato and the Ideal

philosophy, carried on between Count Cagliostro and Pietro Bembo — conversations which he carried long in his mind, the close attention which he paid them yielding a rich harvest at a later time. In Rome, received everywhere, and himself a centre of admirers, of pupils, and of friends; living in the midst of all the angry passions, the sensuality, and the restless misery of the full Renaissance; living during the progress of the most tragic events, while Italy was being overrun by stranger hordes and enslaved by foe and friend alike, he still kept on his quiet way, accepting as his mission the glorious work of rounding off and completing the noble circle of Italian painters — of leaving to after ages the benediction of perfect beauty and of holy peace.

The first work put into the hands of Raphael, on his arrival at Rome, was the task of decorating the walls of the *Stanza della Segnatura*. This was already partially accomplished, and some artists were still at work on it when Pope Julius placed it in the hands of Raphael, desiring him to do what he thought best with it. He retained some of the lesser ornamentation of the ceiling, but the walls he caused to be cleared for his own work. On each of these four walls he painted a large picture, averaging 16x26 feet, which accommodated itself to the shape of the room, and had for subject, respectively, Theology, Poetry, Philosophy, and Jurisprudence. Of the other three, though each great in its kind, and having each its host of admirers, we shall not speak. We shall direct our attention solely to Philosophy, or, as it is more commonly called, the “School of Athens.”

Viewed only as a work of art, the School of Athens will challenge comparison with the most ambitious attempts of its own creator, or of any other artist. Its beauty and finish; its magnificent architecture, so superbly drawn that the illusion of distance and of light is perfect; the grace, ease, and variety, both of movement and of rest, exhibited in the figures, are all unique. But this is the smallest part of its excellence. It is as the epitome of Greek philosophy that it claims our deepest attention. We have here mapped out, as it were, before us, the whole complex product of Greek thought.

Assembled in the atrium of a noble edifice, built in the earliest, and therefore the purest, Renaissance style, we behold the representatives of every phase of Greek philosophy, that wonderful plant which grew up in a night, as it were, and bore its fruit for the ages. Each group or circle, complete in itself, is related to all that precede and to all that follow; and thus these interlacing circles form, together,

the one great round which is itself but a moment in the circling movement of human thought.

The Greek philosophy, counting from its earliest appearance down to its latest outcome (the noble school of exact science at Alexandria), may be divided into three phases: the material, the speculative, and the scientific. In Raphael's work, the first and third, as merely physical, occupy the lower level; the speculative appears, by right, upon the platform above. Like the "closed circle, ending in its beginning," which we are told typifies philosophy, this circle may be broken anywhere. But in the logical sequence we shall begin with the earliest exponents, and so make our progression "in time."

The lonely dreamer, who occupies the first place at the left, is Heraclitus. He is the representative of the Ionian school, which counted Thales, the father of Greek philosophy, as its founder. This school accepted as its mission the search after the beginning of things, and was thoroughly cosmogonical. As a material philosophy, having not yet reached a standpoint higher than that derived from sensation, it necessarily attached itself to a material element—water, air, fire—as its first principle. But it was the first effort of Greek thought to realize itself, and in that lies its deep meaning.

Leaning on a pedestal, a *stylus* in his hand, a tablet resting beside him, he appears immersed in thought. No disciple or friend attends him. The "Obscure" finds, in his own day, no one to sympathize with his doctrine. Vainly endeavoring to make intelligible the great thought that fills his soul, he ponders ceaselessly his own enigma: "All is and is not; for though it does indeed come into being, yet it forthwith ceases to be." "On the same stream we embark and embark not, we are and we are not!"

In strange contrast with this solitary thinker, we see next Pythagoras, surrounded by his disciples and his friends. Their number and eager attention prove unquestionably the popularity of his *exoteric* doctrine, while the disciple at his right (probably Archytas), peering over his shoulder and copying diligently in a large book, is a subtle reminder that he had an *esoteric* one as well: "Not unto all should all be made known." Still seeking after the first principle of things, and wavering between water, air, fire, the Greek mind hungered for something solid and unvarying on which it might make its stand. Pythagoras, founder of the Italian school, thought he had discovered this in Number. His aim was to bring harmony into creation. Aristotle says: "He concluded that the elements of Numbers are the elements of things, and that the whole heaven is a harmony and a Number." The young man, holding a tablet on which music is

noted, reminds us of his maxim: "The nature and energy of Numbers may be traced, not only in divine and demonic things, but in human works and words everywhere, and in all works of art, and in music." The woman behind, seen only in profile, refers to his estimation, — extraordinary at that day — of the importance of woman. Many women ranked among his disciples. This undoubtedly represents his wife, Theano, who was herself a philosopher. The Arab leaning over his shoulder indicates the Arabic invention of figures, and the use made of them in arithmetical combinations of numbers.

These two systems, which form the first antithesis of the picture, form the first antithesis of philosophy. With Heraclitus, and the philosophers of his school, the earth is all in all; it is the centre of the system; the ground beneath their feet is the only reality. Pythagoras looks abroad into the heavens and sees the sun, fixed and immovable, with all its train of planets circling in majestic procession round it, singing as they go. Sensualism and Idealism in embryo!

Back of Pythagoras, and seeming almost a part of his group, is Parmenides, chief of the Eleatics. He is placed near Pythagoras, as believing, like him, "all comes from One;" but his inattention to him, and his pre-occupation, separate them widely — as did their doctrines. Parmenides's "Being is, and nothing is not," is the foundation of pure thought. Of all the pre-Socratic schools, the Eleatic approached nearest to the heights of speculative inquiry, and Raphael has placed Parmenides nearest the platform — almost upon the first step. One of the strongest antitheses in the whole picture is to be found between Heraclitus and Parmenides. Heraclitus broods moodily and heavily; his thought is clogged and weighed down by its gross material embodiment. Parmenides is calm, serene, beautiful (Raphael is said to have given him the features of his prince, Francesco Maria della Rovere); looking abroad from the heights he has scaled, his vision is far and unimpeded.

Between Parmenides and Heraclitus, more in the foreground than Parmenides, but farther removed than Heraclitus and Pythagoras, is Anaxagoras. Standing directly below Socrates, he seems placed there partly to separate him from the physical school, which he held in such contempt, and partly to suggest the deep significance which Socrates was afterwards to give to the assertion of Anaxagoras: "*Νῶς* governs the world." The infinite One Substance of the Ionians became in his hands the *homœomerie*. To express this, he is represented turning quite away from Heraclitus, but seems to be arguing with Pythagoras that, as "without the One there could not

be the Many, so, with the Many only could there be One." Though, with Anaxagoras, the One was not the Many, but the Moving Principle of the many.

The group at the extreme left, and the last on the lower level, introduces us to Democritus. He embodies the final summing up of the material systems, both negatively and affirmatively. He rejected both the One and the Many, and declared *Atoms*, "indivisible and intangible," to be the primary elements. But the Atom, being indivisible, is necessarily *one*; and being one, is necessarily self-existent. He thus affirmed that the self-existent must be One; that there were many things existing; and also that the One could never be more than the One — never become the Many. It is not, however, as the atomic, but as the traditional "laughing philosopher," that Raphael has represented Democritus. We behold him crowned with ivy, and accompanied by boon companions, who believe, like him, that philosophy is the "art of enjoying life;" his jovial face and figure in strange contrast with the earnest, preoccupied air of his predecessors. At his left, a rognish child, whose sunny face is suddenly clouded over at view of the serious company into which he has intruded, connects him with the old school of philosophy, whose systems were articles of faith. On his right, the old man presenting a babe typifies the senility of the material conception, which, in the person of Democritus, approaches its dissolution; but before its departure, presents, still in the person of Democritus, the new-born speculative insight.

The age of Faith, in the Greek philosophy, closes with Democritus. Indeed, attempts have been made to identify him with the Sophists; and his celebrated axiom, "Either nothing is true, or what is true is not evident to us," quoted by Aristotle, gives color to the theory. Certain it is that, by ascribing all our knowledge to sensation, and then affirming its (sensation's) unreliability, he opened the way for the assertion that we have no criterion of truth.

The negative phase of thought has its uses, and is as fully a part of the general movement as the affirmative. After a phase of philosophy has run its course and reached its highest point, it is necessary that it should pass away, not into oblivion, but to reissue as component part of the new doctrine. Before the new edifice can be raised, the old structure must be torn down — but not therefore annihilated. The worthless bricks, the plaster, and other *débris* must all be cleared away; but the solid and heavy stones of the foundation, the polished and sculptured mural tablets, will all be numbered and laid aside, ready for use by the new architect. The work of building

is slow, laborious, calm; tearing down is a wild act, full of movement, haste, and passion. The first group at the left of the platform represents the Sophists. They come hurriedly on the scene; they are in haste to proclaim their mission — to announce the utter vanity and uselessness of all philosophy.

The Sophists had no school, properly so called; no one great master, around whom all the rest revolved. It was rather a popular movement than a system. Accordingly, we see in our picture a group of three men, neither of whom appears to be especially prominent. The one who seems in the most violent haste, who enters half-clothed, his drapery fluttering after him in resistance to his rapid advance, is Diagoras of Melos, whose desire to implant distrust of all preconceived ideas earned him an exile from Athens. More in the background, his head and face alone visible, appears Gorgias of Leontinum, whom Plato honored by making his name the title of one of his dialogues. The third figure represents Protagoras — probably the most representative name of the class. His celebrated *dictum*, "Man is the measure of all things," which formulated the relativity of all knowledge, was the essence of the whole doctrine. Pointing to the next circle, which includes Socrates and his pupils, while turning to his companions, he connects the two groups, and seems to indicate the war which was to be waged between them.

We have now reached the central point of the picture, the highest effort of Greek philosophy, represented by the great triune — Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. Occupying the central and highest point — enshrined, as it were, in the temple itself, each surrounded by his own pupils, — they seem separate, but are really one.

The Greek mind, baffled in its expected results from physics, had sunk for a moment in the slough of scepticism. Only for a moment: too energetic to remain there long, it shook itself free and turned its attention to morals. Socrates aimed to withdraw the mind from what seemed to him to be the utterly barren contemplation of the phenomena of nature, and to turn its regard on its own phenomena. He believed every man has within himself the germs of knowledge, and the only way by which man can conquer truth is to struggle valorously with himself for its possession. Hegel says of him: "Socrates is celebrated as a teacher of morality, but we should rather call him the *inventor of morality*. The Greeks had a morality of custom; but Socrates undertook to teach them what moral virtues and duties were. The moral man is not merely he who wills and does that which is right — not the merely innocent man — but he who has the consciousness of what he is doing. Socrates, in assign-

ing to insight, to conviction, the determination of men's actions, posited the individual as capable of a final moral decision, in contradiction to country and customary morality, and thus manifested a revolutionary aspect towards the Athenian State; for the peculiarity of this State was, that customary morality was the form in which its existence was moulded—an inseparable connection of Thought with actual life. But when, on account of the giving utterance to that principle, which was advancing to recognition, Socrates is condemned to death, the sentence bears, on the one hand, the aspect of unimpeachable justice—inasmuch as the Athenian people condemns its deadliest foe—but, on the other hand, that of a deeply tragical character, inasmuch as the Athenians had to make the discovery that what they reprobated in Socrates had already struck firm root among themselves, and that they must be pronounced guilty or innocent with him."

We see him here, the centre of a motley crowd, "seeking for the meaning of the oracle." He is now interrogating one of those artificers whom he acknowledged "knew things which he did not." Alcibiades, dressed in complete armor, stands opposite. His fixed look, his eager, breathless attention, prove that he will soon be obliged "to stop his ears, and flee away as fast as possible, lest he should sit down beside him and grow old listening to his talk." To the right of Alcibiades, Æschines, the plebeian Athenian orator, warns off the approaching Sophists, and at the same time connects his circle with the one preceding. To the left of Æschines, and directly behind the artisan, is Crito, always the fast friend of Socrates; his benefactor when, removing him from his uncongenial occupation in the marble-cutter's yard, he had him educated; his disciple in later life, and his executor when dead.

Leaning on a stylobate, and watching his master eagerly, is Xenophon. He seems, though, to be intent, rather upon the man than upon his words. He is thinking, "Knowing him, of a truth, to be such a man as I have described; so pious towards the gods, as never to undertake any thing without first consulting them; so just towards men, as never to do any injury, even the very slightest, to any one, whilst many and great were the benefits he conferred on all with whom he had any dealings; so temperate and chaste, as not to indulge any appetite or inclination at the expense of whatever was modest and becoming; so prudent, as never to err in judgment of good or evil, nor wanting the assistance of others to discriminate rightly concerning them; so able to discourse upon, and define with the greatest accuracy, not only those points of which we have been

speaking, but likewise every other, and, looking, as it were, into the minds of men, discover the very moment for reprehending vice or stimulating to the love of virtue; experiencing, as I have done, all these excellencies in Socrates, I can never cease considering him as the most virtuous and most happy of mankind. But if there is any one who is disposed to think otherwise, let him go and compare Socrates with any other, and afterwards let him determine."

More in the background appear Aristippus and Euclid of Megara, two of the most eminent of Socrates's disciples — after Plato — who founded schools. The nearest one, who is represented as an old man, is Aristippus of Cyrene. He specified Pleasure as the infinite Good; but believed that, in order to secure the highest pleasure, it was necessary to temper enjoyment with moderation. Directly behind him is Euclid. The Megaric school was a mixture of the Eleatic and Socratic. Euclid accepted the One which is known only to Reason, but announced that One to be the Good. This One Good was the only true existence; all else is phenomenal and transitory.

Occupying the central and highest position is the double group, with Plato and Aristotle in the centre. Plato is represented as an old man, with flowing white beard and hair. Aristotle is in the prime of manhood. Plato marks the highest point of speculative philosophy; Aristotle, though still a speculative thinker, is the summit from which was to flow the clear stream of positive science.

Democritus embodied the first *resumé* of Greek philosophy; Plato, the second. Plato was the heir of the accumulated riches of the ages. He collected, enlarged, and improved upon the thoughts of all his predecessors, and, adopting their leading features, applied to them the Socratic method — Definitions, Analysis, and Induction. Like his master, he made the investigation of universals his specialty. Dialectics, with him, was the science of Universals. This science was not confined solely to subjective things, but occupied itself with what were the only real existences — Ideas. His doctrine of Ideas was the centre of his system, around which his other speculations — as to Reminiscence, Metempsychosis, God, the World — revolved. Standing erect, a large book — to denote his voluminous writing — in his hand, he points upward to that celestial region which he considered the home of Ideas, the seat of Existence itself, and which he was "constantly, to the best of his powers, occupied in trying to recollect."

On the right of Plato are arranged the Academicians. Speusippus, his sister's son, who succeeded him in the conduct of the Old Academy, is nearest the spectator. Leaning on his shoulder, his face

turned from us, is Xenocrates, who succeeded Speusippus (339 B. C.). These two carried out the principles of their master, and illustrated and defended his doctrines. The Middle Academy is represented by Arcesilaus, who developed the doctrine of the uncertainty of sensuous impressions and the nothingness of human knowledge. His face exhibits the sweet temper for which he was renowned. The next figure is in strong contrast; this shows us Carneades, the founder of the New Academy, the subtle rhetorician, who was largely tinged with Cynicism. Back of him, and almost concealed by his tall figure, is Philo of Larissa, the *avant courier* of Neo-Platonism.

On the left of Plato, we see the one whom he himself characterized so well: "Aristotle is the *Mind* of my school." The pupil was no slavish imitator of his master. Receiving gladly and cherishing tenderly all that he learned of him, he yet dared to disagree on some points of his philosophy, and, by so doing, struck out a new pathway for himself. He opposed Plato's theory of Ideas, and we see him here engaged in dispute. Plato has just proclaimed that Ideas, and Ideas alone, have any existence. Aristotle replies, "I tell thee, Plato, my master, thou art wrong — radically wrong. Far be it from me to deny the *subjective* existence of Ideas; on the contrary, I consider them the very materials of science. But to give them an *objective* existence, is merely to perpetuate an empty and poetical metaphor." The real existence with him was Thought, the activity of Divine Reason — God himself. "God, as the Absolute Unmoved Eternal Substance, is Thought. The Universe is a thought in the mind of God." It is "God passing into activity, but not exhausted in the act." Aristotle made science possible by proclaiming experience to be its basis; by directing man to the observation of nature. He did not, therefore, eliminate Reason, but made of it the architect of science. Hegel has abundantly proved that, "although Aristotle laid more stress upon experience than did Plato, yet he also expressly taught that Reason alone could form science."

Ranged on the left of Aristotle, and opposed to the Academicians, are the Peripatetics — over against the moralists, the natural philosophers. Theophrastus, the foremost of the line, was first a pupil of Plato, but subsequently became the favorite of Aristotle, who made him his heir. Standing next him, with an arm thrown around his neck, is Strato of Lampsacus, who followed Theophrastus as conductor of the Lyceum. These two were the natural philosophers, *par excellence*, of the school. Theophrastus, according to Cicero, attributed a character of divinity to the heavens, and to all astronom-

ical systems; Strato declared that what is called God, Intelligence, Divine Power, was nothing more than the power of nature, deprived of all consciousness of itself; that every thing is explained by the necessary connection of causes and effects, by the poise and counterpoise of nature. The third represents Aristoxenes, the musician, who regarded the soul as a vibration of the body. Peering over his shoulder is Dicaearchus, who taught there was no soul; what we call by that name was nothing else than *life*, equally diffused throughout all bodies. To the right of Aristoxenes is Eudemus of Rhodes, celebrated as an editor and commentator, as well as a disciple of Aristotle. Lycon, the third conductor of the Lyceum, and Aristo, the fourth, follow in succession.

Back of this row, in allusion to the designation Peripatetics, we see two philosophers, who seem to be walking swiftly, while engaged in close conversation. There is a touch of the ludicrous in this little piece of naturalism. And in the next figure—the young man who indicates the Eclecticism about to commence, whose irresistibly comic hurry is manifested by his unstable position (he stands on one leg—with the other crossed, and writes, resting the tablet on his knee), and his hair waving aside—Raphael must have had a premonition of the modern newspaper reporter.

The disciples of Socrates were of two different orders: those—and Plato is the only true example of this order—who understood, who carried out the whole of his philosophical method, and those who were more attracted by his views of morality, his ethical tendencies. We have seen how, in the Megaric school, the abstract Good of Socrates was identified with the Eleatic One; and how, in the Cyrenaic school, it was represented by the concrete, Pleasure. The Cynical and Epicurean schools, though antipodal in their tendencies, were developments of the same idea. Cynicism consisted in the absolute renunciation of all worldly pleasure, of all bodily desires. It was a subjugation of the body by the mind. Its devotees find their parallel only in the hermits and ascetics of later times. To go clothed in the scantiest excuse for raiment, to eat barely sufficient to ward off starvation, to wallow in filth, and to live, to act, and to talk with the most brutal coarseness, was to live a life of virtue, was to be free of sin, and was to have a mind unclogged in its free development.

To this vile doctrine is opposed the elevated one of Epicurus—elevated in itself, though seduced into base uses—of the right employment of *all* the faculties, a rigid temperance the only rule. His doctrine was not an art of Truth. He could not scale those airy heights where Socrates, Plato, Aristotle dwelt serene, but he created

the noblest of all the arts of Life. Over his "Garden" in Athens might have been written the noble aphorism of Goethe, "*Think of Living.*" Democritus had a glimpse of this high thought, Aristippus saw it "darkly," too, but to Epicurus is due its embodiment—to his followers, alas, its prostitution.

Perhaps the finest episode of the picture, certainly the strongest antithesis, is the contrast of Cynicisn and Epicureanism, as represented by their chief exponents. Lying negligently upon the *middle* step (Raphael was no ascetic) is Diogenes of Sinope. His eyes fixed upon a tablet which he holds in his hand, he is absorbed in thought. His drapery is scanty and poor, but he has not yet reached the lowest point of his voluntary destitution; his bowl stands on the step beside him. Mounting the steps we see a young man, handsomely dressed. He has heard of the congress of philosophers, it seems, and has come hither to seek a master. Meeting a stranger (Epicurus, also richly dressed) descending, he inquires of him, "Who is the greatest teacher here? Surely this man, who exhibits so much contempt for all the luxuries and gauds of life; who, solitary, has no need of companionship." Epicurus points to the triumphate above, telling him not to stop on the way, but seek always the highest good; and bids him not to trust too much to an appearance whose only characteristic may be its singularity. We seem almost to hear the echo of words like unto these of Emerson: "It is easy in the world to live after the world's opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but the great man is he who, in the midst of the crowd, keeps, with perfect sweetness, the independence of solitude."

We have seen how the first physical speculations, the utter reliance on sensation, had been thrust aside; and how there had followed a feeling of the unreliability of all knowledge. From that moment Scepticism took firm hold of the Greek mind. Indeed, it must have been latent there from the first; for, who ever begins to inquire until he has first learned to doubt? Socrates himself was so thoroughly convinced of the utter uselessness of all outward knowledge that he was forced to turn his attention inward, thus again making man, though in a new sense, "the measure of all things." The Sophists discovered the weak points of the old belief, and, having discovered them, they attacked and demolished them. Plato, coming after, accepted so much of their conclusions, and, on the ruins of sense-perception—built up his Ideal theory. Aristotle successfully combated that; and Pyrrho, with his absolute scepticism in regard to all speculative thought, was the result.

Pyrrho declared that though Plato and Aristotle, who contained between them all that there was of speculative philosophy, asserted that Reason was the criterion of Truth, they failed to see that Reason, too, was in need of a criterion. His uncertainty drove him so far as to proclaim, "We assert nothing,—no, not even that we assert nothing." In the picture, he stands to the left of the young man representing Eclecticism. Leaning against the base of a column, he gazes contemptuously across the circle of speculative thinkers, and pities their easy credulity.

It is impossible not to notice the scattered appearance of this side of the platform. The woes of Greece, consequent upon her subjugation, were telling upon her philosophy as well as upon her art and political institutions. The short and brilliant dominion of Macedonia was in itself a subjugation for Greece proper, and with Aristotle the glory of the Greek speculative philosophy ended. His immediate and best-beloved disciples earned the *sobriquet* of "Natural Philosophers." There is no reason to quarrel with the result. Greek philosophy had made use of all the material in its possession. Aristotle, though a very erudite man, the most learned of his time, was obliged, again and again, to depart from his method for the pitiful reason that he did not *know* enough; he did not possess "a sufficient number of experiences." It was necessary that science should make new discoveries in order that philosophy might make a new synthesis.

To the left of Pyrrho stands Zeno. His doctrine did not absolutely deny to man the right to speculative endeavor, but inculcated, above every thing else, a virtuous activity. Man must live to be virtuous, to do brave deeds, to be a Man, in the true Latin sense of the word (*vir-tus*). This is what turns his body away from his Grecian compatriots, though his face, turned towards them, connects him with the passing phase. Stoicism is more the philosophy of old Rome than of Greece.

At the extreme right of the platform we see a philosopher who approaches leaning upon a staff, and closely followed by another, whose head and face alone appear. This must represent Plotinus and Proclus, the fervent mystics, who, having learned of Christianity the transcendence of the Deity, return, leaning upon it as a staff, to the old Greek form of Thought.

The youth who appears to be running away typifies the passage of the speculative. But we are consoled to see he is only a youth. The babe which we saw presented by the old man of the material phase has scarcely grown to manhood. He leaves the scene with

the old civilization, but we shall meet him again. With the modern civilization, modern philosophy was born.

We descend now to the lower level—the circle must end in its beginning. The whole round of philosophy must be traversed. Scepticism, which set aside the material philosophy, has done the same for the speculative. But, though it has announced that we can know nothing of the real Existences, it does not deny that what we know of appearances may be true of them as appearances; and the next step is to observe and classify phenomena. Thus science is born. There are two ways in which a phenomenon is viewed: it may be considered as caused by a power which is outside of the object; or, the effect may be viewed as the gradual development of a power which is inherent in the object. The first is typical of the natural man, of the earlier stages of civilization, and is represented in our picture by the material schools. The second is only possible when, after a long series of painful studies and experiences, man has learned to trace an effect through its chain of causes, and is typified by science.

Science, as represented in the “School of Athens,” is purely mathematical; and that is the only aspect in which we can suppose Raphael to have been conversant with it. We see gathered together, explaining each his subject—as we might have seen them in the Museum at Alexandria—the professors of Geography (almost wholly mathematical at that day), Astronomy, and Geometry. The two figures holding globes in their hands represent Eratosthenes and Ptolemy; both distinguished—the former as an astronomer, the latter as a geographer. Ptolemy is depicted wearing kingly robes and a crown, probably to suggest the line of kings (of the same name) whose munificence made of the Museum a model for all future colleges. Raphael has introduced himself, and his master Perugino, in this group. We can imagine how they, as every one else, were interested in the tidings which spread through Europe, during the period of their connection, of the wonderful discovery of Columbus. At the time, too, of Raphael’s arrival in Rome, Copernicus had but lately resigned his chair of mathematics in that city. And could Raphael have failed to hear—even lost in his art as he was—some account of the mighty theory afterwards to be so noised abroad?

The last group introduces us to Euclid, the most illustrious name in Geometry. Raphael has here portrayed his friend, Bramante, explaining a problem to a group of attentive pupils. In this group we can trace a likeness to the four chief attitudes of Thought presented by the whole great circle: the first, who kneels before the

tablet, eager and earnest, but, despite all his efforts, unable to seize the demonstration, might symbolize the material philosophy, seeking in vain to solve the Problem of the Universe; the second, who leans against him, typifies the utmost height of the speculative, which, gazing on the everlasting Existences themselves, through them solves the Problem; the third, also kneeling, sees and understands the Appearances, and thinks he knows the Truth; he turns to speak of it to the fourth, who appears lost in ecstasy at the *revelation* he receives.

Having arranged the grouping, the expression, the *tout ensemble* of his characters, Raphael must have felt somewhat at a loss for a fitting scene in which to place them. The groves, the walks, the porches, the gardens, even the river banks were all occupied. Pausing only for a moment to consider the concrete element he had to locate, he placed them, fitly, at the entrance of a structure, built in that style which is itself the concretest expression in architecture. On the one side, as presiding deity, he placed the sculptured image of Apollo, the god of inspiration, and of high endeavor; on the other, Minerva, the genius of wisdom, science, and practical life.

To us, who have followed Raphael so far, who have been his companions, as it were, in his search after the Beautiful and the True, how utterly vain and idle it would seem to be told of his authority for this or that part of his work; of the books he read, or had read to him; of the instruction he received from Bembo and Cagliostro. What we know, without the telling, is, that the baser metal of their information, whether much or little, turned to purest gold at the mere touch of the philosopher's stone of his genius.

GERTRUDE GARRIGUES.

ST. LOUIS, March, 1879.

WEEDS.

Was it the devil sowed the weeds,
As once was writ in ancient creeds?
Wilding sisters of the flowers,
Unnursed save by sun and showers,
Saved from year to year without care,
We know not how nor can tell where,
Often they make the heart so glad
We cannot think the Fiend all bad.

As saith St. Augustine —
I forget page and line —
Once he was fair and fine;

Composed of purest sky and air,
 And of all intellect the heir.
 Doubtless, of these a little dower
 He saved from Eden's ruined bower,
 And wieldeth with imperfect power.
 The weed is a dethroned flower;
 It grows, it leaves, it blooms, unsought
 By man, and dies without his thought,
 And often minds me it must have
 Another life itself to save.
 A wanderer from Paradise,
 Where once it grew to glad all eyes,
 And happy in its own sweet ease,
 It now itself nor us can please.
 Two things alone escaped the curse,
 The flowers, and high, immortal verse:
 But man and weeds together driven
 Beyond the portal of that heaven,
 Together strive to right their wrong,
 One by man's love, and man by song.
 Beside the garden wall
 They hide until the Fall
 Scatters their million seeds; —
 How safe a wild thing breeds!
 While o'er all earthly fields men flock
 To find and nurse some choicest stock,
 Rearing slow some growth triumphant,
 As nothing could their proud craft daunt,
 Storm, stealthy slug, or drought, or frost
 Undo their work, and all is lost.
 Weeds fail not, parcel of that might
 Beyond our power to wrong or right.
 The weeds, the stars, the winds and sea
 Are self-preserved and wildly free;
 All that is slave to mortal wills
 Shares in the curse of mortal ills.
 Nature hath set by rock and road
 The wild weed's most secure abode;
 In spots where we so often come,
 We see, nor envy them their room,
 That we whose hearts with nature meeting
 May find a pleasant, welcome greeting.
 So, Esther dear, with me and you,
 The meanest things shall have their due;
 The tares and thistles all be sweet,
 Nor to the Lord perhaps unmeet; —
 Run child, and on His altar lay
 This bunch of weeds we pulled to-day.

JOHN ALBEE.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE: a Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method. By W. STANLEY JEVONS, LL.D., Prof. of Polit. Econ. in University College, London. Second edition, revised. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1877. 8vo., pp. 786.

The school of English Positivists is steadily strengthening its claim to be regarded as the most distinctly characteristic of the time. While Mill and Lewes have shaped its philosophy, Bain has written its psychology, and Clifford and Harrison have given eloquent utterance to its polemics; and this work of Prof. Jevons carries its logic well on towards completeness. Like all positive work, it is conducted in the methods of modern physical science, with a wealth of physical illustration and an elaborate avoidance of metaphysical discussion. To the opposite school of thinkers, the author's neglect of the transcendental questions of absolute being, and of the ultimate categories and relativities of thought, and similar topics, will seem a serious defect; but, even from their point of view, there are advantages in treating separately the parts of a subject, where they are as distinct as transcendental and applied logic. Students are more likely to object to the superabundance of scientific illustration, which gives a disproportionate bulk to the latter part of the volume, and, in spite of its interest, actually obscures the laws it is intended to make plain. In this second edition, so much of beauty and comfort has been sacrificed to economy in reducing the two tall volumes of the first edition to this one thick, but still expensive, little book, that one wonders the more that omissions were not more frequent. The style, however, is simple, and very clear; the reasoning is carefully worked out, if not always quite profound, and the reading which filled the professor's note-book has been wide and intelligent. That the book has received so much less attention here than in England, shows the difference between American thought, with its strong transcendental tendencies, and the scientific English school.

The principle of quantification of the predicate is the basis of the new system. First shown by Sir William Hamilton, it remained for many years a barren technicality. Mr. Mill, however, had shaken the power of the old syllogistic logic, by showing the narrowness of its limits and the insufficiency of its rules. But Mr. Mill was not a mathematician, and it seems to have required the special insight which mathematical training gives, to work out the abstractest symbolic forms of the laws of thought. This De Morgan and Boole had supplied, but encumbered, unfortunately, with so much obscurity and complexity as to make their essays of little use to the general student. It is easy to see, however, that it is their work that has made possible this volume of Prof. Jevons, which, notwithstanding some points on which it seems open to criticism, gives a definite, and, we think, a permanent shape to the logic with which he deals.

This quantification of the predicate, by which the portion of the class to which the subject is said to belong is so exactly defined that the two terms connected by the *copula* are identical in extent, was of little value under the Aristotelian system of deduction simply by the inclusion of a thing in a class; for, when mere inclusion was shown, the argument was complete. But, in the new method, every premise is an equation of exactly equivalent terms, and the reasoning is performed by

the substitution and combination of the terms, and thus the exact determination of the quantity of the terms becomes the means by which the operations of reasoning are performed.

In order to use the process readily and accurately, algebraic symbols, A, B, C , etc., are employed to represent the several classes, and the negative of each is represented by a, b, c , etc. It should always be remembered that $a = 1 - A$, and $b = 1 - B$, and that $A + a$, and $B + b$, each $= 1$. The most general form of equation is, that a class is precisely similar to another in some respect, or that it equals a part of that other. $A =$ a part of B , or, as Mr. Jevons ingeniously writes it, $A = AB$. This is a more general form of equation than $A = B$, because the former may always be inferred from the latter, while the latter can only be inferred from the former in the special case that there is no part of B which is not A , a point left entirely uncertain by the first equation. This was, doubtless, the reason for Aristotle's adoption of the principle of inclusion in class as a basis for reasoning; though, unfortunately, the great Greek did not see that this was only a disguised and imperfect, though simple, and at times very convenient, form of reasoning by equations. There is a difficulty in handling these logical equations, not found in ordinary algebra, however. This arises, in part, from the inverse ratio of connotation and denotation; so that, the more fully you describe a class of things, the fewer are the individuals to whom the description applies. B is a term of broader application than BC , as the denotation of BC is only a part of that of B . For example: black cattle are only the black part of the class "cattle," or the cattle part of the class "black objects;" and it makes no difference whether we combine the class-marks as BC or CB , as they may be, in either case, read indifferently as the B th part of the class C , or the C th part of the class B , showing that the process, while nearly akin to both multiplication and division, is not identical with either. Another embarrassment arises from the fact that each quality appears as absolute unity, so that $A = AA = AAA$. The consequences of these peculiar relations are hardly sufficiently shown by Prof. Jevons. Both addition and subtraction are readily performed. We can say, if $A = AB$, and $B = BC$, that $A = ABC$, or that $A + B = AB + BC = B(A + C)$. Subtraction, however, can only be performed when the subtrahend is known to be present in the minuend, for $B - C$ may be an impossible quantity. But you can certainly subtract BC from B , leaving Bc , for $B(C + c)$ must always equal B ; $+ c$ equalling the whole of any thing. Moreover, subtracting a quantity is the same as multiplying by its negative, and $B - C = Bc$. While you cannot multiply in a strict arithmetical sense, you can combine under quite similar laws, and from $A = AB$ infer that $AC = ABC$; and, though it is not certain that either combined term actually exists, yet, if it does, the other must be composed of the same individuals. But you cannot reverse the process into division, and argue that, because $AC = BC \therefore A = B$, for that is equivalent to arguing that because certain parts are alike, the wholes must be. Thus, logical relations cannot be expressed by fractions unless they are numerical, and the Rule of Three is not applicable to them. On the other hand, you can simplify the statement, $A = ABC$, by eliminating directly either B or C . We do not think Prof. Jevons's proof of this (p. 58) is sound, for it seems to involve the assumption of the point to be demonstrated, and one of the expressions he employs, $ABC.C$, seems to be self-contradictory, asserting at once that all of C and only a part are taken. The true proof is, simply, that $A = ABC$ means that A has always the attribute B , and hence $BA = A$, and similarly as to C . The written demonstration the reader can easily make by adding AbC to each term, and reducing.

Prof. Jevons's treatment of disjunctive propositions is the least satisfactory part

of his work. He rejects altogether the symbol \dagger , which Boole employed, using $\cdot\dot{\cdot}$ instead, not seeing that the \dagger symbol is, in many cases, not only true, but necessary to perform the reasoning; while there are also cases where $\cdot\dot{\cdot}$ is to be used, there being a very important difference in distinctions, which he is not aware of, though he seems on the point of reaching it on page 69. The first class is of the nature — men are fools or knaves — meaning that part are the one, and part the other. Algebraically expressed, it is, P (a part of) $A = AB$, and p (the rest of) $A = AC$, whence: by addition ($P \dagger p$) $A = A = AB \dagger AC$. Its negative is not, as Prof. Jevons asserts, a single combined term, but has the general form, $a = a(B \dagger C) \dagger bc$, and we only get his form, $a = bc$, in the special case, when the premise is $A = B \dagger C$, matter is organic or inorganic, for instance. There are also other special forms, as, $A = B \dagger AC$ — mammals are horses, or some other animals, for instance: and, $A = B \dagger C \dagger BC$, etc. The abstract formula is, $A = AB \dagger AC$, not for the reasons he advances, which are wholly unsound, but simply because it is the most general form, being true whether A is the part or the whole of B, or of C, or of both, while the others are true only in special cases.

The other form of disjunction is of the kind — man is immortal, or a wretched failure — meaning that either all men are the one or all men are the other. The addition that we performed so easily before is only possible now with the condition that the one or the other of the terms added shall become nothing. $A = AB$, or, $A = AC$, thus gives $A = AB \dagger AC$, with the qualification that either AB or AC shall equal zero, or that both shall not be true at the same time, and the equation can best be written, $A = AB \cdot\dot{\cdot} AC$, to distinguish it from the other one, where the addition is real. The predicate is now really indeterminate, for B and C may not be equivalent, and you cannot infer from $A = B \cdot\dot{\cdot} C$, and $D = B \cdot\dot{\cdot} C$, that $A = D$, an inference which would have been perfectly correct in the first species of disjunction. This second species may, of course, also take the special forms of $A = B \cdot\dot{\cdot} AC$, and $A = B \cdot\dot{\cdot} C$, but $A = AB \cdot\dot{\cdot} AC$ is again the general one. The negative of $A = B \cdot\dot{\cdot} C$ is not $a = bc$, as before, but $a = b \cdot\dot{\cdot} c$. The law of duality is of this second kind of disjunction, with the special qualification added that $B \dagger C = 1$, or $C = b$. $A = B \cdot\dot{\cdot} b$ gives then for its negative, $a = b \cdot\dot{\cdot} B$. But it cannot now be inferred from this that $A = a$, or that $a = 0$. In the first form the last of these conclusions would have followed, an inference not at all affected by the fact that a has always an existence in thought. The author's difficulty on page 74, and, indeed, in the whole treatment of disjunctives, arises from his not seeing this, and attempting to combine in one form two species of argument which follow very different laws.

We have intentionally selected for comment the points which seem the most abstruse or imperfectly treated by the author, and the reader is not to suppose that the reasoning is, in general, so difficult. Most premises can be combined, and a conclusion reached in an exceedingly simple way, as Prof. Jevons shows. It is only, however, when all connotation is excluded but the one quality of number, so that the denotation is supreme, and qualitative unity yields to quantitative division into similar parts, that the difficulties are avoided, and the full use of our mathematical powers is possible.

Prof. Jevons proceeds, from his examination of equations of identity and of partial identity, to inference by indirect methods, and so to the laws of combination of the knowledge given by the premises; and it is at this point that his handling is most original and striking. He takes all the possible combinations in which the given terms or their absence can occur — sixteen, in the case of three classes, for example — and rejects from them any term that conflicts with the

premises, and he has thus left all the values which the given terms can have — one or more of which each must have, if it exist at all. The process becomes unmanageable when there are more than a few terms, from the great number of the possible combinations. But so simple is it in theory that he is actually able to construct a thinking-machine, so made that, give the premises, properly expressed, and it will immediately present all that can be inferred about them — an ingenious illustration of the automatic character of pure thought. The machine does not admit of any practical use outside the lecture-room, of course.

From this he goes on to an analysis of the laws of combination and permutation, and their application to the laws of probability; and then examines the method of means and the imperfectly worked-out law of error, the theory of approximation, and the use of analogy and hypothesis, and also of empirical observation and its classification and generalization; and he closes with a chapter on the limits of scientific method, which is interesting, if not quite exhaustive, showing a positivism so cautious as to doubt even the certainty of its own laws, and making room for, not only the belief in God, but the possibility and even the probability of miracles. Here he goes farther than most positivists will follow, perhaps, but all may be interested in these closing arguments, and, amongst them, especially in that which shows that the universe must be limited either in space or time. There are many interesting points which we marked, but have not the space to examine; one, however, we must notice — the assertion that the sole test of a hypothesis is its agreement with fact. It is curious how common this misconception is of the character and tests of hypothesis, and it is especially singular in one not only so familiar with them, but so well acquainted with Mill and Hamilton. The tests which hypothesis must undergo are really twofold — congruence with facts and simplicity of form — the ability to explain the phenomena, and the use of the fewest arbitrary suppositions or unnatural elements. The theories of cataclysms in geology and of epicycles in astronomy will readily occur to the reader as cases where hypotheses which perfectly explained the facts have given place to other theories, only because they were of a less simple and natural character. But we do not wish to dwell upon the shortcomings of this able and valuable book. Prof. Jevons has given to the abstract laws of thought a form more general and simple than was before known, by an apparently sound method, and there has been no answer to him, so far as we are aware. Prof. Cairn's objection, from a Kantian stand-point, that all argument from identical propositions is empty, because nothing is gained by what is, in fact, merely restating the subject in the form of a predicate, expressly and deliberately overlooks that, in Jevons's equations $A = AB$, the predicate always asserts a new fact, B about A; and, notwithstanding the difficulties attending the use of these as yet imperfectly developed laws, they are shown to be competent, not only to give all the modes of the old logic, but to deduce more from the same premises, and to solve problems that it could not reach.

HENRY W. HOLLAND.

ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES. Being the Baird Lecture for 1877. By ROBERT FLINT, D.D., LL. D. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1879.

The able author of "The Philosophy of History in Europe" appears before us in this volume, as the defender of Personal Theism, against Atheism and Pantheism. There are ten lectures in this volume: (1) Atheism; (2) Ancient Materialism; (3) Modern Materialism; (4) Contemporary, or Scientific Materialism; (5) Positivism; (6) Secularism; (7) Are there Tribes of Atheists? (8) Pessimism; (9) History of Pantheism; (10) Pantheism. These lectures are followed by an

appendix containing forty-one important notes, elucidating various points in the lectures; some of these notes being brief reviews of polemical treatises—*e. g.*, “Physicus” on Theism, Lange’s Materialism, John Lubbock’s Instances of Atheistical Peoples, etc.

Pantheism he defines to be “the theory which regards all finite things as merely aspects, modifications, or parts of one eternal and self-existent being; which views all material objects [N. B.] and all particular minds as necessarily derived from a single infinite substance. The one absolute substance—the one all-comprehensive being—it calls God. Thus God, according to it, is all that is; and nothing is, which is not essentially included in, or which has not been necessarily evolved out of, God.” “According to the view I have just stated, no system which does not include determinism and exclude freedom is truly Pantheistic.” This is very good, and so is the following discrimination of “Deism” and “Theism”: Deism “represents God as a personal Being, who exists above and apart from the world; and the world as a something which, although created by God, is now independent of Him, and capable of sustaining and developing itself and performing its work without His aid, in virtue of its own inherent energies. It not only distinguishes God from the world, but separates and excludes Him from the world.” Thus Deism is in contrast to Pantheism; the latter being monism and fatalistic, the former being a dualism, which makes nature independent, and God a gratuitous assumption. On the other hand, “Theism takes an intermediate view. It maintains, with Deism, that God is a personal Being, who created the world intelligently and freely, and is above it and independent of it; but it maintains also, with Pantheism, that He is everywhere present and active in the world, ‘upholding all things by the word of His power,’ and so inspiring and working in them that ‘in Him they live, and move, and have their being.’ It contradicts Deism, in so far as that system represents the universe as independent of God; and Pantheism, in so far as it represents God as dependent on the universe.” This latter definition of Theism does not seem quite so happily expressed as the others. It would appear that the best definition of Theism should point out the facts of God’s self-consciousness and freedom, and the personal immortality and freedom of the creature. One is very sorry, too, that Prof. Flint has chosen to accept, as the doctrine of Hegel, the absurd travesty of it which defines the Hegelian conception of God as “a self-evolving, impersonal process, which, after having traversed all the spheres of matter and mind, attains a knowledge of its Godhead in the speculative reason of man.” Of course, any body who conceives such a notion of God would conceive only a “foolish fancy.”

The origin of this error in regard to Hegel lies in the misapprehension of his “dialectic method.” Prof. Flint and others seem to regard it as a purely deductive method, which (p. 427) “starts with the absolute first—the simplest notion of reason, pure being—and thence derives all knowledge and evolves all reality in a continuous process of reasoning, from abstract and implicit to concrete and explicit, everywhere determined by the principle of the identity of contraries.” This is the difficulty: The principle of dialectic is utterly uncomprehended. If the definition of “dialectic method” given by Plato had been studied (Repub., VII., 13), this absurd error in regard to the entire drift of Hegel’s Philosophy might have been avoided. “The dialectic method,” says Plato, “annuls [cancels] its hypotheses [hypothetical categories, or principles] on its way to the highest principle, while geometry and other like sciences use fixed hypotheses, not being able to deduce them.” Hegel’s dialectic—like Plato’s—is *not* a method of proceeding *from* a first principle which continues to remain valid—as, *e. g.*, a mathe-

mathematical axiom does. The dialectic shows that the first principles which are hypothetically placed at the basis are inadequate, and that they *presuppose*, as their ground and logical condition, a concreter principle. This concreter principle is at once the logical presupposition and the chronological presupposition. The dialectical procedure is a *retrograde* movement from error back to truth, from the abstract and untrue back to the concrete and true, from the finite and dependent back to the infinite and self-subsistent. We are proceeding toward a first principle, rather than *from* one, when we study Hegel's Logic or his Phenomenology. Hence, Hegel does *not* (as Prof. Flint thinks) "profess to explain the generation of God, Man, and Nature from the pure being, which is equivalent to pure nothing." He shows that "pure being," which is the highest principle according to many thinkers, is not so adequate as that of "Becoming," and the latter not so adequate as that of "extant being," nor the latter as adequate as "infinite being," etc. He passes in review all the categories, and discovers their defects — *i. e.*, their presuppositions.

While, therefore, we sympathize with the position defended by Prof. Flint, we must express our dissent from his interpretation of Hegel, *in toto*, as a gross piece of injustice to himself and to all persons who will be misled by his authority. In the same spirit, the possibility of a proof of God's existence has been denied: "A proved God were a derived one; for to prove is to derive from a higher principle. Hence, to deduce the existence of God is, at the same time, to destroy altogether the very idea of God." In this species of proof, likewise, is understood mere syllogistic deduction — a barren species of reasoning, when conducted according to the first figure of the syllogism. The dialectic is the only real proof in any case, and its proof proceeds, first through analysis of the principle with which it starts, to find what it lacks. To find a necessary implication is to find a necessary relation; it is to prove the first principle a part of an including totality; and hence it is to refute it, and show that it is true only when it loses itself in a higher — only as grounded in an activity which transcends it. This dialectic method, therefore, is an ascent from the finite, or conditioned, to the infinite, or that which conditions. Instead, therefore, of reaching a result which is finite and necessitated, it reaches, by this annulment of the finite and dependent, the absolute and independent. There are three species of necessity: (a) External necessity, which causes something to be as it is — will not permit it to be otherwise — the necessity of the totality of conditions. (b) Subjective, or the necessity that I shall think it to be so. (c) Logical necessity, or the necessity of presupposition, which is the reverse of external necessity, but may coincide with subjective necessity. Logical necessity includes the necessity involved in the definition, *e. g.*, God is, of necessity, *free*; because freedom is involved in the thought or definition of God. Logical necessity is the opposite of fate, or rather, it is *indifferent* to fate — *i. e.*, does not concern it.

Hence, when Hegel or Plato show, dialectically, the nature of the absolute, they do not show up an external necessity, but a logical necessity — not fate, but freedom.

PHILOSOPHISCHE SCHRIFTEN. VON DR. FRANZ HOFFMANN. Sechster Band. Erlangen: Andreas Deichert. 1879.

In the present volume, which is the sixth of the series of Prof. Hoffmann's, we have nineteen essays, chiefly devoted to the exposition of the doctrine of Von Baader, or to a critique of contemporary philosophers, from its standpoint. This, indeed, has been the character of the previous five volumes, for the self-chosen mission of the author is to make known the system of Baader. We note with

pleasure that everywhere the discussion opposes the pantheistic direction of the later schools of German philosophy, and favors the personality of God and the individual immortality of the soul. There are criticisms, in this regard, of Franz Bicking; on Consciousness in its relation to evil and wickedness; on J. H. Fichte's theory of the human soul; on Frohschlamm's theory of Phantasy as the fundamental principle of the world-process; on A. Wigand's treatise concerning Darwinism, and the investigations of Cuvier and Newton; on Personality-Pantheism, and Theism, as illustrated in the works of Carriere, Baader, Ritter, and Ulrici (for the system of philosophy which sets up *personality*, instead of *person*, may be understood pantheistically; the absolute should be person, and no abstraction of personality); on the theory of immortality, as held by J. G. Fichte; by Schelling; on the comparison of the system of Baader with that of Arthur Schopenhauer—with that of Immanuel Kant; on Kuno Fischer's view of Schelling's system; on various writings by Dr. Hermann Cohen, I. H. Fichte, Friedrich Harms, Rudolph Virchow, and others.

Prof. Hoffmann writes in an entertaining style, and his stand-point is so sharply opposed to all phases of Pantheism that it should excite the interest of American and English theologians.

THOUGHT, THE GREAT REALITY. BY REV. W. H. WYNN, Ph.D., Professor in the State Agricultural College, Ames, Iowa. [Reprint from the Lutheran Quarterly for January, 1879.] Gettysburg. 1879.

Professor Wynn makes a vigorous protest, in this pamphlet, against the current inferences of Physiological Psychology, basing his protest on the following arguments: The power of introversion—to reflect on one's thought—self-consciousness is the boundary-line between the brute and human. Language reduces to roots which express general concepts, instead of particular sensuous events. The poets are far more profoundly versed in the subtleties of man's spiritual nature than are the philosophers themselves. Shakespeare, Dante, and Milton furnish statements of the subject-objectivity of man. The reality of the Ego is the logical condition of the knowledge of the reality of things.

KANT'S ETHICS: THE CLAVIS TO AN INDEX. Including Extracts from several Oriental Sacred Scriptures, and from certain Greek and Roman Philosophical Writings. By JAMES EDMUNDS. Louisville, Ky. 1879.

The readers of the JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY will recognize as the writer of the above, the author of a series of able articles on Kant's Ethics, published in the fifth, eighth, and tenth volumes of this journal. The present volume is a most valuable collection of extracts from (a) The Laws of Moses, (Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy); (b) Zoroaster (the Vendidad, Vispered, Yasna, Gathas, Khordah-Avesta); (c) Buddha's Dharmapada; (d) Confucius (Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects); (e) Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates; (f) Aristotle's Nichomachian Ethics; (g) Cicero's De Officiis; (h) The Sayings of Jesus (Matthew, Mark, Luke, John); (i) The Commandments of Mohammed (Koran).

In searching for explications, during three readings of *Kant's Ethics* and the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Mr. Edmunds noted on the margin such references, from one section to another, as he found serviceable. The frame-work upon which these references are here set forth consists of a series of section-heads, nearly all selected from the text, and constitutes an extended table of contents.

It is an enormous work of industry and erudition, inspired by religious piety and

a profound faith in Kant's ethical views, supplemented by a speculative insight into the identity of all ethical doctrines that the sages, east and west, have taught.

There are nearly one thousand pages in the book, and a large portion of it is in nonpareil type. Pages 614-850 are devoted to the Critique of Pure Reason, and contain a portion of Hayward's Analysis, as well as a mass of other material added to throw light on the analysis of Mr. Edmunds.

No earnest student of Kant can afford to be without this book. [Mr. Edmunds may be addressed care of the *Courier-Journal*, Louisville, Ky.]

THE GEOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE HUMAN RACE. By NATHANIEL HOLMES. [Reprint from Transactions of St. Louis Academy of Science.]

Judge Holmes has, in this brief essay (thirty-two pages), given us an interesting and reliable summary of the most recent conclusions of science in regard to prehistoric man, and has supplemented it by ingenious theories of his own.

THREE HOME-TALKS, ON BEHALF OF EARNESTNESS, HUMILITY, AND THOUGHTFULNESS. By R. R. Philadelphia: Henry Longstreet. 1878.

These Three Home-Talks are full of serenity and light. The author, Richard Randolph, of Philadelphia, is one of the deep-seeing theosophists of our time.

ORGANON OF SCIENCE. Three books in one volume. By JOHN HARRISON STINSON, Esq. Eureka, Cal. 1879.

Book I. treats of Formal Logic; Book II., of Induction; Book III., of Signs in Ratiocination, being a sort of "algebra of logic."

I. DIE VORURTHEILE DER MENSCHHEIT. Von LAZAR B. HELLENBACH. Erster Band. Wien. 1879. Verlag Von L. Rosner.

II. EINE PHILOSOPHIE DES GESUNDEN MENSCHENVERSTANDES. Gedanken ueber das Wesen der Menschlichen Erscheinung. [Same author.] Wien: Wilhelm Braumueller. 1876.

III. DER INDIVIDUALISMUS IM LICHTE DER BIOLOGIE UND PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART. [Same author and publisher.] Wien. 1878.

In his "Philosophy of Sound Common Sense," Dr. Hellenbach discusses the following questions: (a) What do we understand by the term "soul"? (b) Have we a soul? (c) To what extent does the individuation of the soul extend? (A consideration of the views of Schopenhauer, his error being pointed out as regards Kant's view of the subjectivity of time and space; also, Von Hartmann's "Unconscious" discussed). (d) Phenomena connected with abnormal conditions of the organization, — such as visions, prophecies, writing and seeing "mediums," physical phenomena, etc. The use to be made of these phenomena. (e) "The belief in a soul animating the body is a very old one, but it is a mistake to understand by the soul, the thinking and feeling Ego. This thinking Ego is only the product of the organism, and the organism is the work of the soul, — the Ego being only a phantom; or, as Kant suggested, there is identity of subject, but not of person. Kant and Schopenhauer have mapped out the road to this insight."

Following out these views in his work on "Individualism in the Light of Biology and Philosophy," he investigates how human individuality arises, discussing the positions of Herbert Spencer, Ernst Haeckel, and Gustav Jaeger; the rise of many-celled organisms; the monism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann; the individualistic systems of Leibnitz, Herbart, and Drossbach: the victory of optim-

ism, etc., etc. In "Thé Prejudices of Humanity" he discusses, among other themes, the relation of production to population; Ricardo's, Carey's, and Lillienfeld's Social Science; the socialistic standpoint; the unjust apportionment of taxes; the question of over-population; the education of the rising generation; war; false liberalism; aristocracy; the duel; love; coquetry; marriage; the right of suicide.

UEBER DIE BEDEUTUNG DER EINBILDUNGSKRAFT IN DER PHILOSOPHIE KANT'S UND SPINOZA'S. Von J. FROHSCHAMMER, Professor der Philosophie in Muenchen. Muenchen: Theodor Ackermann. 1879.

The notice of the contents of the great work of Prof. Frohschammer on Phantasia as the Fundamental Principle of the World-Process, contained in the last number of this journal, will doubtless create an interest among those of our readers who have not already seen the work named above, to see the application of his views to Kant and Spinoza. Professor Frohschammer devotes one hundred and fourteen pages to a discussion of the results of the transcendental æsthetic and transcendental analytic, the transcendental dialectic, the practical reason, and the judgment, as regards the imagination. In the second part of the book he devotes nearly sixty pages to Spinoza's modes of cognition, and their relation to each other; to a discussion of the nature of the imagination, and its bearing on the will-power; and to its position as the principle of cognition, and of the existence of the world itself.

ON A FOUNDATION FOR RELIGION. BOSTON: GEORGE H. ELLIS. 1879. 48 pp.

This pamphlet is written by one who proposes to show that the sentiments of Gratitude, Submission, Prayer, Faith, and Hope may arise even in the absence of the conception of a personal God. "The conception of a personal Deity is lost to us, not through any arbitrariness of ours, not that we have any hostility to it, not even that we have any positive arguments against it—it may, for all our knowledge, or lack of knowledge, be true—but simply from a discovery that the facts upon which it has ordinarily been based have, to our minds, been misinterpreted."

PRINCIPLES OF THE ALGEBRA OF LOGIC. With Examples. By ALEXANDER MACFARLANE, F.R.S.E. Read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 16th December, 1878, and 20th January, 1879. Edinburgh: David Douglas. 1879.

It is the object of this work "to investigate the foundations of the analytical method of reasoning about Quality, with special reference to the principles laid down by Boole as the basis of his *calculus*, and to the observations which have been published by various philosophers concerning these principles." Mr. Macfarlane claims to bring forward "a new theory of the operation of the mind in reasoning about Quality, which enables him to correct Boole's principles, and place them on a clear rational basis. He endeavors to show that the analytical method of reasoning about Quality is an algebra which coincides with the algebra of Quantity when the symbols are integral, but is a generalized form of the latter when the symbols are fractional. The rest of the work is taken up with the investigation of problems by means of this algebraic organon, especially such problems as are suggested by the ordinary logic."

"Logic, as the algebra of Quality, is a formal science. It investigates the general properties of the symbol of Quality, and by means of these properties deduces equations which are true generally, or combines such equations with *data* of given forms. It is not its province to consider how a particular form of *datum* can in

any case be asserted to be true, that subject of investigation being left to the transcendental logic. It is sufficient that examples of such a form occur, in the practical or theoretical activities of mankind.

“The properties of the symbol of Quality are not laws of thought, in the common acceptance of the term. For the properties of the symbol of Quantity, on which the ordinary algebra is founded, are held not to be laws of thought, but to refer to the actual constitution of things; and there is no difference in the two methods, when developed, which indicates the existence of such a distinction. If the basis of the science of Quality is subjective, it is so only in the same sense in which the basis of the science of Quantity is subjective. There is ground for believing that the true reason why the former science has remained so stationary is, that there has been too much introspection into the individual mind, in the hope of finding laws of thought there, and too little contemplation of the form and nature of the truths of science. The logician assumes that all men reason equally well about Quality, fallacies being possible only by a momentary lapse of attention; but the mathematician never assumes that all men reason equally well about Quantity.”

“Boole entitled his great work on reasoning, ‘An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, on which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities,’ and in several places he says that the laws in question are subjective in a sense in which the laws of Quantity are not. He considers $x^2 = x$, in particular, to be a subjective law; but I have endeavored to show that it is a special condition, which the symbol of this algebra must satisfy in order to be of a particular kind.

“Logic, as the algebra of Quality, is a true organon. It can determine whether a conclusion of a required form can be deduced from *data* of given forms; and if so, what that conclusion is. * * * The algebra of Quantity is acknowledged to be the weapon for the philosopher who attacks the experimental sciences; the algebra of Quality is the weapon for the philosopher who attacks the sciences of observation.”

THE WORLD'S PROGRESS: A Dictionary of Dates; Being a Chronological and Alphabetical Record of all essential Facts in the progress of Society from the Creation of the World to the Present Time. With a Chart. Edited by George P. Putnam, A. M. Revised and Continued to August, 1877, by F. B. Perkins. (Twenty-first Edition.) New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1877.

We are glad to see a new and revised edition of this useful work. Of the many excellent *conspectuses* contained in its 1,020 octavo pages, we consider the best one to be the Tabular Views of Universal History. Turning to the fifteenth century, we find six columns devoted to it, the first giving the events in “The Progress of Society;” second, Ecclesiastical; third, Events in France, Germany, and Spain; fourth, Eastern Empire; fifth, England and Scotland; sixth, The World elsewhere. We wish to see at a glance what was going on at the epoch of the battle of Agincourt (A. D. 1415), in other quarters of the world. Under the sixth column we find: “1412—Italy: Sack of Rome by Ladislas, King of Naples [1408]. 1412—Eric VII., of Pomerania. 1415—Conquest of Ceuta [opposite Gibraltar] by the Portuguese. 1419—Bohemia: Hussite War. 1420—Discovery of Madeira by the Portuguese.”

In the fourth column we learn that Mohammed I., Sultan of the Turks, began to reign in 1413. In the third column we see: 1410—Spain: Ferdinand, King of Aragon; Yusef III., King of Granada. France: Civil war between the parties of Orleans and Burgundy [giving us a clew to the easy conquest by the English].

Germany: Death of Robert and ascent of Sigismund (1411), King of Hungary, to the emperor's throne. 1413 [should be 1415, as in the fifth column]—France: The French defeated by Henry V. of England, at Agincourt. 1416—Spain: Alfonso V., King of Aragon and Sicily. 1419—Sigismund [emperor] succeeds to the Bohemian crown.

In the second column: 1409—The Council of Pisa deposes Gregory and Benedict, and elects Alexander V.; neither will yield, so that there are three popes at once. 1410—Pope John XXIII. 1414—Council of Constance. 1416—John Huss, and Jerome of Prague, burnt by the Council of Constance. 1417—Pope Martin V.

In the first column: 1409—University of Leipsic founded; Thomas à Kempis; John Huss; Jerome of Prague. 1420—First Portuguese colonies on the coast of Africa, Madeira, etc. 1423—George of Peurbach, astronomer, at Vienna. 1425—Peter d'Ailly, theologian. The arts promoted by Cosmo de Medici. 1434—Invention of printing, at Mayence. Here we have hints and suggestions which, followed out in a general cyclopaedia, would in a few minutes give one a pretty fair idea of the times in which Henry V. invaded France.

In the fifth column the important events of the English history are told thus: 1413—Henry V. becomes King of England. 1414—He claims the French crown. 1415—Gains the battle of Agincourt. 1420—Treaty of Troyes. Henry marries Catherine, daughter of Charles VI., and is declared heir to the French crown. 1422—Death of Henry V. Henry VI., king. 1424—The Duke of Bedford defeats the French at Verneuil. 1427—Besieges Orleans. 1429—The siege raised by the Maid of Orleans. 1431—She is taken prisoner and burnt. 1435—Death of the Duke of Bedford, followed by the loss of all the English possessions except Calais.

It is a pity that this valuable work has not been freed from its many slight errors, mostly due to the carelessness of the proof-reader of the original edition.

DISCORSO DI FILOSOFIA DI FRANCESCO DELLA SCALA. (Prof. F. DINI.) Firenze. 1876.

The above work is in two volumes—this being the second edition, enlarged, with an analytical summary of its contents. The notes occupy seventy pages in the first, and one hundred and thirty-six pages in the second volume. The introduction is long, and treats of the decadence of speculative studies; of true and false speculation; of the exaggerated estimate currently placed on German philosophy, etc. Chapter I. treats of knowledge in general; chapter II. of the true method of knowledge.

LUCIAN UND DIE KYNIKER. VON JACOB BERNAYS. Mit einer Uebersetzung der Schrift Lucians ueber des Lebensende des Peregrinus. Berlin. 1879. Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz.

Prof. Jacob Bernays has the art of collecting the scattered rays of knowledge and of concentrating them upon some obscure point as a focus. His work on the lost Dialogues of Aristotle is well known. His work on the Letters of Heraclitus, his translation of Aristotle's Politics, with explanatory notes, have increased his reputation. The present work is admirable. It devotes a few pages to the discussion of the views that have prevailed regarding the object of the work of Lucian, and discusses Theagenes, a contemporary of Lucian; then the Cynics in general; Lucian; Peregrinus; Translation of Lucian on the Death of Peregrinus; Remarks.

THE RELATIONS OF MIND AND BRAIN. By HENRY CALDERWOOD, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Edinburgh. London: Macmillan & Co. 1879.

The question as to the true relations of man's animal and conscious nature is one of the most important at present pressing for solution. However extravagant may be the claim advanced by the experimental school of psychologists in favor of the physiological method, a school already containing many able thinkers in its ranks, and certain to attract an increasing number of adherents to itself, it must be admitted that it rests upon a real perception of the inadequacy and fruitlessness of the "introspective" method, based, as it is, upon the false abstraction of the mind as an independent substance. To adjust accurately, the boundaries of physiology and psychology, and to trace the relations of man's twofold nature, is therefore a task well worth doing, and Professor Calderwood, in setting himself to perform it, has shown his appreciation of current intellectual needs. Admitting, in the fullest way, the importance of physiology as throwing light on psychological problems—an admission that has always been made by the Scottish school of philosophy, at least since Sir William Hamilton—the author boldly challenges the common reproach thrown at psychologists, of neglecting physiological facts in the past; the real state of the case being, he maintains, that "physiology has never, up till this time, been in a position to give a sufficient testimony as to the functions of nerve and brain to throw much light on philosophical problems," although now there is "a large body of ascertained facts calling for some deliberate attempt to harmonize results with the facts of mental experience." It must not be supposed, however, that Dr. Calderwood allows of any overlapping of the two provinces of physiology and psychology; on the contrary, the chief aim of his book is to show that "anatomical and physiological investigations as to brain and nerve afford no explanation of our most ordinary intellectual exercises." That being the author's view, is it not a violation of artistic proportion to occupy about one-half of the work with purely physiological matter? One would have supposed that a short summary of the results of physiological investigation, in so far as these bear upon psychology, might have sufficed. By this economy of space, more room would have been gained for the discussion of such questions as the value and application of Fechner's so-called "law," which is merely referred to, and the worth of the empiricist derivation of extension, of the theory of local signs, and the other contributions of the experimental school, which are not even mentioned. It is not easy to account for these omissions; but, no doubt, in devoting so much attention to physiology, the author intended to show that the most thorough acquaintance with physiological results, as based upon the *consensus* of specialists, is not incompatible with a denial of the dependence of mind upon brain and nerve. In any case, the clear and concise presentation of these results which Dr. Calderwood has given makes this part of his book a valuable educational work for students of psychology, who are too apt to neglect the facts of physiology. It is doubtful, however, whether the author is justified in saying that "there is perfect agreement among physiologists" that in the "nerve-cells *nervé*-energy is generated and stored," and in making continual use of this supposition, after Mr. Lewes's bold rejection of the "superstition of the nerve-cell (*Physical Basis of Mind*, Am. ed., p. 202)"—unless, indeed, Mr. Lewes may be supposed to have lost caste as an experimental physiologist from unfortunately knowing more than physiology.

In the first part of the work, Dr. Calderwood states what is certainly known in

regard to the structure of the brain, with its associate nerve-system; considers the light of comparative physiology; attempts to localize the functions of distinct portions of the brain; and concludes with a comparison of the structure and functions of the brain in lower and higher forms of animal life. The results he reaches, after a careful and detailed consideration of the facts, are briefly these: In all animals there is a similarity in the structure and functions of the nerve-system, including the nerve-centre, but there is great diversity of arrangement, the nerve-centre and nerve-system increasing in complexity correspondently with increased complexity of the muscular system. Sensory and motor fibres are identical in structure, the nerve-centre being the central feature in each case, and the difference of function being due to difference in the terminal arrangements. The diversity existing between the subdivisions of the great central arrangement arises from the number and distribution of the nerve-fibres connected with particular parts. The cerebrum is the grand centre which provides for the sensibility of the physical frame by receiving impressions made on the sensitive surface, and for motor activity by evolving the impulse which excites muscular energy. Those brains which are most elaborate in convolution are associated with the most highly developed muscular system. The regions in which the superiority of the human brain appears are the frontal and parieto-occipital lobes; but this does not prove that brain is the organ of mind, but "seems required to account for the activity of a greatly superior muscular and sensory apparatus." The evidence goes to show that the brain is the organ of motion and sensation, but so far there is nothing to prove that it is the "organ of consciousness." While, therefore, it must be admitted that mental phenomena are *connected with* the central government of the nerve-system, it cannot be shown that these phenomena are the product of brain activity.

Thus far, the conclusion is that intelligence is not a function of brain, and the rest of the book is occupied with an inquiry into the positive functions of mind. Here we pass over to the realm of "personal experience," and it is convenient to consider the lower intellectual operations first in relation to nerve sensibility, and next in relation to motor activity. In this new region, physiology is completely out of court; it is competent, *e.g.*, to account for a tactile impression, but not for the knowledge of self as experiencing a sensation of touch. But there is more than this simplest and primary fact implied in our experience; there is the consciousness of a succession of sensations, and of their distinction from each other; and hence consciousness involves a higher exercise of intelligence than sensation. The faculty of discrimination cannot be explained by the sensibility of nerve-fibre, nor by the sensation which results from the exercise of such sensibility. The important thing to notice is, that in each phase of experience there is a Knowledge of Self as distinct from Sensation, and thus a knowledge of the unity of personal life. Hence Mill's view, that mind may be "a series of feelings," "aware of itself as a series," is inconsistent with the facts of consciousness. Passing to motor activity, the author finds its lowest form to be that of reflex action, which is common to all forms of animal life, is accomplished in the higher order of animals without the interposition of the cerebrum, and in no case implies consciousness. Next in order is sensori-motor activity, connected with reflex action on the lower side and with conscious volition on the higher; for, on the one hand, this form of motor activity is provided for by the connection of the sensory and the motor apparatus, and is so far mechanical, while, on the other hand, there is, at least in man, a voluntary element which may come into competition with the other — as in voluntary endurance of pain without shrinking. Lastly, motor energy is brought

into use as the servant of intelligence and will. The characteristic mark here is the necessity of intelligent determination to originate motor activity. The attempt to identify voluntary activity with reflex action is, therefore, a failure. The volition which acts upon the nerve-cells, and indirectly upon the muscles, is as certainly "external to the system" as is the object which comes into contact with the sensory system. Thus Self is known as an agent in the world, operating according to the inner movement of an intelligent nature.

In one of the best chapters in the book, the possibilities and laws of acquisition are considered. With questionable propriety, considering the prevalent tendency to identify conscious with unconscious processes, Dr. Calderwood extends the term "retentiveness" to physical aptitudes, and even speaks of "physical memory." Physical acquisition, resulting in physical aptitudes, resides partly in the muscular, partly in the nerve system. The child has not only the common characteristics of the race, but inherited specialities which mark its parentage. The next stage of retentiveness consists in retaining what is acquired. A still higher stage is that in which, by conscious discrimination and inference, aided by language, there is developed a retentiveness of a new order, bringing with it a capacity for imperfection nowhere found in animal tissue. As it passes into a higher phase, retentiveness becomes a more difficult exercise, introducing a higher law of progress than that found at a lower stage of human existence. In its highest and most striking form, recollection illustrates the action of intelligence and will; while animal tissue carries with it the impress of past activity, intelligence makes use of materials previously accumulated, according to a plan and for ends which intelligence alone can appreciate.

The superiority of man's life, arising, as it does, from the fact that it is a "personal" life, is manifested still more clearly in the advantages which speech implies. Like the animal, the child has a spontaneous power of vocalizing, dependent on its physical organization; but, unlike the animal, it exhibits at a later stage articulate utterance, implying intelligent discrimination. The thought which arises from the intelligent use of the senses is rectified and expanded by the guidance which comes through the interpretation of the words of others. We can explain the imitative tendency of most, if not all, the animals by means of sensory *stimuli* alone, but not the intelligent observation of movements and sounds by the child. This is shown in a marked way by the education of deaf mutes, which can only be explained on the supposition that intelligence makes the senses instruments of knowledge in a much higher degree than they are by their natural functions.

After three chapters — dealing, respectively, with the action and reaction of body and mind; with weariness, sleep, and unconsciousness; and with brain disorders, but not containing much that is new — Dr. Calderwood goes on to show, in a very interesting way, the great superiority of mind as displayed in the "concentrated intellectual effort of the inner life," as applied to intellectual, moral, and religious topics. Looking at these three departments of intellectual activity in their connection with each other, we see how much the history of intelligent life depends on voluntary reflection, in accordance with rational law.

This is a very hasty summary of a work that everywhere betrays patient industry and careful reflection, and is rich in detail and illustration. The line of argument cannot be regarded as new, nor can it be denied that with a good deal of what is said the psychological reader is already familiar; but it contains many striking suggestions, and is marked all through by a highly commendable calmness and impartiality of judgment. As to the main aim of the work, Dr. Calderwood

has been undoubtedly successful in showing that it is only by confusion of thought that intellectual operations can be regarded as functions of the brain. We may even go further, and admit that much of his reasoning and many of his conclusions, with a little change, may be accepted by those who cannot regard his solution as final. The author evidently assumes that, by overthrowing the crude materialism which identifies mind and brain, he establishes the existence of a "distinct mind." But this is really an *ignoratio elenchi*. To show that conscious experience cannot be regarded as a function of the brain does not prove mind to be a separate and independent existence, externally united to the body, and only an uncritical acceptance of the dualism of Common Sense makes such a supposition plausible. It is possible that Dr. Calderwood would reply that he has not said any thing as to the "nature of Mind, beyond ascertaining its functions;" but this can hardly be regarded as a valid plea, when we find him, all through his treatise, speaking in language that tacitly assumes the independence and separateness of mind. His dualism is implied even in the introductory chapter, in which he makes psychology a special science, based upon observation of one's "own experience"—a conception that rests upon the supposition that mind is a thing apart, having properties of its own, independently of all relation to its objects, the physical organism included. Dr. Calderwood also quotes with approval (p. 212) the *dictum* of Prof. Tyndall, that "the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable"—a view which can only be true if consciousness is outside of brain, as one material thing is outside of another. And we are also told that "consciousness does not involve any knowledge of brain action," (p. 211) from which we must infer that there is a kind of knowledge that excludes consciousness. The truth seems to be, that the author conceives of the extra-organic world as a congeries of individual things, existing independently of all relation to conscious intelligence; the organic world as an assemblage of individual animals, equally independent, and the conscious world as a collection of individual minds, utterly separated from each other and from the bodies they inhabit. It is one of the results of this false opposition of consciousness and its objects that a contrast is drawn, not between the sensitive and the conscious life, but between the Brain and the Mind—*i.e.*, between two independent existences, each definable as the opposite of the other. When we are told that the only functions of the brain are the "sensory and motor functions," we are asked to believe too much; for to Brain, defined as the author defines it, the highest category applicable is that of Force, as comprehending under it the lower categories of Matter and Motion, and its functions must be classed solely as molecular movements. Instead of regarding the Brain and Nerve-System as organs of a Life, manifesting itself through the totality of bodily organs, the author limits himself to their "structure and functions"—*i.e.*, to a description of their parts, and of the movements they exhibit. But this leaves out all that is characteristic of life, and, therefore, does not properly admit of the predication of "sensory and motor functions," in so far as these imply something more than molecular movements. All this is due to a false doctrine, that really imagines mind and brain to be two independent things, only externally attached to each other. Intelligence does not manifest itself as separate from Life, but as transcending and including Life within itself, just as Life presupposes and yet goes beyond Force, Motion, and Matter. To isolate mind, as Dr. Calderwood does, reduces it to an abstraction so thin that it has no properties at all. The embarrassment which the author manifests in dealing with the views of Prof. Bain would have been avoided had he frankly accepted the unity of subject and object.

Thus, when Mr. Bain suggests that "all our knowledge" may be "stored up" in the brain, his critic admits that this is probably true in regard to the revival of Sensation, when "the organism is acted upon from without," but does not explain the fact of recollection when there is "no impulse from without." This seems rather a lame reply; for, if it be once admitted that a revived sensation may be excited by an external impact, why may it not be excited by a change within the brain? The fallacy of Prof. Bain's theory lies in the assumption that "feeling is a mode of the organism," an assumption that confuses molecular movement with animal sensation, and the latter with conscious sensation. Again: to the view shared in common by all the members of the experimental school, that man's complex nature may be explained by the conception of "one substance, with two sets of properties," Dr. Calderwood replies that "a substance with two sets of properties, and these directly antagonistic, as represented by voluntary and involuntary actions, seems an unwarrantable hypothesis." And, no doubt, it is; but it is not easy to understand why one who holds that Body and Mind are two independent things, and yet regards man's physical and mental life as one, should boggle at the "double-faced unity," or how it can be avoided by any theory short of that which recognizes the essential relation of all orders of existence to consciousness as their source. It is but a step from the conception of two independent substances, arbitrarily associated with each other, to the conception of a single substance with "two sets of properties," and, on Hamilton's principle of "parsimony," it is easy to see which is the more tenable hypothesis of the two. JOHN WATSON.

MIND. A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. Edited by GEORGE CROOM ROBERTSON. London: Williams and Norgate. Nos. 1-14 (1876-1879).

We have received the last number of the third volume of this Review, the appearance of which was noticed in a former number of *THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY*. Its articles have kept quite up to the high standard of value fixed at the outset—a result in no wise surprising, since the active support of pretty nearly all the eminent English writers on themes coming within its scope appears to have been secured for the enterprise from the beginning. We have here, then, a very adequate and worthy exponent of the most recent and richest phase of distinctively English thought. We need hardly recall such names as Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, and Stewart to remind the reader of the preponderance which has always been given in England (and Scotland) to empirical psychology over purely speculative investigation, and that thus *Mind*, as might be expected, is especially full and satisfactory upon this side. Prof. Bain presents a series of papers on "Education as a Science," based, of course, on his well-known psychological treatises. The clearness and completeness of statement for which their distinguished author is noted are manifest in these essays, which abound in practical suggestions of the greatest value both to the teacher and to the advanced student. In No. 5 Mr. Henry Travis gives the results of "An Introspective Investigation" upon the question, "What it could be which caused the common belief that man is a personal agent in the forming of his determinations." To indicate some thing of the range of psychological topics treated, we may add the following titles of papers: "Biographical Sketch of an Infant," by Charles Darwin; "Knowledge and Belief," by Daniel Greenleaf Thompson; "The Physical Basis of Mind," by the Editor; "The Question of Visual Perception in Germany," by James Sully; "Consciousness of Time," by George J. Romanes; and "The Muscular Perception of Space," by G. Stanley Hall, etc., etc.

On the other hand, the attention given to philosophy, more strictly speaking, is by no means limited. A highly interesting series of articles on the present state of philosophical study at the various centres of learning in England and Scotland, and on the continent, extends through the several volumes. The papers of the series are by various writers of the different countries of which the contemporary philosophic activity is reported upon. We must content ourselves with enumerating, in addition to these, the titles of a few other papers, selected almost at random: "The So-called Antinomy of Reason," by J. G. Macvicar; "Ethics and Politics," by Alfred Barratt; "The Use of Hypothesis," by J. Venn; "Notes on the Philosophy of Spinoza," by F. Pollock; and "Transcendentalism," by Arthur James Balfour. We are omitting some of the best known names, such as Herbert Spencer, George Henry Lewes, E. B. Tylor, and H. Helmholtz.

It would hardly be fair to the readers of THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY to pass unnoticed a paper by Mr. T. W. Lindsay, containing a vigorous and appreciative statement of the genuine stir which Hegelianism is now making in England. Mr. Lindsay closes his article thus: "But their (the Hegelians') principal value to English philosophy, apart from the special knowledge they give us of the men and ideas they discuss and criticise, is that they bring home to our mind the solidarity of human thought, as that is revealed to us in the history of philosophy, and that they insist upon the synthetic unity, the organic oneness of the mind and of knowledge."

We have only to add, finally, that the "Critical Notices," "Reports," "Notes and Discussions," etc., constitute an important and valuable department of *Mind* which is, on the whole, one of the most significant outgrowths of modern intellectual activity.

W. M. B.

The above-named journal has, if possible, surpassed during the present year its previous high standard. Among philosophical journals it is conspicuous for its excellent editorial management. Besides a wide range of general articles contributed by eminent specialists in Great Britain, Germany, France, and America, it has a department of "Notes and Discussions," in which a still wider and freer scope is permitted. Its "Critical Notices" are careful and well digested; its department of "New Books" contains condensed reports of new works in philosophy, as they appear; and a supplementary department, headed "Miscellaneous," contains notices of the contents of contemporary philosophical journals, correspondence, personal matters, announcements, etc. Contents, January, 1879: (1) Are we Automata? By William James, of Harvard; (2) On Discord, by Edmund Gurney; (3) The Difficulties of Material Logic, by J. Venn; (4) Marcus Aurelius and the Stoic Philosophy, by Frederick Pollock; (5) Pessimism, by O. Plumacher; (6) Philosophy in the United States, by G. Stanley Hall; (7) Notes and Discussions, containing; (a) The Establishment of Ethical First Principles, by Henry Sidgwick; (b) Mr. Balfour on Transcendentalism, by Prof. E. Caird, with a reply by Arthur James Balfour, M. P.; (c) The Number of Terms in a Syllogism, by Carveth Read; (d) "Matter-of-Fact" Logic, by J. N. Keynes; (e) Theoretical and Practical Logic, by Alfred Sidgwick; (f) Modern Nominalism, by Alexius Meinong; (8) Critical Notices, containing (a) Fowler's Edition of Bacon's *Novum Organum*, by the Editor; (b) Remusat's *Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre*, by Carveth Read; Renan's *Dialogues et Fragments*, by the Editor; (9) New Books; (10) Miscellaneous, containing a brief obituary notice of Mr. George Henry Lewes, together with the contents of journals of philosophy.

Contents, April, 1879: (1) Laura Bridgeman, by G. Stanley Hall; (2) Har-

mony of Colors, by James Sully; (3) The Stanhope Demonstrator, by Rev. Robert Harley, F.R.S.; (4) John Stuart Mill (I), by Prof. Bain; (5) Definition *De Jure* and *De Facto*, by Alfred Sidgwick; (6) The Personal Aspect of Responsibility, by L. S. Bevington; (7) Notes and Discussions, containing (a) Mr. Lewes's Doctrine of Sensibility, by E. Hamilton; (b) Prof. Clerk Maxwell on the Relativity of Motion, by James K. Thacher; Mr. G. S. Hall on the Perception of Color, by Grant Allen; Prof. Herzen on "The Physical Law of Consciousness;" (8) Critical Notices, containing (a) Huxley's "Hume," by the Editor; (b) Murphy's "Habit and Intelligence," by Grant Allen; (c) v. Hartmann's *Phenomenologie des Sittlichen Bewusstseyns*, by W. C. Coupland; (d) Jackson's "Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics," by J. A. Stewart; (9) New Books; (10) Miscellaneous (containing an obituary notice of Prof. William Kingdon Clifford, whose article in *Mind*, "On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves," was reprinted in *The Popular Science Monthly*.)—EDITOR.

PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Leipzig. Verlag von Erich Kosehny. Vol. XIV. 1878.

Contents of No. 3: Plotinus's Criticism of Materialism, by Dr. H. v. Kleist; Dr. Harms's Philosophy in its History (Psychology), by Prof. A. Richter; Kapp's Philosophy of Technics, by Prof. A. Lasson; Deussen's Elements of Metaphysics, by Dr. L. Weis; Pfenninger's Idea of Punishment, by Dr. Fr. Jodl. Contents of No. 4: Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious, by Prof. A. Frank; The Deduction of the Psycho-physical Law, by Dr. A. Stadler; Schopenhauer's Life, by Wilhelm Gwinner; Fontana's Idea per una Filosofia della Storia, by Prof. A. Lasson; Hartmann's The Unconscious, from the Stand-point of Physiology and the Evolution Theory, by Dr. Bertling; Franz Hoffmann's Philosophical Writings, by Prof. Rabus; On the Theory of Gedächtniss and Erinnerung, by Arch. Horwicz and Prof. Boehm. Contents of No. 5: The Causal Law in its Purely Logical and in its Real Form, by Prof. K. Gh. Planck; Herder and Modern Natural Philosophy, by Dr. L. Weis; Dr. Michelis's The Philosophy of Consciousness, by C. Schaarschmidt; Hume Studies, by Dr. Meinung, reviewed by C. Schaarschmidt; Dr. Rabus's Philosophy and Theology, by Dr. Frederichs; Dr. Schramm's Cognizability of God in Philosophy and Religion, by Dr. Frederichs; Dr. Erdmann's History of Philosophy, by C. Schaarschmidt. Contents of No. 6: Franz v. Baader's Philosophy, by Prof. Bauman; Tobias's Limits of Philosophy, by Dr. E. Arnoldt; A. Spir's Thinking and Actuality, by Dr. Th. Lipps; Eucken's History and Criticism of the Fundamental Ideas of the Present Time, by C. Schaarschmidt; Pfeleiderer's The Idea of a Golden Age, by C. Schaarschmidt; Spitta's Sleep and Dream States of the Human Soul, by Prof. Boehm; Binz upon Dreams, by Prof. Boehm. Contents of No. 7: Refutation of Subjective Idealism, by C. Schaarschmidt; Cohen's Kant's Basis for Ethics, by G. Knauer; Uberhorst's The Origin of Vision, by Prof. W. Schuppe; Heinrich von Steins on Perception, by W. Schuppe; Baemker's Aristotle's Doctrine of our External and Internal Sense-Faculties, by J. Neuhaeuser; J. A. Pivány's History of the Origin of the Universe, the Earth, and of Organic Beings, by Dr. Siegfried. Contents of No. 10: Hamlet and no End, by Prof. M. J. Monrad, in Christiania; M. Carrière on the Ethical Government of the World, by A. Lasson; K. Dittmar's Lectures on Psychiatrie, by K. Boehm; L. von Golther on Modern Pessimism, by C. Schaarschmidt; L. Struempell on the Mental Forces of Man, by C. Schaarschmidt. Each number of the *Monatshefte* has, moreover, a number of minor book notices, extracts from other philosophical magazines, miscellanies, etc.

A. E. K.

O POSITIVISMO. REVISTA DE PHILOSOPHIA. Dirigida por Theophilo Braga e Julio de Mattos. Porto: Livraria Universal de Magalhaes & Moniz, editores. 1879.

Primeiro Anno. No. 1—Outubro-Novembro, 1878 [contains articles on Mental Discipline, Determinism in Psychology, Sanscrit Literature, the Religion of the Future, etc.].

No. 2—Dezembro-Janeiro, 1879 [contains: Positive Bases of Socialistic Theories, Natural Selection in Sociology, etc.].

No. 3—Fevereiro-Março, 1879 [contains, among other articles, one by Littré, in French, on the weakness of thought pervading the speculations concerning the final result of the world and its beings. The others are in Portuguese, and relate to the Organization of Roman Society, Antique and Modern Civilization, Primitive Constitution of the Family, War and the Military Spirit, etc.].

No. 4—Abril-Maio, 1879 [contains, among others, articles on Evolution in Biology, Sanscrit Literature, etc.].

No. 5—Junho-Julho, 1879 [contains articles on Voltaire, Charity and Pauperism, Positive Method, History of Iberian Civilization, Conservatism, Revolution and Positivism, Philosophy in Brazil, etc.].

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L'ÉTRANGER. Paraissant tous les Mois. Dirigée par Th. Ribot. Tome I, II. (1876), III, IV. (1877), V., VI. (1878), VII. (1879).

This is the most bulky of philosophical journals, sending out each month a pamphlet as large as a quarterly issue of THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

In Volume I. (January to June, 1876) the chief original articles were: (*a*) Contemporary German Æsthetical Treatises, by Charles Bénard; (*b*) The Cause of Pain and Pleasure, by F. Bouillier; (*c*) Habit, by L. Dumont; (*d*) Final Causes, by Paul Janet; (*e*) Schopenhauer and His Disciple Frauenstädt, by E. v. Hartmann; (*f*) Essay on a Comparative Psychology of Man, by Herbert Spencer; (*g*) History of the Development of the Will, by Horwicz; (*h*) The Education of Laura Bridgman, by Dr. Howe; (*i*) On the Theory of the Syllogism, by J. Lachelier; (*j*) On Cerebral Aphasia, by Dr. Lépine; (*k*) Spiritualism and Materialism—The Hypothesis of Specific Energy of the Nerves, by G. H. Lewes; (*l*) On the Notions of Species and Genus in Natural Science, by L. Liard; (*m*) Ancient Indian Philosophy: I. Its Sources, by P. Regnaud; (*n*) The Duration of Psychical Acts, by Th. Ribot; (*o*) Lange's History of Materialism, by J. Soury; (*p*) The Philosophy of Berkeley, by Stuart Mill; (*q*) Upon the Acquirement of Language by Infants and Primitive People; The Elements of the Formation of the Idea of the Me, by H. Taine; (*r*) The Nuptial Number in Plato, by P. Tannery; (*s*) The Antecedents of the Critical Philosophy, by E. Vaucherot; (*t*) The Mission of Philosophy in the Present Time, by W. Wundt.

Besides these original articles, there are notices of the contents of eleven philosophical periodicals, and several reviews of philosophical works of interest

Volume II. (July to December, 1876) contains the following original articles: (*a*) Max Schasler's Critical History of Æsthetics, by Charles Bénard; (*b*) The Philosophy of G. H. Lewes, by L. Carrau; (*c*) Grote's Ethics, by Dr. Cazelles; (*d*) The Algorithm of Logic, by J. Delbœuf; (*e*) M. Delbœuf, and the Theory of Sensation, by L. Dumont; (*f*) The Trial of Galileo, by Luigi Ferri; (*g*) Schopenhauer and his Disciple Frauenstädt, by E. von Hartmann; (*h*) An Unpublished Letter on The Will, by A. Herzen, Sr.; (*i*) The Continuity and Identity of the

Consciousness of the Ego, by A. Herzen, Jr.; (*j*) The Brain as Originator of Movement, by Dr. Lépine; (*k*) English Positivism as Regards the Automatic Theory of the Animal Activity and the Unity of Nature, by A. Main; (*l*) The Place of Hypothesis in Science, by E. Naville; (*m*) The Philosophic Society of Berlin, by D. Nolen; (*n*) J. Ferrier's Metaphysics, by A. Penjon; (*o*) The Vedic System, by P. Regnaud; (*p*) Herbart's Psychology; Ethnographical Psychology in Germany, by Th. Ribot; (*q*) Lange's History of Materialism, by J. Soury; (*r*) Art and Psychology, by J. Sully; (*s*) Geometrical Hypothesis of Plato's Meno, Imaginary Geometry, and the Idea of Space, by P. Tannery.

Besides original treatises, there are notices of eighteen journals devoted to philosophical subjects, and reviews of numerous treatises.

Volume III. (January to June, 1877) contains the following original articles: (*a*) M. Renouvier and French Criticism, by Beurier; (*b*) The Rule of Custom, by Fr. Bouillier; (*c*) Herbert Spencer's Views on Education, by Compayré; (*d*) On the Psycho-physiological Law of Hering and Fechner; (*e*) Leon Dumont and his Philosophical Work, by J. Delbœuf; (*f*) Voltaire's Philosophy according to German Critics, by Auguste Gérard; (*g*) A New Disciple of Schopenhauer, J. Bahnsen, by E. von Hartmann; (*h*) The Heating of the Nerve-centres when in Action, by A. Herzen; (*i*) What is Idealism, by Paul Janet; (*j*) Francis Bacon as a Metaphysician, by Charles Lévêque; (*k*) The Progress of Modern Thought in Philosophy, by G. H. Lewes; (*l*) M. Stanley Jevons's Logic, by L. Liard; (*m*) Thought and Cerebral Vibrations, by H. Taine.

Besides original treatises, there are notes and documents on topics of interest, notices of the contents of twenty-one periodicals, and notices of many books.

Volume IV. (July to December) contains the following original treatises: (*a*) The Æsthetics of the Ugly, by Ch. Bénard; (*b*) On the Ego as Principle of Philosophy, by P. Béraud; (*c*) On Space, According to Clarke and Kant, by M. Boirac; (*d*) Zeller's History of Philosophy, by E. Boutroux; (*e*) Why are Visual Sensations Extended? by J. Delbœuf; (*f*) The Consciousness of the Ego, by Dr. Galicier; (*g*) Chance in Nature, and Liberty According to Epicurus, by Guyau; (*h*) Malebranche, According to Unedited Documents, by C. Henry; (*i*) The Study of Character, by Dr. G. Le Bon; (*j*) Boole's Logic, by L. Liard; (*k*) Formation of the Idea of Space, by H. Lotze; (*l*) Pomponatius and His Italian Interpreters, by L. Mabileau; (*m*) Cause and Will, by A. Main; (*n*) The Directive Principles of Hypothesis, by E. Naville; (*o*) The Idealism of Lange; (*p*) The Mechanism of Lange, by D. Nolen; (*q*) Common Sense, by F. Paulhan; (*r*) Indian Philosophy, by P. Regnaud; (*s*) M. Taine's Psychology, by Th. Ribot; (*t*) Pain, by Dr. Ch. Richet; (*u*) Hartmann's Æsthetics, by G. Séailles; (*v*) Is Psychology a Science? by M. Straszewski; (*w*) numerous Book Notices and Reviews, as in previous volumes.

Volume V. (January to June, 1878) contains the following: (*a*) Bahnsen's Theory of the Tragic as the Law of the World, by A. Burdeau; (*b*) Contemporary English Moralists — M. Sidgwick, by L. Carrau; (*c*) The Law of Psycho-physics and the New Book of Fechner, by J. Delbœuf; (*d*) New Studies in Comparative Psychology, by A. Espinas; (*e*) Critical Tendency in England, by A. Gérard; (*f*) Studies in Sociology, by Herbert Spencer; (*g*) Mathematics and Psychology, by Paul Janet; (*h*) Greek Atomism and Metaphysics, by Ch. Lévêque; (*i*) The Transformation of Psychical Forces, by P. Mantegazza; (*j*) Locke, According to New Documents, by H. Marion; (*k*) Studies in Indian Philosophy, by P. Regnaud; (*l*) D. F. Strauss as a Theological Philosopher, by Th. Reinach; (*m*) Physi-

ological Psychology, by Dr. Ch. Richet; (*n*) Pessimism and Poetry, by James Sully; (*o*) Book Notices and Reviews; (*p*) Contents of Periodicals; (*q*) Correspondence.

Volume VI. (July to December, 1878) contains the following: (*a*) Contemporary English Moralists—M. Lecky, by L. Carrau; (*b*) The Logic of the Probable, by T. V. Charpentier; (*c*) The Psychology of Lamarck, and (*d*) The Psychology of an Infant, by G. Compayré; (*e*) The Physiological Problem of Life, by A. Dastre; (*f*) The *Lapsus* of Vision, by V. Egger; (*g*) Theory of Sentiment, by N. Grote; (*h*) Studies in Sociology, and (*i*) Consciousness Under the Action of Chloroform, by Herbert Spencer; (*j*) Thomasius and the Youth of Leibnitz, by H. Joly; (*k*) The Muscular Sense, by G. Lewes; (*l*) Recent Philosophies in Germany, by D. Nolen; (*m*) The Theory of the Unknowable, by F. Paulhan; (*n*) The Logic of Science, by C. S. Peirce; (*o*) Contemporary English Metaphysics, by A. Penjon; (*p*) Note on the Muscular Sense, by Dr. G. Pouchet; (*q*) Studies in Indian Philosophy, by P. Regnaud; (*r*) Psychological Studies in Germany—Lazarus, by Th. Reinach; (*s*) German Theories Regarding Space as an Idea Derived through the Sense of Touch (*l'espace tactile*), by Th. Ribot; (*t*) On the Duration of Elementary Psychological Acts, by Dr. Ch. Richet; (*u*) Animal Intelligence, by G. J. Romanes; (*v*) Cerebral Geography and Mechanism, by H. Taine; (*w*) Essay on the Syllogism, by P. Tannery; (*x*) Contemporary Philosophers—M. Ravaisson, by G. Séailles; (*y*) The Theory of Local Signs, by W. Wundt; (*z*) Analyses, Book Notices, Contents of Periodicals, Correspondence, etc.

Volume VII. (January to June, 1879) contains: (*a*) The Physiological Problem of Life, by A. Dastre; (*b*) Experimental Philosophy in Italy, by A. Espinas; (*c*) Moral Heredity and Herbert Spencer, by Guyau; (*d*) The Physical Law of Consciousness, by A. Herzen; (*e*) The Visual Perception of Distance, by Paul Janet; (*f*) Physics and Ethics, by E. Naville; (*g*) Kant's Masters, by D. Nolen; (*h*) The Logic of Science, by C. S. Peirce; (*i*) Phenomenalistic Metaphysics in England—Shadworth H. Hodgson, by A. Penjon; (*k*) Hartmann's Ethics, by Th. Reinach; (*l*) Studies in Indian Philosophy, by P. Regnaud; (*m*) Science and Beauty, by G. Séailles; (*n*) The Philosophy of Herbart, by Maurice Straszewski; (*o*) Unpublished Fragments of Socialism, by John Stuart Mill; (*p*) The Theory of Mathematical Knowledge, by P. Tannery; (*q*) Mechanical Determinism and Liberty, by J. Bousinesq; (*r*) History of the Sensation of the Electric Shock, by G. Pouchet; (*s*) Analyses and Reviews of New Books, Contents of Periodicals, and Correspondence.

LA FILOSOFIA DELLA SCUOLE ITALIANE, RIVISTA BIMESTRALE. 1877 and 1878. Sono Principali Compilatori: Terenzio Mamiani, *Direttore*, L. Ferri, G. Barzellotti, S. Turbiglio.

In Volume XI. (October, 1877) we noticed the contents of Volumes XII., XIII., and XIV. of the above-named journal. The contents of Volumes XV., XVI., XVII., and XVIII. are as follows:—

Volume XV., No. 1 (February, 1877): (1) A Psychological Excursion into the Region of the Idea, by F. Bonatelli; (2) Philosophy of Religion, by Terenzio Mamiani; (3) Notes on Darwinism, N. N.; (4) Is the Separation of Church and State Logical or Sophistical? by F. Bertinaria; (5) Religion and Metaphysics, by T. Collins Simon; (6) The Precursors of Kant in Critical Philosophy, by Carlo Cantoni; (7) Correspondence, by Terenzio Mamiani; (8) Bibliography; (9) Philosophical Periodicals; (10) Recent Publications.

Volume XV., No. 2: (1) Is the Separation of Church and State Logical or Sophistical? by F. Bertinaria; (2) The Platonic Doctrine in the Nineteenth Century, by A. Paoli; (3) The New Peripatetics in some Theological Schools of the Present Time, by Terenzio Mamiani; (4) On Sentiment, by G. Jandelli; (5) Ideal Representation, by Terenzio Mamiani; (6) The Precursors of Kant in Critical Philosophy, by C. Cantoni; (7) Philosophy of Religion, by A Believer; (8) Notes on Darwinism, by N. N.; (9) Bibliography; (10) Philosophical Periodicals; (11) Notices; Recent Publications.

Volume XV., No. 3: (1) The History of the Moral Idea in Malebranche, by V.; (2) The Psychology of Kant, by Terenzio Mamiani; (3) Concerning the Problem of the Idea, by F. Bonatelli; (4) Notes on Darwinism, by N. N.; (5) Psychology and the Science of Language, by A. Martinazzoli; (6) The Question of the Soul, According to Pomponatius, by Luigi Ferri; (7) A Reply, by T.; (8) Bibliography; (9) Philosophical Periodicals; (10) Recent Publications; (11) Index to Volume.

Volume XVI., No. 1: (1) On Sentiment, by G. Jandelli; (2) The Psychology of Kant, by Terenzio Mamiani; (3) Philosophy of Religion, by Agostino Tagliavanti; (4) Positivism, Scientific and Metaphysical, by Terenzio Mamiani; (5) The Perception, by Angelo Macchia; (6) Brief Note on the Preceding Article, by Terenzio Mamiani; (7) Bibliography; (8) Philosophical Periodicals; (9) Notices; (10) Recent Publications.

Volume XVI., No. 2: The Ego and the Consciousness of Self, by L. Ferri; (2) The Psychology of Kant, by Terenzio Mamiani; (3) Pantheistic Idea in Modern Times, by V.; (4) The Future of the New Peripatetics, according to the *Civiltà Cattolica*, by Terenzio Mamiani; (5) Assioco. or Concerning Death — a Dialogue of Æschines, by Francesco Acri; (6) Notes on Darwinism, by N. N.; (7) Bibliography; (8) Philosophical Periodicals; (9) Recent Publications.

Volume XVI., No. 3: On Sentiment, by G. Jandelli; (2) Philosophy of Religion, by Terenzio Mamiani; (3) The First Cognition and the First Intention (Primo Consciuto e Prima Inteso), by A. Martinazzoli; (4) The Problem of Non-Citizenship, by F. Bertinaria; (5) Correspondence — Courage, treated Morally, by Ivo Ciavarini Doni; (6) Notes on Darwinism, by N. N.; (7) Bibliography; (8) Philosophical Periodicals; (9) Recent Publications; (10) Index to Volume.

With Volume XVI. Messrs. Barzellotti and Turbiglio retire from the editorial corps, and henceforth the management of this journal is under the conduct of Terenzio Mamiani and Luigi Ferri.

Volume XVII., No 1: (1) Address to the Reader, by the Editors; (2) Is War Progressive? by Terenzio Mamiani; (3) Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, by G. M. Bertini; (4) The Absolute Idealism, by M. J. Monrad; (5) The Limits of the Ideal, by L. Ferri; (6) Courage, by Ivo Ciavarini Doni; (7) Scotch Philosophy, by L. Ferri; (8) Bibliography; (9) Philosophical Periodicals; (10) Recent Publications.

Volume XVII., No. 2: (1) The Two Psychologies, by Terenzio Mamiani; (2) Critics on the Question of the Spirituality of the Human Mind, by Adolfo Marconi; (3) The Doctrine of Liberty, According to Herzen and Spencer, in Relation to Morality, by R. Bobba; (4) G. M. Bertini, by C. Cantoni; (5) Bibliography; (6) Philosophical Periodicals; (7) Notices; Recent Publications.

Volume XVII., No. 3: (1) Critique on Knowledge and the Metaphysical Treatment of Knowledge, According to Kant, by G. Barzellotti; (2) G. M. Bertini, by Carlo Cantoni; (3) Final Cause in Plato and in Aristotle, by P. Ragnisco; (4) Courage, Treated Morally, by Ivo Ciavarini Doni; (5) Bibliography; (6) Philosophical Periodicals; (7) Notices; (8) Recent Publications.

Volume XVIII., No. 1: (1) On the Increasing Need for a Brief Synthesis—A Summary of the Principles of the Philosophy of Reality, by Terenzio Mamiani; (2) The Critical and Metaphysical, According to Kant, by G. Barzellotti; (3) Fragments of the Philosophy of Girolamo Clario, by F. Bonatelli; (4) The Personality of Man, by G. Allievo; (5) Bibliography; (6) Philosophical Periodicals; (7) Notices; (8) Recent Publications.

Volume XVIII., No. 2: (1) The Idea—An Analysis of its Character, by Luigi Ferri; (2) On the Physio-psychology of Prof. Herzen, by G. Danielli; (3) The Doctrine of Liberty, According to Spencer, in Relation to Morals, by R. Bobba; (4) Final Cause in Plato and Aristotle, by F. Ragnisco; (5) Human Personality, by G. Allievo; (6) Bibliography; (7) Periodicals of Philosophy; (8) Recent Publications.

Volume XVIII., No. 3: (1) On the Doctrine of Love, According to Giordano Bruno and Schopenhauer, by Romeo Manzoni; (2) Philosophy of Reality, by T. Mamiani; (3) Has Modern Civil Society progressed or retrograded? by Francesco Bertinaria; (4) On Sentiment, by G. Jandelli; (5) Upon the Principles of Moral Education, by Francesco Lavarino; (6) Bibliography; (7) Notices; (8) Recent Publications; (9) Index to the Volume. M. J. H.

ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Edited by I. H. VON FICHTE, HERMANN ULRICH, and J. U. WIRTH. Halle by C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1878. Vols. 72 and 73.

CONTENTS 1ST NUMBER, VOL. 72.

(1) On *αἰτία* in Philebos. By Prof. G. F. Rettig. (2) A thorough Foundation of Absolute Philosophy. By Th. v. Varnbueler. (3) Concerning a Proper Understanding of Sensuous Perceptions. By Dr. Eugene Dreher. (4) The Thing in itself as a critical limitative Conception. By Frederic von Baerenbach. (5) Concerning the Genesis and Criticism of the Theory of Cognition. By Robert Schellwien. (6) In the Matter of Scientific Philosophy. By H. Ulrich. (7) Book Notices and Reviews.

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Journal of Speculative Philosophy.
Vol. 13, 1879.

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